JUDGMENT : The issue that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the subsequent events or developments after the allotment of the privilege to vend toddy could be taken into account to determine retroactively the rights of the participants in the auction. 2. To put the issue in perspective, we may have to narrate the facts keeping the fifth respondent as the protagonist. 3. The fifth respondent was the licencee for the toddy shops of Group No.I in Kunnamangalam till 31.03.2014. While the licence was subsisting, the Excise officials periodically drew samples and sent them for chemical analysis. In two instances, the samples were tested adverse. 4. In elaboration, on 20.12.2012, the Department received Exhibit R5(d) chemical analysis of A-Sample taken from one of the shops of the fifth respondent. Consequently, on 20.02.2013, the authorities registered a crime against the fifth respondent for offences under Sections 57(a) and 56(b) of the Abkari Act ('the Act' for brevity). As a natural corollary, the Excise Commissioner suspended the petitioner's licence through an order dated 17.03.2013. 5. Under those circumstances, the fifth respondent approached the Judicial First Class Magistrate and had the B-Sample sent for analysis. Eventually, on 19.03.2013, through Exhibit R5(e), the chemical analysis report of B- Sample was made available. The result was negative: it was in favour of the fifth respondent. 6. Armed with Exhibit R5(e), the chemical analysis report of B-Sample, the petitioner filed W.P.(C)No.8094/2013 challenging the Excise Commissioner's order of suspension- cum-show cause dated 17.03.2013. In fact, the fifth respondent obtained an interim stay on 22.03.2013 and continued his business. 7. Soon thereafter, based on the chemical analysis report dated 19.10.2012, obtained on a sample sent earlier, the Excise Department, however, on 04.04.2013 registered another crime, Crime No.23/2013 against the fifth respondent for offences under Sections 57(a) and 56(b) of the Act. Predictably, the fifth respondent had the second sample sent for chemical analysis and obtained Exhibit R5(h) report dated 26.04.2013--It was, indeed, in favour of the fifth respondent showing that the percentage of ethyl alcohol was within the permissible limits. 8. As if it were an instance of deja vu, the fifth respondent once again approached this Court by filing W.P. (C)No.12135/2013 and obtained an interim stay, whereby he continued his business. 9. 8. As if it were an instance of deja vu, the fifth respondent once again approached this Court by filing W.P. (C)No.12135/2013 and obtained an interim stay, whereby he continued his business. 9. It is the contention of the fifth respondent that in 2013, there was no policy of regular allotment of the licence or privilege to vend toddy. In that abkari year, the licence was extended periodically, on three occasions, till 31.04.2014. 10. As it emerges from the record, pending those two writ petitions, the fifth respondent filed Crl.M.C.No. 1606/2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., before this Court seeking a direction to the Investigating Agency to expedite the investigation and file a final report on the crimes registered against him. Through an order dated 28.06.2013, this Court directed the investigating agency to complete the investigation at the earliest. 11. Later, in February 2014, the fifth respondent is said to have come to know that in both the crimes the investigating agency had filed its final report. In that context, the fifth respondent on 19.02.2014 obtained a certified copy of the final report and filed petitions for his discharge on the premise that the final reports did not contain even a whisper about the chemical analysis reports of B-Samples, leave alone any challenge to their correctness. 12. The Judicial First Class Magistrate through Exhibit R5(k) dated 25.03.2014 and this Court through Exhibit R5(i) order discharged the fifth respondent and other accused from the crimes. In the interim, on the parallel lines, the Government initiated steps, as a matter of policy, to allot the privilege or licence to vend toddy for the abkari year 2014-2015. 13. In terms of the said policy, the Government published Exhibit P4 programme of sale fixing 05.03.2014 to be the date for holding the auction. However, one day prior to the date of the auction, the fifth respondent filed W.P.(C)No.6324/2014 and obtained an interim order on 05.03.2014. This Court stayed the confirmation of the allotment. On 05.03.2014, perhaps oblivious of the interim order, the authorities went ahead and declared that the petitioner was successful to have the privilege for the year 2014-2015. 14. This Court eventually disposed of W.P.(C)No. 6324/2014 through Exhibit P6 common judgment. This Court stayed the confirmation of the allotment. On 05.03.2014, perhaps oblivious of the interim order, the authorities went ahead and declared that the petitioner was successful to have the privilege for the year 2014-2015. 14. This Court eventually disposed of W.P.(C)No. 6324/2014 through Exhibit P6 common judgment. Since there were other writ petitions involving the same issue of granting the privilege, the direction in Exhibit P6 judgment was to the Excise Commissioner to consider the rival claims of the incumbent licencees and the new allottees. 15. In compliance with Exhibit P6 judgment, the Excise Commissioner, having considered the issue, passed Exhibit P7 order upholding the claim of the fifth respondent that he was entitled to preference in terms of Rule 5(1) of the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules ('the Rules' for brevity). Thus, had the allotment in his favour. 16. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 13868/2014 and obtained Exhibit P8 order that the allotment in fifth respondent's favour shall not be confirmed. A perfect case of poetic justice. On earlier occasion, the fifth respondent obtained a stay against the confirmation in petitioner's favour; this time, it was the petitioner's turn to obtain a similar direction against the fifth respondent. 17. Later, this Court through Exhibit P9 common judgment, which is elaborate, further directed the Excise Commissioner to consider the issue afresh taking into account all the issues raised by the parties. Eventually, the Excise Commissioner passed Exhibit P10 order reiterating his earlier stand as was taken in Exhibit P7, i.e., the fifth respondent is entitled to have his privilege for the present abkari year as well. Under those circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court. 18. In the above factual backdrop, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Government declared its policy on 12.02.2014 and fixed 05.03.2014 to have the auction held. Despite the fact that the fifth respondent was fully aware of the steps being taken by the Government, he remained silent till the penultimate day. He approached this Court only on 04.03.2014. He has further submitted that this Court consciously did not stymie the entire process; instead, it only directed that there should not be any confirmation of sale. 19. Despite the fact that the fifth respondent was fully aware of the steps being taken by the Government, he remained silent till the penultimate day. He approached this Court only on 04.03.2014. He has further submitted that this Court consciously did not stymie the entire process; instead, it only directed that there should not be any confirmation of sale. 19. According to the learned counsel, had this Court been even prima facie satisfied that there was any merit in the fifth respondent's claim, it would have stalled the entire process instead of granting limited relief that the sale should not be confirmed. 20. The learned counsel has made extensive submissions concerning the statutory mandate under Rule 5 of the Rules. According to the learned counsel, it is by the date the allotment took place, indisputably there was a crime registered against the fifth respondent. He thus earned a disqualification. 21. In the alternative, the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner, despite the availability of sufficient time, did not approach the authorities on time to obtain any preference certificate. Though he made his efforts, without the preference certificate, to participate in the auction, his application was rightly rejected in the scrutiny. According to the learned counsel, despite the rejection of his application by the authorities, the fifth respondent was very much present at the time of the allotment. 22. In other words, it is the singular contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that since Rule 5 mandates that any allotment must be subject to the objections, nothing prevented the fifth respondent to raise an objection contending that he was entitled to the privilege. 23. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to the finding rendered by the Excise Commissioner in Exhibit P10. In that context, the learned counsel would urge that the entire order was blissfully silent about the rights of the petitioner; on the contrary, it only speaks about the alleged entitlement of the fifth respondent. 24. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that the provisional allotment is subject to the confirmation in terms of Rule 5(15) of the Rules. He contends that any disqualification or objection to having the allotment confirmed must be attributable to the lapses or latches on the petitioner's part. 24. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that the provisional allotment is subject to the confirmation in terms of Rule 5(15) of the Rules. He contends that any disqualification or objection to having the allotment confirmed must be attributable to the lapses or latches on the petitioner's part. In this case, even in Exhibit P10, the Excise Commissioner, avers the learned counsel, has not found any shortcoming or any statutory violation or non-compliance by the petitioner. It is, therefore, axiomatic that the provisional allotment in favour of the petitioner ought to have been confirmed. 25. The learned counsel has summed up his submissions as follows:- (1) that the fifth respondent had been indolent in obtaining any preference certificate and clearance certificate at the earliest point of time; (2) that he approached this Court belatedly, i.e., one day prior to the date of allotment; (3) that there was indisputably a crime registered against the fifth respondent by the time the allotment took place; (4) that in Exhibit P10, the Excise Commissioner has not found any shortcomings on the petitioner's part; and (5) that he ought to have recognised the petitioner's vested right to have the confirmation. In the end, the learned counsel has urged this Court to allow the writ petition. 26. Per contra, the learned counsel for the fifth respondent has strenuously contended that the officials in these instances have taken recourse to gross abuse of process. To begin with, he has submitted that the officials initially pressed into service Exhibit R5(d) chemical analysis report dated 21.12.2012 to register a crime and suspend the petitioner's licence. When this Court interfered with the process and stayed the orders of the Commissioner on the strength of the report of B-Sample in Exhibit R5(e), yet again the officials pressed into service a report which had been obtained earlier on 19.10.2012. 27. The learned counsel has further submitted that, in both instances, even before the final report could be filed, the reports of B-Sample were very much available, and the findings were in petitioner's favour. For the reasons not fathomable, the respondent officials, contends the learned counsel, filed final reports entirely disregarding the B- Sample reports. Under those circumstances, the Judicial First Class Magistrate has discharged the fifth respondent from the crime. 28. For the reasons not fathomable, the respondent officials, contends the learned counsel, filed final reports entirely disregarding the B- Sample reports. Under those circumstances, the Judicial First Class Magistrate has discharged the fifth respondent from the crime. 28. The learned counsel, addressing the issue whether the fifth respondent had been indolent in his approach, has submitted that in 2013-2014, the Government had no clear policy as regards the renewal of licence. According to him, intermittently (on three occasions) the Government extended the licences of the existing licencees. In that context, the fifth respondent was hopeful that the same policy would be adopted for the next abkari year as well. At any rate, the learned counsel contends that the fifth respondent did approach the authority for the purpose of preference certificate, but he could not secure it. The reason for rejection was that crimes were registered against the fifth respondent. 29. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel for the fifth respondent that only under those circumstances, as the rejection was just a couple of days prior to the date fixed for allotting the privilege, did the fifth respondent rush to the Court and seek its intervention. 30. The learned counsel has laid a heavy stress on twin aspects: First, in the light of the B-Sample reports, it ought to be concluded that the crime has not been validly registered. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Exhibit R5(a) judgment rendered by a learned Division Bench of this Court. Second, he has urged that since the B-Samples were conclusive, they even resulted in the fifth respondent's discharge from both the crimes. 31. According to the learned counsel, the authorities have been left with no other alternative than taking note of the B-Sample reports and hold that the fifth respondent has not violated any of the statutory provisions. As a consequence, without much ado, contends the learned counsel, the privilege statutorily recognised in fifth respondent's favour automatically springs into action. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Exhibit R5(c) judgment rendered by a learned Division Bench of this Court. 32. The learned counsel has also submitted that this Court has time and time again deprecated the cavalier manner in which the officials register crimes. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Exhibit R5(c) judgment rendered by a learned Division Bench of this Court. 32. The learned counsel has also submitted that this Court has time and time again deprecated the cavalier manner in which the officials register crimes. Without proper application of mind, the authorities went on, unabated, registering crimes by applying provisions which had no application, avers the learned counsel. 33. In sum and substance, the fifth respondent's grievance is that he had been wronged, and the department had tried, at every stage, to disentitle him to have the privilege. The learned counsel, making specific reference to Exhibit P10, would contend that the Excise Commissioner had taken into account the rival pleas and rendered his findings, especially based on the binding judicial pronouncements of this Court. 34. The learned counsel lays specific emphasis on the fact that all the judgments he has referred to, the Excise Commissioner himself is a party. They squarely bind him. The learned counsel has further contended that on the very 05.03.2014, when the allotment had to take place, the fifth respondent made a complaint to the District Collector about the officials' efforts to disentitle him to have the benefit of privilege, as is evident from Exhibit P15 in W.P.(C)No. 6324/2014. 35. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to refute the contentions of the fifth respondent. He has submitted that to decide the right of the petitioner to have the confirmation of the allotment, all that the authorities have to examine is the situation prevailing as on the date of allotment, but not the subsequent developments. According to the learned counsel, any such consideration, otherwise, would lead to incongruity and uncertainty. 36. It is also the specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that just because there is a semblance of justification in the fifth respondent's claim, the vested rights of the third parties cannot be defeated. According to him, only in the absence of any objection at the time of allotment, despite the presence of the fifth respondent, was the petitioner made to pay the entire licence fee and in that context the confirmation under Rule 5(15) of the Rules is only a formality. 37. According to him, only in the absence of any objection at the time of allotment, despite the presence of the fifth respondent, was the petitioner made to pay the entire licence fee and in that context the confirmation under Rule 5(15) of the Rules is only a formality. 37. In sum and substance, the learned counsel has submitted that Exhibit P10 does not contain any valid reasons why the petitioner is not entitled to confirmation, apart from rendering a finding that the fifth respondent is entitled to privilege. 38. Concerning Exhibit R5(a) judgment, the learned counsel would contend that in that case, the entire judgment turned upon the fact that the very Excise Commissioner had expressed doubt about the manner of registering the crime. According to the learned counsel, no such situation prevails in the present instance as the registration of crime against the fifth respondent had not been doubted. As regards Exhibit R5(c) judgment, the learned counsel would contend that it was rendered at an interlocutory stage. On these grounds, the learned counsel has urged this Court to allow the writ petition. Issues: I. What is the true scope and intend of Rule 5(1)(a) of the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002? II. Whether discharge of the licencee from the crime for the alleged offences under the provisions other than Section 56 of the Act entails him to the preference even after the conclusion of the proceedings concerning granting the privilege? III. Whether the provisional licenceee who has been extended the privilege because the existing licencee has faced criminal proceedings has got any vested right, said to be indefeasible, even after the incumbent licencee is exonerated of the criminal charges before the proceedings of granting the privilege could attain finality? Issue Nos. I & II: 39. As it is a pure question of law, it needs, I reckon, a careful analysis. Rule 5(1)(a) which is the pivot for our purpose of adjudication reads as follows: "While giving privilege, preference shall be given to those licensees who has conducted toddy shops during the preceding three years consecutively from 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09, provided no Abkari case is registered against him other than under section 56 of the Abkari Act. Rule 5(1)(a) which is the pivot for our purpose of adjudication reads as follows: "While giving privilege, preference shall be given to those licensees who has conducted toddy shops during the preceding three years consecutively from 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09, provided no Abkari case is registered against him other than under section 56 of the Abkari Act. The licensees who have conducted the shops during 2002-03 and subsequent years and whose licences cancelled due to registration of Abkari cases and subsequently exonerated by the Courts and those Licensees who could not complete the preceding three years on account of the closure of shops shall also be given preference." 40. An analysis of the above provision reveals the following: (1) While extending the privilege to vend toddy, preference shall be given to those licencees who have conducted the toddy shops during the preceding three consecutive years; (2) The incumbent licencee shall not have any crime registered against him under any provision of the Act other than Section 56 thereof; and (3) If the incumbent licencee has not been preferred because of his facing criminal charges, any subsequent exoneration should revive his claim to preference. 41. In the present instance, the fifth respondent admittedly is the incumbent licencee, who, nevertheless, has a crime registered against him for the alleged offences under Sections 56(b) and 57(a) of the Act. Indeed, indisputably a crime registered under Section 56(b) of the Act does not disentitle the licencee from claiming privilege. The crime registered against the fifth respondent is also for the alleged offence under Section 57(a) of the Act. 42. In defence, the learned counsel for the fifth respondent has submitted that in the course of time the fifth respondent had been discharged by a competent court in both the crimes that had been registered against him for the offence under all provisions, including Section 56(a). He has further contended that this Court has earlier held that to attach the stigma of disqualification to the incumbent licencee, a crime ought to have been validly registered. 43. The issue, thus, turns upon the expression "validly registered". Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that ex facie the crime has been registered for the offences under the provisions other than Section 56 of the Act. 43. The issue, thus, turns upon the expression "validly registered". Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that ex facie the crime has been registered for the offences under the provisions other than Section 56 of the Act. And it is also his contention that the Commissioner of Excise is not a competent authority to adjudicate an issue; namely, whether the crime has been registered validly. It is, on the contrary, within the competence of a competent criminal court. In other words, any collateral adjudication by any forum other than the jurisdictional Magistrate, before whom the crime is pending, that the crime has not been validly registered renders the issue fait accompli and the criminal trial a mere mockery, or rather otiose. 44. In the light of the above rival claims, it is apposite for us to examine Section 57(a) of the Act. The said provision to the extent relevant reads as follows:- "57. For adulteration, etc., by licensed vendor or manufacturer.- Whoever being the holder of a licence for the sale or manufacture of liquor or of any intoxicating drug under this Act, (a) mixes or permits to be mixed with the liquor or intoxicating drug, sole or manufactured by him, any drug, other an noxious drug or any ingredient likely to add to its actual or apparent intoxicating quality or strength, or any article prohibited other an article which the Government shall deem to be noxious by any rule made under section 29, clause (k), when such admixture shall not amount to the offence of adulteration under section 272 of the Indian Penal Code." 45. A perusal of the above provision makes it manifestly clear that the offence made punishable is adulteration in its various nuances. If a person mixes with the liquor sold or manufactured by him any other drug or ingredient likely to add to its actual or apparent intoxicating quality, etc., the liquor thus mixed and sold by the licencee is an adulterated one attracting the penal provision. In both the crimes registered against the fifth respondent, the allegation is that the toddy being sold by him is adulterated. In other words, a foreign substance has been added to enhance the intoxicating potency of the toddy. In both the crimes registered against the fifth respondent, the allegation is that the toddy being sold by him is adulterated. In other words, a foreign substance has been added to enhance the intoxicating potency of the toddy. Prima facie, it cannot be denied that the allegation in the crime attracts Section 57(a) of the Act, and consequently the crime falls within the mischief of Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules. 46. As has already been adverted to, much turns upon the aspect whether the crime has been validly registered. In the present instance, initially the reports of chemical analysis concerning A-Samples turned out to be positive. The reports relating to B-Samples, obtained at the behest of the fifth respondent, both turned out to be negative. 47. In fact, on the strength of the B-Sample reports, the fifth respondent has been discharged from both the crimes. Chronologically examined, the samples were drawn in and around December 2012. The two crimes were registered in February and April 2013. The B-Sample reports were received thereafter. The fifth respondent soon got discharged from the crimes. 48. On 05.03.2014, the department put in auction the privilege to vend toddy. On the same day, this Court in W.P. (C)No.6324/2014, at the instance of the fifth respondent, issued an interim direction that there should be no confirmation of the licence in petitioner's favour. This Court, through Exhibit P6 common judgment, directed the Excise Commissioner to consider the rival claims of the petitioner--a new allottee--and the fifth respondent, the incumbent licencee. 49. As is evident from the record, when the Excise Commissioner passed Exhibit P7 order upholding the fifth respondent's claim that he was entitled to preference, the said order was once again called into question by the petitioner. And it resulted in another direction from this Court to the Excise Commissioner to re-consider the issue afresh. Eventually, in Exhibit P10 order the Commissioner has reiterated his earlier findings. 50. Viewed narrowly, it can be held that Rule 5(1)(a) contemplates registration of a crime to be a pre-condition to disentitle an existing licencee to the privilege of renewal. However, the crime thus registered ought to be under any other provision than Section 56 of the Act. Indeed, crime was registered for the alleged offences under not only Section 56 but also Section 57. The pre-condition provided in Rule 5(1)(a), therefore, has come to be fulfilled. However, the crime thus registered ought to be under any other provision than Section 56 of the Act. Indeed, crime was registered for the alleged offences under not only Section 56 but also Section 57. The pre-condition provided in Rule 5(1)(a), therefore, has come to be fulfilled. At any rate, does a mere registration of a crime suffice? 51. The B-Sample reports have turned out to be negative. And on the strength of those reports, the fifth respondent has come out clean--exonerated. At this juncture, it is pertinent to observe that Rule 5(1)(a), in fact, provides for a contingency: If the licencee is subsequently exonerated, he could also re-assert his claim for preference. In the present instance, the learned counsel for the fifth respondent would have concluded that since the fifth respondent has been exonerated, the licencee has suffered no disqualification. In other words, at the very inception, the crime has not been validly registered. 52. This Court through a learned Division Bench in Exhibit R5(a) judgment has held that though Rule 5(1)(a) speaks of registration of an abkari case against the licencee, it nevertheless implies that it ought to be a validly registered case. True, their Lordships have, in a measure, felt persuaded by the fact that the very Excise Commissioner in that case expressed doubt on the genuineness of the case. The fact, however, remains that their Lordships have laid down as a proposition of law that the crime ought to have been validly registered. 53. In Exhibit R5(c) judgment, another learned Division Bench has considered a case somewhat similar to the one present before me. Considering the impact of the second analysis report, their Lordships have observed that even if a criminal case has been registered and still pending, once the second analysis report is in the negative, the very crime becomes untenable and will have to end in acquittal. Their Lordships have also tellingly observed that the fact that a criminal case is pending, in such circumstances, cannot be taken advantage of by the officials to deny the claim of the incumbent licencee for preference as contemplated under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules. Incidentally, the learned Division Bench, while arriving at the above conclusion, has placed reliance on Exhibit R5(a) judgment, too. 54. Incidentally, the learned Division Bench, while arriving at the above conclusion, has placed reliance on Exhibit R5(a) judgment, too. 54. Without much cavil, I am required, rather bound, to declare that the fifth respondent is entitled to the preference, for the ratio of Exhibits R5(a) and R5(c) judgments rendered by two learned Division Benches bind me. There lies a catch, however. Interlocutory orders--Binding Nature: 55. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in both instances--Exhibits R5(a) and R5(c) judgments--the learned Division Benches were called upon to examine the legality of interim orders passed in the writ petitions. According to him, Exhibits R5(a) and R5(c) do not have any precedential value because they were rendered in interlocutory mattes. 56. Appealing as the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner may be, there cannot be, to me, any invariable principle that any adjudication vis-a-vis an interlocutory order and thereby any ratio laid down in relation thereto has to be completely ignored. There is no gainsaying the fact that an interlocutory order is an order that does not finally determine the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties to a proceeding. 57. In Vishnu Traders v. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 461 the Apex Court has held that in the matters of interlocutory orders, the principle of binding precedent cannot be said to apply. However, the need for consistency of approach and uniformity in the exercise of judicial discretion respecting similar causes and the desirability to eliminate occasions for grievances of discriminatory treatment require that all similar matters should receive similar treatment except where factual differences require a different treatment; so that there is assurance of consistency, uniformity, predictability, and certainty of judicial approach. 58. True, that once a learned Division Bench interferes with the interim order but leaves the matter to be decided by the learned Single Judge, and consequently once the learned Single Judge decides the matter; all the proceedings that have arisen subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, and all the orders that had been pronounced at the intermediate stage stand merged in the judgment finally rendered in the writ petition. 59. 59. It is essential, at this juncture, to observe that such a course of events, as has been indicated above, does not abdicate the judicial observation provided the said observation stands, as a matter of law, least dependent on the facts or the conclusion of proceedings; in other words, if it is a declaration on a pure question of law, it persuades--if not binds. 60. It is too well settled to be ignored that there can be no precedent based on the facts; equally true is the converse proposition that no ratio can be said to have been laid down divorced from the facts of a particular case. At the same time, once a proposition of law has been propounded by a competent judicial forum, and the said proposition can be applied under varied circumstances, without doing violence to the principles of ratio decidendi; in my considered view, a judgment even at the interlocutory stage, at least to the extent of a pure question of law, has the persuasive effect. 61. As Exhibits R5(a) and R5(c) judgments fall within the exceptions indicated above, I justifiability feel persuaded to follow the dictum, for the judicial priority demands. 62. Without hesitation, we may accept that in Exhibit R5(a) judgment the learned Division Bench, while holding that a crime ought to have been registered, has inter alia taken into account the observation of the Commissioner of Excise that there is something amiss in the authorities' registering the crime. Thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner may have an element of justification in trying to persuade me that Exhibit R5(a) judgment cannot qualify itself to be a precedent. 63. That said, I am further required to observe that Exhibit R5(c) judgment does not suffer from any such limitation. The learned Division Bench has, in fact, held that once the second sample report is in the negative; notwithstanding the pendency of the crime, the incumbent licencee cannot be denied the right to preference. In the present instance, the fifth respondent, I believe, stands on a better footing. It is not a case of any pending criminal proceedings in the face of a negative second sample report; on the contrary, it is the case of a clean discharge. Validly Registered Crime: 64. In the present instance, the fifth respondent, I believe, stands on a better footing. It is not a case of any pending criminal proceedings in the face of a negative second sample report; on the contrary, it is the case of a clean discharge. Validly Registered Crime: 64. Coming back to the issue of registering a crime validly, I may have to tread carefully for any sweeping observation in this regard may have far-reaching consequences, especially if the crimes are still pending adjudication before competent criminal courts. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, any declaration of law collaterally should not defeat the rights of the parties in principal proceedings. 65. Thus, applying in a narrow compass the ratio that crime ought to have been registered validly, I may observe that if the previous licencee obtains an acquittal or a discharge subsequent to the confirmation of the privilege in favour of a new licencee, it may not affect the new licencee's right to continue with the licence. 66. Following the last limb of Rule 5(1)(a), I may further observe that exoneration of the previous licencee may enure to his benefit in the following year to re-claim his privilege as if no crime had been registered. For the principal needs no reiteration that any acquittal or discharge relates back to the date of the crime. 67. In the same breadth, I am to observe further, especially in the light of the ratio laid down in Exhibit R5(c) judgment, that the second analysis report is in favour of the previous licencee, and by that time the privilege had not been confirmed in favour of the new licencee. What bolsters the fifth respondent further is that he has earned a clean discharge. Issue No. III: 68. At the outset, it is made clear that the petitioner has not questioned the Government policy in providing the right of preference to an existing licencee. I, therefore, consider the issue in the backdrop of the said policy. That accepted, it emerges that the existing licencee has a privilege conferred on him to have his licence renewed or his right to preference reckoned subject to his fulfilling all the conditions. In the same reckoning, it follows that the right of any other person is dependent on, if not subservient to, the right of the existing licencee. 69. That accepted, it emerges that the existing licencee has a privilege conferred on him to have his licence renewed or his right to preference reckoned subject to his fulfilling all the conditions. In the same reckoning, it follows that the right of any other person is dependent on, if not subservient to, the right of the existing licencee. 69. The legislature is conscious that once a policy of preference is to be operational, until the right under the said policy has been conclusively rejected, the right of any other person is only contingent. In other words, if there is any dispute, bona fide, concerning the preference denied to an existing licencee, until the issue is resolved conclusively, the subsequent allottee can have licence unhindered so long as the cloud on the previous licencee's right has not been dispelled. To that extent alone his right is indefeasible. 70. A word of caution may be necessary here: provisional may be the licence, but it is not a Damocles sword hanging forever. Once the confirmation is made and by then the crime against the previous licencee has not been concluded; that is, ended in neither acquittal nor discharge, the subsequent allottee can enjoy the licence in full. 71. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that in Exhibit P10 the Commissioner of Excise has only focused on the alleged rights of the fifth respondent. Put differently, the said authority has disregarded the petitioner's vested right. According to him, confirmation is a mere formality and should not be denied unless the new licencee has suffered any disqualification or failed to comply with any procedural norms. 72. To the credit of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I must observe that this submission, too, appears to be attractive. And it could have made perfect sense as well, but only in the absence of the policy of privilege in favour of the incumbent licencee. More particularly, Rule 5(1)(a) throws ample light on this controversy. 73. Even after the finality of the proceedings confirming the privilege in the new licencee's favour, if the previous licencee is exonerated or acquitted at a later point of time, his right to preference gets restored. More particularly, Rule 5(1)(a) throws ample light on this controversy. 73. Even after the finality of the proceedings confirming the privilege in the new licencee's favour, if the previous licencee is exonerated or acquitted at a later point of time, his right to preference gets restored. In sum and substance, viewed from any perspective, it cannot be held that new licencee has any indefeasible right and that the confirmation can be denied only on account of his failure rather than the success of the previous licencee. In the facts and circumstances, this Court dismisses the writ petition, thereby affirming Exhibit P10 order of the first respondent.