JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner, and Ms. Ramani, learned advocate, for Mr. Pathak, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. In this petition, the petitioner corporation has challenged award dated 28.2.2005 passed by learned Tribunal, Bhavnagar in Reference (IT) No. 122 of 2000 whereby the learned Tribunal set aside the decision of the petitioner rejecting present respondent's application for appointment on compassionate ground and the learned Tribunal further directed the petitioner corporation to appoint the respondent on compassionate ground on the post of writer and to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- for the delay caused in the decision. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the said directions, the corporation has taken out present petition and it is claimed that the impugned directions are not only erroneous and unjustified but beyond learned Tribunal's jurisdiction, inasmuch as the learned Tribunal has not only directed the petitioner corporation to appoint the respondent but has also directed the corporation to appoint her on a particular post specified by the Tribunal i.e. on the post of writer. 4. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record that one Mr. B.B. Kotila, a driver, was relieved from service on the basis of certificate issued by Civil Surgeon certifying that he was continuously suffering ill-health and was unfit for performing his duties. The corporation relieved the said driver on and from 9.5.1996 and within short time thereafter, i.e. on 18.5.1996, the said workman submitted an application (on 12.6.1996) to the corporation to appoint his daughter on compassionate ground. The corporation rejected the said application mainly on the ground that according to the provision of the Scheme, she was neither a member of family nor a dependent because she was not unmarried daughter and her marriage was solemnized before the date of application and/or before the date the workman was relieved. In his counter, the applicant claimed that before/at the time his daughter submitted the application, her marriage had broken down and as per the custom of the community, divorce deed was executed and the husband and wife were divorced by executing and after her divorce, she was dependent on her parents (i.e. the driver who was relieved from service on 9.5.1996) and that therefore she would come within the definition and meaning of the term "dependent". The said claim was not accepted and therefore, the claimant raised dispute which culminated into award dated 28.2.2005. 5. Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, submitted that the workman and his daughter based their claim for appointment on compassionate ground by providing incorrect details and that the conduct of the workman and his daughter amounts to misrepresentation with intention to unjustifiably secure employment with the corporation. He submitted that the daughter of the employee was not a dependent on the employee and therefore, she could not have submitted application for appointment on compassionate ground, however, the employee and his daughter misrepresented the facts and by claiming that the daughter is dependent, the application for appointment on compassionate ground was submitted. Mr. Raval, learned counsel, further contended that when the corporation noticed correct facts, it rejected the application. According to the petitioner corporation, there was no illegality in its decision, however, the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the relevant facts and passed the impugned directions, which are incompetent and unjustified. 6. Per contra, Ms. Ramani, learned advocate, for Mr. Pathak, learned advocate for the respondent, submitted that the husband of the workman's daughter had divorced her and that on account of the divorce, the daughter was staying with her parents and therefore, though she was once married, she should be considered dependent after her divorce and consequently there was no illegality when the employee and daughter submitted application for appointment on compassionate ground. She submitted that the corporation acted illegally and arbitrarily in rejecting the application and there is no error in the order passed by the learned Tribunal. She submitted that even the welfare officer had submitted the report which stated that the claimant was divorced and dependent on her parents. 7. I have considered the material on record and rival submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties and I have also considered the award impugned in present petition. 8. It comes out from the submissions by learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned award is essentially challenged on the ground that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the respondent could not have been termed as "dependent" and would not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. 8. It comes out from the submissions by learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned award is essentially challenged on the ground that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the respondent could not have been termed as "dependent" and would not be entitled for appointment on compassionate ground. On the other hand, the award is sought to be justified by the respondent on the ground that since the daughter was divorced and her marriage had broken down, she was "dependent" upon her father and that therefore, she was eligible for appointment on compassionate ground. The respondent has also relied on the report said to have been submitted by the Welfare Officer of the corporation and other documents to claim that she was divorced and dependent upon her father. 9. Even if the contentions and factual aspects urged by learned advocate for respondent are taken into account, then also, an important fact which emerges from the date of document of divorce cannot be overlooked and ignored. The facts submitted by the respondent are not accurate and not in consonance with evidence (documents) available on record. From the said document, it emerges that the alleged divorce or separation between the respondent and her husband took place on 3.8.1996 whereas the application was submitted on 18.5.1996 and second/subsequent application was submitted on 12.6.1996. Thus, on the date of the application, the respondent's marriage was still in existence and she was not divorced and that therefore, on relevant date, she was otherwise also not eligible for submitting an application as dependent, for appointment on compassionate ground. It is pertinent that on the date when the application/s was/were submitted, the daughter's marriage was not dissolved and the husband and wife were not divorced and that therefore, she cannot be considered member of family and/or dependent. Besides this, the claim was based on incorrect details. The learned Tribunal failed to consider the material aspect and instead proceeded only on the premise that the claimant being divorced daughter should be presumed to be dependent upon parents and therefore, she was eligible for appointment on compassionate ground. However, learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that on the date of application, her marriage was in existence and that therefore, the application could not have been considered as an application by "dependent" of an employee. 10. However, learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that on the date of application, her marriage was in existence and that therefore, the application could not have been considered as an application by "dependent" of an employee. 10. The learned Tribunal ought to have taken into account the fact that the so-called deed of divorce was prepared and was executed in August 1996, i.e. almost 3 months after the claimant submitted application for appointment on compassionate ground. In these circumstances, even if it is assumed that the marriage of the employee's daughter was genuinely dissolved and the husband and wife had divorced then also, the said event took place after the application was submitted and that therefore, the application which claims that the claimant was divorced was based on incorrect facts. Further, learned Tribunal also failed to appreciate that according to the corporation's policy, married daughter does not come within purview of dependent and/or family as contemplated under the Scheme and therefore also, the application and claim by the daughter was not justified and could not have been accepted by the corporation. The learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that application for appointment on compassionate ground can be considered strictly in light of the terms and conditions prescribed by the policy/Scheme and if the claim and its basis do not fall within four corners of the Scheme, then, the application cannot be entertained. In view of the fact that as on the date of the application, the marriage of the employee's daughter was not dissolved and the husband and wife were not divorced and on the dates of the applications, the marriage was in existence, the learned Tribunal could not have concluded that the corporation's decision in respect of the application by the daughter is incorrect. Besides this, another important aspect with regard to the error committed by the learned Tribunal is that the learned Tribunal not only quashed the corporation's decision namely, rejection of the application, but the learned Tribunal took a further step and directed the corporation to appoint the daughter of the employee under its policy for appointment on compassionate ground. The learned Tribunal could have, at the most, directed the corporation to reconsider the application but direction to grant appointment could not have been passed. The learned Tribunal could have, at the most, directed the corporation to reconsider the application but direction to grant appointment could not have been passed. Further, the learned Tribunal did not restrict its orders to the direction to the corporation that the employee's daughter should be appointed on compassionate ground, but the learned Tribunal proceeded further and also directed the corporation to appoint the daughter of the said employee as (on the post of) writer. The said direction by the learned Tribunal is not only unjustified but without jurisdiction. While directing the corporation to grant appointment to the daughter on the particular post, the learned Tribunal transgressed the boundaries of its jurisdiction. Therefore also, the impugned award and the directions by the learned Tribunal are not sustainable and deserves to be set aside and are here by set aside. In this view of the matter, the award cannot be sustained and is, accordingly, set aside.