Bijaya Kumar Padhy @ Biji Padhy v. Chairman, State Sentence Review Board, Orissa, Bhubaneswar
2016-11-24
BISWANATH RATH, VINOD PRASAD
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT By the Bench:- The petitioner, a life convict, has filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1509 of 2015, hankering his release, by making following prayer:- “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to :- (a) Direct pre-mature release of the Petitioner in terms of judgment dated 15.4.2015 in CRLMP No. 816/14 and then in CRLMP No. 1128/15 disposed of on 23.3.2015: (b) Pass such order or further order as may be deemed fit and proper. 2. Another petition was also filed by the same petitioner being CRLMP 227 of 2016, challenging rejection of his prayer for pre-mature release by the State Government, basing his claim on the decision by this Court rendered in W.P. (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014. Petitioner has made following prayer in this second application:- “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to: (a) quash the impugned minutes of meeting dated 20.2.2016 and final order dated 25.2.2016 under annexure-4 Series and thereby direct pre-mature release of the Petitioner in terms of judgment dated 15.4.2015 in CRLMP No. 816/14 and then in CRLMP No. 1128/16 disposed of on 23.9.2015. (b) direct State/its instrumentalities to pay adequate compensation to the Petitioner for depriving him his personal liberty since the year 2007, (c) pass such or further order as may be deemed fit and proper (d) And for this act of kindness the petitioner shall as in duty bound shall ever pray.” 3. Perusal of pleadings, counter affidavits and the record reveals that the petitioner initially invoked extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by preferring CRLMP No. 816 of 2016, for his premature release of the petitioner. The CRLMP was heard and disposed of by this Court by judgment dated 15.4.2015, by making following observations and order:- “In our view the State Government is not powerless to modulate the Rules or exercise executive power to undo an apparent injustice when its Rule comes in conflict with the basic structure of the Constitution under Chapter-III thereof, especially Article 14, which is untouchable. After 24th January 2012 the date on which the petitioner was acquitted of the crime alleged against him while on parole. Case of the petitioner became at par with other accused who is enjoying liberty of freedom outside jail boundary wall. The petitioner remained in jail cell for two more years.
After 24th January 2012 the date on which the petitioner was acquitted of the crime alleged against him while on parole. Case of the petitioner became at par with other accused who is enjoying liberty of freedom outside jail boundary wall. The petitioner remained in jail cell for two more years. This brings his case within the area of breach of Article 14 of the Constitution. Since we are of the opinion that in this peculiar case the State is not bereft of the power to grant further periodic parole t the petitioner to remedy injustice meted out to him by it till the Hon’ble Supreme Court decides the issue to remission or reprieve or premature release, therefore while concluding we direct the State Government to consider parole to be granted to the petitioner considering entire relevant facts and circumstances and it is hereby order as such.“ 4. Subsequently the respondent State Government considered the case of the petitioner and again rejected his claim for premature release and hence a second innings was initiated by the petitioner by filing Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1128 of 2015, with the prayer to set aside adverse order passed by the State Government. Since interregnum, Hon’ble Apex Court, took up the question of premature release of life convicts by the State Governments, and reserved the judgment, that this Court, after hearing both the sides in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition 1128 of 2015, disposed it off by directing the petitioner to get an order from the apex Court or wait till apex Court has decided the matter finally. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in all the concerned cases, lead case being Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014, disposed of by their judgment dated 2.12.2015 with certain directions. 5. In this back ground that we have heard both the contesting sides. From perusal of the pleadings and from the submissions of Sri Tripathy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, it appears that the petitioner has challenged the illegal order of rejection by the State Authorities in the matter of his pre-mature release, clamoring and ruing that he has been illegally discriminated from other similarly situated co accused who has been released prematurely by the State Government a decade ago.
Other convict also stood on the identical footing as that of the petitioner and consequently, in essence, the petitioner has pleaded violation of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution, by the respondent State and harangue illegal discrimination, without existence of any intelligible differentia. Petitioner pleads that the act of respondent States is mala fide, arbitrary, sham and de-horse all cannons of reasonableness breaching Rule of Law, common sense and principles of natural justice. The primary castigation is of course violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Since there is commonality of facts and relief that we dispose of both the aforesaid CRLMP analogously by this common judgment. 6. A priory, recapitulation of background facts evinces that the petitioner was tried along with other co accused Pradeep Pandhi (Pandi), and vide judgment and order dated 20.7.2001, rendered in concerned Session’s Trial being Sessions Case No. 40 of 1993, learned trial Judge/Sessions Judge convicted both the accused for offences under Sections 302/34, 307/34 and 324/34 of I.P.C. and sentenced both of them to life imprisonment and 5 years R.I. for attempt to murder and 2 years R.I. for causing simple hurt by sharp edged weapon. This conviction and sentence has attained finality, as both the convicted accused remained unsuccessful in their preferred appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1995. Their conviction and sentence was affirmed by this Court vide its judgment and order dated 20.7.2011 and hence they remained in penitentiary to serve life imprisonment, the petitioner as life convict no. 7258/A and the other co-convict as life convict no. 8847/A. When the matter stood thus, co-convict 8847/A Pradeep Pandi (Padhi) applied for his pre-mature release in the year 2006. A report was called for from O.I.C. Kodala Police station, who furnished a favorable report which was concurred by Superintendent of Police, Ganjan also, who recommended the case of Pandi (Padhi) co-convict 8847/A to Additional district Magistrate, Ganjam on 15.12.2006. Superintendent of Special Jail, Bhubaneswar, Superintendent of Circle Jail also recommended for release of above convict 8847/A (Padhi). Consequence upon those reports co-convict 8847/A (Padhi) was released prematurely during the year 2008 and since then he is leading a life in open air, free shackles and his complete Fundamental Rights were restored to him. 7.
Superintendent of Special Jail, Bhubaneswar, Superintendent of Circle Jail also recommended for release of above convict 8847/A (Padhi). Consequence upon those reports co-convict 8847/A (Padhi) was released prematurely during the year 2008 and since then he is leading a life in open air, free shackles and his complete Fundamental Rights were restored to him. 7. Adverting now the petitioner, his claim for remission of sentence was considered by the State Sentence Review Board on 17.6.2009 and was rejected on the pretext that petitioner got himself involved in an Arm’s Act crime. Later on, successively on two subsequent occasions, dated 3.11.2010 and 28.11.2011, also his prayer for premature release was declined. Case of the Petitioner was again reviewed by State Sentence Review Board in its meeting dated 28.2.2013 when the Board deferred consideration of petitioner’s case for premature release and postponed it for further consideration after a period of one year. Failing to obtained his hankered freedom from the respondent State, that the dejected petitioner invoked Jurisdiction of this Court in CRLMC No. 816 of 2014 which matter, taking note of learned Advocate General’s submission that the Hon’ble Apex Court in W.P. (Crl.) 48 of 2014 has directed all the States not to exercise power of remission pending consideration of W.P. (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014, that the matter was dropped permitting the petitioner to move after the disposal of W.P. (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014, while directing the State Government to consider case of petitioner for interim parole. 8. In the meantime, petitioner moved another CRLMP No. 1128 of 2015, which again was found to be pre-mature and was disposed of on 23.9.2015 passing following order:- “Admittedly, in the mater or premature release of life convicts, the final verdict is reserved with the Hon’ble Apex Court. In such peculiar circumstance, although we are oblivious of the fact that gross injustice has been meted out to the present applicant-Bijaya Kumar Padhy alias Biji Padhy as he has been segregated from other similarly situated convicts without any intelligible differentia, we do not find ourselves as of now to direct for his release or premature release. The applicant is directed to wait for the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court.” In the meantime, petitioner filed CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015, with the prayer for premature release.
The applicant is directed to wait for the verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court.” In the meantime, petitioner filed CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015, with the prayer for premature release. Pending consideration of the CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015, State Government considering the case of the petitioner for premature release by minutes of proceeding dated 20.02. 2016 and rejected the claim once again for release for the reason indicated therein and communicated the rejection of his request vide letter dated 25.2.2016 to the petitioner, which has now given rise to CRLMP No. 277 of 2016. 9. Learned State Counsel defending the action of the State raised three fold of submissions, One for petitioner’s filing an intervention application in W.P.(Crl. ) No. 48 of 2014 pending consideration, present attempt is sheer abuse of process, Second for the order dated 2.12.2015 the matter involving issue with regard to States power of remission still remain under consideration in W.P. (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014 where the claim of the petitioner also stands pending, Thirdly, Review Board being a creation of the State Legislature have rightly taken the care of the interest of the petitioner in passing the impugned order to ensure his protection in view of rivalry between him and his adversaries. 10. Before proceeding with the merits of rival submissions this Court was obliged by both the sides who produced and relied upon various decisions concerning the issue, some of which are considered herein below. Whether imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal Code meant imprisonment for the rest of life of the prisoner or convict undergoing life imprisonment has a right to claim remission and whether as per the principles enunciated in paragraphs-91 to 93 of Swamy Shraddananda (2) : (2008) 13 SCC 767 is special category of sentence may be made for the very few cases where in death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of 14 years and to put that category beyond application of remission.
Considering the 2nd part of the questions referred to herein where Hon’ble Apex Court in (1961) 3 SCR 440 held as follows: “A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted persons natural life” This question was again considered in Maru Ram etc, etc. v. Union of India and another: 1981 (1) SCR 1196 (and at page 1248) it is held as under: “We follow Godse’s case (supra) to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath, and whether the length of remission earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Government” In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh and others : (1976) 3 SCC 470 , it is has been held by the apex Court. “That a sentence of imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the end of 20 years including the remissions, because the administrative rules framed under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act cannot supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life means a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the Appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” Again in Subash Chandra v. Krishan Lal and others: (2001) 4 SCC 458 , Hon’ble Apex Court following Godse and Ratan Singh has held that a sentence for life means a sentence for entire life of the prisoner unless the Appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to remit either the whole of part of the sentence under Section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Considering all the decisions on the subject, as existed by then, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014 reported in (2014) 11 SCC 1 , framed the following question: Whether imprisonment for life in term of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code meant imprisonment for rest of life of the prisoner or a convict undergoing life imprisonment has a right to clear remission?
Hon’ble Apex Court, while answering the question cited above has held, in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 48 of 2014, as under:- “The sentence of life imprisonment means imprisonment of the rest of life or the remainder of life of the convict. Such convict can always apply for obtaining remission either under Article 72 (b) of the Constitution or under Section 432 Cr.P.C. and the authority would be obliged to consider the same reasonably” In view of binding precedent by the apex Court as above, which is now law under Article 141/142 of the Constitution, that now the State Governments are obligatorily mandated to consider the case of life convicts reasonably. 11. Now coming back to the present case, this Court finds the cae of the petitioner for remission in the sentence was taken up by the Special State Sentence Review Board held on 20.2.2016 in which the Review Board held as follows: “The member Secretary placed the petition dated 16.01.2016 of the Life Convict No. 7712/A Bijaya Kumar Padhy @ Biji Padhy of Circle Jail, Berhampur for examination & consideration by the Board for his premature release. The member Secretary briefed the Board on order No. 4 dated 13.01.2016of the Hon’ble High Court, Orissa passed in CRLMP No. 1509/2015 and the guidelines contained in Resolution No. 4817/L dated 5.5.2010 of Government of Odisha in Law Department. The application for premature release of the life Convict No. 7712/A Bijaya Kumar Padhy @ Biji Padhy of Circle Jail, Berhampur is discussed for consideration. The Member Secretary Presented the case of the Prisoner Bijaya Kuamr Padhy @ Biji Padhy and placed a comprehensive note in that respect. He further placed the report of the District Magistrate, Ganjam and Superintendent of Police, Ganjam dated 20.02.2016 in regard. The Board discussed and examined the case meticulously and perused all the materials presented before it including the reports received from the District Magistrate and S.P. Gajnam on the conduct and likely impact in the locality on the likelihood of the return of the prisoner on remission. This is a case of pre-plan murder and the district authorities have given and adverse report against him.
This is a case of pre-plan murder and the district authorities have given and adverse report against him. Taking into account the circumstances in which the offence was committed by the prisoner and whether he has the propensity and is likely to commit similar or other offence again, and the welfare of the prisoner as well as the society at large, the Board come to the view that the release of the petitioner, Bijaya Kumar Padhy @ Biji Padhy, Life Convict No. 7712/A will be detrimental not only to himself but also to the society as a whole. He has ample propensity and likelihood of committing crime on his release. There is less possibilities on his part of becoming an useful member of the society at this moment. In such circumstances the Board unanimously resolved not to recommend the premature release of the life Convict No. 7712/A Bijaya Kumar Padhy @ Biji Padhy. The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the chair.” Above development has been communicated to the convict petitioner vide letter dated 25.2.2016, which is apparent from page 54 of CRLMP No. 277 of 2016. 12. Reading the notes from the above minutes of meeting dated 20.2.2016 this Court finds that the first two grounds for non-consideration of the petitioner’s case for remission favorably has no substance and are based on totally hypothetical premise. There was total absence of any material, what to say convincing material to support such views as by the time the matter came up for consideration before the Board, the petitioner stood acquitted in the Arm’s Act case, which acquittal had attained finality and hence case of the petitioner was at par with other co-accused who was enjoying liberty outside jail. The third ground that there is likelihood of threat perception to the petitioner’s life by the rivalry group, the State being the law and order machinery cannot take a futile plea based on pure assumption and surmises that it is vulnerable to protect the life of a citizen. Records were produced during the course of hearing, perusal of which did not reveal any material for such unfounded conclusion and apprehension by the State machinery. 13.
Records were produced during the course of hearing, perusal of which did not reveal any material for such unfounded conclusion and apprehension by the State machinery. 13. Now, coming to the question as to whether exercise of power by the respondent State in rejecting the claim of the petitioner for premature release by grant of remission of sentence is just and fair and whether the same has been dealt with fairly, we find that the same seems to be motivated and sans objective and fair exercise violating Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution. There is no denial to the fact two persons involved in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1993 were convicted and sentenced identically. There was/is no disparity between their cases. It also remains confirmed that one of the convict, identically situated namely, Bijaya Pandi (Padhy) has got the benefit of remission since 2008 and is enjoying a premature release. Indisputable is also the fact that the petitioner is still languishing in jail since 1993 and as on the date of filing of CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015, he has already served more than 25 years. Petitioner’s case for remission of sentence was considered in 2009 but was rejected. However scrutiny of papers and assessing case and counter affidavit we find that the rejection was based on extraneous consideration which, on the date on which petitioner’s case was considered by the Board, was also non-existent, as by that date petitioner stood acquitted in the Arm’s Act case, which decision had already attained finality. Thus we find that at all stages but for the first petitioner has been subjected to discriminatory action by the respondent State and hence on those occasions both the rejections were not only illegal and discriminating but also arbitrary. We further find form the letter/affidavit of the Senior Superintendent Jail filed in CRLMP No. 816 of 2014, which brief was also produced for our perusal, that as on 29.8.2014 the petitioner had already served 25 years 10 months and 13 days and excluding remission he had served 25 years 4 months and 14 days. Hence, under Government of Orissa Law Department Resolution dated 25.5.2005 and 5.5.2010 premature release of the petitioner after he had served 25 years in jail could have been denied under any circumstances.
Hence, under Government of Orissa Law Department Resolution dated 25.5.2005 and 5.5.2010 premature release of the petitioner after he had served 25 years in jail could have been denied under any circumstances. Further the comprehensive note vide Annexure-(B) to the counter affidavit submitted by the Superintendent Jail in CRLMP No. 816 of 2014, relied on by State Counsel also indicates that the conduct and behavior of the petitioner inside jail was satisfactory and even Senior Superintendent, Circle Jail, Berhampur has recommended for the premature release of the convict for his good conduct inside the jail. The comprehensive note even further states that the petitioner is not a professional offender, additional circumstances favoring the petitioner are that he whenever the petitioner was released on parol under the interim orders passed by this Court in CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015 he has never misused the liberty granted to him. In the first instance, by order dated 13.1.2016, this Court had directed release of the petitioner on parole for a period of one month with stringent conditions. The petitioner has not violated the terms fixed therein. Reading of CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015, again by order dated 12.4.2016, this Court allowed the petitioner short term bail till further orders subject to conditions assigned therein and as it appears, petitioner is on bail and there has been no incident involving the petitioner in the meantime. 14. Taking into consideration that a co-convict in the same proceeding having been permitted with remission in his sentence since 2009, this Court finds that the reason for rejection of similar request of the petitioner, even seven years thereafter, is not only illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory but appears to be an attempt staged and cooked one with clear intent to thwart the liberty of the petitioner granted under Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution of India. There is clear violation in Article 14 & 21 of the Constitution of India and there cannot be a better example of the vindictive attitude of the State towards its citizen than the present one. 15. Before parting with the case, we would like to reproduce the celebrated words of the apex Court in Tara Singh & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors., as follows:- “Para-14.
15. Before parting with the case, we would like to reproduce the celebrated words of the apex Court in Tara Singh & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors., as follows:- “Para-14. Having appreciated the analysis made in the aforesaid verdict, we may advert to the statutory scheme pertaining to suspension, remission and commutation of sentence under the CrPC. Section 432 deals with power to suspend or remit sentences. Section 433 deals with power to commute sentences. Section 433-A lays the postulate for restrictions on power of remission or commutation in certain cases. The said provision reads as follows:- “433 –A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases. – Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where the sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.” 15. The constitutional validity of Section 433-A was challenged in Maru Ram (supra) and the said provision has been held to be intra vires. While dealing with the 12 constitutional validity, Krishna lyer, J., speaking for the majority, distinguished the power conferred under the constitutional authorities under Articles 72 and 161 and the power conferred under the Code. In the said case, it has been held that:- “59. …. But two things may be similar but not the same. That is precisely the difference. We cannot agree that the power which is the creature of the Code can be equated with a high prerogative vested by the Constitution in the highest functionaries of the Union and the States. The source is different, the substance is different, the strength is different, although the stream may be flowing along the same bed. We see the two powers as far from being identical, and obviously, the constitutional power is “untouchable” and “unapproachable” and cannot suffer the vicissitudes of simple legislative process. Therefore, Section 433-A cannot be invalidated as indirectly violative of Articles 72 and 161. What the Code gives, it can take, and so, an embargo on Sections 432 and 433 (a) is within the legislative power of Parliament.” 6.
Therefore, Section 433-A cannot be invalidated as indirectly violative of Articles 72 and 161. What the Code gives, it can take, and so, an embargo on Sections 432 and 433 (a) is within the legislative power of Parliament.” 6. Even so, we must remember the constitutional status of Articles 72 and 161 and it is common ground that Section 433-A does not and cannot affect even a wee bit the pardon power of the Governor or the President. The necessary sequel to this logic is that notwithstanding Section 433-A the President and the Governor continue to exercise the power of commutation and release under the aforesaid articles.” 16. After so stating, the Court posed the question, whether the Parliament has indulged in legislative futility with a formal victory but a real defeat? The Court answered stating ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Explaining further, the larger Bench opined:- “An issue of deeper import demands our consideration at this stage of the discussion. Wide as the power of pardon, commutation and release (Articles 72 and 161) is , it cannot run riot; for no legal power can run unruly like John Gilpin on the horse but must keep sensibly to a steady course. Here, we come upon the second constitutional fundamental which underlies the submissions of counsel. It is that all public power, including constitutional power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily or mala fide and, ordinarily, guidelines for fair and equal execution are guarantors of the valid play of power. We proceed on the basis that these axioms are valid in our constitutional order” 17. The majority thereafter dealt with the powers conferred under the constitutional authorities under Articles 72 and 161 and eventually concluded as follows:- “ xxx xxx xxx (9) Considerations for exercise of power under Articles 72/161 may be myriad and their occasions protean, and are left to the appropriate Government, but no consideration nor occasion can be wholly irrelevant, irrational, discriminatory or mala fide. Only in these rare cases will the Court examine the exercise.” 16. Law as laid down is that the punishment awarded through a judgment is not overruled but the convicts gets the benefit of a liberalized policy of State pardon and such right of a convict cannot be thwarted on the whims and unfounded apprehensions without any tangible material.
Only in these rare cases will the Court examine the exercise.” 16. Law as laid down is that the punishment awarded through a judgment is not overruled but the convicts gets the benefit of a liberalized policy of State pardon and such right of a convict cannot be thwarted on the whims and unfounded apprehensions without any tangible material. Granting remission to one in the same conviction and order of sentence and refused to the other is nothing but a most discriminatory act by the concerned authorities which has to be stamped with serious disapproval. 17. In deciding a case of refusal of remission to a co-convict while allowing other co-convict challenging the direction of Punjab & Haryana High Court by the State Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. V. Jagdish AIR 2010 SC 1690 has held as under:- “43. The right of the respondent prisoner, therefore, to get his case considered at par with such of his inmates, who were entitled to the benefit of the said policy, cannot be taken away by the policy dated 13.08.2008. This is evident from a bare perusal of the recitals contained in the polices prior to the year 2008, which are referable to Article 161 of the Constitution. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, was absolutely justified in arriving at the conclusion that the case of the respondent was to be considered on the strength of the policy that was existing on the date of his conviction. State authority is under an obligation to at least exercise its discretion in relation to an honest expectation perceived by the convict, at the time of his conviction that his case for pre-mature release would be considered after serving the sentence, prescribed in the short sentencing policy existing on that date. The State has to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such benefit to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour of the respondent.
The State has to exercise its power of remission also keeping in view any such benefit to be construed liberally in favour of a convict which may depend upon case to case and for that purpose, in our opinion, it should relate to a policy which, in the instant case, was in favour of the respondent. In case a liberal policy prevails on the date of consideration of the case of a “lifer” for pre-mature release, he should be given benefit thereof.” In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India : 1978 (1) SCC 248 in paragraph-7, Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as following:- “The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article-14 like a broading omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be right, just and fair and not obligatory, fanciful or oppressive, otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the required of Article 21 would not be satisfied.” In the case of Shatrughan Chouhan & Anr. V. Union of India & Ors : (2014) 3 SCC 1 , in paragraph 244, the Hon’ble Apex Court has even gone to the extent of holding that Right to Seek mercy under Article 72/161 is a Constitutional right and not at the discretion or whims of exclusive and every Constitutional duty must be discharge with due case and diligence otherwise judicial interference commenced if the Constitution for upholding its values. 18. Under the circumstances, while allowing CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015 and CRLMP No. 277 of 2016, this Court sets aside the decision of the Review Board vide minutes of the meeting dated 20.02.2016 as well as the final order dated 25.2.2016 appended to CRLMP No. 277 of 2016 and mandates respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner a fresh in the light of the observations made herein above positively within a period of two month form today and pass an order in consonance with Law and equity. The petitioner is under parole by virtue of order dated 12.4.2016. He shall continue to be on parole till a final decision is taken following the direction as above. 19. CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015 as well as CRLMP No. 277 of 2016 stand allowed with the above directions. No cost.
The petitioner is under parole by virtue of order dated 12.4.2016. He shall continue to be on parole till a final decision is taken following the direction as above. 19. CRLMP No. 1509 of 2015 as well as CRLMP No. 277 of 2016 stand allowed with the above directions. No cost. BISWANATH RATH, J. I agree Ordered accordingly.