JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Rawal, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, and Mr. Songara, learned advocate, for Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. In present petition, the petitioner corporation has brought under challenge award dated 1.4.2005 passed by learned Tribunal, Vadodara in Reference (IT) No. 47 of 2002 whereby the learned Tribunal directed the petitioner corporation to grant appointment to the claimant on compassionate ground in view of corporation's policy. 2.1. According to the petitioner corporation, the claimant before the learned Tribunal had not submitted application in accordance with the policy and that therefore, he was not entitled for appointment on compassionate ground under the policy and the learned Tribunal committed error in passing the impugned award and directions. 3. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties that father of present respondent was an employee of the petitioner corporation. He was employed as conductor and his service came to be terminated by way of dismissal vide order dated 2.7.1987. The dismissal order dated 2.7.1987 was followed by a permission application filed by the petitioner corporation under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"]. It appears that the learned Tribunal rejected the permission application and the corporation felt aggrieved by the decision of the learned Tribunal and that therefore, the corporation challenged the learned Tribunal's order rejecting the permission application by filing a petition, i.e. Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988. During pendency of the petition, the workman, i.e. father of present respondent, died on 3.2.1991. The wife of the deceased workman filed Special Civil Application No. 6039 of 1994 which was disposed of vide order dated 24.10.1994. While disposing the said petition, (i.e. Special Civil Application No. 6039 of 1994, which was filed by the wife of the deceased workman), the Court observed that the payment made by the corporation by way of settlement in connection with the dispute related to permission application/dismissal of the workman shall satisfy all claims of the petitioner i.e. wife of the deceased workman. It appears that the respondent herein was minor at the time of death of the workman. According to the corporation, respondent herein attained adulthood on 30.11.1994. It appears that the respondent herein was minor at the time of death of the workman. According to the corporation, respondent herein attained adulthood on 30.11.1994. It is the case of the petitioner corporation that the policy for compassionate appointment which was in force at the relevant time, prescribed that the heir of the deceased workman, if minor at the time of death of the workman, should submit application within one year after he attains adulthood, however, the respondent in present case, submitted the application seeking appointment on compassionate ground on 5.10.1998 though he became major on 30.11.1994. It appears that on such ground, the corporation rejected the respondent's application for appointment on compassionate ground. The rejection of the application gave rise to dispute which was referred for adjudication and culminated into Reference (IT) No. 47 of 2002. Before the learned Tribunal, the respondent herein claimed that he had submitted the application on 12.6.1995. The learned Tribunal accepted the said claim of the respondent workman and consequently, the learned Tribunal held that the workman had submitted application within time prescribed under the policy and the decision of the corporation namely rejecting the application on the ground of delay was not justified. Having reached the said conclusion, the learned Tribunal directed the corporation to grant appointment to the claimant on compassionate ground. Against the said direction, present petition is filed. 4. Mr. Rawal, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, submitted that, actually, in view of the order dated 24.10.1994 in Special Civil Application No. 6039 of 1994 whereby settlement was arrived at by way of full and final settlement of all claims on payment of 25% of salary amount wherein it was stipulated and declared by the learned advocate for the petitioner i.e. wife of the deceased workman that all claims are settled, the dispute i.e. Reference (IT) No. 47 of 2002 was not maintainable and learned Tribunal ought not have entertained the said reference. Mr. Rawal, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, further submitted that the respondent had not placed any evidence on record to establish that he had submitted application on 12.6.1995 and that the learned Tribunal committed error in accepting oral allegations of the workman. Mr. Rawal, learned advocate for the petitioner corporation, further submitted that the respondent had not placed any evidence on record to establish that he had submitted application on 12.6.1995 and that the learned Tribunal committed error in accepting oral allegations of the workman. He also submitted that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the delay caused by the applicant in raising dispute which was raised for the first time in 2002 and in view of said delay, the claim should not have been granted. 5. Mr. Songara, learned advocate for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the learned Tribunal found that the application was submitted in June 1995 and that therefore, the case of the corporation that application was not submitted within one year after he became major was incorrect and consequently, the direction by the learned Tribunal is justified and there is no error, inasmuch as learned Tribunal has found that the application was submitted in accordance with the conditions under the policy. Mr. Songara, learned advocate for the respondent, submitted that in light of the directions by the learned Tribunal, the respondent is entitled for appointment on compassionate ground and he is also entitled for the consequential monetary benefits granted by the learned Tribunal under the award which is impugned in present petition i.e. salary for the period from the date of the award until actual appointment. 6. I have heard submissions by learned advocates for the petitioner and the respondent and I have also considered the material available on record. I have also examined the award impugned in present petition. 7. It is not in dispute that the service of father of present respondent was terminated by way of dismissal vide order dated 2.7.1987. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner corporation had, at the relevant time, sought permission from the learned Tribunal in connection with the dismissal order by filing of permission application in accordance with Section 33 of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the learned Tribunal had rejected the permission application and the corporation had challenged the learned Tribunal's order by filing Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988. 7.1. It is also not in dispute that during the pendency of the said Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988, concerned workman died on 3.2.1991. It is also not in dispute that the learned Tribunal had rejected the permission application and the corporation had challenged the learned Tribunal's order by filing Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988. 7.1. It is also not in dispute that during the pendency of the said Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988, concerned workman died on 3.2.1991. It is also not in dispute that during the pendency of the said Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988, the wife of the deceased workman had filed a petition i.e. Special Civil Application No. 6039 of 1994 and claimed benefits which would flow on enforcement of learned Tribunal's order rejecting the permission application. The said Special Civil Application No. 6039 of 1994 came to be disposed of vide Court's order dated 24.10.1994 which reads thus:- "Heard Mr. Rathod for the petitioner, Mr. S.N. Shelat for respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mr. Bambania for respondent No. 3. The petitioner herein is the widow of a deceased employee of the first respondent-Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. Certain disputes arising out the dismissal of the accused husband of the petitioner led to a Permission Application by respondents No. 1 and 2 to respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 3 declined to grant the said permission and the present petition is filed to enforce certain claim arising out of that order. Keeping aside that controversy, Mr. Shelat, learned advocate appearing for respondents No. 1 and 2, stated that respondents No. 1 and 2 have already paid the entire amount of gratuity and provident fund that is payable to the deceased employee and the same has been paid to the petitioner. He further states that respondents No. 1 and 2 shall pay 25% of the amount of salary, which was due to the deceased employee during the period from 2nd July, 1987 to 3rd February, 1991. Mr. Rathod makes a statement that, this shall satisfy all the claims of the petitioner on behalf of her deceased husband. Mr. Shelat further states that the aforesaid amount will be paid within six weeks hereof. In view of the aforesaid statement, Mr. Rathod seeks leave to withdraw the present petition. Leave granted. Petition is dismissed as withdrawn. Respondents No. 1 and 2 have also filed a cross petition bearing Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988 and Mr. Mr. Shelat further states that the aforesaid amount will be paid within six weeks hereof. In view of the aforesaid statement, Mr. Rathod seeks leave to withdraw the present petition. Leave granted. Petition is dismissed as withdrawn. Respondents No. 1 and 2 have also filed a cross petition bearing Special Civil Application No. 7194 of 1988 and Mr. Shelat states that the same shall be withdrawn in view of the aforesaid settlement." 7.2. It is also not in dispute that at the time of death of the workman and during the pendency of above mentioned petitions, the respondent herein was minor and he became major on 30.11.1994. 7.3. It is also not in dispute that according to the policy (which came to be cancelled/withdrawn in 2011) for appointment on compassionate ground, an application should be submitted within one year from the date of death of the workman and in those cases where the heir of the deceased workman is minor on the date of death, the application should be submitted within one year after the heir attains majority. 8. In present case, the dispute arises at this stage and it lies in purview of the said provision of the policy for appointment on compassionate ground. 8.1. On one hand, the corporation's claim is that though the respondent attained majority on 30.11.1994, he submitted the application seeking appointment on compassionate ground after four years i.e. on 5.10.1998. 8.2. On the other hand, the respondent claims that he had submitted application on 12.6.1995 i.e. within period of one year after he became major. 8.3. It is true that the learned Tribunal believed the claim of the respondent. 9. The said conclusion of the learned Tribunal is under substantial challenge by the corporation in present petition. 9.1. When impugned award is examined in light of this controversy, it emerges that the respondent had not placed any direct and substantive evidence to establish that the application seeking appointment on compassionate ground was actually submitted to the corporation on 12.6.1995 and that it was actually received by the corporation on or around 12.6.1995. 9.2. 9.1. When impugned award is examined in light of this controversy, it emerges that the respondent had not placed any direct and substantive evidence to establish that the application seeking appointment on compassionate ground was actually submitted to the corporation on 12.6.1995 and that it was actually received by the corporation on or around 12.6.1995. 9.2. Though the respondent claimant claimed that he had forwarded the application by registered post, any acknowledgement receipt was not placed on record before the learned Tribunal nor even the receipt issued by the postal department (while receiving the application for forward post/service) to the respondent was placed on record before the learned Tribunal. 9.3. It is not in dispute that any cogent document or even any other material evidencing service of the application to the corporation in June 1995 was not placed on record before the learned Tribunal. 9.4. Despite absence of such evidence, learned Tribunal accepted the claim that he had submitted the application on 12.6.1995 only on the ground that the corporation did not deny in its written statement, the claimant's allegation with regard to the application dated 12.6.1995. 9.5. When the written statement which was filed by the corporation before the learned Tribunal is examined in view of such controversy, it emerges that in paragraph No. 12 of the written statement, the corporation had specifically claimed and asserted that the claimant became major on 30.11.1994 and that the claimant attained 18 years of age on 30.11.1994 and that he had submitted the application on 5.10.1998 i.e. after four years and after expiry of the time limit prescribed under the policy. 9.6. Merely because the corporation did not specifically assert that the application dated 12.6.1995 was not received by the corporation, the learned Tribunal could not have assumed or jumped to the conclusion that the application was duly served to the corporation, more so when the corporation had expressly mentioned that the application was received on 5.10.1998 and any application was not received within prescribed time limit, the decision of the learned Tribunal by ignoring the positive assertion, is not justified. 9.7. In absence of any cogent evidence, the learned Tribunal's conclusion that the application was submitted in June 1995 is not sustainable. 10. 9.7. In absence of any cogent evidence, the learned Tribunal's conclusion that the application was submitted in June 1995 is not sustainable. 10. Besides this, even if, only for the sake of examining the merits of the respondent's claim for appointment on compassionate ground, it is presumed that the respondent had submitted the application in June 1995 then also, a vital fact stairs in the face of the respondent is that from 1995 to 2002, the respondent did not take any action to pursue/enforce his application and claim for appointment on compassionate ground. 10.1. On this count, it is pertinent to note that according to the respondent he had submitted the application in 1995 and the corporation conveyed rejection in 1999. 10.2. During the said period of four years, the respondent did not take any action to pursue his application for appointment on compassionate ground. 10.3. It is also pertinent that even after 1999 (when the corporation conveyed the rejection of the application) the respondent did not take any action for another period of 3 years i.e. until 2002 and it was for the first time that in 2002, that the respondent raised dispute and thereby took any action for ascertaining his claim. At that time, respondent had reached 25 years of age which would be outer limit for appointment in regular course. 10.4. Besides this, considering the date of birth of the respondent, as of now, he would be about 40 years of age. 10.5. During the interregnum, the respondent must have secured employment/source of income and could not have remained unemployed. 10.6. Moreover, it has come on record that the corporation has since 2011 scraped the policy of appointment on compassionate ground. Instead, a policy granting lump sum compensation is introduced. 11. In that view of the matter, learned advocate for the respondent would claim that the respondent shall be granted compensation in accordance with the said policy. 11.1. He submitted that the respondent may submit a representation to the competent authority for considering his case for lump sum compensation in view of the policy which has introduced in 2011. 11.2. 11. In that view of the matter, learned advocate for the respondent would claim that the respondent shall be granted compensation in accordance with the said policy. 11.1. He submitted that the respondent may submit a representation to the competent authority for considering his case for lump sum compensation in view of the policy which has introduced in 2011. 11.2. It is for the respondent to decide further course of action as he considers proper or he may be advised and it goes without saying that if any representation is made by the respondent, then, appropriate reply will be given by the corporation in accordance with its policy and rules. 12. The facts discussed above brings out that there is no evidence which would demonstrate and establish that the application was submitted in June 1995. 12.1. Having regard to the fact that the corporation had conveyed rejection of the request in 1999 and that it specifically claimed that the application was submitted in October 1998, there was no justification to disbelieve the said assertion of the corporation, more particularly when the respondent failed to show any evidence to establish that the application was served to the corporation in June 1995. 12.2. Therefore, the decision of the corporation i.e. rejecting the application on the ground that it was not submitted within time limit prescribed under the policy, cannot be faulted. 13. Even if the facts were to be assumed in favour of the respondent and it was to be assumed that the application was submitted in June 1995, then also, the delay on the part of the respondent in raising the dispute would not support the respondent's claim for appointment or for lump sum compensation. 14. The equity would help a vigilant and not an indolent person. 15. The fact that for almost 7 years the respondent did not take any action to ascertain his claim disentitles him from any relief. 16. In this view of the matter, the learned Tribunal's direction vide award dated 1.4.2005 cannot be sustained. 16.1. There is no justification to direct the corporation to appoint the respondent on compassionate ground. 17. Even otherwise, the policy does not exists. 17.1. There is no justification to direct the corporation even to pay lump sum compensation in light of the policy which is introduced since 2011. 18. Therefore, the petition succeeds. 16.1. There is no justification to direct the corporation to appoint the respondent on compassionate ground. 17. Even otherwise, the policy does not exists. 17.1. There is no justification to direct the corporation even to pay lump sum compensation in light of the policy which is introduced since 2011. 18. Therefore, the petition succeeds. Accordingly, the petition allowed and the award impugned in present petition is set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.