JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, a former Deputy Engineer serving with the Erstwhile Gujarat Electricity Board, has prayed for the following reliefs:- "(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, direction and/or order for quashing and setting aside the order dated 14.10.1997, passed by the Member (Tech.), whereby order of respondent No. 2 of dated 26.3.1992, being No. DGM (P)/VI/DA/285/HHD/186 was confirmed. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the order dated 26.3.1992 during pendency and final disposal of this petition. (C) Your Lordships be pleased to be direct the respondents not to consider the order of the appellate authority dated 26.3.1992 for extending any benefit to the petitioner, during the pendency and final disposal of this petition. (D) Your Lordships may be pleased to grant such other and further relief as may be deemed just, fit and proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. (E) Be pleased to award the cost of this petition." 2. The facts of this case may be summarized as under: 2.1 The petitioner, while serving as a Deputy Engineer, was served with a departmental charge sheet dated 9.11.1987 with the following charges; "You, Shri H.H. Dave, Junior Engineer, Modasa Town Sub-Division now promoted as Deputy Engineer and posted at Mapur O&M Sub-Division, are hereby charged for following acts of misconduct specified at Sr. No. 9, 10, 24 & 37 of schedule "A" of the employees' conduct, Discipline and Appeal procedure committed by you. Sr. No. 09: Breach of trust, dishonestly in connection with the affairs of the Board. Sr. No. 19: Instances of disloyalty to board or the superior under whom the employee is working. Sr. No. 25: Habitual breach of any orders of circulars. Sr. No. 37: Making a false statement or making a false complaints. It has been noticed that Shri Khodaji Udaji Khant of Village : Kolikhad under Modasa (T) Sub Division has demanded agricultural connection of 5 HP Load on his well situated in land survey No. 172 vide his application registered in office on 5/11/1984. The survey was carried out by you. It has been noticed that Shri Khodaji Udaji Khant of Village : Kolikhad under Modasa (T) Sub Division has demanded agricultural connection of 5 HP Load on his well situated in land survey No. 172 vide his application registered in office on 5/11/1984. The survey was carried out by you. Though the distance from nearest pole to well (metering point) was about 45 Mts, the connection was falling under "B" category, you have prepared the proposal under "A" category, considering the distance as 20 meters. You were aware of the facts that under "B" category the firm quotations for the applications registered upto June-83 are issued and hence it is obvious that the connection in question under this category will be delayed. Therefore to extend a favour to the consumer for early getting of connection, the proposal was prepared under "A" category & thus party's connection was released on 20/11/84. The party had applied on 5/11/84 and taken the connection on 20/11/84 i.e. within 15 days was due to wrong classification of category. Subsequently on detailed enquiry by Dy. Engr. (T) Modasa had disconnected the supply on 27/12/84. Your Such acts shows gross negligency, spoiling reputation of the board, inconvenience to the consumer and this is a breach of trust for work allotted to you and have show dishonesty and disloyalty to the board." 2.2 An Inquiry Officer was appointed, and at the end of the inquiry, he filed his report stating that the charges were held to be established. 2.3 The Disciplinary Authority, i.e., the Chief Engineer, by an order dated 3rd January, 1992, imposed the penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect. The order reads as under; "I have carefully gone through the papers of the inquiry and reply dated : 11-11-1991 to the show cause notice given by Shri H.H. Dave, Deputy Engineer. I concur with the findings of the enquiry officer and I hold that the charges levelled against Shri H.H. Dave vide charge sheet at (1) above have been proved. I concur with the findings of the enquiry officer and I hold that the charges levelled against Shri H.H. Dave vide charge sheet at (1) above have been proved. I, therefore, pass the following orders: "Ensuing two increments in respect of Shri H.H. Dave, Deputy Engineer should be withheld, with cumulative effect." 2.4 The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, i.e., the Deputy General Manager, and the Appellate Authority, by an order dated 26th March, 1992, dismissed the appeal, observing as under; "The appeal dated 18-01-1992 preferred by Shri H.H. Dave, Deputy Engineer Modasa Town Sub Division now at Bhildi Sub-Divn was submitted to the competent appellate authority, who itself carefully going through the said appeal and connected papers decided to reduced the punishment as ordered under order dated 03-01-1992 as under:- "Instead of withholding ensuing two increments with cumulative effect, one ensuing increment in respect of Shri H.H. Dave, Deputy Engineer should be withheld without cumulative effect." 2.5 The petitioner came before this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 9029 of 1992. A statement was made by the learned counsel appearing for the Board that the second appeal was available to the petitioner under Rule 10 of the Employees Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Procedure. In view of such statement, the petition was withdrawn and was disposed of accordingly. The order passed by this Court, in Special Civil Application No. 9029 of 1992, reads as under; "The learned counsel Mr. Pandya appearing for the respondents states that there is a provision of Second Appeal available to the petitioner udder Rule 10 of the Employee Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Procedure. He also states that if the petitioner prefers such an appeal within 3 week from today, it will be duly considered. On this statement being made by the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the petition. Permission granted. Petition stands disposed of accordingly." 2.6 It appears that the second appeal was not entertained and the same was treated as a review application, and the same came to be disposed of by a Member (Technical) as under; "I have carefully gone through the Second appeal preferred by Shri H.H. Dave, Dy. Engineer, Modasa (T), S/D/Bhildi S/D now as Jr. Petition stands disposed of accordingly." 2.6 It appears that the second appeal was not entertained and the same was treated as a review application, and the same came to be disposed of by a Member (Technical) as under; "I have carefully gone through the Second appeal preferred by Shri H.H. Dave, Dy. Engineer, Modasa (T), S/D/Bhildi S/D now as Jr. Engineer at Timbdi 220 KV S/S under Amreli (TR) Circle against the punishment order dated 3.1.1992 and first appeal partly allowed vide order dated 26.3.1992 reducing the punishment of withholding his ensuing two increments with cumulative effect to that of withholding his ensuing one increment without cumulative effect and other connected papers. I do not find any grounds for reviewing the case and Dave, Dy. Engineer now Jr. Engineer. Accordingly, the second appeal preferred by Shri H.H. Dave, Now Jr. Engineer is not permitted and hence the order No. DGMP/VI/DA/285/HHD/186 dated 26.3.1992 allowing the appeal partly and reduced the punishment from withholding his ensuing two increments with cumulative effect to that of withholding his ensuing one increment without cumulative effect stands." 2.7 Being dissatisfied, the petitioner has come with this writ application. 3. Although, the appearance of Mr. M.D. Pandya, the learned counsel has been shown on behalf of the respondents, yet Ms. Desai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. Pandya, submitted that they have handed over the papers to the Board long time back. In such circumstances, none appears on behalf of the respondents. I take notice of the fact that this writ application is of the year 1998. There is no reply filed till this date, denying any of the averments made in the writ application. 4. The principal argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the entire inquiry could be said to have been vitiated as the relevant documents, as demanded by the petitioner, were not supplied to him at any point of time. The failure on the part of the authorities concerned to supply the relevant documents, as demanded, caused serious prejudice, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. I take note of the following averments made in this petition, which have gone un-rebutted. 7. The failure on the part of the authorities concerned to supply the relevant documents, as demanded, caused serious prejudice, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. I take note of the following averments made in this petition, which have gone un-rebutted. 7. The petitioner submits that thereafter, for a period of one year no action was initiated by the respondent authorities and therefore, the petitioner bonafidely believed that his request dated 5.4.1988 was considered and the charge sheet was withdrawn. However all of a sudden, the petitioner received a letter dated 24.5.1989 being No. DGM/VI/DA/HHD/149, whereby he was intimated that Shri J.N. Hala was appointed as Inquiry Officer to inquire into the charge sheet dated 9.11.1987. 8. The petitioner submit that petitioner immediately responded to said letter from respondent Board and wrote a letter to the Chief Engineer (Distribution) on 17.6.1989 in which he objected to the initiation of inquiry in absence of documents. He also objected to the inquiry in respect of 3 years old incidence and requested for withdrawal of charge-sheet. A copy of the letter dated 17.6.1989 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE F to this petition. 9. The petitioner submits that thereafter, no action was taken in respect of the said charge sheet for a period of 9 months. Therefore, again the petitioner reasonably believed that the charges were dropped. However, again the respondent authorities awoke from its slumber and on 14.3.1990, the petitioner was informed that he was required to remain present for inquiry on 22.3.1990. 10. The petitioner submits that all of a sudden the proceedings against the petitioner gained momentum because of the news item appeared in Gujarati daily news papers viz.: "Jansatta" and "The Times of India" leveling baseless allegations against the petitioner in respect of electric connections. The petitioner, therefore, instituted a criminal cases for defamation against the Editors and Reporters of those news papers on 8.10.1989. The news paper personnel therefore, approached and pressurized the respondent Board and as a result thereof, the petitioner was called by the Superintending Engineer, Palanpur Circle on 22.2.1990 to discuss the matter of the defamation proceedings filed by the petitioner against the news paper personnel. It is submitted that during the meeting, the petitioner was pressurized by the Superintending Engineer of respondent Board for withdrawal of defamation cases which were filed by him against the news paper personnel. It is submitted that during the meeting, the petitioner was pressurized by the Superintending Engineer of respondent Board for withdrawal of defamation cases which were filed by him against the news paper personnel. The petitioner was also informed by the Superintending Engineer that if the cases were not withdrawn, the petitioner would have to face the consequences. The petitioner refused to withdraw the defamation cases as it had adversely affected his reputation and therefore, all of a sudden on 14.3.1990, the proceedings against the petitioner in respect of said charge sheet dated 9.11.1987 gained momentum. A copy of the TA bill (sanctioned) of petitioner dated 22.2.1990 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-"G" to this petition to show that the petitioner was called for discussion of matter of the defamation proceedings. 11. The petitioner submits that in response to letter dated 14.3.1990, the petitioner remained present at Modasa on 22.3.1990. The petitioner had objected before the Inquiry Officer on the same day and again requested Inquiry Officer to furnish documents before starting of the inquiry. A copy of the letter dated 22.3.1990 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE-'H' to this petition. It is submitted that on his taking objection to the proceedings the Inquiry Officer assured the petitioner that the documents would be furnished to him within a short time and therefore, the Inquiry was adjourned. 12. The petitioner submits that thereafter on 23.4.1990, the petitioner met with an accident when he was on his official duty. The accident resulted into permanent partial disability. As a result of the accident, the petitioner remained on leave upto 7.12.1990. After resuming his duties, the petitioner had again requested the Inquiry Officer vide his letter dated 17.1.1991 to supply him relevant documents. A copy of letter dated 17.1.1991 is annexed hereto and marked as ANNEXURE - I to this petition. Petitioner submits that pursuant to his letter dated 17.1.1991, he was supplied only two documents by the Inquiry Officer vide his letter dated 25.1.1991 and also informed the petitioner to remain present at Modasa on 12.2.1991 before the Inquiry Officer." 5. The dates and events narrated in this petition speaks volumes about the manner in which the inquiry was conducted and the petitioner was dealt with. 6. The dates and events narrated in this petition speaks volumes about the manner in which the inquiry was conducted and the petitioner was dealt with. 6. In State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 , the Supreme Court has explained, in detail, the basic principles of natural justice in the context of disciplinary inquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee. I may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court, as contained in paragraphs-32 and 33 as under; "32. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above discussion. [These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee]: (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudicate, including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudicate, including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision g expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity inspite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) herein-below is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory characters the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provisional which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirements either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived its then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirements either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived its then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not it or that the provision could no be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions [include the setting aside of the order of punishment], keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunkar. The ultimate test is always the same viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice -or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice [rule of audi alteram] and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between no opportunity" and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no hearing" "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid [one may call it "void" or a nullity if one chooses to]. In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule [audi alteram partem]. (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation [of a facet of the rule of audi alteram] has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other word in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this principle [No. 5] does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.] (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem [the primary principle of natural justice] the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and over-riding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. 33. Now, in which of the above principles does the violation of sub-clause (iii) concerned herein fall? In our opinion, it falls under Principles No. 3 and 4(a) mentioned above. Though the copies of the statements of two witnesses [Kaur Singh, Patwari and Balwant Singh] were not furnished, the respondent was permitted to peruse them and take notes therefrom more than three days prior to their examination. Of the two witnesses, Balwant Singh was not examined and only Kaur Singh was examined. The respondent did not raise any objection during the enquiry that the non-furnishing of the copies of the statements is disabling him or has disabled him, as the case may be, from effectively cross-examining the witnesses or to defend himself. The Trial Court has not found that any prejudice has resulted from the said violation. The Appellate Court has no doubt said that it has prejudiced the respondent's case but except merely mentioning the same, it has not specified in what manner and in what sense was the respondent prejudiced in his defence. The High Court, of course, has not refereed to aspect of prejudice at all." 7. I take notice of the fact that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are non speaking orders. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that specific grounds were raised before the Appellate Authority in this regard. The High Court, of course, has not refereed to aspect of prejudice at all." 7. I take notice of the fact that the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are non speaking orders. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that specific grounds were raised before the Appellate Authority in this regard. However, the same have been overlooked, and by an order, running in four lines, the Appellate Authority disposed of the appeal by modifying the punishment, i.e., from withholding of two increments with cumulative effect to that of one increment without cumulative effect. 8. In the overall view of the matter, I am convinced that the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and are hereby quashed. The consequential effect of quashing of the two orders shall be looked into by the authorities concerned, and they shall act accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 9. Direct service is permitted.