JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. All these writ petitions involved the issue which pertains to Industrial Disputes raised by the workmen for their regularization under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 giving rise to I.D. Case No. 16 of 1969 and as such all the cases have been directed to be heard together and accordingly heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. W.P.(C) Nos.10540, 5859, 5861, 5862, 5863, 5864, 5865, 5866, 5867, 5868, 5869, 5870, 5871, 5872, 5873, 5874, 5875, 10541, 10543, 10544, 10545, 10546, 10547, 10548, 10555, 10838, 10849, 10840, 10841, 10843, 10844, 10846, 10847, 10848, 10850, 10867, 16206, 16208, 16213, 16215 & 10839 of 2015 having been filed by the Management of M/s.Steel Authority of India Limited, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela (herein after referred as writ petitions preferred by the Management) in which the order passed U/s.33-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in different miscellaneous applications pertaining to I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 has been challenged whereby and where under the maintainability of the application filed by the workmen U/s.33-A has been questioned. 3. W.P.(C) Nos.14098, 14099, 14100, 14101, 14102, 14103, 14104, 14105, 14106, 14107, 14108, 14109, 14110, 14111, 14112, 14113, 14114, 14115, 14116, 14117, 14118, 14119, 14120, 14189, 14190, 14191, 14192, 14193, 14194, 14195, 14196, 14197, 14198, 14199, 14200, 14201, 14202, 14203, 15105 & 15106 of 2015 having been filed by the workmen (herein after referred to as writ petitions filed by the workmen) wherein the workmen have questioned the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal on the application filed U/s.33-A of the I.D. Act, 1947 whereby and where under the Tribunal has refused to pass order for reinstatement of the workmen in service. 4. W.P.(C) No.153 of 2008 having been filed by the workman questioning the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal dtd.20.11.2007 whereby and where under the restoration application filed by the workmen has been held to be not maintainable and accordingly the petition has been dismissed. O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 having been filed by the Management, Steel Authority of India Limited, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela challenging the notification dtd.17th December, 1998 issued by the Labour and Employment Department, Government of Odisha. O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 having been filed by the Management, Steel Authority of India Limited, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela challenging the notification dtd.17th December, 1998 issued by the Labour and Employment Department, Government of Odisha. W.P.(C) No.10273 of 2014 having been filed by another group of workmen assailing the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal whereby and where under the proceeding arising out of I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 has been kept in abeyance till disposal of O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 filed by the Management. 5. The brief history of the cases is that a writ petition has been filed by the workmen, namely, R. K. Panda and Others before the Hon’ble Supreme Court being W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986 praying inter alia therein that they had been employed by the Steel Authority of India through various contractors at its Rourkela Plant, but they are doing jobs which are perennial in nature and identical to the jobs which are being done by the regular employees of the Management and as such they are entitled to same pay which is being paid to the regular employees of the Management and are entitled to be treated as the regular employees of the Management. It has been alleged that the Management in order to frustrate the claims of the workmen and other labourers similarly situated, to be treated as regular employees of the Management, designated them as contract labourers. According to them they had been working for the Management for the last 10 to 20 years under different contractors, the contractors used to be changed, but while awarding the contract, one of the terms incorporated in the agreement used to be “the incoming contractors shall employ the workers of the respective outgoing contractors subject to the requirement of the job”. In the said agreement it has been stated that the parties shall be governed by the provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 as well as Payment of Bonus Act but one of the terms of the agreement is that incoming contractors shall employ the workers of outgoing contractor. The Hon’ble Apex Court while disposing of the writ petition has found that due to different interim orders passed, many contract labourers have continued with the Management. Such contract labourers had been employed in 246 jobs in the Steel Plant. The Hon’ble Apex Court while disposing of the writ petition has found that due to different interim orders passed, many contract labourers have continued with the Management. Such contract labourers had been employed in 246 jobs in the Steel Plant. Out of them 104 jobs have been identified in which the contract labour has been abolished, but in 142 jobs the contract labour is being continued and the contract labourers are continuing by virtue of interim order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the submission of learned counsel representing the Management to the effect that there are 879 workmen holding notified jobs with the Management and the Management is ready to give options to all of them either to accept voluntary retirement on the terms offered by the Management or agree to absorb on the regular basis in the employment of Management, the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration entire aspect of the matter passed some directions, the Management has given effect to the directions passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred herein above, 310 workers working in 23 category of jobs claimed parity with the contract employees who were benefited as per direction issued by Hon’ble Apex Court in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986, the matter having not been settled, dispute has been raised, conciliation having been failed on 16.11.1996, the same has been referred before the appropriate Government by the conciliating officer to pass appropriate order U/s.12(5) of the I.D. Act, 1947. On 23.11.1996 retrenchment notice has been issued to the 104 workers who were found to be under the category of abolished jobs to the effect that they shall be retrenched w.e.f.31.12.1996, but in the meantime the appropriate Government has made a reference on 04.12.1996. While the matter was pending before the Industrial Tribunal being I.D. Case No.16 of 1996, a settlement was arrived at in between the Management and the Union on 31.8.1998 reaching to a settlement to give benefit as per direction passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986, but only restricted to 167 contract labourers and the Industrial Tribunal after taking into consideration the Memorandum of Settlement passed an award on 02.09.1998. The 104 workers having been retrenched from service w.e.f.31.12.1996 have filed interlocutory application being I.A. No.12 in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1996 seeking direction to take them back in regular employment from the date from which the other workmen were regularized pursuant to the order passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986 but the Hon’ble Apex Court, vide order dtd.13th September 2000, has rejected the application of 104 workers directing them to work out their remedies if available under relevant labour enactments or otherwise, if any and pursuant to the said direction, demand has been raised by them before the appropriate government and accordingly reference has been made on 18.09.2004, which has been registered as I.D. Case No.17 of 2004, to see the legality and propriety of the action of the Management of Steel Authority of India in retrenching 104 workers. Some of the retrenched workmen have made an application on 15.12.2004 praying to restore I.D. Case No.16 of 1996, but the same has been rejected by the Industrial Tribunal vide order dtd.20.11.2007 stating the reason that the Tribunal has got no power to review its own order and the petition has been held to be not maintainable and accordingly dismissed. The retrenched workmen have also filed application U/s.33-A of the I.D. Act, 1947 on 15.12.2004 in which an award was passed on 17.12.2014, entertaining the application U/s.33-A of the I.D. Act, 1947, holding therein the relationship of employee and principal employer, however, refused to reinstate the workmen in service on the ground that the writ petition has been filed before this court for their absorption which was pending at that time, hence declined to pass order regarding reinstatement. In these factual backgrounds these writ petitions have been filed by the Management challenging the order passed U/s.33-A of the I.D. Act, 1947 whereby and where under the Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela has been held to be the Principal Employer of the retrenched workmen who have been retrenched w.e.f. 31.12.1996 and the other set of the writ petitions have been filed by the workmen whereby and where under even after coming to the conclusion that there is relationship of employer and employee but refused to absorb them in services. 6. 6. The Management has filed writ petitions assailing the order passed U/s.33-A of the I.D. Act on the ground that the application is not maintainable for the reason that the workmen who are related with I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 which relates to regularization of 310 workmen working under a contractor against whom retrenchment notice was issued on 23.11.1996 for their retrenchment w.e.f. 31.12.1996 and the same has been given effect to from 31.12.1996, since the retrenchment notice was given on 23.11.1996 which was after failure of conciliation proceeding, i.e. on 16.11.1996, hence it cannot be said that the retrenchment notice, which had been given on 23.11.1996, was during pendency of the conciliation proceeding. It has been submitted that even the application filed U/s.33-A is not maintainable on the ground of pendency of reference which was made on 04.12.1996, as has been argued by the workmen that since they have been retrenched from 31.12.1996 as such on the date when retrenchment has been given effect to, i.e. on 31.12.1996, the reference was made on 04.12.1996, hence application U/s.33-A will be said to be maintainable, but rebutting this argument, it has been submitted by the learned counsel representing the Management that the 33-A application was filed on 15.12.2004 and on that date a separate case being I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 was pending as per the reference made on 08.09.2004 relating to their retrenchment which has already been given effect to on 31.12.1996 and as such even the award having been passed in I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 on 02.09.1998, thereafter the application has been filed U/s.33-A on 15.12.2004, hence it cannot be said that the application filed U/s.33-A was during pendency of I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 and further since in the I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 the reference is regarding retrenchment of the concerned workmen which has been made in pursuance to the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the behest of the retrenched workmen. Further it has been submitted that the 104 workmen have approached the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing interlocutory application in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986 but the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to interfere with the order of retrenchment, however, given liberty to work out their remedies in the enactments and in pursuance to the same the reference has been made being I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 whereby and where under the issue has been referred before the Tribunal to adjudicate regarding legality and propriety of the order of retrenchment dtd.31.12.1996 and as such if the application filed by the workmen U/s.33-A would be allowed to stand, then it will amounts to over-reaching the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, but this aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by the Tribunal and only on this ground itself the workmen are not entitled to get the benefit of reinstatement in the garb of an application filed U/s.33-A, rather they ought to have approached the Tribunal as per the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court, if they so wish, but they have not chosen to do so. It has been submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the original order passed in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986 has confined the benefit of the enactment only to 879 workmen holding notified jobs, i.e. under 142 jobs and since 104 jobs have been identified in which the contract labour has been abolished and the workmen belongs to that group, hence they cannot be given benefit even in pursuance to the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.K. Panda and Others decided on 12th May, 1994. 7. While on the other hand the submission advanced on behalf of the workmen is that the 33-A application is well maintainable before the Tribunal for the reason that the service condition of the workmen has been altered without seeking prior permission as stipulated U/s.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, since the retrenchment order was effective w.e.f. 31.12.1996 and before that the reference was there, i.e. on 04.12.1996 and as such it will be said that they have been retrenched during pendency of the dispute, hence the application U/s.33-A is well maintainable. It has been contended that 104 workmen who have been retrenched by order passed on 31.12.1996 had approached the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing interlocutory application but the Hon’ble Apex Court has rejected the same, however with liberty to work out their remedies under the Labour enactment and in pursuance of the same the reference was made on 08.09.2004 regarding adjudication of the retrenchment of 104 workmen, but these workmen are not participating in I.D. Case No.17 of 2004, even not party to the proceeding before Hon’ble Apex Court in the I.A. case, however, he has not disputed the fact that they belong to the Rourkela Shramika Sangh union. It has further been contended that the Tribunal after coming to the conclusion that the Steel Authority of India Ltd. of its Rourkela Steel Plant is the Principal Employer, however, refused to pass order of reinstatement merely on the ground of pendency of writ petition before this court and by doing this the tribunal has not followed the intent of the legislation as contained in Section 33-A of the Act. 8. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the documents available on record and the judgment relied upon. The writ petitions filed by the Management and the workmen are being taken up together wherein the question pertaining to legality and propriety of the order passed U/s.33-A has been challenged by both the parties. Before appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be relevant to state the undisputed fact of the cases. (i) R.K. Panda and Others, the workers working under Rourkela Steel Plant, a unit of Steel Authority of India Ltd. have filed writ petition before Hon’ble Apex Court being W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986, decided on 12th May 1994 praying therein to give them parity with the regular employees working under the Management. (i) R.K. Panda and Others, the workers working under Rourkela Steel Plant, a unit of Steel Authority of India Ltd. have filed writ petition before Hon’ble Apex Court being W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986, decided on 12th May 1994 praying therein to give them parity with the regular employees working under the Management. The Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the fact that out of 246 jobs in the Steel Plant 104 jobs have been identified for its abolition and in 142 jobs the contract labour is being continuing, the workmen being 879 in number, the Management has conceded before the Hon’ble Apex Court that they are ready to absorb by giving options to such workmen for their voluntary retirement and after taking into consideration this concession the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to pass following directions:- (i) All labourers, who had been initially engaged through contractors but have been continuously working with the respondent for the last 10 years on different jobs assigned to them in spite of the replacement and change of the contractors, shall be absorbed by the respondent, as their regular employees subject to being found medically fit and if they are below 58 years of age, which is the age of superannuation under the respondent. (ii) While absorbing them as regular employees their inter se seniority shall be determined department/job-wise on the basis of their continuous employment. (iii) They will not be entitled to the difference in their contractual and regular wages till the date of their absorption. After absorption as regular employees, they shall be paid wages, allowances etc. on a par with their counterparts, working as regular employees with the respondent. If in respect of any group of contract labourers, no rate of wages or emoluments have been fixed by the respondent because those jobs had not been performed by the regular employees of the respondent in the past, the contract labourers so absorbed for performing the said jobs, shall be paid at the minimum rate payable to the unskilled workmen, doing other similar jobs. (iv) After absorption, the contract labourers will be governed exclusively by the terms and conditions prescribed by the respondent for its own employees irrespective of any existing contract or agreement between the respondent and the contractors. (iv) After absorption, the contract labourers will be governed exclusively by the terms and conditions prescribed by the respondent for its own employees irrespective of any existing contract or agreement between the respondent and the contractors. No claim shall be made by the contractors against the respondent for premature termination of their contracts in respect of the contract labourers. (v) The benefit of absorption shall not be extended to contract labourers who in terms of this Court's order referred to above have taken voluntary retirement on payment of the retrenchment compensation. (vi) The respondent shall be at liberty to retrench workmen so absorbed, in accordance with law. This order shall not be pleaded as a bar to such retrenchment. (vii) If there is any dispute in respect of the identification of the contract labourers to be absorbed as directed above, such dispute shall be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), on material, produced before him by the parties concerned. (viii) This direction shall be operative only in respect of 142 jobs out of 246 jobs, in view of the fact that contract labour has already been abolished in 104 jobs. (ix) This order does not relate to the persons who have already been absorbed. (x) The persons, who had been retrenched, but in terms of the directions of this Court, have been taken back, shall also be entitled to the benefit of this order. If there is any dispute in respect of the identity of such persons, that shall also be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). (xi) For the purpose of calculating the payment of retrenchment benefit, in the event of their retrenchment, hereafter, the 10 years' period aforesaid shall be counted, in respect such retrenched persons, although they are absorbed after the passing of this order. (xii) This order shall be complied with by the respondent within four months from today.” From the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.K. Panda (supra) it is evident that 246 jobs have been identified out of them 104 have been identified for its abolition and accordingly it has been abolished, in pursuance to the direction passed by Hon’ble Apex Court regarding the benefit to be given for their regularization or voluntary retirement to the workmen under 142 jobs, i.e. 879 workmen have been given the said benefit. (ii) The 310 workmen have raised dispute claiming parity with that of workmen who have been regularized in terms of the order of Hon’ble Apex Court and reference has been made to the effect “whether 310 contract labourers (as per list) working in 23 categories of jobs (as per list) in M/s. Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela are entitled for regularization in service under the principal employer, i.e. M/s. Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela? If so, what would be the details?” The said reference was registered as I.D. Case No.16 of 1996. The reference was made after the failure report having been submitted on 16.11.1996, on 23.11.1996 notice of retrenchment has been given to 104 workmen pertaining to the identified jobs in which the contract labour has been abolished. The contents of the notice dtd.23.11.1996 is that the contract labourers working against specific jobs are notified that their services will no more be required after 31.12.1996 and as such all have been notified to collect their final dues on 31.12.1996 between 3 P.M. to 4 P.M. at Town Services Building. I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 wherein the reference was made on 4.12.1996 and the retrenchment order has been given w.e.f. 31.12.1996 pursuant to the retrenchment notice issued on 23.11.1996. (iii) While I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 was pending a Memorandum of Settlement was arrived at on 31.8.1998 between the Management of Rourkela Steel Plant and Rourkela Shramika Sangha representing the contract labours whereby and where under the workers working on that date were found to be 167 in number since balance 8 jobs including 4 prohibited jobs have been closed and no contract labour is working, 7 jobs appearing in the prohibited category, not connected with the industrial dispute, no contract labour is working in 5 jobs since the contracts have already been closed and only 10 contract labours are working in two of the job contracts and taking into consideration this aspect of the matter the voluntary separation scheme of 167 contract labours engaged by contractors in 14 job contracts to opt for the benefits under the scheme. The workmen who will not opt for separation and if below 58 years of age shall be considered for employment in regular cadre. The Labour Court, after taking into consideration the bipartite settlement arrived at during pendency of the dispute, has passed the award in terms thereof on 02.09.1998. The workmen who will not opt for separation and if below 58 years of age shall be considered for employment in regular cadre. The Labour Court, after taking into consideration the bipartite settlement arrived at during pendency of the dispute, has passed the award in terms thereof on 02.09.1998. (iv) 104 workmen who have been retrenched by virtue of notice dtd.23.11.1996 w.e.f.31.12.1996 have approached before the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing interlocutory application being I.A. No.12 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.617 of 1986 wherein the order of retrenchment was also subject matter but the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to reject the application, however, with the liberty to the parties to work out their remedies under labour enactments or otherwise. Pursuant to the direction passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in I.A. No.12 in W.P.(C) No. 617 of 1986 the workmen have approached the appropriate Government questioning the order of retrenchment having given effect to w.e.f.31.12.1996 and the appropriate Government has made reference to the effect “whether the action of Management of Steel Authority of India, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela in retrenching the 104 workmen (as per list enclosed) is legal and or justified? If not, what relief these workmen are entitled to ?” (v) Some of the workmen, who are the petitioner herein, have filed an application for restoration of I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 vide their application dtd.15.12.2004 praying therein to set aside the award, restore the case and hear the dispute afresh on merit, but the said application was rejected vide order dtd.20.11.2007 stating the reason that the Industrial Tribunal has no power to review its own order and as such held to be not maintainable. (vi) Separate application has been filed U/s.33-A of the I.D. Act, 1947 alleging therein that order of retrenchment w.e.f.31.12.1996 since been done during pendency of proceeding in I.D. Case No.16 of 1996, as such there is violation of provision of Section 33-A of the I.D. Act, 1947 and the Tribunal has passed order on 20.12.2014 coming to conclusion that the G.M. (P & A), Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela is the principal employer of the complainant and there is contravention of Section 33-A holding maintainability of the application filed U/s.33-A, but however the order of reinstatement has not been passed on the ground that writ petition for absorption is subjudiced before this court. In the light of these admitted position the argument of learned counsels for respective parties have been appreciated and before answering the same it would be relevant to go through the provision of section 33 and 33-A which are being reproduced here under as:- “33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.- (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall— (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman],-- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute— (a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub-section, a “protected workman", in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being a[ member of the executive or other office bearer] of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf. (4) In every establishment, the number of workmen to be recognised as protected workmen for the purposes of sub-section (3) shall be one per cent. of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the appropriate Government may make rules providing for the distribution of such protected workmen among various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which the workmen may be chosen and recognised as protected workmen. (5) Where an employer makes an application to a conciliation officer, Board, [an arbitrator, a] Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to sub- section (2) for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, [within a period of three months from the date of receipt of such application], such order in relation thereto as it deems fit:] [Provided that where any such authority considers it necessary or expedient so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as it may think fit: Provided further that no proceedings before any such authority shall lapse merely on the ground that any period specified in this subsection had expired without such proceedings being completed.]” “33A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceedings.- Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings [before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, [in the prescribed manner,-- (a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such industrial dispute; and (b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.]” From perusal of the statutory provision as contained in Section 33 which makes it clear that the provisions are intended to be applied during the pendency of any proceeding either in the nature of conciliation proceeding or in the nature of proceeding by way of reference made under Section 10. The pendency of the relevant proceeding is thus one of the conditions prescribed for the application of Section 33. Section 33(1) shows that the provisions of the said sub-section protect workmen concerned in the main dispute which is pending conciliation or adjudication. The effect of sub-section (1) is that where the conditions precedent prescribed by it are satisfied, the employer is prohibited from taking any action in regard to matters specified by clause (a) and (b) against employees concerned in such dispute without the previous express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. In other words, in cases falling under sub-section (1), before any action can be taken by the employer to which reference is made by clause (a) and (b), he must obtain the express permission of the specified authority. In the light of this statutory provision the fact of this case is to be appreciated. 9. Admittedly in this case conciliation proceeding was initiated for regularization of 310 workmen. In the light of this statutory provision the fact of this case is to be appreciated. 9. Admittedly in this case conciliation proceeding was initiated for regularization of 310 workmen. Conciliation was failed on 16.11.1996, failure report was submitted before the appropriate Government under the provision of Section 12(4) of the I.D. Act, 1947. The appropriate Government in exercise of its power conferred U/s.12(5) of the I.D Act has made a reference on 04.12.1996. 10. The other admitted fact is that notice of retrenchment was issued on 23.11.1996 for retrenchment of workers to be retrenched w.e.f.31.12.1996 with a direction to collect their dues on 31.12.1996, for ready reference the contents of notice dtd.23.11.1996 is reproduced herein below:- “It is hereby notified for information of all concerned that consequent upon closure of the job contract with Rourkela Steel Plant, vide letter No. TS/CE/17982-85, dtd.21.11.1996 of Dy. Manager (Admn.) T.S., the contractor’s establishment is going to be closed on and from 31.12.96. The following contract labours working against the above job contract are hereby notified that their services will no more be required after 31.12.96. All the contract labours are hereby notified to collect their final dues on 31.12.1996 between 3.00 PM to 4.00 PM at Town Services Building. xxxx” Thus it is evident that the notice contains the effective date of retrenchment, i.e. after 31.12.1996. Admittedly, conciliation failed on 16.11.1996 and the notice of retrenchment was given on 23.11.1996, hence as on the date of notice of retrenchment there was no conciliation proceeding pending before the conciliating officer since failure report has already been submitted on 16.11.1996. 11. Learned counsel arguing for the workmen in order to demonstrate his case has submitted that the application U/s.33-A is maintainable for the reason that the notice of retrenchment has actually been given effect to on 31.12.1996 and before that the reference was made on 04.12.1996 and during pendency of the dispute the order of retrenchment has been effected after 31.12.1996, even if he has filed application U/s.33-A on 15.12.2004 it is immaterial, since the cause of action has already arisen way back on 31.12.1996, hence the application U/s.33-A can be filed at any time. But this contention is not acceptable to us for the reasons:- (i) Save and except the notice of retrenchment dtd.23.11.1996 no other order has been issued for retrenchment. But this contention is not acceptable to us for the reasons:- (i) Save and except the notice of retrenchment dtd.23.11.1996 no other order has been issued for retrenchment. the notice dtd.23.11.1996 clearly stipulates that since the jobs under which the workmen are working have been notified for its abolition, as such their services will no more be required after 31.12.1996, hence had been notified informing the contract labourers to collect their final dues on 31.12.1996 and as such the effective date of alteration in the service condition will be said to be the notice dtd.23.11.1996 which was admittedly after failure of conciliation proceeding and before reference dtd.4.12.1996, hence the application U/s.33-A cannot be said to be maintainable since it was after the failure of conciliation proceeding and before the reference having been made by the appropriate Government. (ii) The retrenched workmen who were 104 in numbers had approached before the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of filing interlocutory application in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986 wherein the question of retrenchment was also one of the subject matters, but the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to interfere with the order of retrenchment by observing therein as follows:- “When the matter was pending before this Court several directions have been given by this Court including the one made on 06.8.1992 to which we have adverted to wherein 879 workmen holding notified jobs were given the option either to take voluntary retirement or to get absorbed on regular basis. However, the matter was finally disposed of by making it clear that the direction issued in the case will be applicable only in respect of 142 jobs out of 246 jobs in view of the fact that contract labour has been abolished in respect of 104 jobs. Cause of action, if any, for the petitioner has arisen by their alleged retrenchment made on 31.12.1996. In the circumstances, particularly when in respect of certain employees, industrial dispute had also been raised and a settlement had been reached pursuant to which an award is made, if the applicants were aggrieved they should have adopted that course as indicated by this Court to be the normal course and what other employees have adopted in the Industrial Dispute Case No.16 of 1996. Therefore, we think that it would not be appropriate to allow this application, but it is made clear that it is appropriate for the applicants to work out their remedies if available under relevant labour enactments or otherwise, if any. Xxxx” Pursuant to the direction of Hon’ble Apex Court the 104 retrenched workmen out of which the workmen - petitioners were also belong, had made application before the Appropriate Government and thereafter a fresh reference was made being I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 for adjudication of issue as to “whether the action of management of SAIL, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela in retrenching the 104 workmen (as per list enclosed) is legal and or justified? If not, what relief these workmen are entitled to?” and as such the issue of retrenchment dtd.31.12.1996 has itself became the subject matter of reference before the Industrial Tribunal and if the application filed by the workmen – petitioners herein will be allowed by way of an application filed U/s.33-A, then it will be said to be answering the reference before its adjudication in the original reference, i.e. I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 or it will become infructuous. (iii) The provision of Section 33 or 33-A contains the provision not to alter the service condition of the workmen during pendency of a conciliation proceeding or the dispute which is pending for its adjudication and here in this case 33-A application has been filed on 15.12.2004 which is after the reference having been made on 08.09.2004 which is subject matter of I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 and as such on this ground also the application U/s.33-A is not maintainable. (iv) When the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to entertain the interlocutory application filed by the workmen giving liberty to work out their remedy under labour enactments and if the application filed U/s.33-A will be allowed granting ante-status to the workmen, then it will amount to over reaching the direction passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in I.A.12 in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986. Learned counsel representing the workmen has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vrs. Learned counsel representing the workmen has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vrs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors., reported in AIR 2002 SC 643 in order to demonstrate that violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is prohibited by the Legislature and any alteration in service condition in violation therein will be deemed to be nullity in the eye of law. We have examined the judgment rendered in Jaipur Zila Sahakari case, but that judgment is not applicable for the reason that the judgment exclusively deals with section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act which contains a provision of post approval of the order of dismissal by the Management after completion of domestic enquiry, but here the question involved is relating to the provision of section 33-A which contains provision of seeking prior permission of the Tribunal where there is pendency of conciliation proceeding or the dispute and as such the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the workmen is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The Tribunal has not appreciated this aspect while passing award in the application filed U/s.33-A that the question of retrenchment is pending for adjudication before it and any order passed U/s.33-A will prejudice the original dispute pending before it. In the entirety of facts and circumstances of this case the Tribunal has not passed the award in its right perspective and as such taking into consideration this aspect of the matter the award passed by the Tribunal in the application filled U/s.33-A in all the I.D. Misc. cases are not sustainable and accordingly quashed for the reason the Tribunal in the matter of an application U/s.33-A has decided the issue as to whether the G.M., Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela is the principal employer of the complainant while the original proceeding is pending in the shape of I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 and further on the ground that the Hon’ble Apex Court has declined to interfere with the order of retrenchment and if the order of retrenchment will be said to be nullity in the eye of law, then it will amounts to over reaching the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Accordingly the writ petitions being W.P.(C) Nos.10540, 5859, 5861, 5862, 5863, 5864, 5865, 5866, 5867, 5868, 5869, 5870, 5871, 5872, 5873, 5874, 5875, 10541, 10543, 10544, 10545, 10546, 10547, 10548, 10555, 10838, 10849, 10840, 10841, 10843, 10844, 10846, 10847, 10848, 10850, 10867, 16206, 16208, 16213, 16215 & 10839 of 2015 are allowed and W.P.(C) Nos.14098, 14099, 14100, 14101, 14102, 14103, 14104, 14105, 14106, 14107, 14108, 14109, 14110, 14111, 14112, 14113, 14114, 14115, 14116, 14117, 14118, 14119, 14120, 14189, 14190, 14191, 14192, 14193, 14194, 14195, 14196, 14197, 14198, 14199, 14200, 14201, 14202, 14203, 15105 & 15106 of 2015 are dismissed. However, the workmen are at liberty to work out their remedy available under the labour enactment as per the direction already passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in I.A No.12, arising out of W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986. W.P.(C) No.153 of 2008 12. The question fell for consideration in this case is the power of Industrial Tribunal as to whether the original application after passing of an award can be restored or reviewed for hearing afresh. Learned counsel representing the petitioner – workmen has submitted that the Industrial Tribunal has rejected the application without appreciating the fact that the application filed by them was not a review application, rather it is for restoration of I.D. case No.16 of 1996 to its original file for its adjudication as because the reference being I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 was related to 310 workmen out of which Memorandum of Settlement has been made in respect of 167 workmen on 31.08.1998 and on the basis of that Memorandum of Settlement the award has been passed without answering with respect to the fate of rest of the workmen, hence the award itself is defective and taking into consideration this aspect of the matter the restoration application has been filed to answer the reference, but without appreciating this aspect of the matter the restoration application has been rejected. It has further been contended that once the reference is made by the appropriate Government, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is duty bound to answer the reference in its entirety, but that has not been done in the instant case, as such the Tribunal ought to have restored I.D. Case No.16 of 1996 to its original file for its adjudication in its entirety. 13. 13. Learned counsel representing the Management, while on the other hand, has submitted that in the entire I.D. Act there is no provision to review or restore the I.D. case, that too when the award has been notified in the Official Gazette as because as per the provision of Section 17-A the award became enforceable after completion of one month from the date of notification in the Gazette notification and once it has been notified in the Official Gazette, the Tribunal will become functous officio and taking into consideration this statutory provision, the Tribunal has passed correct order. Learned counsel representing the Management has relied upon the same judgment as has been relied upon by the learned counsel representing the workmen, i.e. the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Vrs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 606 which has also been relied upon by the learned counsel representing the Management. 14. We have heard learned counsels for the parties at length. Before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties it is relevant to note herein that after the reference having been made by the Appropriate Government U/s.10 of the ID. Act, 1947 the Labour Court/National Tribunal/Industrial Tribunal proceeded in the matter for its adjudication. The Board/Tribunal will submit a report which is known as award as per the provision as contained in Section 16 of the I.D. Act, 1947 which shall be published by the Appropriate Government within 30 days from the date of its receipt under the provision of Section 17 of the I.D. Act, 1947. Under the provision of Section 17(A) an award shall become enforceable on expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication U/s.17 and it is the Appropriate Government, who in appropriate cases, has been authorized to take decision for making a declaration that the award shall not become enforceable on expiry of statutory period of 30 days. Under the provision of Section 17(A) an award shall become enforceable on expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication U/s.17 and it is the Appropriate Government, who in appropriate cases, has been authorized to take decision for making a declaration that the award shall not become enforceable on expiry of statutory period of 30 days. It is evident from the provision as contained in Section 17A of the Act, 1947 that the award once published in the Gazette notification shall become enforceable on expiry of 30 days save and except a declaration is to be made by the Central Government in the Official Gazette for the reason mentioned in the said provision and except that there is no provision in the I.D. Act for re-opening the issue once the award has been published and notified in the Official Gazette Notification. In the instant case the award has been passed on 2.9.1998 and after period of one month it has been notified in the official Gazette and as such became enforceable and after the award having been enforced, the application has been filed by the workmen – petitioners on 15.12.2004, i.e. after delay of about more than six years for restoration of the original dispute for its adjudication afresh, but the Labour Court, while rejecting the application, has not committed error for the reasons:- (i) The Award has been passed on 2.9.1998, after completion of a month period it has became enforceable and after that application has been filed after lapse of more than six years for its restoration which is not maintainable for the reason that the award became enforceable as per provision of Section 17(A) (1) of the I.D. Act, 1947, thereafter Labour Court/Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to review the same in the garb of restoration application. (ii) We have gone through the application filed by the workmen – petitioner wherein it has been specifically stated at paragraph 11 that the award is not in conformity with the law and by passing of such an award, the present petitions have been seriously prejudiced and subsequently at paragraph 12 it has been stated that unless the said reference is restored to file and heard afresh on merit, the present petitions shall suffer irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in any manner, on the basis of such submission prayer has been made to restore the case to file, also to hear the dispute afresh on merit and answer the reference in favour of the petitioners. It is evident from the pleading and prayer made in the application that in the garb of restoration application, the review of the award has been sought for. There is no dispute about the fact that review/revision is the creation of statute, unless provided, it cannot be exercised. Accordingly the Tribunal has committed no error in rejecting the application. (iii) So far as contention that the workmen will be prejudiced, it is not sustainable in view of the fact that the Hon’ble Apex Court, while rejecting the interlocutory application being I.A.12 filed in W.P.(C) No.617 of 1986, has protected their interest by giving liberty to them to work out their remedy under labour enactment and in pursuance of the same dispute has been raised in the shape of I.D. Case No.17 of 2004. (iv) Learned counsel representing the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Grindlays Bank Vrs. (iv) Learned counsel representing the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Grindlays Bank Vrs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (supra) to strengthen his argument that in the ends of justice the tribunal has got power to review or restore for the purpose of doing justice, but we after going through the said judgment, have found that the fact related to the said case was that the Tribunal had passed ex parte order on 9th December, 1976 and the award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India on 25th December 1976 but before its publication the application for setting aside the ex parte award has been filed by the respondent – workmen on 19th January 1977, i.e. before expiry of 30 days of its publication, taking into consideration this aspect of the matter the application has been entertained by the Tribunal which has been found to be just and proper, but the fact herein is entirely different for the reason that the award has been passed on 2nd September, 1998, became enforceable but the application for restoration has been filed after lapse of 6 years. i.e. much after the award enforced by publication of the same in the Official Gazette, hence the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel representing the petitioner – workmen is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. We have examined the other authoritative pronouncements pronounced by Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the power of the Labour Court or the Tribunal in setting aside the ex parte award, the judgments in this regard has been rendered in the case of Anil Sood –vs- Presiding Officer, Labour Court II reported in (2001) 10 SCC 534 ; Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi –vs- L.H. Patel and another reported in (2009)2 SCC 81 and Ram Shiroman Mishra –vs- Viswanath Panday reported in (2012) 8 SCC 575 . We, on examination of the facts of these cases, have found that the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the fact that no notice was served upon the management hence laid down therein that the Tribunal or the Labour Court can exercise power for passing of order of restoration of the dispute for hearing afresh. We, on examination of the facts of these cases, have found that the Hon’ble Apex Court after taking into consideration the fact that no notice was served upon the management hence laid down therein that the Tribunal or the Labour Court can exercise power for passing of order of restoration of the dispute for hearing afresh. In these judgments the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank has not been overruled, however due to divergent view taken by different Hon’ble Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court the matter has been referred before the Larger Bench as would be evident from the judgment in the case of Ram Shiroman Mishra –vs- Viswanath Panday(supra). In such situation, since the matter is pending before the Larger Bench in this respect, hence we thought it proper to apply the ratio of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court by assessing the facts and circumstances of the case and for that purpose we have taken note of the judgement rendered in the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Grindlays Bank Vrs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal (supra) since in this case the proposition is for invoking jurisdiction of the Tribunal for restoration of the application where the award has been passed and not been enforced in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the I.D.Act,1947 which provides enforcement of award on expiry of one month from the date of its Gazette Notification but fact of the case in hand is otherwise. The other reason for not putting reliance upon the judgments in the cases of Anil Sood –vs- Presiding Officer, Labour Court II(supra) ; Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi –vs- L.H. Patel and another(supra) and Ram Shiroman Mishra –vs- Viswanath Panday (supra) is that the facts and circumstances of these cases are quite different since in these cases no notice was served and taking into consideration of this aspect of the matter the proposition laid down that the Tribunal or the Labour Court in the ends of justice can restore for hearing of the matter afresh. Taking into consideration the grounds mentioned herein above and the factual aspects as narrated above, we found that the Tribunal has committed no error in passing the impugned award, accordingly the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.153 of 2008 is dismissed being devoid of merit. O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 15. Taking into consideration the grounds mentioned herein above and the factual aspects as narrated above, we found that the Tribunal has committed no error in passing the impugned award, accordingly the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.153 of 2008 is dismissed being devoid of merit. O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 15. This case has been filed by the Management, Steel Authority of India, Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela challenging the notification dtd.17th December 1998 on the ground that the said notification has been issued without complying the order passed by this court in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995 whereby and where under the notification dtd.09.05.1995 making some amendment in the notification dtd.30th March 1989 has been quashed on the ground that the rectification in the notification dtd.30th March 1989 has been made without following the principles of natural justice and without seeking leave of the Hon’ble Apex Court, if necessary, but the State Government in highly illegal and arbitrary manner have come out with the notification dtd.17th December, 1998 which is in super-session of the notification dtd.30th March 1989 and inserted the same condition as has been notified vide notification dtd.09.05.1995 which has been struck down by this court in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995 that too without seeking any leave of the Hon’ble Apex Court and without providing an opportunity of being heard as has been directed by this court, hence the notification dtd.17th December, 1998 is not sustainable. We have appreciated the argument advanced on behalf of the parties, gone through the record, the fact which is not in dispute is that the notification issued by the State Government on 30th March 1989 (Annexure-4) in exercise of power conferred U/s.1 of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 prohibiting 104 job categories, the notification issued on 09.05.1995 for making rectification in the notification dtd.30.03.1989 to the effect as follows:- “(i) for the word “cleaning” appearing in column (4) against serial No.49 and Job Serial Nos.79, 80 and 81 the words “Petty and Miscellaneous jobs” shall be substituted; and (ii) for the words “survey work” appearing in column (4) against Serial no.59 and Job serial no.103 the word “Guarding” shall be substituted.” The Management, Steel Authority of India Ltd. has challenged the notification dtd.9th May 1995 on the ground that the State Government has got no authority and jurisdiction to substitute any item in respect of which finality has been arrived at by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court while determining the self-same questions in respect of the abolition of contract labour and the notification is also violative of provisions of the Act and contrary to the principles of natural justice having been passed without providing an opportunity of being heard. The said writ petition has been registered as O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995 disposed of by a Division Bench of this court on 1st March, 1996 wherein following orders have been passed:- “15. Regard being had to the contentions and counter contentions, we are of the view that the acts done and/or caused to have been done by the State – opposite party to issue the impugned notification on the basis of the footing of rectification of mistakes, without giving opportunities to the Management, is bad in law and the same cannot be sustained. 16. For the foregoing reasons we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned notification. This judgment will not, however, prevent the appropriate authority and/or the State Government to take such steps for issuing a fresh notification after obtaining the leave of the Supreme Court, if necessary, or if the situation so permits to proceed with after giving opportunity of hearing to the Management and the workmen in accordance with law. This judgment will not, however, prevent the appropriate authority and/or the State Government to take such steps for issuing a fresh notification after obtaining the leave of the Supreme Court, if necessary, or if the situation so permits to proceed with after giving opportunity of hearing to the Management and the workmen in accordance with law. No order as to costs.” The State Government has issued a fresh notification on 17th December 1998 which is in super-session of the notification dtd.30th March 1998 and 9th May 1995 (which has been questioned by this court in O.J.C. No. 3783 of 1995). The Management has challenged the notification dtd.17th December 1998 on the ground that this Court has passed order in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995 by quashing the notification dtd.9.5.1995 giving liberty to the appropriate authority/State Government to take steps for issuance of fresh notification after obtaining leave of the Hon’ble Apex Court, if necessary and if the situation so permits to proceed with after giving opportunity of hearing to the Management and the workmen in accordance with law. But the State Government before issuing the notification dtd.17th December, 1998 has neither taken leave of the Hon’ble Apex Court nor given opportunity of hearing to the parties and as such the said notification is not in consonance with the direction passed by this court in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995. The State Government have been noticed and the learned counsel representing the State has accepted notice for the State, however not filed counter affidavit but argued out the case at length. The factual aspect has not been disputed with respect to the order passed by this court, with respect to the fact that the State Government without appreciating the fact that the notification dtd.9.5.1995 which has already been quashed by Division Bench of this Court in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1998, but by virtue of fresh notification dtd.17th December 1998 which has been issued in super-session of the notification dtd.30th March 1989 has reiterated the same thing which is in the notification dtd.9.5.1995. Learned Additional Government Advocate very fairly submitted that the notification dtd.17th December 1998 is not in consonance with the direction passed by this court, however, he has submitted that the matter needs re-consideration by the competent authority and if the matter would be remitted back again, the order passed by this court in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995 shall be complied with. Taking into consideration this submission advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties and the materials available on record and taking into consideration the concession of the learned Additional Government Advocate representing State of Odisha, the notification dtd.17th December 1998 is not sustainable in the eye of law, accordingly quashed. However the State Government is directed to take steps as per the direction already passed by this Court in O.J.C. No.3783 of 1995 decided on 1st March 1996. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. W.P.(C) No.10273 of 2014 16. In this writ petition the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal on 24.02.2014 passed by the Industrial Tribunal by which the proceeding pertaining to I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 has been kept in abeyance till disposal of O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 on the ground that the Industrial Tribunal is duty bound to answer the reference once it has been referred by the Appropriate Government, but without appreciating this aspect of the matter, merely on the ground that O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 is pending, the entire proceeding of I.D. Case No.17 of 2004 has been kept in abeyance which is not proper and the matter is being delayed without any fault on their part. In view of the fact that O.J.C. No.729 of 1999 has been disposed of by us, the Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela is directed to proceed with the matter and take decision in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible taking into consideration the retrenchment order which has been passed in the year 1996. Accordingly all the writ petitions are disposed of. Interim orders if any shall stand vacated. Sanju Panda, I agree.