JUDGMENT : R.M. Chhaya, J. 1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner society has challenged the order dated 15.6.1990 passed by the Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals) [wrongly mentioned as 16.5.1990 in the prayer clause] and so also the order dated 4.5.1989 passed by the District Collector, Surat in Suo Motu Revision under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879. 2. Following noteworthy facts emerge from the record of the petition:-- "That, the petitioner is a registered Cooperative Society registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act and the members of the society have constructed about 284 industrial sheds for running their small scale units. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner purchased the land bearing survey No. 177/1 and 177/2 admeasuring 6 Acres and 13 Gunthas and 6 Acres and 15 Gunthas respectively situated at Village Majura, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat (now part of Surat Municipal Corporation) in an auction held in accordance with law by Special Recovery Officer vide order dated 22.5.1981. The record indicates that the petitioner society purchased the lands in question as an auction purchaser for Rs. 17,50,000/-. The record indicates that on the basis of the said sale having been confirmed in favour of the petitioner society, name of the society also came to be mutated in the revenue record. As per the case in the petition after the entry came to be mutated, the members of the society obtained permission for construction of industrial unit and as on the date of filing of the petition 100 to 120 plots were already put to use. The record further indicates that on the basis of the confirmation of sale, the sale certificate was issued in favour of the petitioner society by Special Recovery Officer on 22.5.1981 and on that basis, as indicated above, entries also came to be mutated in the revenue records. About 8 years after such confirmation of sale and sale certificate having been issued, by a notice dated 14.3.1989, the District Collector, Surat called upon the petitioner society to show cause mainly on the ground that the auction held on 22.5.1981 was without prior permission of the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The petitioner society appeared before the District Collector and the same culminated into an order dated 4.5.1989. The petitioner society appeared before the District Collector and the same culminated into an order dated 4.5.1989. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner society preferred a Revision as provided under Section 211of the Code which came to be registered as Revision Application No. 12 of 1989 which came to be dismissed vide order dated 15.6.1990 and being aggrieved by the said order, the present petition is filed." 3. It deserves to be noted that the present petition came to be admitted and the interim orders were stayed vide order dated 15.11.1990. However, the petition came to be dismissed for want of non-prosecution vide order dated 17.4.2000 and therefore, the petitioner filed Misc. Civil Application No. 1077 of 2011 which came to be allowed vide judgment dated 23.12.2013 and the main matter came to be restored. 4. Heard Mr. N.M. Kapadia, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Shirish Gohil, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State Government authorities. 5. Mr. N.M. Kapadia, learned advocate for the petitioner has raised the following contentions:-- 5.1 That, the very initiation of Suo Motu proceedings by the District Collector was beyond jurisdiction and the Suo Motu powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 have been exercised after a lapse of 8 years i.e. not within the reasonable period and therefore, on that ground alone, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.2 It is contended that the District Collector, in exercise of powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, has no authority to decide the issue relating to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and therefore, the very initiation of the proceedings under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 by the District Collector lacks jurisdiction. 5.3 Mr. Kapadia has relied upon the unreported judgment of this Court dated 17.8.1990 passed in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990 and has submitted that in identical fact situation, this Court has allowed the petition and quashed orders which were identical on facts and law and therefore, following the said judgment, the petition deserves to be allowed. 5.4 Mr. Kapadia submitted that the petitioner society is a bonafide purchaser in auction and have purchased the land in question way back on 14.4.1981. Mr. 5.4 Mr. Kapadia submitted that the petitioner society is a bonafide purchaser in auction and have purchased the land in question way back on 14.4.1981. Mr. Kapadia submitted as per the provisions of the Act, the sale certificate in favour of the petitioner society was also considered, but however, even though such facts were brought on record, the same are totally ignored by both the authorities and both the authorities have in fact failed to consider the documents and record of the case and have thereby committed an error apparent on the face of the record and hence, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.5 Mr. Kapadia further submitted that under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, the District Collector had no power or authority to reopen the auction sale which was conducted in accordance with law and cancel the same by passing the impugned order and such action is without jurisdiction and total non-application of mind on the part of the authorities. 5.6 It is submitted that the petitioner has brought on record by way of amendment the fact that by now about 284 industrial units are functioning on the land in question. Again relying upon the judgment of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990, it is submitted that even according to the zoning regulations under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, the lands in question are designated in industrial zone. It is therefore submitted that even between 1981 and 1989, all individual members of the petitioner society have not only developed the land in question but have incurred huge expenses for establishment of their industrial units for small scale units and therefore, even on the ground of equity, Suo Motu action which is ex-facie without jurisdiction could not have been initiated after lapse of more than 8 years and therefore, on facts as well as in law, both the orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. 5.7 Mr. Kapadia has also taken this Court through plethora of evidence which is produced by the petitioner to establish that the land in question is put to use. On the aforesaid grounds, it is therefore, submitted that the petition be allowed on the same lines of the judgment of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990. 6. Mr. On the aforesaid grounds, it is therefore, submitted that the petition be allowed on the same lines of the judgment of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990. 6. Mr. Shirish Gohil, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State Government authorities has supported the impugned orders. It is submitted that though the lands were purchased in auction, the fact remains that the lands in question were declared as surplus lands under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and any action taken under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would prevail upon the actions taken that too, even of a sale by proclamation under the State law. It is submitted that the District Collector has acted within its power and jurisdiction under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 and the notice dated 14.3.1989 came to be issued immediately after coming to know that such illegality having been committed in auctioning the lands. It is submitted that as the auction itself is bad and illegal and by connivance, the lands in question were put to auction, delay of 8 years would not defeat the Suo Motu actions taken by the District Collector. It is therefore submitted that the petition is misconceived and the same deserves to be dismissed. 7. No other or further contentions and/or submissions are made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 8. Having considered the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and the record of the petition, it appears that the petitioner society is an auction purchaser. The order dated 22.5.1981 clearly recites that the revenue authorities had undertaken exercise of recovery and had issued a certificate as provided under Section 106 of the Code. The said order recites that the upset price was fixed and public auction was held on 14.4.1981. The order further indicates that the petitioner society's bid of Rs. 17,50,000/- through his Chairman - Girish Hiralal Swami and the Secretary - Magan Narottam Patel was the highest and it was accepted. 9. The record clearly establishes the fact that on payment of the auction price of Rs. 17,50,000/-, the sale certificate came to be issued on 22.5.1981. The order further indicates that the petitioner society's bid of Rs. 17,50,000/- through his Chairman - Girish Hiralal Swami and the Secretary - Magan Narottam Patel was the highest and it was accepted. 9. The record clearly establishes the fact that on payment of the auction price of Rs. 17,50,000/-, the sale certificate came to be issued on 22.5.1981. The record clearly indicates, which is not denied by the respondent authorities, that the land in question is fully developed into the industrial estate which is quite evident from the evidence produced on record. Even as per the say of the petitioner in the petition even on the date of issuance of show cause notice, 100-120 plots were already developed. In order to verify the said fact, the Court had called upon the learned Assistant Government Pleader to verify and make a statement. Today, Mr. V.D. Patel, Surat City is present and on his instructions, the Court has informed that about 284 industrial units function on the land in question. In facts of the case therefore, the very exercise of powers i.e. Suo Motu under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 by issuing of notice dated 14.3.1989 is beyond the reasonable period. Mr. Kapadia, learned advocate for the petitioner has rightly relied upon the unreported judgment of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990, wherein in identical fact situation, an auction purchaser was subjected to Suo Motu Revision under Section 211 by the Collector and has observed thus:-- "Mr. Oza is right in his submissions. In State of Gujarat V. Patel Raghav Natha and others reported in AIR 1969 SC 1267 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the question of exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the State Government under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code in respect of the permission granted under section65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, held that the powers of revision under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code must be exercised within a reasonable time even though there is no period of limitation prescribed under section 211 of Bombay Land Revenue Code. In that case, three months time was considered to be quite reasonable period within which the revisional power should have been exercised. In that case, three months time was considered to be quite reasonable period within which the revisional power should have been exercised. This ratio was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Bhagwnji Bhawanji Patel V. State of Gujarat and another. XII GLR 156. wherein the Division Bench observed that the State Government cannot keep the sword hanging on any person in respect of his property by choosing to act and revise the order granting or allotting a plot of land, at its sweet will after Seven years. The Division Bench held that the maximum period for exercising the powers under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code cannot be more than a year from the date of allotment. In Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel V. State of Gujarat and others. XXV (2) GLR 1225, learned Single Judge of this Court held that the order of the revenue authority declaring the sale of a fragment to be null and void and summarily evicting the petitioner under section 9 (3) of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, after a period of seven years after sale was ex facie illegal, unreasonable and unjust. In another judgment of a learned Single Judge of this court in the case of paju Co-op? Housing Society Limited v. State of Gujarat and others. XXVI (2) GLR 1187, the exercise of powers under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code after lapse of about 5 1/2 years and after the petitioner had taken over possession of the land, put up construction there on and allotted flats to its members, was held to be unjust and illegal, inasmuch as the State Government did not exercise the powers within a reasonable time. In perhaps the latest judgment of this court in the case of (M/S.) Yashkamal Builders, Baroda v. State of Gujarat and others. 1989 (1) GLH 177 , it was held by the learned Single Judge of this court that the State Government could not have cancelled the permission granted under section 65 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code after lapse of about 4 1/2 years in view of the fact that the petitioner had put up construction on the land at a huge cost. It is therefore, repeatedly held that if such power of revision is permitted to be exercised after unduly long delay, the affected parties who would have materially altered their position would have to face irreparable injury, as during the long period, they would have irretrievably changed their position to their detriment. Where a power is conferred, the power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time. So the exercise of revisional power under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code by the Collector of Surat after a lapse of a period of eight years in the present case was absolutely unjust. While deciding the case under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, the Collector entered into the realm of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 which provides for its own independent machinery to adjudicate disputes. It is quite possible that an officer may be occupying different capacities under different enactments, but that would not justify the officer proceeding under a particular enactment to exercise his powers under an altogether different enactment. If the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act passes any order in respect of the lands in question. It would be obligatory for the revenue authority to implement such an order by effecting necessary entries in the revenue record. Mr. Oza, learned advocate for the petitioner, also appears to be right in his submission that the collector had no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Special Recovery Officer, who was exercising the powers of the Collector under Sections 149,150 and 155 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In fact, it is left for the Collector to recover the demands by way of arrears of land revenue and his orders during recovery would be revisable only by the State Government. The petitioner, therefore, succeeds on all these counts. The order of the Collector, Annexure C to the petition, in case No. 52/82, is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs." 10. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has not been able to point out anything from the record that the case on hand is different on facts and law. The order of the Collector, Annexure C to the petition, in case No. 52/82, is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs." 10. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has not been able to point out anything from the record that the case on hand is different on facts and law. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances arising in this case that after admission, the petition was dismissed and it has been restored after about 14 years in order to verify the present status as observed hereinabove, the Court deemed it fit to call for the details which indicates that about 284 industrial units function on the lands in question. Even the show cause notice as held by this Court was beyond the jurisdiction of the Collector under Section 211of the Code. While exercising the powers under Section 211 of the Code, the Collector had no authority or jurisdiction to pass the order considering the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. No actions are taken by the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and therefore, considering the ratio laid down by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990, the very initiation of the proceedings by the District Collector was without jurisdiction. It is an admitted position that the show cause notice was issued after a lapse of more than 8 years and therefore, the very initiation of action was beyond the reasonable period. Considering the catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court, such action without any explanation whatsoever deserves to be quashed and set aside. Adopting the reasonings of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 5516 of 1990 and the observations made hereinabove, the petition deserves to be allowed and is allowed. The order dated order dated 15.6.1990 passed by the Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals) as well as the order dated 4.5.1989 passed by the District Collector, Surat in Suo Motu Revision under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.