ORDER : Mr. Deepak Maheshwari, J. 1. This review petition has been filed by the appellant defendant Moti Ram in respect of judgment dated 03.09.2013 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in S.B. Civil First Appeal No.14/1989 whereby the appeal was dismissed. 2. Heard learned counsels for both the sides and perused the relevant documents as also the judgment dated 03.09.2013, which is under review. 3. Briefly stated, relevant facts are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a plaint for recovery of Rs.30,800/- mentioning that the petitioner defendant took a loan of Rs.20,000/- for his business on 19.5.1983 from him while mortgaging his shop. The rate of interest agreed upon was 2% per month. As the defendant could not pay of the loan, suit was filed which came to be decreed on 29.08.1988 by the 4. Learned trial Court for Rs.30,800/- and the interest @ 2% per month. The appeal was filed against the said judgment, which was decided by this Court vide judgment dated 03.09.2013 whereby the appeal was rejected and the judgment of the trial Court was maintained. Learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant has sought the review of the judgment dated 03.09.2013 mainly on three grounds. Firstly, it has been contended that the affidavits filed by the appellant with regard to the fact that the defendant was doing money lending business have been wrongly discarded by this Court on the ground that the appellant could not disclose the names of those deponents, who have sworn in those affidavits. In this regard, contention has been raised that the appellant was examined on 10.5.1988 whereas the affidavits were sworn in by the deponents on 16.1.1989 i.e. after eight months, thus, the appellant could not mention their names in his statements. This Court could not take note of this fact and, thus, the affidavits have been discarded which were filed with the application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC. 5. Secondly, it has been contended that the compromise, which took place between the parties on 09.01.2006 by which it was decided to square up the total debt liability for Rs.1,07,500/- has not been taken into consideration. This is an undisputed compromise, which must have been considered while passing the judgment. 6. Thirdly, the contention has been raised that provisions of Section 34 CPC have not been taken into consideration and applied in the facts of the case. This is an undisputed compromise, which must have been considered while passing the judgment. 6. Thirdly, the contention has been raised that provisions of Section 34 CPC have not been taken into consideration and applied in the facts of the case. Learned trial Court passed the decree on 29.08.1988 while allowing the interest @ Rs.2% per month i.e. 24% per annum on the principal amount of Rs.20,000/- This Court while rejecting the appeal preferred by petitioner/ appellant, has upheld the said judgment dated 29.08.1988 while ignoring the provisions of Section 34 CPC. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant has also referred some judgments in support of his contentions mentioned above. 8. Learned counsel appearing for non-petitioner/ respondent has argued that the application under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC filed by the appellant has been rightly rejected vide order dated 03.09.2013. The deponents were never examined during trial. The genuineness and correctness of their signatures on the affidavits could have not been verified at the stage on which the affidavits were produced. Such affidavits could have not been filed at the stage of deciding the appeal, hence, there was no occasion to consider these documents. Likewise, the alleged compromise dated 09.01.2006 was not required to be considered by the first appellate Court while passing the judgment. The so called compromise was not honourned by the appellant, hence, no prayer can be made in this review petition on the ground of the same. 9. So far as the rate of interest and provisions of Section 34 CPC is concerned, it has been argued that interest has been awarded at the rate agreed upon between the parties. No contention was raised in this regard before the learned trial Court as well as this Court. At last, it has been prayed that the review petition be dismissed. 10. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has also referred the judgment passed in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Ors., reported in 2014 DNJ (SC) p.40. 11. I have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by both the sides in the light of the judgments referred by them. 12. 10. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner has also referred the judgment passed in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Ors., reported in 2014 DNJ (SC) p.40. 11. I have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by both the sides in the light of the judgments referred by them. 12. So far as the application filed under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC is concerned by which affidavits of Khumdas, Himmat Singh, Arjun Das, Mangal Singh and Nawab Khan were produced, they were more in the nature of the evidence, which were required to be produced by the appellant during trial. This Court, while rejecting the application as well as civil first appeal, has observed that no satisfactory explanation has been furnished as to why these deponents were not examined as witnesses before the trial Court. These affidavits have not been discarded simply on the ground that the appellant could not disclose the names of these persons in his evidence but other reasons have also been mentioned in the judgment such as the relevant documents verifying the fact of taking loan by these persons from the respondent have not been annexed with these affidavits. These affidavits have also been discarded being unreliable and having no evidentiary value. Moreover, it is not an appeal wherein sufficiency of reasons assigned in the judgment for not relying upon these affidavits is to be scrutinized. In these circumstances, in my considered opinion, this cannot be a ground on which the judgment can be reviewed as prayed. 13. Compromise dated 09.01.2006, as alleged to have been reached between the parties, has also taken place after the judgment passed by learned trial Court on 29.08.1988. As contended by learned counsel for the respondent/non-petitioner, this compromise has also not been honoured by the petitioner and that is why first appeal has been decided on merits. Moreover, any such compromise cannot be a ground for review of the judgment passed on the merits of the case. Thus, this plea is also not tenable. 14. So far as the scope of review is concerned, judgment delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kamlesh Verma (supra) is worth consideration. In para 16 of the judgment, grounds on which the review petition is maintainable, as also not maintainable have been explained. Thus, this plea is also not tenable. 14. So far as the scope of review is concerned, judgment delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kamlesh Verma (supra) is worth consideration. In para 16 of the judgment, grounds on which the review petition is maintainable, as also not maintainable have been explained. Taking recourse to these principles as also the provisions contained in Order 47 CPC, this Court is of the view that the above mentioned two grounds on which the review petition has been moved cannot be said to be valid grounds for the review. 15. With regard to the scope of review, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the judgment delivered in case of M. Shankaraiah & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC p.596. In this judgment, the expression "for any other sufficient reason" has been given an expanded meaning. It has also been held that the Court is not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for the sake of justice. 16. Similarly in case of Rajender Singh v. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands & Ors., reported in 2005 (13) SCC p.289, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the claim of the petitioner is not accepted and he will suffer immeasurable loss and injury, then the Court should not hesitate to exercise the power of review. 17. In the judgment in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Allied Beverages Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2010) 10 SCC p.640, Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue, which is pertinent in this matter in hand. The rate of interest which is justified to be awarded in a money suit has been elaborately discussed and decided in view of the provisions contained in Section 34 CPC. Relevant part of para-39 of the judgment reads as under:- "39. Mulla on the Code of civil Procedure (1995 Edn.) sets out three divisions of interest as dealt in Section 34 CPC. Relevant part of para-39 of the judgment reads as under:- "39. Mulla on the Code of civil Procedure (1995 Edn.) sets out three divisions of interest as dealt in Section 34 CPC. The division is according to the period for which interest is allowed by the court, namely.-(1) interest accrued prior to the institution of the suit on the principal sum adjudged; (2) additional interest on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, at such rate as the court deems reasonable; (3) further interest on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the decree to the date of the payment or to such earlier date as the courts thinks fit, at a rate not exceeding 6 per cent per annum. Popularly the three interests are called pre-suit interest, interest pendente lite and interest post-decree or future interest. Interest for the period anterior to institution of suit is not a matter of procedure; interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law (see Secy., Irrigation Deptt., Govt of Orissa v. G.C. Roy SCC para 44-iv). In conclusion, the Constitution Bench formulated certain principles. They are: (1) … … … … (2) … … … … (3) … … … … (8) Award of interest pendente lite and post-decree is discretionary with the court as it is essentially governed by Section 34 CPC dehors the contract between the parties. In a given case if the court finds that in the principal sum adjudged on the date of the suit the component of interest is disproportionate with the component of principal sum actually advanced the court may exercise its discretion in awarding interest pendente lite and post-decree interest at a lower rate or may even decline awarding such interest. This discretion shall be exercised fairly, judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary or fanciful manner." 18. In view of above principles, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court that pursuant to the decree passed by the trial Court in this matter for the principal amount of loan of Rs.20,000/-, execution petition has been filed by the respondent plaintiff for a sum of Rs.77,96,470/-. Copy of which has been filed by him. In view of above principles, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court that pursuant to the decree passed by the trial Court in this matter for the principal amount of loan of Rs.20,000/-, execution petition has been filed by the respondent plaintiff for a sum of Rs.77,96,470/-. Copy of which has been filed by him. He has contended that learned trial Court has awarded the rate of interest @ 24% per annum in complete disregard to the provisions contained in Section 34 CPC. Such erroneous rate of interest has been maintained by this Court while dismissing the first appeal vide judgment dated 03.09.2013. These facts are substantiated, if we look the contents of the plaint. A loan of Rs.20,000/- was taken by the appellant defendant from respondent plaintiff on 19.5.1983 for his business on the agreed rate of interest @ 2% per month i.e. 24% per annum. Learned trial Court awarded the amount of interest at this rate from 19.5.1986 till realization of whole amount. The said judgment has been upheld by this Court vide judgment dated 03.09.2013 whereby the said rate of interest has also been upheld. It appears that either the contention regarding the rate of interest has not been specifically agitated in the first appeal or it has skipped the attention of this Court while upholding the judgment of learned trial Court. 19. It is worthy to note that provisions contained in Section 34 CPC, which reads as follows:- 34. Interest. It appears that either the contention regarding the rate of interest has not been specifically agitated in the first appeal or it has skipped the attention of this Court while upholding the judgment of learned trial Court. 19. It is worthy to note that provisions contained in Section 34 CPC, which reads as follows:- 34. Interest. – (1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit: Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions.? 20. It is not disputed that the loan was taken by appellant for his business. Thus, as per the proviso to Section 34 CPC, the rate of further interest may exceed 6% per annum but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest, which is 24% per annum. But the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in Central Bank of India v. Ravindra & Ors., reported in (2002) 1 SCC p.367, as followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Punjab & Sind Bank (supra), propounds that if the component of interest is disproportionate with the component of principal sum actually advanced, the court may exercise its discretion in awarding interest pendente lite and post-decree interest at a lower rate or may even decline awarding such interest. The discretion should be exercised fairly, judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary and fanciful manner. 21. The discretion should be exercised fairly, judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary and fanciful manner. 21. Here in this matter in hand, the component of interest amount appears to be not only disproportionate but enormously large and rather oppressive. The loan of Rs.20,000/- taken in the year 1983 has resulted in filing the execution proceedings by the respondent for Rs.77,96,470/- against the petitioner/appellant. This fact regarding the execution petition has not been controverted by the learned counsel for respondent. 22. Thus, following the principles laid down in case of M. Shankaraiah (supra), it appears to be a fit case where the power of review needs to be exercised so far as the rate of interest is concerned for the sake of justice. 23. In case of Punjab & Sind Bank (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has approved the view of High Court to fairly neutralize the claim of the Bank as well as the sufferings of the loanee Company and upheld the workable order passed by the High Court for reducing the rate of simple interest to 14% per annum in respect of the period pendente lite and future interest w.e.f. the date of which the Bank filed the application before the DRT. 24. Following the above principles, it appears reasonable to reduce the rate of interest from 24% per annum to 14% per annum with simple interest in this matter also from the date of filing the suit. 25. In view of the above discussions, this review petition is partly allowed to the extent that the rate of interest awarded by learned trial Court and upheld by the judgment of this Court is modified @ 14% per annum simple interest. Rest of the judgment dated 03.09.2013 shall remain as it is. The review petition stands disposed of accordingly. Review petition partly allowed.