JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2045 of 2014 dated 14.07.2015 whereby, petition preferred by this appellant was dismissed, hence, the original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix This appellant, M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan and several other persons are ready to serve this institution which is most important difficulty. Every body is narrating himself as best servant of this institution and one of them is this petitioner and another is respondent no.4 and still 3rd party is also there namely, Rajesh Kumar. Their anxiety to serve this appellant-M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan has given rise more than half a dozen litigations. It is alleged by this appellant that Jyoti Swarup is claiming to be the President of this appellant-M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan. That one Rajesh Kumar, who was the Treasurer, has resigned from the M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan and similar situated two other persons had also resigned, and therefore, an application was preferred, which is at Annexure-10 to this memo of this Letters Patent Appeal, before the Inspector General (Registration) on 07.10.2007 under Section 4A of the Society Registration Act, 1860. As several persons had resigned from the appellant-M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan, an application was needed to be filed and ultimately Inspector General (Registration) allowed this amendment which was carried out on 05.11.2007. Thus, on 07.08.2006 and 31.08.2007, respondent no.4 as well as one Rajesh Kumar and one more person who had resigned from the appellant-M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan and necessary amendment was carried out on 05.11.2007. Respondent no.4 as well as one more person who resigned from this appellant-M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan filed a title suit being Title Suit No.268 of 2007 before the lowest available Civil Courts, i.e., the Court of Munsif, Ranchi and the suit is pending. On 09.01.2010 one Rajesh Kumar, who also resigned, preferred an application for amendment before the Inspector General (Registration). The Inspector General (Registration) allowed such type of application preferred by Rajesh Kumar without proper verification and without looking to the earlier order dated 07.10.2007 and without joining Jyoti Swarup as party respondent. This application of Rajesh Kumar was allowed by the Inspector General (Registration) on 15.03.2010. The Inspector General (Registration) allowed such type of application preferred by Rajesh Kumar without proper verification and without looking to the earlier order dated 07.10.2007 and without joining Jyoti Swarup as party respondent. This application of Rajesh Kumar was allowed by the Inspector General (Registration) on 15.03.2010. This order of Inspector General (Registration) was challenged by Jyoti Swarup who is a President of this appellant-M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan in writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 1887 of 2010, (this number is supplied by the counsel for the appellant). Similarly, the respondent no.4 has also preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 6070 of 2012 before this High Court challenging the order passed by the Inspector General (Registration) dated 17.07.2012. Meanwhile, Inspector General (Registration) was also holding enquiry, and hence, writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1887 of 2012 was disposed of with a direction that the this appellant can assist Inspector General (Registration) for holding proper enquiry. Ultimately, Inspector General (Registration) completed the enquiry and passed an order on 17.07.2012 that the order, which was passed by him on 15.03.2010 at the behest of Rajesh Kumar, was obtained by fraud. Fraud vitiates the whole proceedings. Ultimately, the order dated 15.03.2010 was quashed and set aside. Thus, order dated 05.11.2007 remained intact which is in favour of appellant, Jyoti Swarup. Simultaneously, a writ petition which was preferred by respondent no.4 being W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 came for hearing and it was decided by this Court as the statutory appeal under Section 23 of the Society Registration Act, 1860 is available to this petitioner, the writ was disposed of with a liberty to the respondent no.4 to prefer a statutory appeal with all delay condonation application etc. under Section 14 of Bihar Society Registration Rules, 1965 enacted under the Society Registration Act, 1860. Thereafter, respondent no.4 as well as Rajesh Kumar has preferred miscellaneous appeal being M.A. No.10 of 2013 before Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, without delay condonation application and without joining this Jyoti Swarup, who is President of appellant M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan, as a party respondent and that to though he was a party respondent in W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2010. M.A. No.10 of 2013 was allowed by Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand vide order dated 22.01.2014 without condoning the delay and in absence of this Jyoti Swarup, President of M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan. M.A. No.10 of 2013 was allowed by Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand vide order dated 22.01.2014 without condoning the delay and in absence of this Jyoti Swarup, President of M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan. Hence, this appellant preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No.2045 of 2014 before this Court challenging the order passed by the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand dated 22.01.2014 passed in M.A. No.10 of 2013. This writ petition has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 14.07.2015, and hence, original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal mainly on the grounds that :- (a) Without any delay condonation application and without condoning the delay, miscellaneous appeal being M.A. No.10 of 2013, preferred by the respondent no.4, has been allowed. (b) Though this appellant was a party in writ petition being W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012, which was preferred by respondent no.4, this appellant was never joined as a party respondent in M.A. No.10 of 2013. Thus, there was non-joinder of the party as these two grounds were not properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner. 3. Argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant (original petitioner). Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that in Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013 before Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, no delay condonation application was preferred whereas, there was a gross delay in preferring the miscellaneous appeal and the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand without delay condonation application and without condoning the delay has allowed the Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013 vide order dated 22.01.2014. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition and hence, the order dated 14.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2045 of 2014 deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant (original petitioner) that in earlier writ petition being W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 preferred by the respondent no.4, this appellant was a party respondent. This writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge because statutory appeal was available to the respondent no.4. It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant (original petitioner) that in earlier writ petition being W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 preferred by the respondent no.4, this appellant was a party respondent. This writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge because statutory appeal was available to the respondent no.4. After the disposal of writ petition being W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 when the respondent no.4 preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013, respondent no.4 ought to have joined this appellant as a party respondent in Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013, but for any reasons whatsoever this respondent no.4 had not joined this appellant as a party respondent whereas, there was already an order dated 05.11.2007 passed by the Inspector General (Registration) in favour of this appellant. These facts were also known to respondent no.4 despite this fact, this appellant was not joined as a party respondent in Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013. Thus, there was non-joinder of the party. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, and hence, also the order passed in W.P.(C) No.2045 of 2014 dated 14.07.2015 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent no.4 It is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent no.4 that once order is passed in W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 dated 19.03.2013 whereas, miscellaneous appeal being M.A. No.10 of 2013 preferred by the respondent no.4 can be allowed or dismissed on merit by the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand without any delay condonation application. Moreover, it is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent no.4 that in W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 this appellant was a party respondent, but no notice was ever issued by this Court, and hence, he was not joined as a party in M.A. No.10 of 2013. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand as well as by the learned Single Judge while dismissed the W.P.(C) No.2045 of 2015 vide order dated 14.07.2015. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent no.4 that let the matter be remanded to the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, so that afresh M.A. No.10 of 2013 can be decided after taking care of all the defects in the miscellaneous appeal. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent no.4 that let the matter be remanded to the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, Ranchi, so that afresh M.A. No.10 of 2013 can be decided after taking care of all the defects in the miscellaneous appeal. It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent no.4 that Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure preferred by the State in M.A. No.10 of 2013 has not been disposed of by the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, and hence, also let the matter be remanded to the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand. Reasons 5. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides, and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we, hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge dated 14.07.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2045 of 2015 mainly for the following facts and reasons :- (i) M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan appears to be a very productive Sansthan for this appellant namely, Jyoti Swarup as well as respondent no.4 as well as Rajesh Kumar and therefore, everybody is trying to get the control upon this Sewa Sansthan, and hence, more than half a dozen of litigations have been initiated by one or other party who is directly connected with this appellant - M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan. (ii) It is alleged by this Jyoti Swarup, who is claiming himself to be the President of M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan that respondent no.4 as well as one Rajesh Kumar had resigned from this appellant M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan, and therefore, an application, which is at Annexure – 10 to this memo of appeal, was preferred before Inspector General (Registration) for an amendment, which was allowed by the Inspector General (Registration) vide order dated 05.11.2007 and necessary amendment was carried out. (iii) Respondent no.4 as well as one more person who had resigned, filed a title suit being Title Suit No.268 of 2004, which was pending before the Court of Munsif, Ranchi. Thereafter, on 09.01.2010 one Rajesh Kumar also preferred an application for amendment before Inspector General (Registration), the said application was allowed on 15.10.2010 by the Inspector General (Registration) : (a) without holding any enquiry; (b) without joining M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan as a party respondent; (c) without appreciating the earlier order dated 05.11.2007. Thereafter, on 09.01.2010 one Rajesh Kumar also preferred an application for amendment before Inspector General (Registration), the said application was allowed on 15.10.2010 by the Inspector General (Registration) : (a) without holding any enquiry; (b) without joining M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan as a party respondent; (c) without appreciating the earlier order dated 05.11.2007. (iv) Thus, application of Rajesh Kumar for amendment was allowed by the Inspector General (Registration) vide order dated 15.03.2010, which was challenged by this appellant in W.P.(C) No.1887 of 2014 before this Court. Thereafter, it appears from the facts of the case that Inspector General (Registration) was also holding enquiry, and ultimately, it is concluded by the Inspector General (Registration) vide order dated 17.07.2012. That the order dated 15.03.2010 was obtained by one Rajesh Kumar by playing fraud. Fraud vitiates the whole proceedings, and hence, the order dated 15.03.2010 was quashed and set aside vide another order dated 17.07.2012. This Order was challenged by respondent no.4 and Rajesh Kumar in W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012, which was disposed of by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 19.03.2013 on the ground of availability of efficacious remedy by statutory appeal under Rule 14 of the Bihar Society Registration Rules, 1965 enacted under Society Registration Act, 1860. (v) It appears that after disposal of W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012, respondent no.4 and one Rajesh Kumar preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013 before the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, but : (a) no delay condonation was ever preferred by respondent no.4 and Rajesh Kumar in Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013, though there was a gross delay; (b) this appellant, Jyoti Swarup, President of appellant M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan, was not joined as a party respondent, though the order dated 05.11.2007 passed by the Inspector General (Registration) was in favour of this appellant and though this Jyoti Swarup – President of this appellant M/s Maharshi Nikhilesh Sewa Sansthan was a party respondent in W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 (vi) The Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, without delay condonation application and without condoning the delay, allowed the Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013 in favour of respondent no.4. This is a gross error on the facts of the record of the case committed by the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand, which is not properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, and hence, the order dated 14.07.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.2045 of 2014 deserves to be quashed and set aside. (vii) It further appears from the facts of this case that though this appellant was a party respondent in W.P.(C) No.6070 of 2012 and though the order passed by the Inspector General (Registration) dated 05.11.2007 was in favour of this appellant, he was not joined as a party respondent in Miscellaneous Appeal No.10 of 2013, which tentamounts to non-joinder of necessary party. This aspect of the matter has also not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing W.P.(C) No. 2045 of 2014 vide order dated 17.07.2015, and hence, this order also deserves to be quashed and set aside. (viii) Thus, it appears that though this appellant was a necessary party, but, deliberately the respondent no. 4 and Rajesh Kumar, have not joined him as a party respondent in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 10 of 2013. (ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Pradeep Kumar, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 372 , especially in paragraph nos.17, 18 and 19, which reads as under : “17. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has subsequently overruled the dictum laid down by the Single Judge in the above case (vide Maya Devi V. M.K. Krishna Bhattathiri). The same fate had fallen on the above view adopted by the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Madhukar case when a Division Bench had subsequently overruled it (State of Karanataka v. Nagappa). N. Venkatachaliah and S.A. Hakeem, JJ (as they then were) dealt with the background of introducing Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code and after discussion held that sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A is mandatory. However, learned Judges pointed out that the sub-rules (2) and (3) have been employed by the legislature for highlighting the purpose of introducing such a new Rule. However, learned Judges pointed out that the sub-rules (2) and (3) have been employed by the legislature for highlighting the purpose of introducing such a new Rule. The following passage from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court can usefully be quoted in this context : “A combined reading of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3-A makes it manifest that the purpose of requiring the filing of an application for condonation of delay under sub-rule (1) along with a time-barred appeal, is mandatory, in the sense that the appellant cannot, without such application being decided, insist upon the Court to hear his time-barred appeal. That was the very purpose sought to be achieved by insertion of sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3-A, becomes clear from the legislative history of new Rule 3-A to which we have already adverted.” 18. We may also point out that a Division Bench of the Ptana High Court has adopted the same view even earlier in State of Bihar V. Ray Chandi Nath Sahay. 19. The object of enacting Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code seems to be twofold. First is, to inform the appellant himself who filed a time-barred appeal that it would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining the delay. Second is, to communicate to the respondent a message that it may not be necessary for him to get ready to meet the grounds taken up in the memorandum of appeal because the court has to deal with application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent. Barring the above objects, we cannot find out from the Rule that it is intended to operate as unremediably or irredeemably fatal against the appellant if the memorandum is not accompanied by any such application at the first instance. In our view, the deficiency is a curable defect, and if the required application is filed subsequently the appeal can be treated as presented in accordance with the requirement contained in Rule 3-A Order 41 of the Code. (Emphasis supplied) (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khetrabasi Biswal Vs. Ajaya Kumar Baral, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 317 , especially in paragraph no.6, which reads as under: “6. (Emphasis supplied) (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khetrabasi Biswal Vs. Ajaya Kumar Baral, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 317 , especially in paragraph no.6, which reads as under: “6. The procedural law as well as the substantive law both mandates that in the absence of a necessary party, the order passed is a nullity and does not have a binding effect.” (Emphasis supplied) (xi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhu Bhagwandas Durlabhram Vs. Uday Kumar H. Dave, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 599 , especially in paragraph no.6, which reads as under: “6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that the entire issue was decided without the appellants being made a party to the proceedings. This is not disputed. Various other questions as to the maintainability of the proceedings before the High Court were also raised by the appellants. It was also argued that the High Court was entirely wrong in passing the order it did. We do not wish to go into the merits of the High Court's decision. We set aside the decision of the High Court solely on the ground that the appellants were not party thereto. The matter is remanded back to the High Court for rehearing of the matter after notice to the parties hereto including the Gujarat Maritime Board and the Joint Charity Commissioner. All issues are left open. (Emphasis supplied) (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Competition Commission of India Vs. SAIL, reported in (2010) 10 SCC 744 , especially in paragraph nos.108, 109, 110 and 111, which reads as under: “108. In light of the above statutory provisions, let us examine the scheme under the general principles as well. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure control the parties to the proceedings and their addition or deletion thereof. Wide discretion is vested in the court/appropriate forum in regard to impleadment of necessary and proper parties to the proceedings. Of course, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with provisions of law and the principles enunciated by various judicial pronouncements. Wide discretion is vested in the court/appropriate forum in regard to impleadment of necessary and proper parties to the proceedings. Of course, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with provisions of law and the principles enunciated by various judicial pronouncements. The consideration before the court, while determining such a question, is whether the said party is a necessary or a proper party and its presence before the court is essential for complete and effective adjudication of the subject-matter, inter alia, it should also be kept in mind that multiplicity of litigation is to be avoided and that the necessary or proper party should not be left out from the proceedings, particularly, before the tribunal or the forum. 109. These principles were stated by this Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia V. Board of Revenue, wherein this Court has held as under : (AIR p. 788, para 7) “7. To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled: it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.” 110. Another way to examine the matter is that if the proceedings cannot be concluded completely and effectively in absence of a party, that party should be normally impleaded as a party before the court, of course, subject to other restrictions in law. While nonjoinder of necessary parties may prove fatal, the nonjoinder of proper parties may not be fatal to the proceedings, but would certainly adversely affect interest of justice and complete adjudication of the proceedings before the appropriate forum. 111. As a normal rule, the applicant informant is dominus litis and has the right to control the proceedings, but at the same time, such applicant is required to notify all other parties against whom the applicant wishes to proceed. 111. As a normal rule, the applicant informant is dominus litis and has the right to control the proceedings, but at the same time, such applicant is required to notify all other parties against whom the applicant wishes to proceed. Even if an applicant fails to join a party the court has the discretion to direct joining of such party as the question of impleadment has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that a necessary or proper party may be added. (Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal V. Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Bombay).” (Emphasis supplied) 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement, we, hereby quash and set aside the order dated 14.07.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 2045 of 2014. We also hereby quash the order dated 22.01.2014 passed by the Board of Revenue, State of Jharkhand in M.A. No.10 of 2013. 7. Thus, this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. 8. In view of the final order passed in this Letters Patent Appeal, I.A. Nos. 4822 of 2015, 2110 of 2016, and 2193 of 2016 are hereby disposed of.