ORDER 1. Petitioners-defendants, being aggrieved by the order dated 6.12.2016 passed in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.08/2016 (Shambhu Singh Tomar, plaintiff v. Smt. Munni Devi and another, defendants) and Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.09/2016 (Smt. Munni Devi and another, defendants v. Shambhu Singh Tomar, plaintiff) by XIV Additional District Judge, Gwalior, have approached this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India whereby the appellate Court has reversed the order passed by the trial Court dated 16.2.2016 in Civil Suit No.535-A/2015 by which the respondent-plaintiff’s application under Order XXXIX rule 1 and 2 CPC had been rejected. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this writ petition are in narrow compass. Plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiff’) has filed the suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendants-petitioners (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendants’) from evicting him from the suit premises otherwise than by due process of law inter alia contending that suit premises is a commercial property situated at 3, Govindpuri, University Road, City Centre, Gwalior where plaintiff is running Food Court under the name and style, ‘Gwalior Food Court’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘GFC’). The plaintiff and the defendants being related, are well-known to each other. On 1.3.2005, plaintiff sought consent of defendants for raising construction on the suit premises which was a vacant plot for running the Food Court and thereafter defendants had agreed, constructed and provided one kitchen, two halls, latrine bathroom with tin shed to the plaintiff on payment of Rs.5,00,000/- by him. Thereafter, the plaintiff started running restaurant, initially, in the name of ‘Mehman Restaurant’, on monthly rent of Rs.4,000/-. However, in the month of April, 2002, as a part of the construction was demolished by the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior for the purpose of construction of ‘Nala’, therefore, again, on discussion one big hall, staircase and other construction work was carried out and the plaintiff has paid Rs.25,00,000/- as pagadi to the defendants. Thereafter, the restaurant has all along been run in the name and style of “GFC” on a rent of Rs.8,000/- per month. Plaintiff has also paid an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- in the year 2014 by three cheques each amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- vide cheques No.494186, 494187, 494188 to the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.2 encashed the same on 9.9.2014 and 13.9.2014. Plaintiff has also paid an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- in the year 2014 by three cheques each amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- vide cheques No.494186, 494187, 494188 to the defendant No.2 and the defendant No.2 encashed the same on 9.9.2014 and 13.9.2014. Further, the commercial electric meter was installed at the suit premises as the suit premises was being used for commercial purpose though in the name of defendant No.1. The monthly rent has all along been paid by the plaintiff. Likewise, landline telephone connection was installed at the suit premises. As such, since the year 2005, the plaintiff is running the restaurant business at the suit premises. On 5.12.2015, the defendants No.1 and 2 have refused to accept the rent and asked the plaintiff to vacate the suit premises. When the plaintiff demanded to return the amount paid by him, the defendants refused and with the aid of antisocial elements threatened for forcible dispossession. Under such circumstances, plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction. 3. Defendants No.1 and 2 have filed written statement and denied plaint allegations. It is specifically denied that there is landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants. Plaintiff has never been inducted in the suit premises. Plaintiff is not in possession of the suit premises, therefore, the question of running restaurant business thereon does not arise. It is denied that the plaintiff paid Rs.5,00,000/-, Rs.25,00,000/- and Rs.3,00,000/- as alleged. The alleged incident dated 20.12.2015 was denied. It is submitted that the plaintiff fabricated facts and has concocted false story for being in possession of the suit premises. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. Plaintiff and the defendants both filed applications under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 CPC with supporting documents before the trial Court. 5. The trial Court though has found that the plaintiff had been in possession of the suit premises upto April, 2015 but for want of documentary evidence, the plaintiff was not found to be in possession. Trial Court did not take cognizance of the complaint filed by the plaintiff before the Police Station, University on 26.12.2015 and also another complaint so filed on 10.1.2016 alleging that in the intervening night of 4.1.2016 and 5.1.2016, defendant No.2 Ram Bahadur Singh Bhadoriya and his sons committed theft of Fridge, Laptop and other articles after breaking open lock of the rear door of the restaurant. The said complaint/application was also given in Jansunwai on 12.1.2016 to the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior. Similarly, a complaint made on CM Help Line was also tendered in evidence. However, the trial Court found that plaintiff had not produced any document to suggest that any action was taken by the police on the said complaints. Consequently, the trial Court held that no document of the date posterior to March-April, 2015 was placed on record by the plaintiff to substantiate the claim of possession of suit premises and running of restaurant business thereon. Consequently, the applications filed by the plaintiff and also that of the defendants under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 CPC have been rejected (paragraphs 14 and 15). 6. Against the order of the trial Court, the plaintiff has filed Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.08/2016 and the defendants have filed Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.09/2016. 7. Both, plaintiff and the defendants filed applications under Order XLI rule 27 CPC before the appellate Court to take on record the additional documents. 8. Both the appeals were heard together and decided by a common order. 9. Appellate Court has re-appreciated the entire evidence placed on record on the question of possession of the suit premises as claimed by the plaintiff and denied by defendants and reached the conclusion that the plaintiff is in possession over the suit premises and running the restaurant business on the basis of various documents, viz., electricity bills, receipts, water tax receipts, vouchers of commodities purchased for running GFC and complaints filed at the Police Station, University and approached the Superintendent of Police, Gwalior in Jansunvai etc., beyond April,2015 upto February, 2016. Consequently, the appellate Court protected the possession of the plaintiff with an observation that the plaintiff shall not be dispossessed from the suit premises except by due process of law. 10. Before this Court, defendants and plaintiff have filed additional documents in support of their respective cases. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants-petitioners while criticizing the order passed by the appellate Court contends that the impugned order suffers from perversity of approach inasmuch as the evidence has not been correctly appreciated. The plaintiff himself has admitted before IV Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gwalior in motor accident claim case No.MACC/006011 of 2014 that he is not employed. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants-petitioners while criticizing the order passed by the appellate Court contends that the impugned order suffers from perversity of approach inasmuch as the evidence has not been correctly appreciated. The plaintiff himself has admitted before IV Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gwalior in motor accident claim case No.MACC/006011 of 2014 that he is not employed. That apart, the trial Court has rightly found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit premises and, therefore, not entitled for temporary injunction. It is prayed that the order passed by the appellate Court granting temporary injunction in favour of plaintiff be set aside. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the trial Court has not considered each and every piece of evidence placed on record by both the parties and, as such, has committed grave illegality while dismissing the application seeking temporary injunction filed on behalf of the plaintiff. However, the appellate Court after careful analysis thereof including the documents mentioned below : Statement of account of Allahabad Bank maintained in the name of GFC; Cheque No.1096 of Allahabad Bank, electricity bills and payment therefor from March 2015, April, 2015, May 2015, June 2015, July 2015, August, 2015 upto February, 2016 and original electricity bills March 2016, April 2016, May 2016, July 2016, October 2016 and November, 2016; water tax payment receipt dated 12.3.2016, vouchers of commodities purchased for running GFC, viz., May 2015, June 2015, July 2015, August 2015, September 2015, October 2015, November 2015, Statement and account details in the name of Shambhu Singh Tomar of State Bank of India bearing No.30029011473, complaints filed by the plaintiff on 26.12.2015, 10.1.2016 and 21.2.2016 at the Police Station, University, Gwalior, complaint made on CM Help line on 8.1.2016 and approaching the Superintendent of Police during Jansunwai on 12.1.2016, etc., has recorded a finding as regards factum of possession of the plaintiff and allowed the appeal No.08/2016 filed by the plaintiff by which granted temporary injunction, therefore, no interference is warranted in the order passed by the appellate Court. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the certificate issued to the plaintiff by the Office of Assistant Labour Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior dated 11.4.2016 (Annexure R-1) in respect of registration of the restaurant in question in the name and style of GFC situated at 3, Govindpuri, University Road, Gwalior which is in existence as on 11.4.2016 with a copy thereof to the defendant No.1. That apart, the affidavit of one Bhupendra Singh Gurjar son of Nanhe Singh Gurjar dated 27.12.2016 has also been placed on record as Annexure R-2 wherein it is stated that the said person, Bhupendra Singh did not sign the affidavit submitted by the defendants before the Court below alleging that the restaurant business is being run by the plaintiff and his wife at Saugat Apartment, F-107, Govindpuri but not at the suit premises and also involved in the illegal and immoral activities. On such affidavit filed by Bhupendra Singh, the trial Court has initiated the proceedings under sections 195(1)(b) and 340 CrPC, With the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel submits that no illegality has been committed by the appellate Court while allowing the injunction application and protecting the plaintiff against forcible dispossession from the suit premises by the defendants. 13. Heard. 14. Well known three-fold principle for grant of temporary injunction, viz., prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss have been lucidly explained by this Court in the leading case, Shankarlal Debiprasad Rathore v. State of M.P. and others [ 1978 JLJ 51 = 1978 MPLJ 419 ], and in paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof has held as under : “5. The principles on which temporary injunctions are issued were recently examined by the house of Lords in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon [(1975)I All ER 504]. The following passages from the speech of Lord Diplock is instructive on the point : “The use of such expressions as ‘a probability’, ‘a prima facie case’ or ‘a strong prima facie case’ in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The Court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.” It is no part of the Court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend not to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. One of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as to damages on the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that ‘it aided the Court in doing that which was its great object, viz. abstaining from expressing any opinion upon the merits of the case until the hearing’ [Wakefield v. Duke of Buccleuch [(1865)12 LT 628 at p.629]. So unless the material available to the Court at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the plaintiff has any real prospect of succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, the Court should go on to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief that is sought. As to that, the governing principle is that the Court should first consider whether if the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to a permanent injunction he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of the defendant’s continuing to do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however, strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage. If damages in the measure recoverable at common law would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however, strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage. If on the other hand, damages would not provide an adequate remedy for the plaintiff in the event of his succeeding at the trial, the Court should then consider whether, on the contrary hypothesis that the defendant were to succeed at the trial in establishing his right to do that which was sought to be enjoined, he would be adequately compensated under the plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages for the loss he would have sustained by being prevented from doing so between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages in the measure recoverable under such an undertaking would be an adequate remedy and the plaintiff would be in a financial position to pay them, there would be no reason on this ground to refuse an interlocutory injunction...... 6. The principle that generally the plaintiff is not required to make out a clear legal title, but has only to satisfy the Court that he has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the legal right claimed by him in the suit is well recognized in India. The following two passages from Woodroffe’s The law relating to injunctions (Tagore Law Lectures, 1897; 1964 Edition) are relevant on this point : “An applicant is not required to make out a clear legal title, but to satisfy the Court that he has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the legal right which he sets up, and that there are substantial grounds for doubting the existence of the alleged legal right, the exercise of which he seeks to prevent.” (page 104) “The Court will, in many cases, interfere to preserve property in status quo during the pendency of a suit in which the rights to it are to be decided, and that, without expressing, and often without having the means of forming, any opinion as to such rights. It is true the Court will not interfere if it thinks that there is no real question between the parties, but if it sees that there is a substantial question to be decided, it will preserve the property until such question can be regularly disposed of; and in order to support an injunction for such purpose it is not necessary for the Court to decide upon the merits in favour of the plaintiff If the plaint states a substantial question between the parties the title to the injunction may be good, although the title to the relief prayed may ultimately fail.” 15. Upon perusal of the record and consideration of submissions made at Bar by learned counsel for the parties, it is evident firstly; the plaintiff has filed the suit for permanent injunction on the premise that he is running the restaurant business at the suit premises in respect whereof number of documents have been filed including the shop registration number in the name and style of GFC with the address of the suit premises by statutory authority informing to the plaintiff its further continuance by the Office of Assistant Labour Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior dated 11.4.2016 (Annexure R-1) with a copy endorsed to the defendant No.1, secondly; payment of Rs.3,00,000/- through cheques to the defendants, thirdly; installation of commercial electricity connection at the suit premises, electricity bills upto November, 2016 and payment of bills by the plaintiff, fourthly; water tax receipts, fifthly; vouchers of commodities purchased by the plaintiff for running GFC, sixthly; complaints/FIRs lodged by the plaintiff on 26.12.2015 and 10.1.2016 at the Police Station, University, Gwalior, seventhly; complaint made on CM Help line on 8.1.2016 and eighthly; approaching the Superintendent of Police during Jansunwai on 12.1.2016, besides, number of photographs of the restaurant where details of running of the restaurant business are well apparent as discussed in detail and found by the appellate Court. There is overwhelming evidence as regards the factum of running of a restaurant business in the name and style of GFC by the plaintiff in contrast to the extreme defence by defendants that the plaintiff is not known to the defendants, the plaintiff has not been put in possession of the suit premises and no business is being run at 3, Govindpuri, University Road, Gwalior. The aforesaid facts have rightly been found to have substantial bearing for determination of the first limb of consideration for temporary injunction, i.e., prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. Besides, false affidavit submitted by the defendants before the trial Court in the name of one Bhupendra Singh Gurjar as evident from the affidavit filed by the said person, Bhupendra Singh Gurjar before the appellate Court alleging impersonation and fraudulent signatures on the alleged affidavit submitted before the trial Court in his name for which the trial Court has already initiated the proceedings under sections 195(1)(b) and 340 CrPC, and this goes to show that the defendants have attempted to go to any extent of falsity to claim that the restaurant business is not being run at the suit premises. Further, the appellate Court was justified having found no answer by the defendants as regards the reason for having accepted Rs.3,00,000/- from the plaintiff deposited by three cheques (supra), and for having a commercial electricity connection at the suit premises since beginning though in the name of defendant No.1 which was being used for commercial purpose by the plaintiff. It is not the case of the defendants that they are running any business at the suit premises. There is strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the balance of convenience has rightly been found to be in favour of the plaintiff protecting him from forcible dispossession, otherwise the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable loss which cannot be redressed and the suit shall render infructuous. 16. This Court has discussed the merits of the findings of the appellate Court only for the limited purpose to assess that the prima facie findings recorded by the appellate Court are based on relevant material and do not suffer from perversity of approach as this Court normally refrains from appreciation of the evidence in the context of the findings of the Court below, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 17. Consequently, writ petition is found to be devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed.