JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order passed by learned Central Administrative Tribunal on 15.3.2011, whereby it dismissed the original application filed by the petitioner. 2. Petitioner was appointed as GDSBPM in the Branch Post Office at Taklech, Tehsil Rampur, District Shimla, where he worked for about seven years. A charge-sheet dated 28.8.2007 was served upon him containing therein the following charges:- “Charge-1 That though he received Rs.262/- (5 installments of Rs.50 each plus fine for delayed deposits) from the depositor of RD Account No.85590 on 27.7.2006 and made entry thereof in the pass book but did not account for it in departmental accounts and misappropriated the same for personal use. Charge-II That on 13.9.2005, he received Rs.1048/- from the depositor of RD Account No.85759 (5 installments @ Rs.200/- each plus Rs.48/- as fine) and made entry in pass book but failed to account for it in departmental accounts and used it for personal purposes. Charge-III That during the period from 27.10.2006 to 5.3.2007, he received payments against telephone bills and RPLI (Insurance) but accounted for Rs.146/- less in Govt. account and thereby vitiated departmental rules and exhibited lack of devotion to duty.” 3. Regular inquiry was conducted wherein it was concluded that all the charges against the petitioner stand proved and in addition thereto, it was observed that the petitioner had willfully absented himself on two days and had unauthorisedly allowed Roshan Lal GDSMD to work in his place. A copy of the inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner, against which he submitted representation on 24.10.2008. The Disciplinary Authority held all the charges to be proved against the petitioner and vide order dated 29.11.2008 imposed penalty of removal from service. Appeal preferred against this order was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 19.2.2008, constraining the petitioner to file Original application before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, wherein he prayed for the following reliefs: “(i) That impugned orders dated 29.11.2008 (A-1) and 19.2.2009 (A-2) be quashed and set aside being illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. (ii) That respondents be directed to reinstate the applicant in service with retrospective effect from 18.5.2007 with all consequential benefits like arrears of salary along with 12% interest for delayed payment and seniority etc.” 4. (ii) That respondents be directed to reinstate the applicant in service with retrospective effect from 18.5.2007 with all consequential benefits like arrears of salary along with 12% interest for delayed payment and seniority etc.” 4. The respondents had contested the Original application by filing a reply, wherein it was averred that petitioner in his reply had denied Articles I and II, whereas he admitted charge No. III. It was further averred that this plea taken by the petitioner that Roshan Lal GDSMD had made entries in the pass book was not tenable since it was the petitioner alone who was authorized to make such transactions and Roshan Lal, GDSMD performed the duties of the petitioner with his consent but the latter was not authorized by the competent authority to do so. Therefore, it was only the petitioner, who alone was responsible for misappropriation of government money since he delegated his powers without authority and competence to an unauthorized person and that the petitioner had illegally tried to transfer his responsibility upon Sh. Roshan Lal, GDSMD. Respondents have thereafter averred that all the charges were found to have been established and proved and in addition to the charges framed, it was also found by the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner was in the habit of absenting himself from duty and entrusting the job to Sh. Roshan Lal unauthorisedly. It was lastly averred that the punishment awarded to the petitioner was not based on any new charge but was based on the original articles of charge which have been proved and established during the inquiry. 5. Three contentions were raised by the petitioner before the learned Tribunal, firstly that as per orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, charges I and II had not been proved against the petitioner and only the charge of absenting from duty had been established. This contention was rejected by the learned Tribunal by holding that the punishment order dated 29.11.2008 revealed that the Disciplinary Authority had clearly relied upon the report of the Inquiry Officer, wherein all the charges against the petitioner, had been proved. 6. This contention was rejected by the learned Tribunal by holding that the punishment order dated 29.11.2008 revealed that the Disciplinary Authority had clearly relied upon the report of the Inquiry Officer, wherein all the charges against the petitioner, had been proved. 6. Second contention raised by the petitioner was that only charge proved against him was short fall of Rs.146/- which had occurred due to wrong totaling over a period from 27.10.2006 to 5.3.2007, for which he had no intention and, therefore, the punishment of removal from service, in such circumstances, was highly disproportionate. This contention was rejected by the learned Tribunal by concluding that the punishment had not been imposed on the petitioner on this sole ground, whereas whole tenor of the punishment order reflected that the petitioner was in the habit of absenting himself from his job and had unauthorisedly been assigning the same to Sh. Roshan Lal. 7. The third contention raised by the petitioner was that he had not been afforded personal hearing by the Appellate authority, which plea was rejected by the learned Tribunal on the ground that the petitioner himself had not asked for personal hearing. 8. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority and learned Central Administrative Tribunal has been challenged on various grounds as taken in the writ petition. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on records. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the learned Tribunal below has gravely erred in concluding that the petitioner was not entitled for personal hearing before the appellate authority which finding, according to him, is against the principles of natural justice. 10. It is a trite that the rule of audi alteram partem is not an absolute right. The court, in such like cases, is required to see as to whether all the contentions of the employees have been considered. This has been so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala Vs. Mahendra Kumar Singhal, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 463. It is apt to reproduce para 3 which reads as follows: “3. No rule has been brought to our attention which requires the appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a right of audience at the appellate stage. Mahendra Kumar Singhal, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 463. It is apt to reproduce para 3 which reads as follows: “3. No rule has been brought to our attention which requires the appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a right of audience at the appellate stage. That is what this Court observed in F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, 1957 SCR 1151. We, therefore, think that the impugned order is not valid. Our attention was, however, drawn to the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , wherein observation is made in regard to the right of hearing. But that was not a case of a departmental inquiry, it was one emanating from Article 324 of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, those observations are not pertinent to the facts of this case”. 11. In this background, if one would peruse the order passed by the appellate authority on 19.2.2009, it would be seen that the same is a detailed one, wherein all the contentions as raised by the petitioner have been dealt with and only thereafter appeal has been rejected. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then contend that the statements of witnesses had not been appreciated by the authorities and the learned Tribunal and they further failed to consider that the penalty imposed is totally disproportionate. 13. Insofar question of re-appreciation of evidence and disproportionality of punishment vis-à-vis scope of interference by this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction are concerned, these issues have been recently considered by us in case titled Sher Singh Vs. Union of India, & Ors. CWP No. 9030/2011, decided on 26.4.2016, wherein it has been held as under: “6 That apart, it would also be noticed that the order of removal from service of the petitioner has been upheld by the first appellate authority, the revisional authority and thereafter by the learned Tribunal and there is nothing to suggest that the findings recorded by any of the authorities below are in any manner perverse. 7. Insofar as the reliability and adequacy of the evidence is concerned, this Court cannot venture into re-appreciation of the evidence and act as third appellate authority. 8. 7. Insofar as the reliability and adequacy of the evidence is concerned, this Court cannot venture into re-appreciation of the evidence and act as third appellate authority. 8. The scope of interference by the High Court in such matters has been succinctly summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Union of India and others vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR 2015 SC 545 in the following terms:- “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 9. Notably, the case of the petitioner does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above so as to call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 10. Now adverting to the second contention regarding the proportionality of punishment, it was held in P. Gunasekaran’s case (supra) that the High Court would go into the question of proportionality of punishment only in case it shocks its conscience, but then this Court would not re-appreciate the evidence for reaching at such conclusion. 11. As observed earlier, the indictment of the petitioner was mainly on the basis of the confession made by him. Once the petitioner confessed to the charge of impersonation and retained the salary for 10 days before handing to Jai Ram, no leniency could have been shown by the Department. 12. It is trite that punishment is the discretion of the disciplinary authority and the Court would not substitute its own judgment unless the punishment shocks the conscience. Even, in such case, it has been held that the Court should ordinarily remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for consideration of punishment. 13. The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was subject matter of discussion before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. S. Vasanthi, (2014) 9 SCC 315 wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- “10. The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- “10. The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC 106 , the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) “7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist. 8. The order of the Appellate Authority while having a re-look of the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is reasonable or not. If the Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Such a power which vests with the Appellate Authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the Court or a Tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts. (See: Union Territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775 ). In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the Court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the Court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the Court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. 9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with doctrine of Wednesbury4 Rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the Court and the Court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174, in the following words: (AC p. 410 DE) ‘….Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads of the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of “proportionality”.’ 10. An Imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well, in Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 . Speaking for the Court, Justice Venkatachaliah (as he then was) emphasizing that “all powers have legal limits” invokes the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p.620, para 25) ‘25….The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review.’ 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 (SCC p.382, para 19) “19.1. When charges of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 14. The legal position has thereafter been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Diwan Singh versus Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, (2015) 2 SCC 341 and it was held as under:- “8. As far as argument relating to quantum of punishment, as modified by the High Court, which results in consequential forfeiture of pensionary benefits in view of Rule 23, quoted above, is concerned, we do not find the punishment to be harsh or disproportionate to the guilt, in view of the nature of the charge of which the appellant is found guilty in the present case. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the Courts. 9. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh, (2006) 6 SCC 187 , this Court, in para 18 of the judgment has expressed the views on this point as under: (SCC p.193) "18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs.360.95. This Court has considered the punishment that may be awarded to the delinquent employees who misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and the factors to be considered. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment." 10. In Karnataka SRTC v. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254 in which unaccounted amount was only Rs.93/- this Court expressed its opinion in para 12 as under: (SCC p.259) "12. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal." 11. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 , this Court has made following observations in paragraph 25 of the judgment: (SCC p.654). "25..... In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law." 12. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bajrang Lal, (2014) 4 SCC 693 , this Court, following Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari and others, (1996) 2 SCC 714 , has opined that in cases involving corruption there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. It has been further held that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. It has been further held that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant. In said case (Rajasthan SRTC), the respondent employee was awarded punishment of removal from service. In the present case it is compulsory retirement. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that on earlier occasion, appellant was awarded minor punishment, for his misconduct, regarding defalcation of stamps. And now he is found guilty for the second time.” 14. From the material available on record, we find that not only the Disciplinary Authority, but even the appellate authority had considered threadbare the statement of witnesses and only thereafter passed the impugned orders. Moreover in such like cases, it is not the amount misappropriated but the loss of confidence, which is the primary factor to be considered, while awarding punishment. 15. It is then contended by the petitioner that the penalty as imposed is not account of charges I to III having been proved, but for allegations which did not even form the basis of the charges i.e. absence from duty. 16. Even this contention is equally without merit as the learned Tribunal has already dealt with this issue and has rightly concluded that punishment had not been imposed upon the petitioner on this sole ground, rather the whole tenor of the punishment order reflects that in addition to the charges already framed, petitioner in terms of charge No. III had exhibited lack of devotion to his duty as he was in the habit of absenting himself from his job and had unauthorisedly been assigning his work to Sh. Roshan Lal. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.