JUDGMENT By the Court.—This writ petition has been filed for challenging the Gorakhpur Nagar Nigam Main Vigyapanon Par Kar Ka Nirdharan Aur Vasooli Niyamawali, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Niyamawali’), Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 2. At the very outset, we may record that the recital in the prayer clause that Niyamawali has been framed by the State Government is factually incorrect. The Niyamawali has been framed by the Gorakhpur Nagar Nigam in exercise of powers under Section 545 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. 3. Sri Ravi Kant, senior advocate, made a statement that the last line of the prayer clause may be deleted. 4. The other prayer made in the writ petition is for a writ of mandamus commanding the Nagar Nigam not to give effect to the Niyamawali, 2015. 5. Written submissions have been filed which are taken on record. 6. Sri Ravi Kant submitted before us that in view of Full Bench judgement of this Court in the case of Anurag Bansal v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(5) ADJ 879 (LB) (FB), the impugned Niyamawali cannot be legally sustained. It is explained to the Court that the right to advertise is a facet of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The Nagar Nigam in exercise of its power to frame rules which is in the nature of subordinate legislation, cannot impose a tax in the matter of exercise of such fundamental right. It is submitted that the powers conferred upon the Municipal Corporation to that extent would be hit by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Similarly, it is stated that Rule 6-A, 6-B, 7(2) and 8 as well as Rule 9 are patently arbitrary, they affect the fundamental right of the persons like the members of the petitioners association, who are involved in the business of advertising. Similarly, it is stated that Rule 6(9) is vague in the background that it requires minimum premium to be fixed by a Committee before right to advertise is granted by auction or tender. Similarly, it is stated that if an advertisement or pole of the hoarding falls down on account of an accident or any other act of God, the licensee would be held responsible for compensation when no person can be held liable for an act of God i.e. for an act beyond his control. Similarly, it is stated that if an advertisement or pole of the hoarding falls down on account of an accident or any other act of God, the licensee would be held responsible for compensation when no person can be held liable for an act of God i.e. for an act beyond his control. Rule 7(2) is challenged on the ground that it empowers the allotment committee to fix minimum amount of premium in light of items provided therein which is arbitrary. It confers absolute discretion in the Committee to fix the amount of premium according to its own estimate of said factors. 7. Under Section 193(3) of the Nagar Nigam Adhiniyam, permission for advertisement can be granted after payment of tax but demand of premium, over and above, the said tax under the rules would be in excess of the statutory provision and, therefore, bad. Similarly, the power to reject an application for putting up an hoarding as conferred upon Rule 8(ga) and (anga) is also bad being unchannelized. Similarly, the competence of the Nagar Nigam to prohibit installation of a hoarding at a particular place because of the site being unfit is also arbitrary, as no guidelines have been laid down for the purpose. Rule 15(ka)(5) and Rule 18 are subjected to challenge on the ground that the norms fixed in the matter are arbitrary as no guidelines have been laid down therein. Rule 21 (2) is challenged on the ground that an appeal has been provided against the order of Municipal Commissioner to the Municipal Board which would be an appeal from Caesar’s to Caesar’s wife. The power conferred upon the State Government and the Central Government to declare any area as prohibited area, for the purpose of advertising under Rule 25 is challenged on the ground that it violates Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Rule 27 is subjected to challenge on the ground that no guidelines have been framed. 8. We have heard Sri Ravi Kant, senior counsel assisted by Sri Tarun Agrawal for the appellant and Sri Sanjay Kumar Tripathi for the respondent at some length. 9. Rule 27 is subjected to challenge on the ground that no guidelines have been framed. 8. We have heard Sri Ravi Kant, senior counsel assisted by Sri Tarun Agrawal for the appellant and Sri Sanjay Kumar Tripathi for the respondent at some length. 9. Since the sheet anchor of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant is the judgement of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Anurag Bansal v. State of U.P. and others, 2011(5) ADJ 879 (LB) (FB), we deem it fit and proper to refer to the same at the first instance. 10. From the reading of the judgement, we find that the basic issue for consideration before the Full Bench was the power of the State Government to frame the rules called Municipal Corporation (Assessment and Collection of Tax on advertisement) Rules, 2009 in exercise of powers under under Section 540 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1959”). 11. The Full Bench of this Court has held that power under Section 540 of the Act is not to be read in isolation. It has to be read alongwith the other provisions of the Act, 1959. 12. We find that there is no application of the legal proposition so laid down, in the facts of this case. The Full Bench has held that Municipal Corporation as constituted under the provisions of Municipal Corporation Act is body corporate and it is required to discharge its duties in accordance with the statutory provisions. It is an autonomous, to some extent, to manage the affairs within the four corners of law. The Full Bench found that the Rule framed by the State Government known as U.P. Municipal Corporation (Assessment and Collection of Tax on Advertisement) Rules, 2009 have been framed without following the due procedure as provided under Sections 129 and 303 and without taking recourse to Section 206 of the Act 1959. 13. The Court has held that the Rules do not fulfill the aims and objects of Article 243(Q). The State Government has acted beyond its power and in contravention of the provisions of the Act 1959. 14. 13. The Court has held that the Rules do not fulfill the aims and objects of Article 243(Q). The State Government has acted beyond its power and in contravention of the provisions of the Act 1959. 14. We have no hesitation to record that the judgement of the Full Bench in Anurag Bansal v. State of U.P. and others (supra) has to be read in the background of the issues which were under consideration before the Full Bench namely the competence of the State Government to frame the rules. Para 59 and 84 of the judgement read as follows: 59. The provisions contained in Sections 172 to 196 should be read conjointly and not in isolation. While framing the rules, the state Government, thus, seems to have not taken into account these statutory provisions. 84. In view of above, the tax imposed by the State Government straightway without exercising the power conferred by the Act i.e. issuance of direction by notification in gazette to impose tax seems to be an act of exceeding of jurisdiction. Impugned rules have been framed by the Government in contravention of statutory provisions (supra) contained in the Act. By framing the impugned Rules, the State Government seems to have acted treating the Corporations of the State as its department which seems to not the aim and object of Article 243 (Q) of the Constitution. The question referred to the Full Bench has been answered in para 89 which reads as follows: 89- In view of above, the judgment of the division bench in the case of Taj Advertising (supra) does not seem to lay down the correct law and questions No. 1, 2, 6 and 7 are answered as under;- (1) State Government has got legislative competence to frame rules but subject to fulfilment of necessary conditions and procedure prescribed under Chapter IX of the Act (supra). (2) Government could not have framed impugned rules for all the Municipal Corporations without taking recourse of not only Section 206 of the Act but other statutory provisions contained in Chapter IX of the Act. (6) Impugned Rules 2009 is invalid and ultra vires to the Act being framed without following the provisions of Sections 199 to 203 of the Act and other statutory provisions discussed in the body of judgment (supra). (6) Impugned Rules 2009 is invalid and ultra vires to the Act being framed without following the provisions of Sections 199 to 203 of the Act and other statutory provisions discussed in the body of judgment (supra). (7) Provision contained in the Rules 2009 requiring the owner of building to face penal consequences is invalid and violative of Section 195 of the Act. Other questions framed by the Division Bench are left open for consideration by the regular Division Bench since no contrary finding has been recorded in the case of Taj Advertising. It is open to the Division Bench to record finding on other questions in case it is so desired. At the very outset, we may record that the ‘Niyamawali’ under challenge before us has been framed by the Municipal Corporation, in exercise of powers under Section 541 of the Act, 1959. There is no pleading in the present writ petition challenging the competence of the Municipal Corporation to frame the said ‘Niyamawali’ nor there is any challenge qua the procedure prescribed for framing of the ‘Niyamawali’ having not been followed by the Municipal Corporation. 15. We may record that before framing the aforesaid Niyamawali in exercise of powers under Section 541 of the Act, the Municipal Corporation had published a Notification on 24.4.2015 in newspapers having wide circulation inviting objections from the persons likely to be affected, within the time specified. The Notification under challenge dated 30.10.2015 records that only one objection was received from M/s Bharti Street, Adhiyari Bagh, Gorakhpur which has been considered by the competent authority and recommendations were made for suitable amendment. 16. After such consideration of the objections, the rules (Niyamawali) was published in the Official Gazette for enforcement. The facts so recorded in the notification qua objections being invited and that filed by M/s Bharti Street, Adhiyari Bagh, Gorakhpur being decided are also not under challenge before us. It is not the case of the petitioner that any other objections were filed by it or its members to the proposed rules and/or the same having not been considered. 17. The power to impose tax on advertisement has been conferred upon the Municipal Corporation under Section 172(1)(2)(h)(3) of Act 1959. It reads as follows: 172. It is not the case of the petitioner that any other objections were filed by it or its members to the proposed rules and/or the same having not been considered. 17. The power to impose tax on advertisement has been conferred upon the Municipal Corporation under Section 172(1)(2)(h)(3) of Act 1959. It reads as follows: 172. Taxes to be imposed under this Act.—(1) For the purpose of the Act and subject to the provisions thereof and of Article 285 of the Constitution of India the Corporation shall impose the following taxes, namely- (a) property taxes, (b) a tax on vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles, and other conveyances plying for hire or kept within the City or on boats moored therein; (c) a tax on helicopters or any other type of planes, when they land on or take off from the helipads, airports, airstrips or places made for this purpose situated within the Corporation. The tax so imposed shall be paid by the airport authority or person or persons, or managers, or director or institution or department or agency involved in the maintenance, management and supervision of the airport, airstrip, helipad or the place as the case may be. (d) a tax on trades and professions. (e) a tax on deeds of transfer of immovable property situated within the city. (f) a tax on vacant land situated within the city. (2) In addition to the taxes specified in sub-section (1) the Corporation may for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof impose any of the following taxes, namely,— [(a) a tax on callings and on holding a public or private appointment] (b) [* * *]2 (c) [* * *]3 (d) [* * *]4 (e) a tax on dogs kept within the City; (f) a betterment tax; (g) [* * *]5 (h) a tax on advertisement not being advertisements published in newspapers; (3) The Corporation taxes shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-laws framed thereunder. 18. It will be seen that Sub-section 3 of Section 172 (2) provides that the taxes to be imposed by the Corporation shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules and bye-laws framed thereunder. 19. 18. It will be seen that Sub-section 3 of Section 172 (2) provides that the taxes to be imposed by the Corporation shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules and bye-laws framed thereunder. 19. It is worthwhile to refer Section 192 of the Municipal Corporation Act which provides for the person liable to pay the advertisement tax imposed by the Municipal Corporation under Section 172(2)(h). Section 192 reads as follows: Section 192. Tax on advertisements.—Where a Corporation imposes a tax mentioned in Clause (h) of Sub-section (2) of Section 172, every person who erects, exhibits, fixes or retains upon or over any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure any advertisement or who displays any advertisement to public view in any manner whatsoever, in any place whether public or private, shall pay on every advertisement which is so erected, exhibited, fixed, retained, or displayed to public view, a tax calculated at such rates and in such manner and subject to such exemptions as may be provided by the Act or rules made thereunder: Provided that no tax shall be levied under this section on any advertisement or a notice- (a) of public meetings, or (b) of an election to any legislative body or the Corporation, or (c) of a candidature in respect of such an election: Provided also that no such tax shall be levied on any advertisement which is not a sky-sign and which- (a) is exhibited within the window of any building, or (b) relates to the trade or business carried on within the land or building upon or over which advertisement is exhibited, or to any sale or letting of such land or building or any effects therein or to any sale, entertainment or meeting to be held upon or in the same, or (c) relates to the name of the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited, or the name of the owner or occupier of such land or building, or (d) relates to the business of any railway administration, or (e) is exhibited within any railway station or upon any wall or other property of a railway administration except any portion of the surface of such wall or property fronting any street. 20. 20. The power to frame bye-laws in respect of regulation and prohibition of advertisements is conferred upon the Municipal Corporation under clause (48) of Section 541 of Act 1959 which reads as follows: (48) “Prohibition and regulation of advertisements; and” 21. For the purpose of the assessment and levy of tax on advertisement, the Municipal Corporation has framed bye-laws known as the Gorakhpur Nagar Nigam Main Vigyanpanon Par Kar Ka Nirdharan Aur Vasooli Niyamawali, 2015. These bye-laws framed by the Municipal Corporation are as per the provisions of the Act specifically Sections 172, (2)(h) read with Section 192 as also in accordance with the provisions of Section 541 (48) of Act 1959. 22. We, therefore, have no hesitation to record the following two conclusions: (A) The competence of the Nagar Nigam to frame the rules is not under challenge. (B) There is no challenge in the matter of procedure adopted as prescribed under the Act having been followed. 23. So far as challenge to the rules on the ground that they violate the right to advertise as guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is concerned we may only record that the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute, it has been made subject restrictions which may be imposed. 24. We may notice that the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(2) is subject to clause (2) to the same Article 19 of the Constitution of India which reads as follows: Art. 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right- (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form association or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; and [........................] (g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 25. 25. We find that the ‘Niyamawali’ has been framed by the Nagar Nigam strictly as per the statutory provisions of Section 172(2)(h) and 193, which statutory provisions are not under challenge. 26. There is no material to establish before this Court as to how the bye-laws can be said to be unreasonable or unfair and not saved by Clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. We may record that Section 172 of the Municipal Corporation permits imposition of tax as well as Section 192 which makes the owners of the private premises alongwith others responsible persons for such payment of tax on advertisement. There is no substance in the challenge to the vires of these bye-laws. 27. We have already dealt with the issue with regard to the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Anurag Bansal (supra). We are more than satisfied that the Full Bench judgement was on a different issue dealing with the competence of the State Government to frame the rules to the exclusion of the Municipal Corporation. The judgement has to be read for what it decides. 28. Now coming to the challenge to the individual rules, we may first consider the issue of liability fastened upon the owner of the land/building owner in case of default of payment of taxes by the person primarily responsible for the advertisement. The Full Bench in paragraph 59 held as under: “Under Clause V of Rule 5, the owner of the land or building has been held responsible for any default and held liable to pay taxes. This is contrary to provision contained in Section 195 of the Act. Building owners may receive rent but actually beneficiary of the advertisement, is the Company or person, who advertised its goods. It is for the advertising agency to ensure compliance of Rule or Bye-laws.” 29. We find that the counsel for the petitioner is not right in contending that Clause V of Rule 5 which was come up for consideration before the Full Bench is para meteria to Rule 5 of Clause IV of the impugned bye-laws. It is for the advertising agency to ensure compliance of Rule or Bye-laws.” 29. We find that the counsel for the petitioner is not right in contending that Clause V of Rule 5 which was come up for consideration before the Full Bench is para meteria to Rule 5 of Clause IV of the impugned bye-laws. Sub-clause 5 of Clause IV reads as follows: ¼5½ mifu;e ¼4½ esa fufnZ"V Hkwfe ;k Hkou ds izR;sd Lokeh dks ;g fyf[kr le>kSrk djuk gksxk fd fdlh O;fDrdze dh fLFkfr esa og foKkiudrkZ gsrq ns; dj dk Hkqxrku djus ds fy, nk;h gksxk+A uxj vk;qDr vFkok muds }kjk izkf/kd`r vf/kdkjh dks foKkiu iV~Vk gVkus gsrq ifjlj esa izos'k dk vf/kdkj gksxk A 30. At the outset, we may record that petitioner is not the society of owners of residential or commercial properties. It is an association of persons involved in the business of advertisement. 31. The selection of the person for grant of right to put up advertisements at public places is to be determined by inviting tenders or by auction under bye-laws. 32. So far as private premises are concerned the advertiser has to have a written consent from the owner of the premises, in terms of the conditions mentioned in the Rule. For the purpose, every owner of a private premises who intends to provide space for advertisements is required to enter into an agreement with the Nagar Nigam by making an application. One of the conditions of the agreement is that in case the advertiser does not make payment of the tax then the owner shall be liable for such payment of tax on advertisement and the Nagar Ayukt and other Officers would be entitled to remove the advertisement in default and to enter the premises for the purpose. We fail to understand as to how such a provision can be said to be hit by Section 195 of Act 1959. We find the liability of tax is shifted upon the owner of the premises, only in case of default of the advertiser to pay the tax as the owner of the premises had authorized the advertiser to put up the advertisement upon his premises. 33. We may record that it is only a method for collection of tax and not a case of tax liability being fixed on a person not liable. 33. We may record that it is only a method for collection of tax and not a case of tax liability being fixed on a person not liable. (Ref: State of U.P. and others v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. and another, (2011) 13 SCC 588 . 34. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provision cannot be said to be in conflict with Section 195 of Act 1959 of the Municipal Corporation Act in any manner. Section 195 of Act 1959 reads as follows: “Beneficiary from advertisement to be deemed responsible.—Where any advertisement shall be erected, exhibited, fixed or retained upon or over any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure in contravention of the provisions of Section 192 or Section 193 or after the written permission for the erection, exhibition, fixation or retention thereof for any period shall have expired or become void, the person for whom or for whose purposes the advertisement has prima facie been so erected, exhibited, fixed or retained shall be deemed to be the person who has erected, exhibited, fixed or retained such advertisement in such contravention unless he proves that such contravention was committed by a person not in his employment or under his control or was committed without his connivance.” 35. Under the bye-laws, the Municipal Corporation has directed that owner of a private land/buildings who propose to let out the property for the purpose of advertisement shall enter into an agreement with the Municipal Corporation that he shall be liable for the payment of tax by the person to put up the advertisement in case of default inasmuch the permission to put up the advertisement itself is granted only on the asking of the owner of the buildings and not in otherwise. 36. So far as the challenge to bye-laws 6-A, 6-B, 7(2) and 8 are concerned we find that the bye-laws provide for the conditions on which permission to put up the advertisement is to be granted. Rule 7(2) deals with the factors which are to be taken into consideration by the Committee constituted for the purpose of determination of premium for a particular place of advertisement. In our opinion, these provisions cannot be said to be arbitrary or having the effects of interfering with the right of speech and expression as has been suggested by counsel for the petitioner. 37. In our opinion, these provisions cannot be said to be arbitrary or having the effects of interfering with the right of speech and expression as has been suggested by counsel for the petitioner. 37. Relevant considerations to be taken into account while determining the premium have been provided for under the bye-laws, therefore, the power granted cannot be said to be unchannelised. Rule 6(9) requires deposit of the premium in addition to the bid in the matter of selection of the suitable candidate for being authorized to put up the hoardings by the Nagar Nigam. It is in the nature of minimum bid amount fixed for a particular place, where the right to advertise is to be granted in respect of public place. The bidders/tenderers are required to offer over and above the premium amount. The rule is not arbitrary. It is for the Nagar Nigam to determine as to what should be the minimum amount of tax for a particular place where the advertisement/hoarding is to be put up having regard to the factors indicated in the ‘Niyamawali.’ 38. So far as Rule 6-A(da) and Rule 6-A(ka) are concerned they regulate the period and the specifications under which such permission is to be granted. We record that the provisions only ensure that hoardings which are not obscene or which may raise public sentiments are not permitted to be put up within the limits of the Municipal Corporation. The power conferred upon the Nagar Ayukt cannot be said to be unreasonable. 39. We find that what is being demanded under the Niyamawali in the shape of premium and the auction money is basically the tax on advertisement as is permissible to be levied under Section 193 of the Municipal Corporation Act. We find that for the purpose of determining the amount of tax payable, the Municipal Corporation has framed the Niyamawali which provide for a detail mechanics for determination of such levy. 40. Challenge to Rule 8(kha) 8(ga) and 8(anga) are more presumptive in nature then on any actual basis. Even otherwise there can be no objection in the matter of rejection of permission to put up the advertisement, if the material which is to be advertised, is found to be obscene, or to generate communal tension etc. The power of Municipal Commissioner to remove such hoardings on satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the Niyamawali cannot be faulted with. Even otherwise there can be no objection in the matter of rejection of permission to put up the advertisement, if the material which is to be advertised, is found to be obscene, or to generate communal tension etc. The power of Municipal Commissioner to remove such hoardings on satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the Niyamawali cannot be faulted with. 41. However, if any exercise of powers is found to be bad in any particular case it will always be open to the aggrieved person to challenge the same. There can be no issue with regard to competence of the Nagar Nigam to not to permit installation of such hoardings. 42. Challenge to other bye-laws is more for the sake of argument than on any substantial grounds. 43. The writ petition has no merit and is dismissed.