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Gujarat High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 1195 (GUJ)

Director, District Rural Development Agency v. Bhimsing Velnath Raval

2016-06-28

K.M.THAKER

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. M.H. Rathod, learned advocate for the respondents. 2. In present petition the petitioner has challenged award dated 02.11.1998 passed by the learned Labour Court at Nadiad in Reference (LCN) No. 325 of 1989 whereby the learned Labour Court directed the petitioner to reinstate the claimants and to pay full backwages and other consequential benefits from the date of termination. 3. Before proceeding further it is necessary and appropriate to mention at the outset that Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the claimants stated and submitted that in view of the interim order passed by the Court and in view of the fact that any interim relief against the direction to reinstate the claimants is not granted by the Court, the petitioner has reinstated the claimants and the claimants, even as of now, the respondent continues in the service with the petitioner. 4. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the material on record and from the submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties that the claimants raised industrial dispute against their termination. 4.1 The dispute raised by the claimants was referred for adjudication and was registered as Reference (LCN) No. 325 of 1989. 4.2 Before the learned Labour Court the respondents herein alleged that their services were terminated without following procedure prescribed by law. 4.3 With such allegation the concerned claimants demanded reinstatement in service with consequential benefits. 5. The reference was opposed by present petitioner on various grounds including contention that its establishment is not an industry and therefore the reference is not maintainable. It was also claimed that the claimants cannot be termed "workmen" and therefore also the reference is not maintainable and should be rejected on the said ground. The opponent employer also claimed before the learned Labour Court that the claimants were engaged on ad hoc basis as part time Peons on or around 21.10.1983 and they were required to work only for about two to three hours a day. The employer also claimed that the services of the claimants were discontinued w.e.f. 11.9.1984. The opponent employer claimed that in light of the facts of the case it had not committed breach of any provision of law applicable to the claimants and there was no illegality in its action. 6. The employer also claimed that the services of the claimants were discontinued w.e.f. 11.9.1984. The opponent employer claimed that in light of the facts of the case it had not committed breach of any provision of law applicable to the claimants and there was no illegality in its action. 6. After recording evidence and after considering rival submissions learned Labour Court passed award dated 4.4.1997 with the direction to the opponent employer to reinstate the claimants in service on their original post with consequential benefits and full backwages. 6.1 The said award was challenged by present petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 8359 of 1997. 6.2 This Court heard and decided the said Special Civil Application No. 8359 of 1997 vide order dated 3.2.1998. This Court partly allowed the petition and remanded the case for reconsideration by the learned Labour Court. This Court specifically directed the learned Labour Court to decide 3 issues mentioned in the order. The said order dated 3.2.1998 reads thus:- "Rule. Mr. H.K. Rathod, learned Advocate waives service of the Rule on behalf of the respondents. With the consent of the learned Advocates, this matter is taken up for final hearing today. The petitioner has challenged the award dated 4-4-97 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nadiad in Reference LCN) No. 325/89 whereby the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Nadiad, has ordered the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with continuity of service on their original posts with full backwages. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondents were appointed on 19-8-82 and 31-10-83, respectively, on temporary basis as peons for the purpose of cleaning the office and were terminated on 11-9-84. A reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for reinstatement of the respondents was made for adjudication to the Labour Court, Nadiad by the Additional Labour Commissioner, Nadiad. In reply to the Statement of Claim, the petitioner has specifically raised a contention that the petitioner is not an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) and the respondents are not the "workmen" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the reference itself is not maintainable. It appears that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has not decided the said questions presumably because the said contentions were not urged at the time of hearing the arguments. It appears that the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has not decided the said questions presumably because the said contentions were not urged at the time of hearing the arguments. Since the said questions have been urged before this Court and which go to the root of the matter being the question of jurisdiction of the Labour Court, I am of the opinion that the matter is required to be remanded to the Labour Court, Nadiad. Moreover, there is no positive evidence on the record as to whether the respondent-workmen were gainfully employed during the pendency of the reference and for that also the parties are required to lead appropriate evidence. In view of the above, this petition is allowed. The matter is remanded to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nadiad, for the purpose of deciding the questions: 1. Whether the petitioner is an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? 2. Whether the respondents are the "workmen" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? and 3. Whether the respondents have been gainfully employed during the pendency of the reference? The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nadiad shall decide the aforesaid question after allowing the parties to lead evidence and hearing them. The Labour Court shall decide the matter as early as possible and preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court. The learned Advocates of the respective parties have fairly agreed to the suggestion of the Court to reinstate the respondents and pay them backwages from the date of the award i.e. from 4-4-97 till the matter on remand is decided by the Labour Court. Accordingly, it is ordered that the petitioner shall reinstate the respondents on their original posts and pay them backwages with effect from 4-4-97 till the matter on remand is decided by the Labour Court, Nadiad. Mr. Mishra for the petitioner has assured that the direction of this Court for payment of wages shall be complied with by the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs." 6.3 Accordingly proceedings were remanded for fresh decision. Thereafter learned Labour Court heard the matter afresh and pass award dated 2.11.1998 which is impugned in present petition. 7. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs." 6.3 Accordingly proceedings were remanded for fresh decision. Thereafter learned Labour Court heard the matter afresh and pass award dated 2.11.1998 which is impugned in present petition. 7. During the hearing of present petition Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the learned Labour Court has committed error in not appreciating and accepting the contention that the petitioner institute cannot be termed or considered industry as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He submitted that since the petitioner institute is not an industry, the claimants cannot be termed as workmen and the reference was not maintainable. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate submitted that though contention was specifically raised and reliance was placed on the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. v. Arun Kumar Singh, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 241, the learned Court failed to appreciate the said contention and committed error in holding that the petitioner establishment is an industry and therefore reference is maintainable. Learned Labour Court, according to the petitioner, also committed error in directing the petitioner to reinstate the claimants with consequential benefits. 8. Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the claimants could not dispute the submission based on the decision in case of State of U.P.(supra) however he submitted that the claimants have been reinstated by the petitioner and there is no complaint or grievance against the concerned claimants and therefore there is no justification to prosecute the petition against the direction to reinstate the workmen. Learned advocate for the claimants also submitted that the claimants were terminated without following procedure prescribed by law, the direction by the learned Labour Court do not warrant any interference. 9. I have heard learned advocates for the petitioner establishment and respondents -claimants and also considered the material on record. I have also perused the award by learned Labour Court. 10. Before proceeding further it is relevant to take into account the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. (supra) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed and held that:- "1. Delay condoned. Special leave granted. 2. Heard counsel on both sides. I have also perused the award by learned Labour Court. 10. Before proceeding further it is relevant to take into account the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. (supra) wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed and held that:- "1. Delay condoned. Special leave granted. 2. Heard counsel on both sides. We find that the High Court has proceeded on a wrong footing that the District Rural Development Agency is an industry, and since the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') were not complied with, the termination of the services of the respondent-employee was invalid. The High Court has also erred in directing regularisation of the employee in the service. 3. According to us, the District Rural Development Agency is only entrusted with the work of carrying on different schemes entrusted to it including the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. Hence it cannot be described as industry within the meaning of the Act or the U.P Industrial Disputes Act. Hence, the provisions of the said statutes do not apply to the facts of the present case. The High Court should, therefore, decide the question falling for consideration in the present case on the basis that the provisions of the said statutes are not applicable. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remitted to the Division Bench of the High Court for decision according to law in the light of the above observations. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs." 11. It can be seen from the above quoted observations that the appellant before Hon'ble Apex Court was District Rural Development Agency which is, the petitioner in present case. In the said decision Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the District Rural Development Agency is only entrusted with the work of carrying on different scheme and that therefore it cannot be described as 'industry' within the meaning of the Act. 11.1 Thus, the contention and objection raised by the petitioner against maintainability of the reference is covered by the abovementioned decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P.(supra). 11.1 Thus, the contention and objection raised by the petitioner against maintainability of the reference is covered by the abovementioned decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P.(supra). 11.2 In view of the fact that the petitioner establishment cannot be termed as industry, the reference was not maintainable and learned Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain, adjudicate and decide the claim and dispute raised by the present respondents i.e. original claimants. 11.3 The decision by the learned Labour Court holding that the petitioner can be termed as 'industry' is contrary to and in disregard to abovementioned decision by Hon'ble Apex Court and therefore the conclusions by the learned Labour Court cannot be sustained. 12. In light of the abovementioned decision by Hon'ble Apex Court the award passed by the learned Labour Court is not sustainable. 12.1 The learned Labour Court has passed award in respect of establishment which cannot be termed as 'industry'. The Court passed the award in respect of the matter for which it had no jurisdiction. 12.2 Thus, the award is required to be set aside. Consequently following order is passed:- "In light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. (supra) the award dated 02.11.1998 passed by the learned Labour Court at Nadiad in Reference (LCN) No. 325 of 1989 is set aside and the petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent."