JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. The petitioner-Executive Engineer, Road & Building Department (State) has Challenged award dated 1st October 2009 passed by the Labour Court, Mehsana in Reference (LCM) No. 353 of 2008 (Old No. 186 of 2002) whereby the Labour Court has directed present petitioner to reinstate present respondent without any benefit of continuity or other benefits. The Labour Court has merely directed the petitioners to reinstate the respondent in service on his original post. 2. From the record, it appears that the respondent herein raised Industrial Dispute somewhere in 2002 against the alleged termination in May 1985. The respondent claimed that her service was orally terminated by the petitioners with effect from 20.05.1985 and that before terminating the service, any procedure prescribed by law was not followed and any amount including retrenchment compensation or other amount were also not paid. On such premise, the respondent prayed that illegal termination may be set aside and reinstatement with all consequential benefits may be granted. 3. It appears that present petitioners contested the proceedings by filing reply, wherein it was contended that the respondent was never engaged by the petitioner-employer and there was no relationship of employer and workman between the petitioner and the respondent and since the respondent was never engaged, there was no occasion for the respondent to complete work of 240 days as alleged or otherwise. On the same premise, it was also contended that there was no scope or occasion for terminating the respondent's service by way of victimization or illegally as alleged. 4. The Labour Court did not accept the defense of the petitioner herein and came to the conclusion that the respondent was in service of the petitioner and that since undisputedly the service of the respondent-workman was terminated without complying any procedure and without payment of compensation, despite the fact that the respondent was working since 1980, the action of termination was illegal. However, considering the fact that the workman had raised the dispute after delay of almost 17 years, the Labour Court considered it appropriate to deny and reject the demand for backwages and continuity in service etc. 5. The petitioner feels aggrieved by the said direction, hence present petition. 6. However, considering the fact that the workman had raised the dispute after delay of almost 17 years, the Labour Court considered it appropriate to deny and reject the demand for backwages and continuity in service etc. 5. The petitioner feels aggrieved by the said direction, hence present petition. 6. Learned A.G.P. appearing for the petitioner has contended that the award is bad and unsustainable because the Labour Court has failed to appreciate that the respondent was never engaged by the petitioner and the respondent did not, by any cogent evidence, establish that she was engaged by the petitioner. The second contention which learned AGP advanced and rather strenuously urged was about the delay in raising the dispute. He submitted that the respondent's service was allegedly terminated in 1985. However, the dispute came to be raised in 2002 i.e. after delay of almost 17 years and, therefore, the reference ought to have been dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay in raising the dispute. Any other contention is not raised. 7. The challenge raised against the award on the said two grounds is not sustainable. 8. It is required to be noted that in his deposition the witness of present petitioner admitted before the Labour Court that the presence of the workman was being recorded in muster roll. Further the witness of the petitioner also admitted that any pay slip or other documents were not issued to the respondent. 9. In face of such evidence by the witness of the petitioner-employer, an application on behalf of the respondent was given with a request for the direction to place on record the attendance record/muster roll and wage record for the period during which the respondent was, allegedly, in the employment with the petitioner. On such application, the Court passed order asking the petitioner to comply or reply. However, the petitioner did not file any reply and did not place the documents on record. Under the circumstances, considering the noncompliance of the direction, the Labour Court considered it appropriate to draw adverse inference. The Labour Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in case of R.M. Yallati v/s Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106 . 9.1. Under the circumstances, considering the noncompliance of the direction, the Labour Court considered it appropriate to draw adverse inference. The Labour Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in case of R.M. Yallati v/s Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106 . 9.1. Having regard to the total length of service of the respondent and the fact that the witness of the petitioner had admitted that any document, which would demonstrate the factum of employment, were not supplied to the respondent by the petitioner-employer and the attendance register or wage register for relevant period were not placed on record despite specific request made by/on behalf of the workman (Exhibit 11 application) the decision of the Labour Court cannot be faulted. 9.2. In this background, the court reached the conclusion that the respondent had worked for 240 days in preceding 12 months. 9.3. Once the said position is accepted, then the case has to be considered in light of the fact that respondent's termination was not preceded by disciplinary proceeding or with payment of retrenchment compensation. 9.4. When the case is seen from said perspective, it emerges that the learned Trial Court, in such factual background, concluded that the termination was brought about without following any procedure prescribed by and known to law and the termination was brought about illegally, and that the said condition cannot be said to be incorrect, or contrary to evidence or arbitrary or perverse. 10. So far as the contention regarding delay in raising Industrial Dispute is concerned, the Apex Court has, in catena of judgment including the decision in case of Director Food and Supplies, Punjab and another vs. Gurmit Singh, 2007 (5) SCC 727 observed that:- "The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer makes a grievance that the workman has made a stale claim then an employer can challenge the reference by way of a writ petition and contend that since the claim is belated there was no industrial dispute. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot strike down the reference on this ground. As observed in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors., 2001 (6) SCC 222 there are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot strike down the reference on this ground. As observed in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors., 2001 (6) SCC 222 there are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. The long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the Adjudicating Authority while moulding the reliefs. That is a different matter altogether." 10.1. Besides the said decision reference may also be made to the decision in case of Karsanbhai L. Harijan vs. Western Railway, 2001 [1] GLH 441 wherein this Court observed that:- "Now, therefore, so far as the first contention of Mrs. Talati regarding delay in making Reference is concerned, the said ground was negatived in the Special Civil Application preferred by the Railway Administration, which was dismissed summarily, and even the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed and now the said ground cannot be allowed to be canvassed again by the Railway Administration as the same point is concluded in the petition filed by the Railway Administration. The only point which is required to be considered in this petition is whether the substitution of penalty from removal to discharge can be said to be an adequate punishment or even that substituted penalty can be said to be on the higher side looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even otherwise, so far as the question about delay in making Reference is concerned, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider almost an identical question in the decision in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. and another, AIR 1999 SC 1352, wherein delay of 7 years was shown to be existing and admitted by workman. The Apex Court found that the Court can mould relief by refusing back wages or directing payment of part of back wages. The Apex Court found that the Court can mould relief by refusing back wages or directing payment of part of back wages. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as under: "...The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workmen merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....". 10.2. It is also held that the reference (raising dispute about illegal termination) ought not be rejected as a rule or mechanically in routine manner only on ground of delay and there cannot be a straight jacket formula for all such cases to suit all facts and Labor Court in such cases, ought to mould the relief appropriately which would take care of the delay in raising the dispute. 11. In this view of the matter, when the Labour Court has denied any relief by way of direction in nature of continuity of service and any back wages for entire period, it can be said in the facts of the case, that the Labour Court has not committed any error in moulding the relief by not granting benefit of continuity of service and back wages. 11.1. Actually by not granting back wages i.e. denial of back-wages duly compensates the aspect of delay while ensures and grants source of bread and livelihood for one family. 11.2. For this reason also the award does not deserve to be interfered with. 11.3. 11.1. Actually by not granting back wages i.e. denial of back-wages duly compensates the aspect of delay while ensures and grants source of bread and livelihood for one family. 11.2. For this reason also the award does not deserve to be interfered with. 11.3. Even if the respondents employment with the petitioner was to be considered as casual or on daily wage basis, then also the equity is balanced by the Labour Court by directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondent on original post. 11.4. Therefore, even the second ground on which the petitioner has sought to assail the award is not found to be unjustified or arbitrary, much less perverse. 12. The foregoing discussion establishes that the award impugned in present petitions does not deserve to be interfered with and set aside. On careful consideration of the direction, I do not find that Labour Court has committed error of law or jurisdiction in passing the impugned direction. 13. Having regard to the aforesaid aspect, I am not inclined to entertain the petition. The petition fails and is accordingly rejected. Rule is discharged. Ad-interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith.