JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The petitioner while serving as Deputy Superintendent of Police was recommended for the post of Assistant Director in the Directorate of Enforcement in Shimla City on deputation basis for which he gave his willingness and was subsequently appointed vide order dated 24.5.2013. The period of deputation as specified in the order was for the period of three years commencing from the date of assumption of charge i.e. 26.6.2013. The petitioner was relieved by the respondent vide notification dated 24.6.2013. 2. On 4.3.2014 the petitioner was promoted to the post of Additional Superintendent of Police. Earlier to that the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, vide memorandum dated 8.1.2013, advertised 50 posts of Deputy Director of Enforcement, which were later on increased to 95 vide advertisement dated 13.6.2014. In the later advertisement, one vacant post of Deputy Director at Shimla was also included. The petitioner applied for the said post, through proper channel, vide his application dated 25.4.2014. Vide letter dated 9.7.2014, the same was forwarded by the Zonal Office at Chandigarh to the Directorate of Enforcement at Delhi. The Directorate of Enforcement vide its letter dated 9.10.2014 requested the State Government to consider this application and the State Government was further requested to provide the ACRs of the last five years of the petitioner along with cadre clearance and vigilance clearance. In pursuance to the aforesaid letter, the State Government vide its letter dated 17.1.2015 (Annexure P-10) recommended the name of the petitioner for deputation against the post of Deputy Director Enforcement and at the same time granted the vigilance clearance. Thereafter vide letter dated 28.4.2015 the VCC, integrity certificate, State of Major/Minor Penalty Certificate and ACRs for the last five years up to 2013-2014 were also forwarded to the Ministry of Finance vide letter dated 28.4.2015. However, vide letter dated 22.7.2015 (Annexure P-12), the Government of Himachal Pradesh withdrew its recommendation. 3. Aggrieved by the said letter dated 22.7.2015, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of present writ petition claiming therein the following substantive reliefs: “(i) Issue a letter of certiorari to quash Annexure P-12 i.e. letter dated 22.07.2015. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities not to implement Annexure P-12 i.e. letter dated 22.07.2015. 3. Aggrieved by the said letter dated 22.7.2015, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of present writ petition claiming therein the following substantive reliefs: “(i) Issue a letter of certiorari to quash Annexure P-12 i.e. letter dated 22.07.2015. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities not to implement Annexure P-12 i.e. letter dated 22.07.2015. (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to consider the name of the present petitioner for appointment to the post of Deputy Director Enforcement Directorate against the existing vacancy at Shimla.” 4. At this stage, it shall be pertinent to note that when this petition came up before the learned Vacation Judge on 15.2.2016, the operation of order dated 22.7.2015 was ordered to be stayed and further directions were issued to respondents No. 1 and 2 to consider the case of the petitioner for the post of Deputy Director of Enforcement on the basis of recommendations made earlier by the State Government vide its letter dated 17.1.2015 (Annexure P-10). 5. Respondent No.1 i.e. Ministry of Finance, did not choose to contest the petition and has also not filed its reply. However, the Union Public Service Commission, which has been arrayed as respondent No.2 has contested the petition by filing its reply wherein apart from raising various preliminary submissions, it has been averred that the application of the petitioner had been forwarded by respondent No.1 vide its letter dated 24.11.2015 and received by the replying respondent along with applications of other 142 candidates on 30.11.2015. The application of the petitioner was accompanied by letter dated 17.01.2015 (Annexure P-10), integrity certificate, vigilance clearance and minor/major penalty statement and attested photocopy of ACRs for the five years. The application was duly considered on the basis of the letter dated 17.1.2015, but the petitioner was found to be ineligible as his bio-data was not countersigned by the employer as required in the employment news dated 13-20.9.2014. 6. It is further averred that the respondent-Commission decides the eligibility of the candidates strictly as per the provisions of the Recruitment Rules and DoPT guidelines, in a fair and impartial manner and recommends the names of the suitable candidates after holding the selection process. 6. It is further averred that the respondent-Commission decides the eligibility of the candidates strictly as per the provisions of the Recruitment Rules and DoPT guidelines, in a fair and impartial manner and recommends the names of the suitable candidates after holding the selection process. As per the vacancy circular dated 13.6.2014 and employment news dated 13-19 September, 2014, the Cadre Controlling Authorities were required to countersign the bio-data with seal so as to ensure that the particulars furnished by the applicants are correct. 7. It is also contended that in the instant case 28 candidates who fulfilled all the eligibility criteria were called for personal talk on 30.12.2015 and 31.12.2015. Thereafter, even the petitioner’s bio-data was considered by the Commission vide letter dated 17.1.2015 along with other documents. However, he was found to be ineligible by the Commission to be called for personal talk as his bio-data was not countersigned by his employer/Cadre Controlling Authority with seal as provided in the proforma published in the employment news/vacancy circular (supra). 8. The State of Himachal Pradesh through its Chief Secretary and Secretary (Home) have been arrayed as respondents No.3 and 4 and have filed joint reply wherein it has been claimed that no employee has a right to claim Central Deputation and even otherwise, the State Government always has a right to call back its employees from Central Deputation and also to withdraw any recommendation made to this effect, if a need so arises. It is further averred that under para 8 of the State Finance Department’s Office Memorandum dated 20.2.1999, the tenure of deputation has been fixed for a maximum period of three years in all cases except those posts where a longer period of tenure is prescribed in the Rules. 9. It is also averred that it was not the petitioner alone who was recalled, but along with him another similarly placed officer who too was on deputation was ordered to be recalled keeping in view the requirements of the State Government. 10. 9. It is also averred that it was not the petitioner alone who was recalled, but along with him another similarly placed officer who too was on deputation was ordered to be recalled keeping in view the requirements of the State Government. 10. Insofar as the contents of letter dated 17.1.2015 (Annexure P-10) are concerned, it has been averred that though the name of the petitioner was recommended for the post in question, but the same was due to oversight and thereafter letter dated 22.7.2015 (Annexure P-12) was issued and the recommendation made vide letter dated 17.1.2015 was withdrawn due to vacancy of 10 functional posts of Additional Superintendent of Police in the State. 11. In rejoinder to the reply filed by respondent No.2, the petitioner has averred that as he was already on deputation with the Enforcement Directorate and therefore, there was no requirement of his bio-data being countersigned by his employer. Whereas, in rejoinder filed to the reply of respondents No. 3 and 4, the petitioner has averred that the shortage of HPPS officers in the rank of Additional Superintendent of Police did not originate overnight and was there even in January 2015 when the name of the petitioner was recommended. Therefore, it was lame excuse agitated by the respondents in order to defeat the right of the petitioner. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 12. At the outset, it may be noticed that this writ petition does not contain any distinct or separate grounds of challenge upon which the petitioner seeks the relief as prayed for. The petitioner after setting out the necessary facts up to paragraph 18, has in paragraph 19 set out some grounds which are being reproduced in the latter part of the judgment. Thereafter paras 20 and 21 of the petition contain the necessary and mandatory averments with respect to no other petition on the same and similar grounds being pending either before this Court or any other court including the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also fact that the petitioner has not other alternative efficacious remedy available to him and thereafter the relief as quoted above has been prayed for. 13. 13. The grounds which could be discerned from the entire length and breadth of the petition are partly contained in paragraphs 14 and 19 of the petition and the same read as under: “14. That in order to show the fallacy in the aforesaid reason cited in letter dated 22.07.2015 i.e. Annexure P-12, it would be appropriate to draw the attention of this Hon’ble Court to the sanctioned strength of Himachal Pradesh Police Service as on 12.05.2015. A copy of the sanctioned strength of Himachal Pradesh Police Service as on 12.5.2015 is being appended along with as Annexure P-13. A perusal whereof reflects that the total authorized strength is 170 total duty posts therein are 137 and the deputation reserve provided for is 12. Total Additional Superintendent of Police provided for are 34. Out of the aforesaid 34 only the petitioner is on deputation and one Shri Arvind Chaudhory is on UN Deputation. The balance 32 Additional Superintendent of Police are available in the State of Himachal Pradesh to serve the State. Even otherwise as has already been stated in Annexure P-13 the deputation reserve provided for is 12 whereas presently out of the sanctioned strength only 2 individuals as has been stated herein above are on deputation. Hence, in view of the aforesaid the reason cited in letter dated 22.7.2015 i.e. Annexure P-12 is without any basis. Besides, the aforesaid the present petitioner reserves right/liberty to lay challenge to the aforesaid withdrawal of recommendation vide letter dated 22.7.2015 on other grounds at an appropriate stage. “19. That apart from the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances it is clearly evident that the petitioner is presently on deputation till 26.06.2016. Besides the aforesaid it is clearly evident that letter dated 22.07.2015 i.e. Annexure P-12 is arbitrary, without any basis. Moreover, the petitioner has a distinguished career till date. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances the case of the petitioner needs to be considered for appointment as Deputy Director Enforcement Directorate at Shimla against the existing vacancy.” 14. Before proceeding any further, we may notice that there are no allegations of mala fide with which we are required to deal with. In other words, we must proceed on the basis that it was a bona fide act on the part of the Government whereby it on 22.7.2015 withdrew the recommendations earlier made on 17.1.2015. Before proceeding any further, we may notice that there are no allegations of mala fide with which we are required to deal with. In other words, we must proceed on the basis that it was a bona fide act on the part of the Government whereby it on 22.7.2015 withdrew the recommendations earlier made on 17.1.2015. Therefore, it was an exercise of the executive power of the State Government not to send the petitioner on further deputation. The reason given is the shortage of the officers which position has though been contested by the petitioner, but then in absence of mala fides, this question cannot be gone into by this Court. After all, it is not the function of the Court to run the Government, it is the Government authorities who are charged with such function to decide what is in the best interest in the administration. The interference of the Court is only called for when the action is founded on illegality, arbitrariness or mala fides in the State action. 15. That apart, the petitioner admittedly has lien and is permanent employee of the State Government and, therefore, it is for the Government to decide as to how best his services can be utilized and it is not for this Court to dictate the terms in this regard. That apart, it is the respondent–State which is the best authority to decide whom, where, why and when a person is to sent on deputation and it is not for the petitioner to dictate such terms. Moreover, the respondent-State otherwise has made it categorically clear that the shortage of officers at the level of Additional Superintendent of Police was on account of their having been posted to non-cadre post which necessitated the issuance of letter dated 22.7.2015 (Annexure P-12) and such plea has not even been controverted by the petitioner. 16. The Government is the best authority to decide all these questions. It is not for the Court to judicially review by encroaching into these areas. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. However, this power must be exercised honestly, bona fide and reasonably. It should be exercised in public, interest. It is not for the Court to judicially review by encroaching into these areas. The Government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. However, this power must be exercised honestly, bona fide and reasonably. It should be exercised in public, interest. If the exercise of power is based on extraneous considerations or for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive it would amount to mala fide and colourable exercise of power. 17. A challenge to an order of this kind should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the Courts or tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that courts or tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter for that of competent authorities of the State. It is purely an administrative matter and therefore the scope of interference by the Courts is very limited. The State Administration cannot function with its hands tied by judiciary behind its back. And these matters must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. These are purely administrative matters, and it is well settled that courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint. 18. What is the deputation has been succinctly dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Inder Singh and others (1997) 8, SCC 372, in the following terms: “18. Concept of "deputation" is well understood in service law and has a recognized meaning. 'Deputation' has a different connotation in service law and the dictionary meaning of the word 'deputation' is of no help. In simple words 'deputation' means service outside the cadre or outside the parent department. Deputation is deputing or transferring an employee to a post outside his cadre, that is to say, to another department on a temporary basis. After the expiry period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per Recruitment Rules. After the expiry period of deputation the employee has to come back to his parent department to occupy the same position unless in the meanwhile he has earned promotion in his parent department as per Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer is outside the normal field of deployment or not is decided by the authority who controls the service or post from which the employee is transferred. There can be no deputation without the consent of the person so deputed and he would, therefore, know his rights and privileges in the deputation post. The law on deputation and repatriation is quite settled as we have also seen in various judgments which we have referred to above. There is no escape for the respondents now to go back to their parent departments and working there as Constables or Head Constables as the case may be.” 19. In service jurisprudence, deputation is resorted to in public interest to meet exigencies of public service. Deputation is a tripartite agreement as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh’s case (supra) based on voluntary consent of the principal employer to lend the services of his employee, which decision has to be accepted by the borrowing Department/employer and also involves consent of the employee. 20. In Gurinder Pal Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others, 2005 (1) SLR 629, a learned Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that a deputation subsists so long as the parties to this tripartite arrangement do not abrogate it. However, if any one of the parties repudiate the agreement, the other two have no legally enforceable right to insist upon continuance of the deputation. It is apt to reproduce para 12 of the judgment which reads thus: “12. In service jurisprudence, “deputation” is described as an assignment of an employee of one department or cadre to another department or cadre. The necessity for sending on deputation arises in “public interest” to meet the exigencies of “public service”. The concept of deputation is based upon consent and voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee, corresponding acceptance of such service by the borrowing employer and the consent of the employee to go on deputation. A deputation subsists so long as the parties to this tripartite arrangement do not abrogate it. The concept of deputation is based upon consent and voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee, corresponding acceptance of such service by the borrowing employer and the consent of the employee to go on deputation. A deputation subsists so long as the parties to this tripartite arrangement do not abrogate it. However, if any one of the parties repudiate the agreement, the other two have no legally enforceable right to insist upon continuance of the deputation. Even in the cases where deputationists continue for a pretty long period and options for their “absorption” in the borrowing department were taken, yet their repatriation to the parent department was upheld by the Apex Court in Rattilal B. Soni vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1990 SC 1132 : [1991 (3) SLR 77 (SC)] after holding that “the appellants being on deputation, they could be repatriated to their parent cadre at any time and they do not get any right to be absorbed on the deputation post.” “Deputation” per se being a contractually made ad hoc arrangement, seldom confers any right upon a deputationist, either for completion of the term of deputation or regularization of such stop-gap arrangement. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the College in this regard squarely answer the controversy.” 21. Thus, there can be no gain saying that ‘deputation’ is the assignment of an employee of one Department/cadre to another Department/cadre and the deputation subsists so long as parties to tripartite agreement adhere to the same. The moment this tripartite agreement is disturbed or vitiated or repudiated, the employee would have no legally enforceable right to continue to complete the agreed period of his deputation. The necessary corollary of this would be that no employee can be sent on deputation unless there is a voluntary consent of the principal employer to lend the services of his employee. 22. Therefore, once the principal employer i.e. State of Himachal Pradesh refuses or does not give voluntary consent to lend the services of the petitioner, the petitioner has no right to claim that he should still be sent on deputation. 23. 22. Therefore, once the principal employer i.e. State of Himachal Pradesh refuses or does not give voluntary consent to lend the services of the petitioner, the petitioner has no right to claim that he should still be sent on deputation. 23. The law has now developed to the extent that a deputationist would have no vested right to even continue in the borrowing department till the completion of the stipulated period of deputation, of course, subject to certain laid down exceptions like grounds of repatriation being stigmatic/punitive etc. 24. It is vehemently contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.2 has wrongly held the petitioner ineligible simply because the bio-data was not countersigned by the employer which was not even the requirement of law and, therefore, the respondent should be directed to consider the name of the petitioner for the appointment in question. 25. Apart from what has already been observed above, we find this contention to be otherwise not legally tenable as it was pursuant to the orders passed by this Court on 15.2.2016 that the case of the petitioner for deputation was considered but rejected by respondent No.2. In spite of this rejection, the petitioner took no steps whatsoever to assail the said order of rejection by amending the petition nor has even cared to place the same on record, rather it is respondent No.2, who has placed this order on record. 26. It is trite that when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, whereas in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. (Refer: Bharat Singh and others vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1988 SC 2181 ). 27. That apart, it would be noticed that respondent No.2 while considering the case of the petitioner was totally uninfluenced by subsequent letter dated 22.7.2015 and had rather considered the case of the petitioner in accordance with the recommendation made by the State Government on 17.1.2015, yet, the petitioner was not found eligible as his bio-data was not countersigned by the employer so as to ensure that the particulars furnished by the applicants were correct. 28. Even though the petitioner would contend that his biodata was not required to be counter-signed as he was already on deputation, we are not persuaded to accept such submission as the requirement of bio-data is so stipulated in the vacancy circular F.No.A-35011/6/2014-Ad.ED dated 13.06.2014 and employment news dated 13-19 September, 2014 and it is more than settled that an action to be taken in a particular manner must be taken, done or performed in the manner prescribed or not at all. 29. It was more than eighty years back that the Hon’ble Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad Vs King Emperor, (AIR 1936, PC 253) held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the things must be done in that way or not at all and the ratio of this judgment has thereafter been approved and further expanded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments (Refer: Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & anr Vs.State of Vindh-P, AIR 1954, SC 322; Deep Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961, SC 1527; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh & ors, AIR 1964 SC 358 ; Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961, SC 1527; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh & ors, AIR 1964 SC 358 ; Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad, 1999(8) SCC 266 ; Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka, 2001 (4), SCC 9; State of Jharkhand & ors Vs. Ambay Cements and anr, (2005) 1 SCC 368 ; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited Vs. Essar Power Limited, 2008 (4) SCC 755 ; Zuari Cement Ltd Vs. Regional Director, ESIC, Hyderabad & ors, AIR 2015 SC 2764 ; and Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd Vs. Sant Singh & ors, Civil Appeal No.5072 of 2016 decided on 13th May, 2016). 30. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Interim order dated 15.2.2016 is vacated. All pending applications are also dismissed.