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2016 DIGILAW 1199 (ORI)

Rama Chandra Behera v. State of Orissa

2016-12-05

S.K.SAHOO

body2016
JUDGMENT : S.K. SAHOO, J. The petitioner Rama Chandra Behera has filed this application under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal proceeding in G.R. Case No. 567 of 1991 in which he has been charge sheeted under sections 409, 420, 167, 218 read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code pending in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar. The said case arises out of Capital P.S. Case No. 114 of 1991. 2. The main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Karunakar Jena is that the criminal proceeding has been initiated in the year 1990 and in the meantime twenty six years have passed and the delay in disposal of the criminal case is in no way attributable to the petitioner and whatever delay has occasioned, it was due to the lackadaisical attitude of the investigating agency in submitting the charge sheet at a belated stage and then for non-supply of police papers by the Court . It is further contended that in the meantime, the petitioner has been superannuated/retired from his service and the petitioner faced a departmental proceeding and he has been found not guilty by the appellate authority. It is further contended that no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceeding to continue against the petitioner. 3. Mr. Tusar Kumar Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State on the other hand contended that the delay cannot be a sole factor to quash the criminal proceeding in all the cases and the allegations against the petitioner and other co-accused persons are very serious in nature and they have misappropriated the contributory provident fund amount and sufficient materials are available on record against the petitioner and therefore, it is not a fit case to invoke the inherent power to quash the criminal proceeding. 4. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties and on perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that one Mr. 4. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties and on perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that one Mr. N.K. Behera, Secretary (C.P.F.) submitted the First Information Report on 26.06.1990 before the Officer in charge, Capital Police Station, Bhubaneswar alleging therein that there has been misappropriation of substantial amount of public money and malpractices done in the Contributory Provident Fund Trust Section by some employees including the petitioner who was working as Senior Accountant in falsely recording that there has been no outstanding against some members of the Trust Fund in the concerned loan files put up to A.A.O. (C.P.F.) in recommending sanction. It appears that though the first information report dated 26.06.1990 submitted by the Secretary (CPF) was received on the very next day i.e. on 27.06.1990 by the Officer in charge of the Capital Police Station but he did not register the First Information Report and made a station diary entry bearing SDE No. 1885 dated 27.06.1990 and subsequently on 23.02.1991, the F.I.R. was registered as Capital P.S. Case No. 114 of 1991 under sections 408/34 of the Indian Penal Code against four persons including the petitioner who was the Senior Accountant in the CPF Section of Orissa Mining Corporation Limited at the relevant point of time i.e. January 1990 to May 1990. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted in Court on 23.10.1998 under sections 409/420/167/218/120-B of the Indian Penal Code against five accused persons including the petitioner. Though it is mentioned in the charge sheet that it is dated 27.12.1994 but since it was submitted on 23.10.1998, the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar directed the matter relating to suppression of police report for about four years to be brought to the notice of learned C.J.M., Khurda, Superintendent of Police, Khurda and Additional D.G. (P), Circle, Cuttack. After submission of charge sheet, the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar on the very same day i.e. on 26.10.1990 took cognizance of offences under sections 409/420/167/218/120-B of the Indian Penal Code and issued process against the accused persons including the petitioner who appeared and released on bail. From the certified copy of the order sheet which has been filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it shows the position of the case from 20.11.1992 to 15.02.2010. From the certified copy of the order sheet which has been filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it shows the position of the case from 20.11.1992 to 15.02.2010. It reveals that the case was adjourned from time to time right from 07.10.1999 for supply of the police papers to the accused persons and even the last order dated 15.02.2010 indicates that the police papers have not been supplied. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that till date no police papers have been supplied to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand submitted that since the petitioner approached this Court on 22.06.2010 by filing this Criminal Misc. Case and thereafter, vide order dated 27.06.2011 in Misc. Case No.1201 of 2010, this Court granted interim stay of further proceeding in G.R. Case No.567 of 1991 pending before the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar, that might be the reason for non-supply of the police papers to the petitioner. 6. Be that as it may, it appears that even though the F.I.R. was submitted before the Officer in charge, Capital Police Station, Bhubaneswar on 26.06.1990, the F.I.R. was registered only on 23.02.1991. Similarly though it is shown in the charge sheet that it was ready by 27.12.1994 but it was submitted in Court only on 23.10.1998. The order sheet indicates that the case was posted from 07.10.1999 onwards for supply of police papers and yet it was not supplied for more than ten years till the petitioner approached this Court for quashing the criminal proceeding on the ground of inordinate delay. On perusal of the materials available on record and also scanning the certified copy of the order sheet produced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is very clear that the delay which has been caused in the case right from the submission of the F.I.R. by the Secretary C.P.F., Mr. N. K. Behera to the Officer in charge Capital Police Station, Bhubaneswar is no way attributable to the petitioner. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has got substantial force that the delay has occasioned mainly for submitting the charge sheet before the Court about eight years after the presentation of the F.I.R. and also for more than ten years thereafter for non-supply of police papers to the petitioner before the petitioner approached this Court for quashing the criminal proceeding. 7. 7. On perusal of the order dated 12.10.2009 issued by Managing Director, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd., it appears that the Board of Directors, the Appellate Authority has found the petitioner not guilty of the charges framed against him vide order No.15078 dated 14.06.1991 and the punishment imposed on him vide order No.7148 dated 25.02.1995 was withdrawn and the petitioner was deemed to have continued in the post of Senior Accountant till the date to his retirement. There is also no dispute that in the meantime the petitioner has been superannuated and he is now aged about 67 years. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Maheswar Mohanty -Vrs.-State of Orissa reported in 2006 (II) Orissa Law Reviews 67, wherein this Court has held that the two criminal cases were registered relating to the occurrences which occurred twenty two years back and no fruitful purpose would be served in keeping the criminal cases pending and accordingly, quashed the proceeding of the two cases. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State Mr. Tusar Kumar Mishra on the other hand placed reliance in the case of Ranjan Dwivedi -Vrs.-C.B.I. through the Director General reported in (2012) 53 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 428, wherein it is held as follows:- “20. Second limb of the argument of the learned Senior Counsel Shri Andhyarujina is that the failure of completion of trial has not only caused great prejudice to the petitioners but also their family members. Presumptive prejudice is not an alone dispositive of speedy trial claim and must be balanced against other factors. The accused has the burden to make some showing of prejudice, although a showing of actual prejudice is not required. When the accused makes a prima-facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts on the prosecution to show that the accused suffered no serious prejudice. The question of how great lapse it is, consistent with the guarantee of a speedy trial, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no basis for holding that the right to speedy trial can be quantified into specified number of days, months or years. The question of how great lapse it is, consistent with the guarantee of a speedy trial, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no basis for holding that the right to speedy trial can be quantified into specified number of days, months or years. The mere passage of time is not sufficient to establish denial of a right to a speedy trial, but a lengthy delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, triggers the examination of other factors to determine whether the rights have been violated. 21. The length of the delay is not sufficient in itself to warrant a finding that the accused was deprived of the right to a speedy trial. Rather, it is only one of the factors to be considered, and must be weighed against other factors. Moreover, among factors to be considered in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused is violated, the length of delay is least conclusive. While there is authority that even very lengthy delays do not give rise to a per se conclusion of violation of constitutional rights, there is also authority that long enough delay could constitute per se violation of right to speedy trial. In our considered view, the delay tolerated varies with the complexity of the case, the manner of proof as well as gravity of the alleged crime. This, again, depends on case to case basis. There cannot be universal rule in this regard. It is a balancing process while determining as to whether the accused’s right to speedy trial has been violated or not. The length of delay in and itself, is not a weighty factor. 22. In the present case, the delay is occasional by exceptional circumstances. It may not be due to failure of the prosecution or by the systemic failure but we can only say that there is a good cause for the failure to complete the trial and in our view, such delay is not violative of the right of the accused for speedy trial. 23. It may not be due to failure of the prosecution or by the systemic failure but we can only say that there is a good cause for the failure to complete the trial and in our view, such delay is not violative of the right of the accused for speedy trial. 23. Prescribing a time limit for the Trial Court to terminate the proceedings or, at the end thereof, to acquit or discharge the accused in all cases will amount to legislation, which cannot be done by judicial directives within the arena of judicial law making power available to constitutional courts; however, liberally the courts may interpret Articles 21, 32, 141 and 142. (Ramchandra Rao P. -Vrs.-State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 ). The Seven Judges Bench overruled four earlier decision of this Court on this point: Raj Deo (II) -Vrs.-State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604 , Raj Deo Sharma -Vrs.-State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507 ; Common Cause, A Registered Society -Vrs.-Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33 . The time limit in these four cases was contrary to the observations of the Five Judges Bench in A.R. Antulay (Supra). The Seven Judges Bench in Ramchandra Rao P. -Vrs.-State of Karnataka, (Supra) has been followed in State through CBI -Vrs.-Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar, (2002) 7 SCC 6 and State of Rajasthan -Vrs.-Ikbal Hussen, (2004) 12 SCC 499 . It was further observed that it is neither advisable, feasible nor judicially permissible to prescribe an outer limit for the conclusion of all criminal proceedings. It is for the criminal Court to exercise powers under sections 258, 309 and 311 of the Cr.P.C. to effectuate the right to a speedy trial. In an appropriate case, directions from the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226/227 can be invoked to seek appropriate relief. 24. In view of the settled position of law and particularly in the facts of the present case, we are not in agreement with the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel, Shri. T.R. Andhyarujina. In an appropriate case, directions from the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226/227 can be invoked to seek appropriate relief. 24. In view of the settled position of law and particularly in the facts of the present case, we are not in agreement with the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel, Shri. T.R. Andhyarujina. Before we conclude, we intend to say, particularly, looking into long adjournments sought by the accused persons, who are seven in number, that accused cannot take advantage or the benefit of the right of speedy trial by causing the delay and then use that delay in order to assert their rights.” He further placed reliance in case of Sajjan Kumar -Vrs.-Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2010) 47 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 650, wherein it is held as follows:- “24. Though delay is also a relevant factor and every accused is entitled to speedy justice in view of Article 21 of the Constitution, ultimately it depends upon various factors/reasons and materials placed by the prosecution. Though Mr. Lalit heavily relied on paragraph 20 of the decision of this Court in Vakil Prasad Singh's case (supra), the learned Additional Solicitor General, by drawing our attention to the subsequent paragraphs i.e., 21, 23, 24, 27 and 29 pointed out that the principles enunciated in A.R. Antulay's case (supra) are only illustrative and merely because of long delay the case of the prosecution cannot be closed. 25. Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the intervenor has pointed out that in criminal justice "a crime never dies" for which he relied on the decision of this Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 . In para-14, C.K. Thakker, J. speaking for the Bench has observed: “It is settled law that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the society even though it has been committed against an individual. Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay.” In the case on hand, though delay may be a relevant ground, in the light of the materials which are available before the Court through CBI, without testing the same at the trial, the proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the ground of delay. As stated earlier, those materials have to be tested in the context of prejudice to the accused only at the trial.” He further placed reliance in case of P. Ramachandra Rao -Vrs.-State of Karnataka reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 1856, wherein it is held as follows:- “30. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) AIR 1996 SC 1619 as modified in Common Cause (II) AIR 1997 SC 1539 and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II) AIR 1999 SC 3524 , the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold:- (1) The dictum in A.R. Antulay’s case is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in A.R. Antulay’s case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and re-affirm the said propositions. (3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay's case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II) . The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II) . At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay's case and decided whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and a mandatorily obliging the Court of terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial Judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions. (6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary-quantitatively and qualitatively-by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act.” He further placed reliance in case of Mangilal Vyas -Vrs.-State of Rajasthan reported in 1990(1) SCALE 63 , wherein it is held as follows:- “3. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been prosecuted in 11 criminal cases for offences under section 408 or 409 IPC, that the proceedings are pending for over 25 years, the prolongation of the trial without any fault on the part of the appellant amounts to persecution of the appellant and, therefore, the proceedings should have been quashed by the High Court. It is maintained that in spite of passage of several years, no evidence worth the name has been recorded by the prosecutor. It is maintained that in spite of passage of several years, no evidence worth the name has been recorded by the prosecutor. We have been taken though the various steps taken in each case and the nature of the evidence purported to have been collected. 4. We do not consider it necessary to narrate the detailed facts leading to the present appeals except to state that the trial in the pending cases have been unduly protracted due to various causes. It is no doubt regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the Court. We think that the circumstances of the case only call for appropriate directions for the expeditious disposal of the pending proceedings and the law has to be allowed to take its own course to prevent miscarriage of justice.” He further placed reliance in case of Vakil Prasad Singh -Vrs.-State of Bihar reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court Cases 1822, wherein it is held as follows:- “9. Before adverting to the core issue, viz. whether under the given circumstances the appellant was entitled to approach the High Court for getting the entire criminal proceedings against him quashed, it would be appropriate to notice the circumstances and the parameters enunciated and reiterated by this Court in a series of decisions under which the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is undoubtedly very wide but it has to be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. It is trite to state that the said powers have to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only where the Court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. xxxxx 13. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon's case (supra) was exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. 1992 AIR SCW 1872. Referring to a number of decisions of this Court and the American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution, making the right to a speedy and public trial a constitutional guarantee, the Court formulated as many as eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice to note the gist thereof. These are: (i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is -who is responsible for the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi) ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors-‘balancing test' or 'balancing process’ and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied; (vii) Ordinarily speaking, where the Court comes to a conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the Court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the Court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the Court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in the High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis. x x xx x 15. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in Court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the Court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the Court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the Court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the Court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time frame for conclusion of trial.” He further placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Dalip Singh alias Deepa -Vrs.-State of Punjab reported in 2010 (1) RCR (Criminal) 566, wherein it is held as follows:- “26. Therefore, in every case where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be necessarily put is: who is responsible for the delay? Besides, each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the case. Some delays may indeed work to the advantage of the accused. Inordinate long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, incarceration of the accused will also be a relevant fact. Prosecution should not be reduced to persecution. But when does prosecution become persecution, depends upon the facts of a given case. Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-through a `balancing test' or `balancing process' to determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied. It is neither advisable nor practical to fix any time-frame for trials. Any such rule is bound to be a qualified one. Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-through a `balancing test' or `balancing process' to determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied. It is neither advisable nor practical to fix any time-frame for trials. Any such rule is bound to be a qualified one. Such a rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution.” He further placed reliance in case of Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal -Vrs.-State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 642, wherein it is held as follows:- “24. It is to be kept in mind that on one hand, the right of the accused is to have a speedy trial and on the other, the quashment of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for sending the matter for re-trial has to be weighed, regard being had to the impact of the crime on the society and the confidence of the people in the judicial system. There cannot be a mechanical approach. From the principles laid down in many an authority of this Court, it is clear as crystal that no time-limit can be stipulated for disposal of the criminal trial. The delay caused has to be weighed on the factual score, regard being had to the nature of the offence and the concept of social justice and the cry of the collective.” 9. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties and the citations placed by the learned counsels for both the sides, it is very clear that the delay which has occasioned by action or inaction in the prosecution is one of the main features which are to be taken note of by the Court. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the accused is weighed heavily against the prosecution inasmuch as such delay violates the constitutional rights to speedy trial of the accused. The Court while deciding the case has to see whether there is unreasonable and unexplained delay which has resulted in causing serious prejudice to the accused. There is no dispute that there cannot be any straight jacket formula in a particular case to quash the criminal proceeding if the trial is not concluded within a particular time limit. The Court while deciding the case has to see whether there is unreasonable and unexplained delay which has resulted in causing serious prejudice to the accused. There is no dispute that there cannot be any straight jacket formula in a particular case to quash the criminal proceeding if the trial is not concluded within a particular time limit. The nature and gravity of the accusation, the qualitative and quantitative materials collected during course of investigation, the conduct of the accused in causing the delay are also to be considered by the Court. Coming to the case in hand, I find that not only it took about eight months for the Officer in charge of Capital Police Station to register the F.I.R. but for best reason known to the investigating agency, even though the case records indicates that the charge sheet was made ready by 27.12.1994 but it was withheld from the Court and submitted only on 23.10.1998 and thereafter, till this case was filed in this Court, the case was adjourned by the learned Magistrate from time to time since 07.10.1999 onwards for supply of police papers. It is regrettable that when few hours would have been sufficient to prepare xerox copies of the police papers and then supply it to the accused, the same could not be done even after passage of more than ten years. One after the other Magistrates mechanically and without application of mind went on putting their signatures in the order sheet in adjourning the case from time to time for supply of police papers even without asking the registry to prepare it at an earliest. It was also the joint responsibility and duty of the prosecutor to point out the inordinate delay caused to the notice of the Court to pass appropriate order in that respect. It is for the laches of both that the petitioner against whom serious charges of public nature have been brought could not be proceeded with. More than twenty six years have passed in the meantime since the date of presentation of the F.I.R. The petitioner has not only retired from his service but the Board of Directors, the appellate authority has given a clean chit to the petitioner while rehearing the appeal against the punishment imposed on him in the disciplinary proceeding as per the direction of this Court in O.J.C. No. 5415 of 1995 dated 16.03.2009. There is no gainsaying that exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result in the quashing of the criminal prosecution but in view of long lapse of time passed since the presentation of the F.I.R. and non-supply of copies of police statements and other relevant documents and uncertainty of the memory of 141 charge sheeted witnesses, assuming that they are still available to prove the accusations, it would not be fair and just to allow the case to proceed against the petitioner. In view of exceptional circumstances in this case in favour of the petitioner, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional right of speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The fact that he is in no way responsible for the inordinate delay caused in the proceeding and has suffered serious prejudice, in order to prevent miscarriage of justice and in the interest of justice, invoking my inherent power under section 482 of Cr.P.C., I am of the view that the proceeding against the petitioner in connection with Capital P.S. Case No.114 of 1991 which corresponds to G.R. Case No.567 of 1991 pending in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar should be quashed. Accordingly, the CRLMC application is allowed and the criminal proceeding in G.R. Case No.567 of 1991 pending in the Court of learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar stands quashed.