JUDGMENT : The captioned two petitions are, in effect, cross petitions taken out by the workman and the employer against very same award i.e. award dated 20.3.2003 passed by the learned Labour Court, Ahmedabad in Reference (LCA) No.865 of 1999 whereby the learned Labour Court directed the employer to reinstate the claimant in service on his original post and to pay backwages from 9.3.2001 to the date of award. For sake of convenience, the petitioner in Special Civil Application No.2983 of 2004 will be described as “the workman” or “claimant” and the petitioner in Special Civil Application No.7484 of 2004 (who is the respondent in Special Civil Application No.2983 of 2004) will be described as “the employer”. 2. Heard Mr. D.R.Dave, learned advocate for the workman and Ms. Dawawala, learned advocate, and Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate, for the employer. 3. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record that after he was terminated from service the claimant raised industrial dispute which came to be referred by appropriate government for adjudication to the learned Labour Court, Ahmedabad. The learned Labour Court registered the dispute as Reference (LCA) No.865 of 1999. 3.1 In the said reference case, the claimant filed his statement of claim with allegation that he worked from February 1986 to October 1986 and thereafter, from May 1990 to March 1995 and his service came to be illegally terminated with effect from 31.3.1995. The claimant also alleged that during his service, he was exploited and was paid consolidated salary though he worked regularly and as permanent workman in the employer establishment. The claimant also alleged that by taking disadvantage of his financially delicate condition and his desperation for holding unto the appointment/service, the employer exploited the position and issued repeat-orders for temporary period of 3 months or 6 months from time to time and thereby, the employer arbitrarily treated him as temporary workman. The claimant further alleged that his service was terminated without following any procedure prescribed by law and without payment of compensation or without issuing any notice and without paying any salary in lieu of notice. On such allegations, the claimant demanded that he should be reinstated in service with full backwages and other consequential benefits. The claimant further alleged that his service was terminated without following any procedure prescribed by law and without payment of compensation or without issuing any notice and without paying any salary in lieu of notice. On such allegations, the claimant demanded that he should be reinstated in service with full backwages and other consequential benefits. 3.2 The dispute/reference was opposed by the employer who filed written statement (Exh.10) and in its written statement, the employer contended that the claimant was engaged as casual employee for temporary duration on ad-hoc basis and on payment of consolidated salary. The employer contended that the claimant was engaged at different places at different time and that there was neither any continuity in employing him nor there was any continuity. The employer also claimed that whenever the claimant was engaged, he was engaged for fixed period and consequently, his engagement automatically came to an end upon expiry of the period mentioned in the appointment order. On the strength of such contentions and submissions, the employer claimed that the claimant's appointment was protected by and covered under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as “the Act”]. In backdrop of such facts and contentions, the employer opposed the reference and claimed that the reference should be rejected. 3.3 After the stage of pleadings were concluded, the parties led their respective evidence, oral as well as documentary. The claimant placed on record before the learned Labour Court about 90 documents vide list of documents (Exh.11). The deposition of the claimant was recorded at Exh.12. From the award, it appears that any evidence was not led by the employer before the learned Labour Court. 3.4 When stage of evidence was closed, learned Labour Court heard the submissions by the learned advocates for the claimant and employer and thereafter, the learned Labour Court passed the award after considering rival submissions and the material on record. 4. The claimant is aggrieved by denial of backwages and other benefits. He has filed the petition to claim said benefits. Whereas the employer has challenged the direction to reinstate the claimant. 5. Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the claimant, submitted that the claimant worked with the employer as permanent employee. 4. The claimant is aggrieved by denial of backwages and other benefits. He has filed the petition to claim said benefits. Whereas the employer has challenged the direction to reinstate the claimant. 5. Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the claimant, submitted that the claimant worked with the employer as permanent employee. He accepted the fact that after having been initially appointed in February 1986, the service of the claimant was discontinued in October 1986, and thereafter, he was again appointed in May 1990 and thereafter, his service was discontinued on 31.3.1995 without any notice or payment of compensation. Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the claimant, submitted that the learned Labour Court has, after examining the material on record, recorded findings and observations in favour of the claimant and held that the claimant was employed continuously and that the termination of his service is not protected by or covered under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). Mr. Dave, learned counsel, also submitted that the learned Labour Court also reached to the finding that the claimant had worked for more than 240 days and that the employer committed apparent violation of Section 25-F of the Act. Mr. Dave, learned counsel, submitted that despite having recorded such findings of fact in favour of the claimant, the learned Labour Court denied backwages for the period prior to 9.3.2001 i.e. from the date of termination (1.4.1995 to 8.3.2001). He also submitted that the learned Labour Court committed error in not granting continuity of service while directing the employer to reinstate the claimant on his original post. Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the claimant, submitted that the claimant has taken out present petition to seek direction for continuity of service and for the portion of backwages which is not granted by the learned Labour Court. With regard to the petition filed by the employer, Mr. Dave, learned counsel, submitted that in view of these specific findings recorded by the learned Labour Court, the award in question does not suffer from any error or infirmity except to the extent by which full backwages and continuity in service are denied to the claimant and that therefore, the petition filed by the employer does not deserve to be entertained. He submitted that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error in directing the employer to reinstate the claimant and that though denial of backwages from 1.4.1995 to 8.3.2001 is an error, there is no error in the decision of the learned Labour Court so far as the backwages for balance period until the date of award is granted. Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the claimant, clarified that since this Court did not grant any interim relief against the direction to reinstate the claimant, the employer has reinstated the claimant since 1.7.2005 after the claimant was constrained to take out proceedings under the Contempts of Courts Act. The fact that the claimant is reinstated w.e.f. 1.7.2005 is not disputed by Mr. Bhatt or Ms. Dawawala, learned advocates for the employer. However, he submitted that the reinstatement is subject to final decision by the Court in these petitions. 5.1 While opposing the petition filed by the claimant and in support of the petition filed by the employer, learned advocates Mr. Bhatt and Ms. Dawawala appearing for the employer submitted that the learned Labour Court has committed error in holding that the termination of the claimant's service was not covered under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and that the learned Labour Court has also committed error in holding that the termination of the claimant's service was in breach of Section 25-F. According to learned advocates for the employer, the case of the claimant and the termination of his service do not attract Section 25-F and in present case, the said provision is not applicable. The learned advocates for the employer further contended that the learned Labour Court has committed error in directing the employer to reinstate the claimant and in not appreciating the fact that the claimant was never employed as regular or permanent workman and that during the period when he was appointed by the corporation, he was appointed for different works on intermittent and casual basis and without following the procedure for selection and recruitment prescribed by the Rules of the corporation and that therefore, there was no justification to pass order directing the employer corporation to reinstate the claimant. The learned advocates for the employer submitted that the respondent worked on different posts during his periodical engagement from May 1990 to March 1995 and that whenever the claimant was engaged/appointed, separate and specific appointment orders with clear condition that the appointment is for fixed and limited period were issued. The learned advocates for the employer submitted that though even the claimant himself had accepted and admitted that he was engaged at different times under different and separate orders and despite the fact that the different orders under which the claimant was appointed from time to time were on record before the learned Labour Court, the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the said material and committed error in holding that the claimant was engaged with artificial breaks. The learned advocates for employer relied on the decisions in case of Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar [ (2006) 3 SCC 81 ]. He also relied on the decision in case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ]. 6. I have heard learned advocates for the contesting parties at great length and I have also considered the material available on record, rival submissions and the award. 7. In view of the controversy and in light of the points of dispute and differences between the parties, it is appropriate and necessary to take into account the details with regard to the period for which the claimant was engaged by the corporation. 7.1 The claimant himself has mentioned the period during which he was employed/appointed by the corporation, in his statement of claim and therefore, so far as the claimant is concerned, there is no dispute as regards the period of appointment and dates of appointment. In his statement of claim, the claimant had also mentioned designation/post on which he was appointed/engaged by the corporation. The said details are as follows:- Sr. No. Designation Division Period of Engagement Duration 1. Biogas Supervisor G.A.I. C.L. Energy Division, Godhra 6.2.86 to 14.7.86 5 ½ 2. Accounts Clerk Aviation (Head Office) A’bad 15.7.86 to 15.10.86 3 months 3. Accountant A.G. Food Unit Bavla 5.5.90 to 7.8.90 3 months 4. Accountant GAICL Aviation Dn, A’bad 8.8.90 to 30.10.90 3 months 5. Accountant Head Office Finance Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 31.10.90 to 31.1.91 3 months 6. Biogas Supervisor G.A.I. C.L. Energy Division, Godhra 6.2.86 to 14.7.86 5 ½ 2. Accounts Clerk Aviation (Head Office) A’bad 15.7.86 to 15.10.86 3 months 3. Accountant A.G. Food Unit Bavla 5.5.90 to 7.8.90 3 months 4. Accountant GAICL Aviation Dn, A’bad 8.8.90 to 30.10.90 3 months 5. Accountant Head Office Finance Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 31.10.90 to 31.1.91 3 months 6. Accountant Head Office Finance Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.2.91 to 30.4.91 3 months 7. Accountant Head Office Finance Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.5.91 to 31.7.91 3 months 8. Accountant Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.8.91 to 30.9.91 2 months 9. Accountant Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.10.91 to 31.12.91 3 months 10. Accountant Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.1.92 to 29.2.92 2 months 11. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.3.92 to 30.6.92 4 months 12. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.7.92 to 30.9.92 3 months 13. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.10.92 to 31.12.92 3 months 14. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.1.93 to 30.3.93 3 months 15. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.4.93 to 30.6.93 3 months 16. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.7.93 to 30.9.93 3 months 17. Account Clerk Agro Service Dn., Juhapura, A’bad 1.10.93 to 31.12.93 3 months 18. Account Clerk Agro Service Bhavani Chambers, Ashram Road, A’bad 1.1.94 to 30.6.94 6 months 19. Account Clerk Agro Service Bhavani Chambers, Ashram Road, A’bad 1.7.94 to 31.3.95 3 months 7.2 It is pertinent that the details which are compiled by the claimant in his statement of claim, are compiled and mentioned on the basis of the appointment orders which are found on record of this petition (at pages 82 to 97). 8. When above quoted details are taken into account, it comes out clearly that while there is hiatus in petitioner’s engagement from October 1986 to May 1990. However, his engagement/employment with the corporation has been continuous from May 1990 to 31.3.1995 and during that period, the claimant was engaged – employed by the corporation continuously without any break even of a single day, though in different sections/departments of the corporation e.g. Food unit, Head Office, Finance Division at Juhapura (9 months), Agro Service Division at Juhapura (29 months), Agro Service Division, Ashram Road (9 months). 8.1 It is pertinent that aforesaid departments/sections are at Ahmedabad, and they are part of the corporation and they are not separate undertaking having distinct existence and independent entity in law. 8.2 Another important aspect is that at the said three establishments, he worked in same capacity i.e. Accountant/Account Clerk. 8.3 Now, on the premise or allegation that the claimant was engaged in different sections/departments of the corporation and separate orders were issued for that purpose, the corporation wants to contend that its action of discontinuing the claimant from service without complying the condition under section 25F of the Act is protected by provisions under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act. 8.4 However, four important and relevant aspects or characteristics attached to petitioner's appointment emerge from said orders viz. (a) from 5.5.1990 to 31.3.1995 the corporation continuously and regularly issued consecutive orders without any break, (b) the petitioner was continuously engaged (from May 1990 to March 1995) for same work viz. Accounts work (i.e. as Accountant/Account Clerk) by same employer viz. corporation, (c) for such long span of almost five years the corporation issued consecutive orders mostly for 3 months' duration only to claim break in continuity, (d) the aspects mentioned above cumulatively mean that the method/arrangement adopted was and amounts to facade to concede or camouflage continuity in service/appointment. 8.5 The said contention and defence is raised while overlooking above mentioned aspects and the hard fact that almost all the orders under which the claimant was appointed/engaged, are actually orders of extension of original/initial appointment. 8.6 So as to appreciate this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to take into account as a specimen one of the orders under which the claimant was appointed. Therefore, the office order dated 31.12.1991 is extracted here-in-below: “EST/AC/7812 31/12/1991 OFFICE ORDER Further to this office order of even No. dated 4.10.1991, the temporary services of Shri Ramniklal T. Sitapara STAND EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 2 MONTHS with EFFECT FROM 1ST January to 29th February 1992 on the post of Clerk (Accounts), Agro Services Division, Ahmedabad on consolidated salary of Rs.1000/- per month. He will work as per instructions of manager (Finance), Asst. Manager (Finance) other Executive and Supervisory staff of Agro Services Division, Ahmedabad. On expiry of the above period, his services shall stand automatically terminated. He will work as per instructions of manager (Finance), Asst. Manager (Finance) other Executive and Supervisory staff of Agro Services Division, Ahmedabad. On expiry of the above period, his services shall stand automatically terminated. By Order, Sd/- Illegible Manager (P&A)” 8.7 Of course, some of the office orders, e.g. office orders dated 1.7.1995, 31.12.1994 are slightly different from the above extracted standard office order. Therefore, for the purpose of comparison, the said order dated 31.12.1994 is also extracted below:- “EST/AC/8 31/12/94 OFFICE ORDER Shri Ramniklal T. Sitapara is hereby appointed on purely temporary basis as Clerk (Accounts), Agro Services Division, Ahmedabad, from 1/1/95 to 31/3/95 on consolidated salary of Rs.1401/- per month. Shri Sitapara will attend to subsidy claims and other payments of Agro Services Division as per the instructions of DN(F)/M(F) and other executives of the Division. However, due to the exigency of the work exists in Energy Division, his services shall be utilized in January ‘95 at Energy Division, where he shall report to Manager (Fin)/Asst. Manager (Fin), Energy Division. The duplicate copy of this order duly signed be returned in token of his acceptance. Sd/- Illegible (J N PATEL) ADDL. GENERAL MANAGER (P&A)” 8.8 During the period from May 1990 to 31.3.1995, the claimant was continuously appointed on the post of Accountant/Account Clerk. As mentioned earlier, from the statement/details compiled by the claimant (which is not disputed by the employer at the time of hearing), it has emerged that there is no break or gap of single day in his engagement right from 5.5.1990 to 31.3.1995 and during the said period he was continuously engaged for work related to accounts i.e. either as accountant or account clerk. 8.9 The said fact establishes that the claimant had worked continuously and for more than 12 months and for not less than 240 days during the period of preceding 12 months. Thus, the petitioner complied all conditions which a workman is required to fulfill for attracting, invoking and applying section 25-F of the Act. 8.10 It is not the case even of the corporation – employer that the claimant had not worked for 240 days in 12 months preceding the date on which his service was discontinued. Thus, the claimant complied two conditions required for attracting section 25F of the Act were fulfilled, which obliged the corporation to pay retrenchment compensation to before or at the time of termination. Thus, the claimant complied two conditions required for attracting section 25F of the Act were fulfilled, which obliged the corporation to pay retrenchment compensation to before or at the time of termination. 8.11 It is an undisputed fact that at the time when the service of the petitioner was discontinued and he was relieved, the corporation had not paid retrenchment compensation and had not complied any condition prescribed under section 25F of the Act. 9. In this factual background and so as to escape the obligation cast on the employer by section 25F of the Act and also to escape the consequences of non-compliance of the condition under section 25F, the corporation has put-in all efforts to take shelter under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) and it is contended that since the claimant’s appointment was for fixed period, his termination would not amount to retrenchment and would not attract provision under section 25F of the Act. 10. The question which would arise is that when an employer engages a person continuously for almost 5 years, without break and continuously avails his service for similar type of work (as Accountant/Accountant Clerk in present case) for long time (almost 4½ years in present case) whether such appointment would be covered under and protected by clause (bb) of section 2(oo), more particularly when it is not the claim even of the employer that the sections/departments in which the petitioner was engaged, are different and separate undertakings/organizations or establishments having distinct and independent existence from one another. 10.1 It is undisputed position that even the corporation did not claim and even during the hearing of this petition it is not claimed (even after specific query by the Court) that the offices or sections or departments where the claimant was posted from time to time or wherein he was engaged under separate office order(s), are legally and completely separate, distinct and independent undertakings/organizations or establishments from one another and not part and parcel of the corporation. Actually, in reply to Court's query it is accepted and admitted that the offices/section where the claimant was posted from time to time are part and parcel of the corporation and they are not different or separate organizations/undertakings/establishments with distinct and independent existence in eyes of law. Actually, in reply to Court's query it is accepted and admitted that the offices/section where the claimant was posted from time to time are part and parcel of the corporation and they are not different or separate organizations/undertakings/establishments with distinct and independent existence in eyes of law. The only claim of the corporation is that the claimant was engaged in different sections which are located in different area but are undoubtedly part and parcel of one single organization, i.e. the corporation. 11. From the details which flow out of various office orders issued by the corporation under which it engaged the claimant during the period from 5.5.1990 to 31.3.1995 gives out that the claimant was engaged/employed continuously without break of single day, though by separate office orders for more than 4½ years. The fact that the claimant was engaged continuously as Accountant/Account Clerk from May 1990 to 31.3.1995 establishes that the work for which the claimant was engaged, was neither of casual or ad hoc or temporary nature or duration but it was permanent and perennial work and/or it was related to and connected with permanent and continuous and necessary activity of the corporation inasmuch as the claimant, all throughout and during entire tenure from May 1990 to March 1995, was engaged for Accounting Work (for work related to the Accounts of the corporation) as Accountant/Account Clerk and for performing duties related to Accounts of the corporation. The said work cannot be termed or treated or considered as work of casual or ad hoc nature or work of temporary duration which is also evident from continuous engagement/employment of the claimant for same/similar work. 11.1 Further, the fact that consecutive orders repeatedly appointing the claimant for short duration are passed from time to time, go to show that the such arrangement is a conscious decision and attempt of the respondent to give artificial breaks in the service of the claimant so as to circumvent or frustrate the statutory provisions, more particularly section 25F of the Act and to misuse, rather abuse, the provisions under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act with a view to depriving the claimant of his legal rights conferred by various provisions under different Labour Laws. 11.2 Under the circumstances, the corporation is not justified in taking shelter under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act. 11.2 Under the circumstances, the corporation is not justified in taking shelter under clause (bb) of section 2(oo) of the Act. In the background of above facts, the contention based on the ground of clause (bb) of section 2(oo) cannot be entertained and accepted. 11.3 It is pertinent that Section 25F of the Act is beneficial provision which is introduced with the object to provide some relief to the workman who is visited with drastic action of retrenchment on account of which the workman and his entire family are thrown into life full of uncertainties, difficulties and dark future. In connection with the said beneficial provision an exception is carved out by virtue of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). Certain types of termination of service, which would, ordinarily, tantamount to retrenchment [but for the said clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act], are taken out of Section 25F of the Act. The said clause (bb) provides an exception in respect of the terms and condition prescribed by section 25F. Therefore, the said clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act must be construed strictly. This is necessary so as to curb abuse by unscrupulous employers. Otherwise the said provision can prove to be a handle or weapon in the hands of the employer to resort to policy of hire and fire and indiscriminate violation of Section 25F of the Act as well as to circumvent various provision under different Labour Laws and deprive the workmen the benefits which would flow from continuous service. The scheme of the Act and object of the clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) do not permit, rather abhors its misuse or exploitation for such purpose by employing such novel and ingenious methods. 11.4 Besides this, the said (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act cannot be exploited or abused for repeatedly making consecutive/repetitive appointments with or without artificial breaks on fixed/short term basis and that too for work which is of permanent and/or perennial nature and regular and necessary continuous work of the establishment. 11.5 If a person is repeatedly appointed, though by separate short term orders, for similar work or similar nature of work then the employer cannot get or derive protection from clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). Such continuous and/or repetitive appointments amount to abuse of said provision and the employer cannot derive benefit of such unjust action. 11.5 If a person is repeatedly appointed, though by separate short term orders, for similar work or similar nature of work then the employer cannot get or derive protection from clause (bb) of Section 2(oo). Such continuous and/or repetitive appointments amount to abuse of said provision and the employer cannot derive benefit of such unjust action. 11.6 Actually, such practice of engaging workman by separate but consecutive appointment orders of short duration with a view to opposing workman's claim about continuity in service by citing separate appointment orders giving artificial breaks between two phase of appointments is unjust and runs counter to the object of the provision and such practice has been repeatedly deprecated by Courts. By adopting such practice, the employer actually engages the workman continuously but with a view to establishing that the person was engaged intermittently and was not engaged continuously, separate orders for short duration are issued and/or artificial breaks are given by issuing appointment letters for 3 months or 6 months duration or in some case 1 year tenure and in some cases appointment orders are issued for tenure f 29 days (then break of one or two days is given) and the same workman is again appointed. In such arrangement, the appointment which, in reality and in actual effect, is continuous, is artificially interjected by such facade or smoke screen of separate orders despite the fact that the work, for which the person is engaged, continues and the need for engaging the workman also continues. Such action of engaging the workman in such manner and then abruptly discontinuing the person, would not fall within the purview of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and such practice cannot get protection of the principle of fixed term appointment recognized by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo)(bb). 12. In this view of the matter and when in present case it is also established by cogent evidence that the petitioner was employed by the respondent for more than 12 months and he had worked for 240 days or more during preceding 12 months then the obligation to comply the condition under section 25F would be attracted. In the decision in the case of L. Robert D'Souza vs. Southern Railway 1982 (1) SC 645, Honble Apex Court has observed and held that the provision under section 25F would be applicable in case of daily wagers as well. In the decision in the case of L. Robert D'Souza vs. Southern Railway 1982 (1) SC 645, Honble Apex Court has observed and held that the provision under section 25F would be applicable in case of daily wagers as well. 12.1 In present case it is also an undisputed fact that when the petitioner was relieved and when his service was discontinued with effect from 31.3.2005, the said condition under section 25F including the condition to pay compensation was not complied. The requirement prescribed by Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1961 is also not complied. 12.2 The conditions prescribed under said provision are mandatory and its violation renders the termination of an employee ab initio void. 12.3 Therefore, this Court is convinced to hold that the petitioners appointment was in violation of section 25F of the Act and also in violation of Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1961. 12.4 In view of this Court, such arrangement cannot be acknowledged and countenanced by the Court. If the petitioners defence or explanation or so-called justification with regard to its action and the said arrangement is accepted and the award is interfered with on such premise then it would amount to acknowledging and upholding such artificial, unjust and illegal arrangement and it would also amount to putting seal of approval of the Court in respect of such illegal, artificial and unjust practice and arrangement. Such arrangement and practice also amount to unfair labour practice. 12.5 For all these reasons the arrangement cannot be acknowledged and accepted and the award cannot be interfered with on this ground i.e. by holding that in view of the arrangement under which the workman was engaged, the action is not hit by breach of statutory provision (viz. section 25F) of the Act. The contention is misconceived and not sustainable. 12.6 In this view of the matter and in light of the facts of this case (which are discussed hereinabove at length), it becomes clear that the termination of petitioner's service tantamounts to retrenchment. 12.7 Therefore, mandatory obligation to pay retrenchment compensation at the time of termination was applicable and the respondent was under statutory obligation to comply the conditions under Section 25F of the Act while terminating petitioner's service. 13. 12.7 Therefore, mandatory obligation to pay retrenchment compensation at the time of termination was applicable and the respondent was under statutory obligation to comply the conditions under Section 25F of the Act while terminating petitioner's service. 13. In present case it is undisputed fact that at the time of terminating petitioner's service the respondent had not paid retrenchment compensation and had not complied the conditions under Section 25F of the Act. 14. The failure to discharge the mandatory obligation rendered the termination ab initio void. Therefore the consequence for violation of Section 25F of the Act should follow. 15. The foregoing discussion brings out that the termination of the petitioner's service would amount to retrenchment under Section 2(oo) and Section 25-F and the exception provided by and under clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) is not attracted and applicable in present case and that the retrenchment was effected without complying Section 25-F and that therefore, the employer corporation should be visited with consequences for violation of Section 25-F of the Act. 15.1 The corporation has failed to establish that the said findings and conclusion by the learned Labour Court is erroneous. In this view of the mater, the conclusion and decision by the learned Labour Court cannot be faulted. 16. Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to take into account the decisions on which the learned advocates for the respondent corporation relied. As mentioned earlier, the learned advocates for the employer – corporation placed reliance on the decision in case of Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar [ (2006) 3 SCC 81 ]. According to the facts of the cited decision, the respondent workman was employed in pursuance of a resolution which is quoted in paragraph No.2 of the cited decision. As mentioned earlier, the learned advocates for the employer – corporation placed reliance on the decision in case of Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar [ (2006) 3 SCC 81 ]. According to the facts of the cited decision, the respondent workman was employed in pursuance of a resolution which is quoted in paragraph No.2 of the cited decision. The said resolution reads thus:- “As per the guidelines of the Government, the Municipal Council had required a clerk on contract basis immediately as in the octroi branch, one post is vacant and two employees are already on leave: for the engagement of Shri Raj Kumar s/o Shri Nathu Ram r/o Samrala who had already worked under the Municipal Council @ Rs 1000 p.m., till it deems necessary.” From further observations in the cited decision, it emerges that the said proposal/resolution was approved by the Executive Council and accordingly, the respondent was appointed w.e.f. 24.6.1994 with condition that his service will be availed till it is considered as fit and proper and necessary and thereafter, his service will be dispensed with. In pursuance of the said condition, the respondent was relieved by order dated 22.5.1997. The said facts of the cited decision bring out that justification for engaging a person for limited duration was made out and foundation was led for that purpose in the resolution itself wherein it was mentioned that one post was vacant and the Municipal Council awarded regular appointment on the said post whereas other two incumbents had proceeded on leave. Further, in the cited case, the appointment of the concerned respondent was made as a “single and one time” appointment and he was not repeatedly appointed by way of about 19 separate but consecutive orders issued over a span of more than four and half years. Whereas in present case, such justification was not made out before engaging the concerned claimant. Further, the concerned claimant was not appointed by way of “one time and single appointment”, but he was repeatedly appointed by way of about 19 separate but consecutive orders issued over a span of about 4½ years. These facts distinguish present case from the cited case. The facts of present case are substantially different from the facts involved in cited decision. These facts distinguish present case from the cited case. The facts of present case are substantially different from the facts involved in cited decision. In this view of the matter, the decision on which the learned advocate for the corporation placed reliance is not applicable in light of the material difference in set of facts involved in both cases. The repeated appointments of the concerned claimant for similar work was, undisputedly, related to permanent and perennial nature of corporation's regular work and that fact establishes that the concerned claimant was engaged in such manner with a view to depriving concerned employee of the benefits and statutory protection and legal rights flowing from continuous service. Such method amounts to circumventing the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and various other labour legislations. When the appointment of the concerned claimant is examined in light of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, it becomes clear that the method adopted by the employer – corporation for engaging the concerned claimant by separate but repeated and continuous orders most of which were issued for 3 months duration amounts to unfair labour practice. 16.1 The learned advocate for the employer – corporation also placed reliance on the decision in case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ]. It appears that the learned advocate placed reliance on the said decision in view of the relief prayed for by the claimant in the petition filed by him i.e. in Special Civil Application No.2983 of 2004 wherein in he seeks backwages as well as direction to regularise his service and the direction to confer status of permanency. However, in view of two aspects involved in present case, the said decision would not help the employer – corporation. First, the learned Labour Court has not granted such relief (i.e. any order directing the corporation to regularize the service of the claimant and/or to confer status of permanency in favour of the claimant is not passed). Thus, present case/subject matter of present case is not “regularization in service” and/or “status of permanent workman”. Second, in view of the fact that a substantive reference filed by the claimant wherein relief for regularization and permanency is prayed for is pending before the learned Labour Court, the said claim is not taken into account and considered by this Court also. Second, in view of the fact that a substantive reference filed by the claimant wherein relief for regularization and permanency is prayed for is pending before the learned Labour Court, the said claim is not taken into account and considered by this Court also. Therefore, the decision in case of Umadevi (supra) which deals with the cases where the employees claim regularization in service mainly on the ground that they are employed since many years, is not of assistance to the corporation since such claim is not considered in these two petitions. 17. Now, the question which arises is about appropriate relief. 17.1 In his petition, the claimant has prayed, inter alia, that:- “6(A)A writ of mandamus and/or certiorari, or a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction be issued quashing and setting aside the award of Labour Court, Ahmedabad dtd. 20.03.2003 passed in Reference (LCA) No.865/99 only in as much as it has denied continuity of service, full backwages and all other consequential benefits to the petitioner and reference of the petitioner may kindly be allowed in full and it may further be directed that the petitioner may be reinstated in service with the respondent to his original post with continuity of service, full backwages from the date of his termination till the date of his actual reinstatement and all other consequential benefits, in the interest of justice.” 17.2 On the other hand, in its petition, the corporation has prayed, inter alia, that:- “9(C)Be pleased to call for records and proceedings of Reference (LCA) No.1362 of 1995 and quash and set aside the award in Reference (LCA) No.865 of 1997 dated 20.3.2003 passed by the Hon'ble Juge Shri V.N.Hingorani, Labour Court, Ahmedabad, and dismiss the said Reference with cost;” 17.3 The learned Labour Court has after taking into account that the claimant's termination was effected in breach of statutory provision viz. Section 25-F and after rightly rejecting corporation's defence/explanation directed the corporation to reinstate the claimant in service. 18. While admitting the petition, this Court declined to grant interim relief against the direction for reinstatement. 18.1 Consequently, the claimant is reinstated in service and he would be retiring from service in 2018. Section 25-F and after rightly rejecting corporation's defence/explanation directed the corporation to reinstate the claimant in service. 18. While admitting the petition, this Court declined to grant interim relief against the direction for reinstatement. 18.1 Consequently, the claimant is reinstated in service and he would be retiring from service in 2018. 18.2 In light of foregoing discussion and in view of all reasons mentioned above and in light of the facts of present case, this Court is neither convinced nor inclined to interfere with the directions to reinstate the claimant. 19. This leaves behind the claimant's claim for full backwages and other benefits. 19.1 On reading the award/final directions, it comes out clearly that the learned Labour Court has, vide impugned award dated 20.3.2003, directed the employer to reinstate the claimant and to pay backwages from 9.3.2001. The backwages for the period prior to 9.3.2001 are denied to the claimant by the learned Labour Court on the ground that the workman came forward for getting his evidence recorded on 9.3.2001 though the order of reference was passed in May 1995 and he filed statement of claim on 18.9.1995. It also comes out clearly that learned Labour Court has not directed the employer to treat the petitioner in continuous service and/or to fix the claimant's salary by treating or considering him in continuous service and to calculate and pay backwages after fixing his salary by considering his service continuous. Such directions are not issued by the learned Labour Court. 19.2 In this background, the employer has raised grievance against the claimant's petition on the ground that the petitioner has claimed continuity of service which would translate into the fact that the claimant is demanding regularization and status of permanency. 19.3 Whereas the claimant has challenged the award and preferred the petition to claim backwages prior to 9.3.2001 and to also claim continuity in service. 19.4 When the learned Labour Court has not granted the said relief/direction, then ordinarily, this Court would not interfere with such direction and discretion and would not grant relief which is not specifically granted by the learned Labour Court. 20. 19.4 When the learned Labour Court has not granted the said relief/direction, then ordinarily, this Court would not interfere with such direction and discretion and would not grant relief which is not specifically granted by the learned Labour Court. 20. However, the learned counsel for the claimant would contend that the relief which is granted by the learned Labour Court justifies the claim for continuity of service and supports the submission that it is an inadvertent error on the part of the learned Labour Court that the aspect relating to continuity of service is not expressly mentioned in the award. 21. On this count, it is necessary to take into account the fact that prior to termination, the claimant had worked with the corporation for 5 years. The period during which the reference remained pending before the learned Labour Court is from 1995 to 2003 i.e. almost 8 years. In light of the said facts it becomes clear that the request for continuity of service is not justified. 21.1 Further, it has also come out at the hearing of present petition that the claimant has filed substantive proceedings wherein the claimant has prayed for regularization and permanency in service and the said proceeding is pending before the learned Labour Court. In the said proceedings, the learned Labour Court will consider and decide the claimant's demand for regularization and permanency in service. In that view of the matter, any observation by this Court with regard to claimant's demand for continuity of service, which is expressly not granted by the learned Labour Court in the award, is likely to affect or influence the final outcome of the proceedings which are pending before the learned Labour Court. 21.2 Under the circumstances, the Court is of the view that so far as the learned Labour Court's discretion to refuse the backwages for the period prior to the date on which the claimant came forward for getting his evidence recorded does not warrant interference. 21.3 So far as the claimant's demand for continuity of service is concerned, it is clarified that the said demand will be decided by the Court at the time of final decision and award which may be passed by the learned Labour Court in the reference which is pending with regard to the claim for regularization and permanency in service. 21.3 So far as the claimant's demand for continuity of service is concerned, it is clarified that the said demand will be decided by the Court at the time of final decision and award which may be passed by the learned Labour Court in the reference which is pending with regard to the claim for regularization and permanency in service. 21.4 Therefore, at this stage, any observations with regard to the said claim are not made. The employer's objection against the impugned award and direction for reinstatement and backwages are not accepted and the petition by the employer corporation is not accepted. With aforesaid clarifications and directions, the petitions are disposed of.