ORDER : Vijay Bishnoi, J. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 04.07.2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jodhpur Metro (for short 'the Appellate Tribunal' hereinafter) in Appeal No.14/2012, whereby the Appellate Tribunal has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No.3 and while reversing the finding of the Rent Tribunal on Issue No.1 has remanded the matter to the Rent Tribunal for giving its finding on Issue No.2. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 09.09.2015 whereby the review application filed by him for reviewing the order dated 04.07.2014 has been dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal. 2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No.3 preferred an application before the Rent Tribunal for eviction under section 9(i) of the Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short 'the Act of 2001' hereinafter) while claiming that his grand-father Chhote Lal Ji was owned the premises in question and vide Will dated 06.07.1993 gave the said premises to him and after his death on 21.10.1997, the respondent No.3 became landlord. It is also stated that the said premises in question was let out by his grand-father Chhote Lal Ji to the petitioner and after his death, the respondent No.3 is collecting rent from the petitioner as being landlord. Respondent No.3 has sought eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question on the ground of his bona fide necessity. 3. The eviction petition filed by the respondent No.3 was contested by the petitioner, wherein he has stated that the respondent No.3 in his personal capacity never collected rent from him as being landlord and collected the rent as being agent of Shri Chhote Lal Ji. 4. A rejoinder to the reply to the eviction petition was filed by the respondent No.3 and on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, Rent Tribunal has framed two issues. Issue No.1 is to the effect that whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the respondent No.3 and the petitioner and Issue No.2 is regarding the bona fide necessity of the respondent No.3. 5. Issue No.1 is to the effect that whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the respondent No.3 and the petitioner and Issue No.2 is regarding the bona fide necessity of the respondent No.3. 5. The Rent Tribunal vide its order dated 25.11.2011 decided both the issues together and held that the respondent No.3 is a mere rent collector and not landlord in his personal capacity and, therefore, a certificate of eviction could not be issued on the ground of bona fide need of rent collector. While giving finding to this effect, the Rent Tribunal has rejected the eviction petition preferred on behalf of the respondent No.3. 6. Being aggrieved with the order dated 25.11.2011, the respondent No.3 preferred an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal allowed the said appeal by its order dated 14.07.2014 while reversing the finding of the Rent Tribunal in respect of Issue No.1 and has held that the respondent No.3 should be termed as 'landlord' and he is entitled to maintain the eviction petition. With this finding, the Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter to the Rent Tribunal to give its finding on Issue No.2 regarding the bona fide necessity of the respondent No.3. 7. Being aggrieved with the order dated 14.07.2014, the petitioner preferred a review petition before the Appellate Tribunal, however, the said review petition was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 09.09.2015. Hence, this petition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the respondent No.3 has not come up with the case that he is the landlord in the capacity of legal heir of Chhote Lal Ji but the learned Appellate Tribunal has travelled beyond the pleadings and established a new case, which was not pleaded by the respondent No.3 and as such finding arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal is perverse and is liable to be set aside. It is also argued that after the death of Chhote Lal Ji, the respondent No.3 has not collected the rent in his personal capacity and there is a clear evidence of this effect. It is also argued that after the death of Chhote Lal Ji, the respondent No.3 has not collected the rent in his personal capacity and there is a clear evidence of this effect. It is argued that the respondent No.3 was mere rent collector and not a landlord and, therefore, the Rent Tribunal has rightly held that the rent collector cannot evict any tenant for his bona fide need but the Appellate Tribunal without considering this aspect of the matter has illegally reversed the finding of the Rent Tribunal. It is further argued that the rent collector cannot be termed as 'landlord' and, therefore, the eviction petition filed on behalf of respondent No.3 has rightly been rejected by the Rent Tribunal but the Appellate Tribunal has illegally reversed the finding of the Rent Tribunal. It is also argued that the Appellate Tribunal has totally ignored the fact that the father of respondent No.3 is still alive and until he is alive, the respondent No.3 cannot be termed as a legal heir of his grand-father Chhote Lal Ji. 9. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kanpur, etc. etc. v. Chander Sen etc., AIR 1986 SC 1753 ; Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, 1987(1) (1987) 1 SCC 204; Rajendra Tiwary v. Basudeo Prasad & Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 90 ; A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons & Ors. v. T. Palanisamy Gounder, (2002) 5 SCC 337 and Rishab Chand Bhandari (Dead) by LRs. & Anr. v. National Engineering Industry Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 601 . 10. On the strength of the above arguments and in view of the above referred decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the orders impugned passed by the Appellate Tribunal may be set aside. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.3 on caveat has submitted that there is no illegality in the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal and no interference is called for. 12. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the impugned orders as well as the material available on record. 13. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.3 on caveat has submitted that there is no illegality in the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal and no interference is called for. 12. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the impugned orders as well as the material available on record. 13. It is noticed that though in the claim petition, the respondent No.3 claimed that after the death of his grand-father Chhote Lal Ji, he became owner of the premises in question on account of the Will executed by his grand-father in his favour on 06.07.1993 and he is receiving rent as being the landlord. However, in reply to the eviction petition, the petitioner has specifically averred that the respondent No.3 is receiving rent from him on behalf of late Chhote Lal Ji and his mother and father. The averment of this effect contained in the reply of the petitioner filed before the Tribunal is reproduced hereunder: ^^izkFkhZ vizkFkhZ ls Lo- Jh NksVsyky th o viuh ekrk o firk dh rjQ ls fdjk;k izkIr dj jgk gS u fd dfFkr olh;r ds vk/kkj ij A** 14. Now the question arises that when the petitioner himself has admitted in his reply that he is paying rent to the respondent No.3 on behalf of his grand-father, mother and father whether it can be held that the respondent No.3 is not a landlord as per the definition of 'landlord' provided under section 2(c) of the Act of 2001. Section 2(c) of the Act of 2001 reads as under: "(c) "landlord" means any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant." 15. From the above definition, it is clear that it is not only the person, who for the time being receives the rent but even a person, who is entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver is included in the definition of 'landlord'. 16. From the above definition, it is clear that it is not only the person, who for the time being receives the rent but even a person, who is entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver is included in the definition of 'landlord'. 16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No.3 has filed the eviction petition while claiming himself as owner of the suit premises and not in a capacity of the person, who is entitled to receive rent, therefore, the petitioner cannot be treated as a landlord, is not tenable in view of the clear definition of the 'landlord' as provided under section 2(c) of the Act of 2001. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Kapilnath (dead) through L.Rs. v. Krishna reported in AIR 2003 SC 565 , has held as under: "It was next submitted that though a petition for eviction under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act can be filed by a landlord and it is not necessary that he must also be the owner of the premises yet it is necessary that the petitioner must claim himself to be only a landlord and not an owner. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent has claimed himself to be the owner of the premises which claim is inconsistent with his being a mere rent collector on behalf of the temple and so the claim for eviction at his instance should have been refused. This submission too is wholly devoid of any merit. A petition for recovery of possession of any premises can be filed by the landlord against the tenant within the meaning of Section 21(1). Clause (h) of Section 3 includes in the meaning of `landlord' any person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person etc. It cannot be doubted nor has it been disputed that the respondent is 'landlord' within the meaning of Section 3(h) above said. Though the appellant claimed himself to be an owner also so long as he has been found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for eviction under Section 21(1)(p). It cannot be doubted nor has it been disputed that the respondent is 'landlord' within the meaning of Section 3(h) above said. Though the appellant claimed himself to be an owner also so long as he has been found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for eviction under Section 21(1)(p). The plaintiff or petitioner may claim a higher right and may succeed in proving only a smaller right or entitlement to relief but that would not result in disentitling the plaintiff or petitioner from succeeding so long as the smaller right successfully substantiated by him is enough in law to entitle him to a relief against the defendant." 18. In K.D. Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar, reported in AIR 2002 SC 67 , Hon'ble Supreme Court while taking into consideration the definition of 'landlord' as provided in section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, 1949 has held as under: "6. The short question that arises for our consideration is, what is the import of the word 'landlord' in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act? and whether the respondent has rightly been held to be the landlord and entitled to seek eviction of the appellant. The said provisions reads as follows : "Section 2(c): 'landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord." 7. A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord : (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act, and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of 'landlord', Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of 'landlord', Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner, in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the act the legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act." From the above, it is clear that any person, who is entitled to receive rent of a premises is included in the definition of the 'landlord'. 19. In the present case, as the petitioner himself averred in his reply to the eviction petition that the respondent No.3 was receiving the rent of the premises in question on behalf of his grandfather and his parents, the Appellate Tribunal has not committed any illegality in holding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent No.3 and the petitioner and, therefore, he can maintain the eviction petition. 20. So far as judgment rendered in A.V.G.P. Chettiar & Sons (supra) is concerned, the applicant in that case demanded rent from the tenant while claiming himself absolute owner of the property and the tenant has denied the title of the said person and refused to pay rent to him. However, in the present case, the petitioner in his reply to the eviction petition himself has admitted that he has paid the rent to the respondent No.3 on behalf of his grand-father and his parents and, therefore, the above referred case has no application in the facts of the present case. 21. However, in the present case, the petitioner in his reply to the eviction petition himself has admitted that he has paid the rent to the respondent No.3 on behalf of his grand-father and his parents and, therefore, the above referred case has no application in the facts of the present case. 21. Similarly, in case of Rishabh Chand Bhandari (dead) (supra), the respondent failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove that he was authorised in writing on behalf of the trust to collect the rent and, therefore, the court has held that in absence of any authorisation, the respondent cannot be treated as landlord. However, as observed earlier in the present case, the petitioner himself has admitted that he has given rent to the respondent No.3 on behalf of land-lord and in such circumstances, the above referred case has no application in the present controversy. Similarly, the facts of the case of Rajendra Tiwary (supra) are quite distinguishable from that of present case and, therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the said case is of no help to the petitioner. 22. So far as the case of Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (supra) is concerned, the same is also distinguishable on facts because even if it is assumed that after the death of Chhote Lal Ji, the father of respondent No.3 became the absolute owner of the property, then also, as per the averments made by the petitioner in his reply that the respondent No.3 is collecting rent on behalf of his father and mother, it can be concluded that respondent No.3 was entitled to receive the rent on behalf of his father too. 23. In view of the above discussions, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.