JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner, who was substantively appointed as Sweeper under Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation, filed this writ application seeking for a direction to the opposite parties to regularize his services as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector with effect from 01.05.1989 and grant consequential benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner was appointed as Sweeper by the Executive Officer, Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation vide office order dated 23.12.1980 in the scale of pay of Rs.200-250/- pursuant to which he joined on 27.12.1980. Though he joined in the post of Sweeper, he worked as a Zamadar under Health Officer, Bhubaneswar Municipality since his joining. Subsequently, he was directed to work as Gate Attendant/Watchman at Saheed Nagar Daily Market to assist the police at Gate No.1 from 2 P.M. to 10 P.M vide letter dated 08.05.1987. He was again directed by opposite party no.1 vide memo dated 01.05.1989 to work as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector at Unit-IV daily market. Consequentially, the petitioner is discharging his duty as Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector with effect from 01.05.1989. Though he was allowed to discharge the duty with higher responsibility as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector, he was allowed to draw the salary as a Sweeper. By the time the petitioner filed this writ application in the year 1997, he had already gained experience for more than 8 years and as such when query was made in this regard by this Court, it is stated that till date he has been discharging his duty against the post of Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector. By this process, the petitioner has already gained experience for more than 26 years. The petitioner, being a Scheduled Caste employee, made grievance before the Orissa Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribe Employees Co-ordination Council, which forwarded his representation to the Commissioner-cum-Secretary to Government, Urban Development Department for a direction to the opposite parties to absorb him as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector vide letter dated 27.04.1992, but no action was taken by opposite party no.1. Consequence thereof, the petitioner again submitted his representation on 10.04.1996. In response to same, Government directed to opposite party no.1 vide letter dated 14.05.1996 to take immediate action and consider the case of the petitioner for regularisation of his services as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector. Consequence thereof, the petitioner again submitted his representation on 10.04.1996. In response to same, Government directed to opposite party no.1 vide letter dated 14.05.1996 to take immediate action and consider the case of the petitioner for regularisation of his services as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector. Even then, no action was taken by opposite party no.1. Hence this application. 3. Mr. S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as the petitioner is discharging his duty as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector, he should be absorbed against the said post on regular basis and granted all consequential benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. 4. Mr. P.K. Jena, learned counsel for opposite parties no.1 and 2 submitted that the petitioner, having been appointed against the substantive post of Sweeper, has been receiving the scale of pay as admissible to the said post. As such, he is not entitled to be absorbed as a Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector, since no vacancy is available. Consequentially, the claim made by the petitioner for his absorption against the post of Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector cannot be sustained. Hence, the writ application should be dismissed. 5. This Court heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Since the pleadings have been exchanged, the writ application is being disposed of at the stage of admission. 6. The undisputed fact is that the petitioner has been appointed as Sweeper against the substantive vacancy and is discharging his duty under opposite parties no.1 and 2 as Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector with effect from 01.05.1989 and continuing as such till date. On a review of Saheed Nagar market held on 22.12.1993, it was specifically mentioned in its proceeding as follows: “Sri Nakul Naik, who is a Sweeper (Regular) by designation, works in fact as a Market Fee Collector as per one office order No. 5688/dt.1.5.89 as the Market is too big for one Market Fee Collector to make collection.” From the above, it appears that though the petitioner was appointed as a Sweeper (Regular) by designation, he has been assigned to work as Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector as per office order no.5688 dated 01.05.1989 and he has been discharging his duty till date. 7. 7. A counter affidavit has been filed by opposite parties no.1 and 2, paragraph-6 whereof states as follows: “That, in reply to the para-6 of the writ application, it is submitted that the petitioner is discharging the duties of market fee Collector from 01.05.1989 but he was drawing salary as a Class-IV employees against the post of Sweeper. The Selection Committee could not consider the case of the petitioner for the post of Market Fees Collector in 1989 as there was no vacancy.” Similarly, paragraph-8 of the counter affidavit states as follows: “That, in reply to averments made in paragraph(1) of the writ application, it is stated here that as there was no vacancy of market fee collector/rent collector at the time of allowing the petitioner to collect market fees as such any payment of higher pay to the applicant does not arise.” 8. From the pleadings available on record, it is evident that admittedly the petitioner has been discharging his duty as Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector for quite a long period, i.e., from 1989 and, by this process, he has completed for more than 26 years of service. There is no specific denial made in the counter affidavit that the petitioner is not discharging the duty of Market Fee Collector. But only stand has been taken that due to non-availability of vacancy for the post of Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector, the benefit admissible to the petitioner has not been extended. The said contention cannot be accepted as in the meantime 26 years have elapsed and many persons must have retired from service and consequential vacancies must have occurred to consider the claim of the petitioner for absorption against the post of Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector. But, as a matter of fact, due to inaction of the authority, the petitioner has not been adjusted till date nor has been extended the benefit, as claimed by him. The petitioner has been discharging his duty against the post of Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector for a quite long time, for which it can be safely said that there is need of post and the opposite parties availed the benefit of work performed by the petitioner and, therefore, he cannot be denied salary as due and admissible to the said post on some pretext or other. 9. 9. In Randhir Singh v. Union of India, 1982 SC 879 : (1982) 1 SCC 618 , the apex Court held as follows: “The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g., s. 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, Para 2 of s. 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, s.67 of the Bulgarian Code, s.40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of s.33 of Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in s.31 (g. No.2d) of Book 1 of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with s.3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and Clause 7, s.1243 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance” (vide International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p.265). The Preamble to the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognizes the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions “involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled”. The principle equal pay for equal work is deducible from Articles 14 and 16 and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.” 10. In UT, Chandigarh v. Krishan Bhandari, (1996) 11 SCC 348 , 351 the apex Court held as follows: “The principle of “equal pay for equal work” is a facet of the principle of equality in the matter of employment guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The right to equality can only be claimed when there is discrimination by the State between two persons who are similarly situate.” 11. In U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. V. Sant Raj Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 82 the apex Court held as follows: “The doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ as adumbrated under Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India read with Article 14 thereof cannot be applied in a vacuum. In U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. V. Sant Raj Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 82 the apex Court held as follows: “The doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ as adumbrated under Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India read with Article 14 thereof cannot be applied in a vacuum. The constitutional scheme postulates ‘equal pay for equal work’ for those who are equally placed in all respect.” 12. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Jagjit Singh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.213 of 2013 disposed of on 26.10.2016) considering the principle of equal pay for equal work at length the apex Court in para-55 and 56 held as follows: “55. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 56. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 56. We would also like to extract herein Article 7, of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. The same is reproduced below:- “Article-7 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: (a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: (i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; (ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant; (b) Safe and healthy working conditions; (c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence; (d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.” India is a signatory to the above covenant, having ratified the same on 10.04.1979. There is no escape from the above obligation, in view of different provisions of the Constitution referred to above, and in view of the law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee-whether engaged on regular or temporary basis.” 13. Applying the aforesaid analogy to the present context, when the admitted position is that the petitioner is discharging his duty and responsibility as Market Fee Collector/Rent Collector for more than 26 years, his services against the said post should be regularized and consequentially also he is entitled to get the scale of pay, as admissible to the post. Therefore, this Court directs the opposite parties to extend such benefits, as admissible to the petitioner, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. 14. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No order to cost. Petition allowed.