JUDGMENT : The petitioner, who was an employee of Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (from hereinafter referred to as “THDC”), was implicated in a criminal case in the year 2012. The case was that the daughter-in-law of the petitioner died in her matrimonial house and consequently, a case was registered under Sections 498A/304B and 302 of IPC against the petitioner and his son. Although, the petitioner was acquitted under Sections 302 and 304B of I.P.C., but he was convicted under Section 498A of IPC and sentenced for three years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousands only). Immediately thereafter the appointing authority of the petitioner invoked its power under Section 31.1 of the Standing Orders, which is applicable to the employees of THDC and passed an ex-parte order removing the services of the petitioner. Section 31.1 is an exception to the general Penal Provisions in the Standing Orders, which are an exception to the general Penal Provisions. Sections 31 & 31.1 of the Standing Order read as under:- “31. Special Procedure in Certain Cases:- Notwithstanding anything contained in these Standing Orders, the disciplinary authority may impose any of the penalties specified in these standing orders in any of the following circumstances:- 31.1 The workman has been convicted on a criminal charge or on the strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a judicial trial: or” 2. The order has been passed by the appointing authority on 02.01.2015. This order has been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. The ground of challenge by the petitioner is that although he was convicted by the competent court, but his appeal is pending before this Court and in spite of his conviction, though the powers have been given to the appointing authority to pass an ex-parte order and there are certain observations in the said order, such as that the act of the petitioner was published in newspaper, which has brought to the notice of THDC and this is an additional reason for removing the petitioner from his service. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this observation was made by the appointing authority in the impugned order and no departmental enquiry or opportunity of hearing was ever given to the petitioner before removing him from service. 3. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this observation was made by the appointing authority in the impugned order and no departmental enquiry or opportunity of hearing was ever given to the petitioner before removing him from service. 3. Learned counsel for the THDC on the other hand objects to these submissions and states that what THDC has followed the Standing Order in its letter and spirit. Moreover, the petitioner has been convicted by the competent court and the charges against him are serious. Therefore, the order of the removal has been passed ex-parte by the department. 4. This Court is of the opinion that though the conviction of an employee of THDC does give power to the appointing authority to pass inter alia an order of dismissal or removal of such an employee but this can never be automatic. Reasons must be assigned as to why particular punishment is to be given to him. It is made clear that no departmental inquiry is required where an employee has already been convicted by a competent court, inasmuch as, such an employee has already been given full opportunity to defend himself before the competent court, which is much wider than is normally given in an departmental inquiry and after being convicted of the charge, there is absolutely no requirement for giving an opportunity of hearing to such an employee in order to establish his case where all the charges have already been established before the competent court. 5. The only question is as to what punishment has to be given. On this aspect if we examine order of the THDC, we find that it is a well considered order. The appointing authority has considered the fact that petitioner has been convicted by a competent court on the charge, which is a serious charge i.e. cruelty towards his daughter-in-law. Once he has been convicted under such a charge by a competent court, the only penalty which can be given to him is the penalty of removal from service. Therefore, it cannot be said that there has been no consideration of the appointing authority as to what measure or penalty can be given to the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in WPSS No.187 of 2014 (Constable 67 AP Harish Mehra Vs. Therefore, it cannot be said that there has been no consideration of the appointing authority as to what measure or penalty can be given to the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of this Court in WPSS No.187 of 2014 (Constable 67 AP Harish Mehra Vs. State of Uttarakhand & others decided on 02.12.2015) wherein this Court quashed the impugned termination order of the petitioner and further held that the termination order can be passed after giving a show cause notice to the petitioner. This Court is of the opinion that the facts of the above case are totally different from the present case. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the THDC has relied upon a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Satyavir Singh & others Vs Union of India & others reported in 1985 (4) SCC 252 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the disciplinary authority may pass ex-parte order without hearing to the person concerned. The ratio of this case is applicable in the present case as well. 8. In view thereof, the writ petition has no force and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.