JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. The petitioner, who was working as a Sales Assistant under the Orissa State Handloom Corporation, has filed this application seeking to quash the order of punishment imposed in Annexure-4 dated 01.02.1996, by which the petitioner was removed from service with a further direction to recover a sum of Rs.1,35,083.50 and the period of suspension w.e.f. 26.08.1995 till the date of removal has been directed to be treated as such, and further seeks to quash the confirmation order of removal by the appellate authority in Annexure-5 dated 14.12.2001. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner, having been duly selected, joined as Attendant-cum-Watchman in Orissa State Handloom Corporation in the year 1977. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Sales Assistant by the Managing Director of the Corporation w.e.f. 17.05.1982. The petitioner was posted at Odissi, Kantabanjhi Branch as Branch Manager and continued till 07.02.1988 and, then, he was transferred to Head Office of the Corporation at Bhubaneswar. While he was so continuing, vide letter dated 19.09.1988, the petitioner was called upon to explain about the shortage of Rs.1,13,509.60 in Odissi, Kantabanjhi Branch during the period from 01.04.1985 to 06.02.1988. Basing upon the same, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner, which was communicated to him on 05.02.1990. In compliance of the same, the petitioner submitted show cause reply on 27.02.1990 denying the allegations made against him. But, the authority terminated the services of the petitioner along with others vide letter dated 26.08.1992 complying Rule-20 of the Orissa State Handloom Development Corporation Ltd. Employees Service Rules, 1986 by paying one month salary. Thereafter, the Managing Director of the Corporation stayed the order of termination vide its letter dated 05.09.1992 pending decision of the Board. The termination of the services of the petitioner and others was discussed in the 53rd Board’s Meeting held on 01.10.1992 and 14.10.1992 in Agenda No.5 and it was decided that sufficient opportunity should be given to the employees to defend their case. It was further decided that the General Manager-cum-Secretary of the Corporation should be appointed as Enquiry Officer. Accordingly, the General Manager has been appointed as Enquiry Officer vide letter dated 01.10.1992 to conduct the inquiry. Ultimately, the petitioner was removed from service vide letter dated 01.02.1996. It was further decided that the General Manager-cum-Secretary of the Corporation should be appointed as Enquiry Officer. Accordingly, the General Manager has been appointed as Enquiry Officer vide letter dated 01.10.1992 to conduct the inquiry. Ultimately, the petitioner was removed from service vide letter dated 01.02.1996. Against the said order of removal, the petitioner preferred writ application before this Court bearing OJC No. 7849 of 1996 and this Court disposed of the said writ application vide order dated 13.02.1998 granting liberty to the petitioner to prefer appeal before the appellate authority as per the rules. Consequentially, the petitioner preferred appeal, which was rejected, pursuant to resolution dated 14.12.2001 in Agenda No.6, conforming the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority. Hence, this application. 3. Mr. A. Routray, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that while imposing punishment of removal from service vide letter dated 01.02.1996 by the disciplinary authority, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, which is violative of principles of natural justice. More so, the office order merely indicates the punishment and no reason has been assigned as to why the petitioner is liable for such punishment. Further, the appellate authority without any application of mind and assigning reasons confirmed the order of removal in a cryptic manner vide Annexure-5 dated 14.12.2001. Consequentially, it is contended that the order of punishment in Annexure-4 and confirmation thereof in appeal vide Annexure-5 cannot sustain in the eye of law and the same are liable to be set aside. 4. Mr. M.R. Mohanty-2 and Mr. S.K. Parida, learned counsel though entered appearance respectively on behalf of opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and their names have been reflected in the cause list, none appeared in the first call and even on revised call after lunch. 5. Perused the records. It appears that no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties no. 1 and 2. It is a year old case of 2002 and in the meantime more than 14 years have elapsed. Therefore, this Court instead of adjourning the matter any further suo motu, proceeds to decide the same on the basis of the pleadings available on record itself. As the pleadings of the petitioner in the writ application have remained uncontroverted, due to non-filing of counter affidavit, applying the principles of doctrine of non-traverse, this Court decides the matter accordingly. 6. Therefore, this Court instead of adjourning the matter any further suo motu, proceeds to decide the same on the basis of the pleadings available on record itself. As the pleadings of the petitioner in the writ application have remained uncontroverted, due to non-filing of counter affidavit, applying the principles of doctrine of non-traverse, this Court decides the matter accordingly. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and on perusing the records, it appears that the petitioner was called upon vide letter dated 19.09.1988 to explain about the shortage of Rs.1,13,509.60, while he was discharging the duty of Branch Manager in Odissi, Kantabanjhi Branch during the period from 01.04.1985 to 06.02.1988, and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated on 05.02.1990. Consequentially, the petitioner submitted show cause reply on 27.02.1990 denying the allegations made against him and he specifically contended that he had not received the stock through the challans referred to in the show cause and the signatures appeared in the challans were forged signatures and the entire thing has been done only to cause harassment. But, without considering the same, the disciplinary authority terminated the services of the petitioner on 26.08.1992. Subsequently, the Managing Director of the Corporation granted stay vide order dated 05.09.1992 allowing the petitioner to continue in service till the Board takes a decision in the matter. Thereafter, the Board, in its Meeting held on 01.10.1992 and 14.10.1992, in Agenda No.5, took a decision that sufficient opportunity would be afforded to the petitioner to defend his case and that the General Manager-cum-Secretary of the Corporation would be appointed as the Enquiry Officer. Inquiry was conducted on several occasions by different Enquiry Officers and ultimately report was submitted on 09.02.1993. The specific case of the petitioner is that he was not effectively provided with sufficient opportunity to substantiate the factum that he was no way connected with the allegations made against him. But on the basis of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 09.02.1993 suggesting for removal from service and recovery of Rs.1,35,083.50, the General Manager of the Corporation issued the order removing the petitioner from service vide letter dated 01.02.1996. Though the petitioner approached this Court by filing OJC No. 7849 of 1996, without preferring appeal, this Court disposed of the said writ application allowing the petitioner to prefer appeal before the appellate authority. Though the petitioner approached this Court by filing OJC No. 7849 of 1996, without preferring appeal, this Court disposed of the said writ application allowing the petitioner to prefer appeal before the appellate authority. But, the appellate authority, without considering the contention raised in the appeal, rejected the same in a cryptic manner. 7. In Mahipal Singh Tomar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2013 (12) SCALE 304, the apex Court held that in administrative law, the ‘rules of natural justice’ have traditionally been regarded as comprising ‘audi alteram partem’ and ‘nemo judex in causa sua’. The first of these rules requires the maker of a decision to give prior notice of the proposed decision to the persons affected by it and an opportunity to them to make representation. The second rule disqualifies a person from judging a cause if he has direct pecuniary or proprietary interest or might otherwise be biased. The first principle is of great importance because it embraces the rule of fair procedure or due process. Generally speaking, the notion of a fair hearing extends to the right to have notice of the other side’s case, the right to bring evidence and the right to argue. This has been used by the Courts for nullifying administrative actions. The premise on which the Courts extended their jurisdiction against the administrative action was that the duty to give every victim a fair hearing was as much a principle of good administration as of good legal procedure. 8. In Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , the apex Court held as follows: “Although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The principle of audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of the rules of natural justice. Natural justice is a great humanizing principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The inquiry must always be: Does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” 9. Natural justice is a great humanizing principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. The inquiry must always be: Does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” 9. In Uma Charan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1915 , the apex Court with regard to assigning reasons held as follows: “Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinion or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable.” 10. In Tarachand v. Delhi Municipality, AIR 1977 SC 567 , the apex Court held as follows: “While it may be necessary for a disciplinary or administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions to state the reasons in support of its order if it differs from the conclusion arrived at and the recommendations made by the inquiring officer in view of the scheme of the particular enactment or the rules made thereunder, it would be laying a proposition a little too broadly to say that even an order of concurrence must be supported by reasons. It cannot be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances.” 11. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court as discussed above, applying the same to the present context, it appears that neither the order imposing punishment of penalty in Annexure-4 dated 1.2.1996 by the disciplinary authority nor the consequential order passed by the appellate authority in Annexure 5 dated 14.12.2001 contains any reason for imposing such measure penalty. As such, the orders so passed are in gross violation of principles of natural justice. On perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority, it appears that the following order has been passed: “The Board of Directors are opined to reject all the aforesaid appeal. As such, the orders so passed are in gross violation of principles of natural justice. On perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority, it appears that the following order has been passed: “The Board of Directors are opined to reject all the aforesaid appeal. Further, the Chairman opined to take action against the delinquents who have misappropriated of huge amount of cash/stocks under the OPDR Act, this was absented to by the Board.” 12. The order itself passed by the appellate authority is cryptic one as the same has been passed without assigning any reason, while confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Further, the appeal preferred by the petitioner being disposed of along with that of other employees, and without any application of mind the appeal having been rejected, this Court is of the considered view that the order passed by the appellate authority cannot sustain in the eye of law. Accordingly, the order dated 14.12.2001 in Annexure-5 is hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the said appellate authority to reconsider the same in accordance with law by passing a reasoned and speaking order by affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. 13. The writ application is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to cost. Application allowed to the extent indicated.