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2016 DIGILAW 1227 (ALL)

Vinod Kumar Yadav v. State of U. P.

2016-04-05

PRATYUSH KUMAR, RAMESH SINHA

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JUDGMENT Heard Sri Rakesh Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Nitin Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the FIR dated 10.8.2015 lodged by the respondent no.4 as Case Crime No.283 of 2015, under Sections 342, 302, 201 I.P.C., 3(2)(V) SC/ST Act and 7 & 13 Prevention of Corruption Act, police station Sachendi, District Kanpur City. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the statement of one of the injured, namely, Samir was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in which name of the petitioner also does not figure, hence, the impugned FIR lodged against the petitioner be quashed on this ground alone. 4. The Full Bench of this court in Ajit Singh @ Muraha v. State of U.P. and others (2006 (56) ACC 433) reiterated the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in Satya Pal v. State of U.P. and others (2000 Cr.L.J. 569) that there can be no interference with the investigation or order staying arrest unless cognizable offence is not ex-facie discernible from the allegations contained in the F.I.R. or there is any statutory restriction operating on the power of the Police to investigate a case as laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions including State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and others ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ) attended with further elaboration that observations and directions contained in Joginder Kumar's case (Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. and others (1994) 4 SCC 260 contradict extension to the power of the High Court to stay arrest or to quash an F.I.R. under article 226 and the same are intended to be observed in compliance by the Police, the breach whereof, it has been further elaborated, may entail action by way of departmental proceeding or action under the contempt of Court Act. The Full Bench has further held that it is not permissible to appropriate the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution as an alternative to anticipatory bail which is not invocable in the State of U.P. attended with further observation that what is not permissible to do directly cannot be done indirectly. 5. The Full Bench has further held that it is not permissible to appropriate the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution as an alternative to anticipatory bail which is not invocable in the State of U.P. attended with further observation that what is not permissible to do directly cannot be done indirectly. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not brought forth anything cogent or convincing to manifest that no cognizable offence is disclosed prima facie on the allegations contained in the F.I.R. or that there was any statutory restriction operating on the police to investigate the case. 6. Having scanned the allegations contained in the F.I.R. the Court is of the view that the allegations in the F.I.R. do disclose commission of cognizable offence, hence no ground is made out warranting interference by this Court. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.