JUDGMENT : Biswanath Rath, J This writ petition is filed assailing the impugned order passed by the opposite party no.6 under Annexure-10. 2. Short background involved in the case is that the disputed land was recorded in favour of Krushna Das, Nuki Das and Nalu Das under Khata No.14, Plot No.93 measuring an area of Ac.0.64 decimals with note of possession in favour of one Krushna Das as per the record-of-right published on 10.3.1998 under Annexure-1. In 1927, the record-of-right of the disputed land along with other land stood recorded under Khata No.11, Plot No.77 measuring an area of Ac.0.66 decimals vide Annexure-2 indicating in the remark column, the property under exclusive possession of Krushna Das. After vesting of the Estate, tenancy ledger was prepared in respect of the disputed land Ac.0.66 decimals in Tauzi No. 796 and Khata No.11 vide Annexure-4 in favor of Sambhu Das and Kandarpa Das, both sons of Krushna Das, who went on paying rent and obtained receipts vide Annexure-6 series. In the Major Settlement, record-of-right was published in the year 1988 under Annexure-7 and the said disputed land stood recorded in the name of grandsons of Krushna Das under Plot No.56. In the meantime, in the consolidation proceeding, the disputed land stood recorded in favour of the writ petitioner. Consequently, land register was also prepared and published. Challenging this record in a consolidation proceeding, opposite party no.1’s father Baidhar Das filed Objection Case No.406 of 1992 claiming 50% share over the disputed land. Claim was rejected by the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 31.7.1993 vide Annexure-8. There was no appeal under Section 12 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings & Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 challenging the above order and as a result, the order passed in the Objection Case reached finality. It is alleged that after a gap of at last 7 years, the private opposite parties filed Revision Case No.563 of 2001 refuting the claim of their 50% share in the disputed land. The Commissioner allowed the revision by order dated 27.8.2002 by setting aside the order passed in the objection Case No.406 of 1992, as appearing at Annexure-10, resulting the present writ. 3. The Commissioner allowed the revision by order dated 27.8.2002 by setting aside the order passed in the objection Case No.406 of 1992, as appearing at Annexure-10, resulting the present writ. 3. Learned counsel for the present petitioners challenged the impugned order firstly on the ground of limitation for having filed the revision after almost 8 years and secondly the maintainability of the Revision for no challenge to the order passed in the Objection Case No.406 of 1992, it is argued that the private opposite parties were having statutory remedy by way of appeal and revision (under Section 36 of the Act) challenging the order passed in the objection Case No.406 of 1992 in absence of which the private opposite parties were stopped from filing the revision under Section 37(1) of the Act. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner referring to the provisions contained in Section 57 of the Consolidation Act read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act contended that there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing the revision which does not mean that the revision can be filed at any stage. Referring to the decisions in cases of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors. v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors, 2009 AIR SCW 6305, Labanyabati Devi and others v. Member, Board of Revenue and others, 1993 (II) OLR-365 and in the case of Sri Laxman Kanda v. State of Orissa and others, 1991 (II) OLR-50, learned counsel for the petitioners attempted to impress the Court that the petitioners have no case from the angle of limitation also. 5. In his opposition, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party nos.1 and 3 though not disputed the fact in filing of the revision but pointed out that for the decision of this Court in the Cases of Nikunja Kishore Das and Ors. v. Consolidation Officer and Anr., 66 (1988) CLT-182, Dhadi Parida (after him and) Sundari Parida and Ors. 5. In his opposition, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party nos.1 and 3 though not disputed the fact in filing of the revision but pointed out that for the decision of this Court in the Cases of Nikunja Kishore Das and Ors. v. Consolidation Officer and Anr., 66 (1988) CLT-182, Dhadi Parida (after him and) Sundari Parida and Ors. v. The Commissioner of Consolidation and Ors, 2002 (II) OLR 323 , Gulzar Khan v. Commissioner of Consolidation & Ors., 76 (1993) CLT-161, Laxman Sahu and others v. Director of Consolidation Orissa, Bhubaneswar and another, 1999 (II) OLR,554, Patta Mohapatrani v. State of Orissa, AIR 1972 Orissa-248 and in the case of Kishore Chandra Das and another v. Gouranga Das and others, 62 (1986) CLT-322 and for the detailed reason involved in the revision, there is no illegality otherwise in the impugned order leaving any scope for interfering in the Revisional order. 6. Learned State Counsel supporting the stands taken by the private opposite parties submitted that for the observations and the findings of the Revisional Authority, there is no illegality in the impugned order and there is no scope for interfering in the same. 7. Assessing the pleadings of respective partiers, this Court finds there is no factual dispute so far as publication of the record-of-right in 1998, the private opposite parties also did not dispute to the developments taken place through Objection case No.406 of 1992. From the submissions of learned counsel appearing for respective parties and the pleadings, this Court finds the writ petition involved two questions for consideration viz., (i) Whether the revision under Section 37 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings & Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 after long 8 years is maintainable (ii) Whether the opposite parties 1 and 3 have been authorized to undertake the exercise under Section 37 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings & Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 in absence of challenge of the order passed by the competent authority in Objection Case No. 406 of 1992 for the self same purpose? 8. 8. Coming to answer on the first issue, this Court finds there is no denial to the fact that the decision in the objection Case No.406 of 1992 was passed on 31.7.1993 as appearing under Annexure-8 and the revision being filed on 8.10.2001, there was delay of more than 8 years by the time, the revision was filed. Looking to the provision contained in the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings & Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972, there is specific time stipulation in either filing of the objection case or filing of appeal arising the impugned orders in the objection cases and even for filing revision under Section 36 of the Act. But there is no time frame so far revision initiated under Section 37 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings & Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972. Even though there is a time frame for filing revision under Section 36 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings & Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972, but there is no time stipulation so far as Section 37(1) is concerned. Considering the question of maintainability of revision under Section 37(1) of the Act filed with delay and after going through the decisions relied on by the respective parties, this Court finds in the case of Sri Laxman Kanda v. State of Orissa and others, 1991 (II) OLR 50 at paragraph-5 this Court held as follows: “The second submission urged by Mr.Mishra has equal force. True that Sec. 12(3) of the Act authorizes the Revenue Divisional Commissioner to call for and examine the records of any proceeding under the Act before any officer in which no appeal or revision lies and that if the conditions as specified in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof exist, the Commissioner may pass such order as he deems fit after giving the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Doubtless there is no time limit provided for in the Act during which such power has to be exercised by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner. Yet even if no limitation is provided for, it would hardly mean that the power can be exercised after lapse of any length of time. Doubtless there is no time limit provided for in the Act during which such power has to be exercised by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner. Yet even if no limitation is provided for, it would hardly mean that the power can be exercised after lapse of any length of time. It is a fundamental concept of all judicial or quasi-judicial decisions that a power which inheres in the body deciding, has to be exercised with reasonableness and it would be highly unreasonable to assume that a suo motu power of revision in a case where right, title and interest in respect of immovable property are involved, can be exercised after any length of time. Such question engaged the attention of the Apex Court in AIR 1969 SC 1297 (State of Gujarat v. Patel Pagnav Matha) where interpreting Secs. 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, it was held that a revision power of the Commissioner, where no period of limitation is prescribed, must be exercised within few months of the date of the Collector’s order. In that case the Revisional power exercised after lapse of one year was not found favoured with. It was held that the power of revision has to be exercised within a reasonable time. The decision was followed with approval in AIR 1983 SC 1239 (Mansram v. S.P. Pathak) with the observation that when power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and that exercise of the power in a reasonable manner inheres a concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. A full Bench of this Court observed in 71 (1991) CLT 322 (Laxminarayan Sahu v. State of Orissa) following AIR 1983 SC 1239 (Supra) that there can be no manner of doubt to hold that the power under Sec. 59(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and necessarily stipulates that it should be exercised within a reasonable time and what is reasonable time so as to be immune from the attack that the power has not been exercised in a reasonable manner would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Sec. 59(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act vests authority in the Board of Revenue to revise any order passed by any authority under that Act, if moved by the Collector of the district of the Land Reforms Commissioner in that behalf. Even in a case arising under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act the Supreme court held in AIR 1976 SC 1115 (S.B. Gurubaksh Singh v. Union of India) to the same effect that the exercise of a sou motu Revisional jurisdiction is to be made within a reasonable time and what is reasonable time is dependent upon facts of each case. In view of such overwhelming authorities, we cannot but repel the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate that because of the wording of Sec. 12 the power was available to be exercised by the Commissioner at any time. But the question is as to what is reasonable time within which the power should be exercised. Though there is no intrinsic evidence in the Act itself as to what would be the reasonable time for exercise of suo motu power of revision, yet without going into that question it can be held on the authorities of the decisions (supra) that such reasonableness is dependent upon facts and circumstances of each case, including analysis of relevant provisions of the Statute concerned. Sec. 38-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act is a pari materia statute as regards the vesting of the estates in the State and the settlement thereof with the intermediaries or recognizing the continuance of the tenants under the State. The provision empowers the respective authorities to review any order in a suo motu proceeding within one year from the date of the decision or the order. Even though we do not propose to hold a general view that the power of suo motu revision is to be exercised by the Commissioner under the Act within a year of the date of the order, yet so far as the present case is concerned, we feel that the order of the Tahasildar on 18-1-1978 was not available to be varied after lapse of nearly five year and as a matter of fact no move for a reference should have been made by the Collector after expiry of such period. Here is a case where the petitioner, a tribal was in possession of the land since 1945 and even if it is his admission that since 1965 his sons are in possession of the land it does not alter the position that it is either the petitioner or his sons who are in possession. Ordinarily a person who has continued in possession for such length of time is not to be disturbed even if he is not a tribal and that more weightage is to be attached when the person concerned is one such. We would thus hold that the initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner was erroneous in law and hence cannot be sustained. This Court held that suo motu power available under Section 12(3) of the O.P.L.E. Act could not have been invoked after 5 years time and it should have been within a reasonable time. 9. Considering in a similar situation, exercise of Revisional power under Maharashtra Land Revenue Court, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors. v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors, reported in 2009 AIR S.C.W.6305 in paragraph 16 held as follows: 16. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive up to 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos.1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the Sub-Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976 was obtained fraudulently. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court categorically held that exercise of Revisional power after elapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court discussing on reasonable period held the reasonable period for exercise of there under 3 years. In the case of Labanyabati Devi and others v. Member, Board of Revenue and others, 1993(II) OLR-365, a case under O.L.R. Act, exercising power under Section 37(B), this Court held as follows: 7. Now coming to the next submission as to whether the learned Member, Board of Revenue had exercised his jurisdiction within a reasonable period, we find that he has exercised his suo motu jurisdiction after lapse of 12 years. In Laxminarayan Sahu v. State of Orissa and Ors. 1991 (l) OLR 82 (FB), while considering the scope and ambit of Sections 59(2) and 59(3) of the Act, Hon'ble G. B. Patnaik, J. speaking for the Court observed: "......In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hansaram's case (supra) on which Mr. Murty has placed reliance, even though there is no period of limitation in Section 59 (2) of the Act, we have no manner of doubt to hold that the said power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner which necessarily stipulates that it should be exercised within a reasonable time. Murty has placed reliance, even though there is no period of limitation in Section 59 (2) of the Act, we have no manner of doubt to hold that the said power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner which necessarily stipulates that it should be exercised within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time so as to be immune from the attack that the power has not been exercised in a reasonable manner would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.....," In Sri Laxman Konda v. State of Orissa and Ors., 72(1991) CLT 49 while construing Section 12 of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act in which no time limit has been prescribed to invoke the suo motu power of revision, their Lordships have observed: "We feel that the order of the Tahasildar on 18-1-1978 was not available to be challenged after lapse of nearly 5 years. xxx xxx xxx We would thus hold that the initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner was erroneous in law and hence cannot be sustained.” In Raghubar Bagh others v. Tahasildar, Umerkote OJC No 2320 of 1987, disposed of on 10-12-1991, it has been held that initiation of a proceeding after 11 years was unreasonable. Here, the High Court has observed exercising suo motu power after lapse of 12 years cannot be held to be within reasonable period. 10. From the discussions made hereinabove, the law of the land and the dispute involved in the case that the revision was admittedly preferred after 8 years, this Court finds there was inordinate delay in filing the revision for which the revision by itself was not entertainable. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court need not go into other issue involved hereinabove. Thus, while interfering in the impugned order on the question of delay, this Court sets aside the revisional order. 12. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed. No cost.