ORDER : Petitioner has laid this misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to assail the impugned order dated 12.08.2015 passed by Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar), Merta, District Nagaur (for short, ‘learned Executive Magistrate’) passed in Criminal Case No. 71/2015 and has further prayed for quashing the entire proceeding of the aforesaid criminal case. 2. Succinctly stated the facts of the case are that SHO, Police Station Merta Road submitted a complaint against the petitioner under Section 110 Cr.P.C. stating therein that he is residing within the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate and a habitual offender. Highlighting the criminal activities of the petitioner, it is pleaded in the complaint that activities of recidivism of the petitioner is a cause of grave and serious concern for the entire locality and therefore, it is desirable to ask the petitioner to execute a bond with sureties for maintaining peace and good behaviour. Taking cognizance of the complaint, learned Executive Magistrate issued bailable warrant against the petitioner and thereupon, the petitioner has approached this Court by invoking inherent powers of this Court. For impugning action of the respondent, essentially, the petitioner has pleaded that initiation of proceeding against him is a glaring example of abuse of process of the Court, inasmuch as, the complaint is not satisfying the requirements envisaged under Section 2(a) of the Rajasthan Habitual Offenders Act, 1953 (for short, ‘Act of 1953’) . It is also urged in the petition that the Executive Magistrate has acted mechanically without examining the materials available on record and recording its satisfaction about fulfillment of the requirements for initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. 3. On behalf of State, no formal reply to the petition is submitted, however, a detailed report dated 16.08.2016 is submitted for consideration of the Court which was sent by SHO, Police Station, Merta Road, District Nagaur. In order to justify initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C., SHO has made an endeavour to highlight the conduct of the petitioner and his alleged criminal activities to brand him habitual offender. In order to justify initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C., SHO has made an endeavour to highlight the conduct of the petitioner and his alleged criminal activities to brand him habitual offender. The details about the cases registered against the petitioner and the outcome/status of these cases is incorporated in the report which reads as under:- Ø-la- eq-u-@fnukad /kkjk pktZ'khV ua- U;k;ky; QSlyk 1- 116@23-7- 1986 147] 148] 447] 427] 323 Hkknl esMrkjksM 77@7-8-1986 /kkjk 147] 148] 447] 427] 323] 506 Hkknl QSlyk 12-9-1990 cjh ts,e dksVZ esMrkflVh 2- 47@11-7-95 341] 323] 392 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 37@ 23-8-95 /kkjk 341] 323 Hkknl nks"keqDr fnukad 16-3-1998 ,ets,e dksVZ esMrkflVh 3- 72@21-10-96 341] 323] 452 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 42@24-1-96 /kkjk 341] 323] 451] 325 Hkknl ltk fnukad 25-9-1997 4 ihvks dk Qk;nk ,d ekg ds fy, ikcUn o 750 :- tqekZuk ,ets,e dksVZ esMrkflVh 4- 54@23-7- 1998 341] 323] 324@34 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 36@ 23-7-98 /kkjk 341] 323@34 Hkknl lansg dk ykHk cjh 19-1-02 ,sthts,e esMrkflVh 5- 24@11-4-01 143] 341] 323 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 07@ 17-4-01 /kkjk 323] 341 Hkknl jkthukek 24-4-01 ,sthtstsMh ts,e esMrkflVh 6- 09@23-2-05 341] 323] 379 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 25@ 31-5-05 /kkjk 341] 323] 379 Hkknl fnukad 1-2-10 lUnsg dk ykHk nks"k eqDr ,slhtsMhts,e dksVZ esMrkflVh 7- 37@ 5-5-06 498, Hkknl o 4 nizv Fkkuk Jhckykth 54@8-8-06 /kkjk 498, Hkknl o 4 niz tSj Vªk;y 8- 5@28-1-011 323] 341@34 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 15@ 28-2-11 /kkjk 341] 323@34 Hkknl fnukad 7-5-12 4 ihvks dk Qk;nk o ,d o"kZ ds fy, 5000 :- eqpyds ij ikcUn ,slhts tsMh ts,e dksVZ esMrkflVh 9- 6@ 28-1-11 452] 323 Fkkuk esMrkjksM 16@ 28-2-11 /kkjk 452] 323 Hkknl nks"k fl} 29-1-13 ,slhts tsMh ts,e dksVZ esMrkflVh 10- 24@16-2-15 341] 323] 379 Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 22@27-3-15 /kkjk 341] 323@34 tSj Vªk;y dksVZ 11- 10@7-1-16 279] 337] 304, Hkknl Fkkuk esMrkjksM 04@ 31-1-16 /kkjk 279] 337] 304, Hkknl tSj Vªk;y dksVZ 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the materials available on record. 5. Before adverting to examine the afflictions of the petitioner, it would be just and appropriate to examine the definition of habitual offender envisaged under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953. The definition reads as under :- 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the materials available on record. 5. Before adverting to examine the afflictions of the petitioner, it would be just and appropriate to examine the definition of habitual offender envisaged under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953. The definition reads as under :- 2. (a) ‘habitual offender’ means a person who, during any continuous period of five years, whether before or after the 15th day of September, 1952 or partly before and partly after the said date, has been sentenced on conviction on not less than three occasions since he attained the age of eighteen years to a substantive terms of imprisonment for any one or more of the scheduled offences committed on different occasions and not so connected together as to form parts of the same transaction, such sentence not having been reversed in appeal or revision. Provided that in computing the continuous period of five years referred to above any period spent in jail either under a sentence of imprisonment or under detention shall not be taken into account. Now if the term ‘habitual offender’, as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953, is examined on the touchstone of the factual report submitted by the State then it would ipso facto reveal that the petitioner was convicted in criminal case No. 42/1996 on 25.09.1997 for offence under Sections 341, 323, 451, & 325 IPC and extended benefit of probation with fine of Rs.750/-.The second conviction of the petitioner in criminal case No.15/2011 for offence under Sections 341 & 323/34 IPC wherein yet again petitioner was given benefit of probation by judgment dated 07.05.2012. The third case is criminal case No. 16/2011, the petitioner was found guilty for offence under Sections 452 & 323 IPC and extended benefit of probation by judgment dated 29.01.2013. It is also borne out from the record that three criminal cases are still pending and trial is going on, therefore, from a bare perusal of the factual report, in all two, convictions are recorded against the petitioner preceding five years from the date of initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. 6. It is also borne out from the record that three criminal cases are still pending and trial is going on, therefore, from a bare perusal of the factual report, in all two, convictions are recorded against the petitioner preceding five years from the date of initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. 6. While it is true that why the Courts have repeatedly granted benefit of probation to the petitioner which is not permissible as per the mandate of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 but then even if these three convictions are taken into account, in the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner cannot be treated as habitual offender within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953. It is needless to observe here that criminal cases pending against the petitioner cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of treating him habitual offender as the verdict is yet to be pronounced by the Court of Competent jurisdiction. 7. The contention of learned Public Prosecutor that in two cases i.e. criminal cases No. 36/1998 and 25/2005, petitioner has not been honorably acquitted but has been given benefit of doubt appears to be quite alluring but not of substance. In the first place, the judgment rendered by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Merta City in case No. 36/98 was passed way back on 19.01.2002, therefore, it was almost thirteen years before initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. The second judgment was rendered on 01.02.2010 by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Merta City is also admittedly not a verdict of preceding five years from the date of initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. In criminal jurisprudence honorable acquittal and acquittal by extending benefit of doubt cannot be given two different connotations because ultimately the verdict wipes out an accused person from the blemish of the charge which is attributed to him by the prosecution. Section 232 Cr.P.C., envisages the term ‘acquittal’, which reads as under:- S. 232. If after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal. Section 232 Cr.P.C., envisages the term ‘acquittal’, which reads as under:- S. 232. If after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal. A glance at the above quoted provision makes it abundantly clear that Legislature, in its wisdom, has not made any distinction between ‘honorable acquittal’ and ‘acquittal’ by extending benefit of doubt. Moreover, Act of 1953 nowhere envisages that acquittal by extending benefit of doubt can be considered as conviction or stigma, vis-a-vis, an accused person for treating it differently from honorable acquittal. 8. In totality, I am at loss to say that petitioner cannot be treated as habitual offender or a person having tenancy of recidivism within the four corners of Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953 which is per-requisite for initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. In common parlance asking someone to furnish a bond of good behaviour appears to be innocuous, but one cannot forget its overall impact on the personality of an individual inasmuch as it causes a social stigma. In a democratic republic, a citizen cannot be asked to furnish bond of good behaviour without any justifiable cause or ground because it obviously affects his liberty and his social status in clear negation of Art. 21 of the Constitution, i.e., fundamental right of Life and liberty. The concept of right to life and liberty as enshrined under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India, being a guaranteed fundamental right undoubtedly very wide in its scope and applicability and with the advent of the modern strides in jurisprudence with revolutionary pronouncements by the Apex Court in umpteen number of judgments over the past more than two decades has assumed wider connotations and amplifications. 9. It is not in dispute that the term ‘habitual offender’ is not defined under Cr.P.C., and the law governing the province for surveillance and control of habitual offenders in the State is envisaged under the Act of 1953. Therefore, for treating someone as habitual offender to execute a bond of good behaviour, an Executive Magistrate is required to record its satisfaction in terms of Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953 and not otherwise. Therefore, for treating someone as habitual offender to execute a bond of good behaviour, an Executive Magistrate is required to record its satisfaction in terms of Section 2(a) of the Act of 1953 and not otherwise. Maxim Expressio Unius est exclusion alterius, i.e., “Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another has its fullest application in the backdrop of facts of the instant case. Reliance on this settled legal proposition can be profitably made to a very old decision in Taylor Vs. Taylor (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426. It was further followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmed Vs. King Emperor ( AIR 1936 PC 253 ). 10. Supreme Court in a recent judgment, Mackinon Mackenzie Ltd Vs. Mackinnon Employees Union (2015) 4 SCC 544 , while relying on the decisions in Taylor & Nazir Ahmed (supra) as well as its later judgments recognized this rule as a statutory principle of administrative law and has held: 42. Apart from the said decisions, this Court has followed the Privy Council of 1939 and Chancellor’s decisions right from the year 1875 which legal principle has been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh and the same has been followed until now, holding that if a statutory provision prescribes a particular procedure to be followed by the authority to do an act, it should be done in that particular manner only. If such procedure is not followed in the prescribed manner as provided under the statutory provision, then such act of the authority is held to be null and void ab initio in law. In the present case, undisputedly, the statutory provisions of Section 25-FFA of the ID Act have not been complied with and therefore, consequent action of the appellant Company will be in violation of the statutory provisions of Section 25-FFA of the ID Act and therefore, the action of the Company in retrenching the workmen concerned will amount to void ab initio in law as the same is inchoate and invalid in law. 43. 43. It would be appropriate for us to refer to the decision of this Court in Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, to show that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, and the same is not followed, then the action suffers from nullity in the eye of the law, the relevant paragraphs of the abovesaid case are extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 432-33, paras 31-32) “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: (Nazir Ahmad case, IA pp. 381-82) ‘… where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.’ 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law.” (emphasis supplied) 11. My this view is also fortified by a judgment of this Court in Dhan Raj Vs. State of Rajasthan passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 422/2003 decided on 16th October, 2006 : 2007(1) CJ (Raj.) Cr.48, wherein Court has held: “3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has not been convicted in any of the cases instituted against him; however, learned counsel submits that in Crime Reports No. 192/2002 and 49/2002, the petitioner has been acquitted on 25.03.2003 and 15.02.2003 respectively. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner cannot be said to be a “habitual offender” as defined under the Rajasthan Habitual Offenders Act, 1953 (for short, ‘the Act’ hereinafter). 4. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner cannot be said to be a “habitual offender” as defined under the Rajasthan Habitual Offenders Act, 1953 (for short, ‘the Act’ hereinafter). 4. Section 2 of the Act provides that “habitual offender” means a person who, during any continuous period of five years, whether before or after the 15th day of September, 1952 or partly before and partly after the said date, has been sentenced on conviction on not less than three occasions since he attained the age of eighteen years to a substantive terms of imprisonment for any one or more of the scheduled offences committed on different occasions and not so connected together as to form parts of the same transaction, such sentence not having been reversed in appeal or revision. 5. In the instant case, from the material on record, it appears that the Executive Magistrate directed the petitioner to be bound down under Section 110 of the Code, more particularly under Section 110(e) of the Code, which provides that when a person habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of offence, involving a breach of the peace. 6. From the number of cases, the list of which has been filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the fact that the petitioner has not been convicted in any of the cases; the matter is of the year 2003 and the period of one year has by now elapsed, in my view no useful purpose would be served in allowing the proceeding to continue, particularly when the period as directed by the Executive Magistrate has also expired.” Therefore viewed from any angle, in my considered opinion, initiation of proceeding under Section 110 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner cannot be sustained and consequently, the impugned order dated 12.08.2015 as well as all further proceedings in criminal case No. 71/2015 pending before learned Executive Magistrate are hereby quashed and set aside.