JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The petitioner has preferred this Criminal Revision against the judgment/order dated 27.2.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (2), Shimla in Cr. Appeal No. RBT-187-S/10 of 2014/13 whereby he confirmed the order/judgment passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Court No.3, Shimla in Case No. 58-3 of 2012/11 dated 24.6.2013/16.7.2013 convicting and sentencing the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. The complainant/respondent No.1 filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (for short ‘Act’), on the ground that the petitioner was known to him and had borrowed from him a sum of Rs.1,90,000/-. In lieu of discharging his liability, the petitioner issued the aforesaid cheque for a sum of Rs.1,90,000/- (Ex.CW-1/A). The cheque was dishonoured by the bank with remarks “insufficient funds”. The respondent thereafter issued notice to the petitioner calling upon him to make the payment within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. The legal notice was duly received by the petitioner as the same was returned back with the endorsement “unclaimed and refused”. The respondent was left with no other option, but to file the aforesaid complaint. 3. The petitioner/accused was summoned and thereafter notice of accusation was put to him to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The complainant/respondent was directed to produce his evidence. After completion of evidence, entire incriminating circumstances and evidence were put to the petitioner. The defence raised by the petitioner was that the cheque was issued as security and date and amount had been filled up by the complainant himself. Though the petitioner was granted to lead evidence in defence, but he failed to do so. 4. The learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence and hearing the parties, convicted and sentenced the accused/petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay compensation of Rs.2,25,000/- to the complainant, which findings was assailed but maintained by the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (2), Shimla. 4. The learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence and hearing the parties, convicted and sentenced the accused/petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay compensation of Rs.2,25,000/- to the complainant, which findings was assailed but maintained by the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (2), Shimla. It is against both these findings that the petitioner has filed this revision petition on the ground that both the learned Courts below have failed to take into account the defence raised by the petitioner which has consistently been to the effect that the complainant had borrowed money from Ramesh Thakur, who had retained blank signed cheque of the petitioner which was subsequently filled up by Ramesh Thakur in connivance with the complainant to his advantage. It was further submitted that the petitioner had never borrowed money from the complainant/respondent and the same stands duly proved on record. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully and meticulously gone through the records of the case. 5. Before proceeding to embark upon the relative merits of the case, it would be necessary to note the scope and power of this Court while dealing with such type of criminal revision petitions. 6. In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another, AIR 1973 SC 799 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 7. In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu, AIR 1979 SC 663 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973, SC 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that “judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system”. 8. In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad, AIR 1986 SC 1436 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that High Court “committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence” as in its revisional jurisdiction it was “not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact”. 9. 8. In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad, AIR 1986 SC 1436 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that High Court “committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence” as in its revisional jurisdiction it was “not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact”. 9. In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1721 , the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following terms: “It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope”. 10. In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath, AIR 1991 SC 26 , Hon’ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. 11. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu, AIR 1993 SC 1126 = II (1992) CCR 458 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. 12. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath AIR 1994 SC 26 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint”. 13. 12. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath AIR 1994 SC 26 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint”. 13. In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another, AIR 1997 SC 2485 = II (1997) CCR 109 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 ; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 ; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu, AIR 1975, SC 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when “there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice”. 14. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999) 2 SCC 452 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tentamount to gross miscarriage of justice” 15. In State of A.P. vs. Rajagopala Rao (2000) 10 SCC 338 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment”. 16. In light of the aforesaid exposition of law, this Court will interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Courts below only if the same are either perverse, based on no evidence or have been arrived contrary to the evidence on record. 17. The complainant Ram Rattan appeared as CW-1 and testified on record that he had advanced a loan of Rs.1,90,000/- to the petitioner and he in turn in order to discharge the said unpaid outstanding liability, had issued one cheque No. 105665 dated 8.11.2011 of Rs.1,90,000/- Ex.CW1-A. At that time, the petitioner had assured the complainant/respondent that the cheque would be honored, however, when the cheque was presented, the same was received back dishonoured for the reason “insufficient funds”. The cheque was received along with returning memo Ex.CW-1/B dated 15.11.2011, constraining the complainant/respondent to issue a statutory legal notice Ex.CW-1/C dated 21.11.2011, postal receipt whereof is Ex.CW-1/D. Despite having the notice, the petitioner failed to make the payment within the stipulated period. 18. In cross-examination, the respondent/complainant admitted that he was having good relation with the petitioner. He further stated that the amount was demanded from him in September, 2011 and a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid through bank while as sum of Rs.40,000/- was paid in cash from his own. He denied that the petitioner had not received the notice and further denied that the blank cheque issued by the petitioner had been misused by him. 19. The petitioner in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the entire case as set up by the respondent and stated that the cheque in question had been given to the respondent as security purpose, but he had misused it by encashing the same. 20. Both the learned Courts below have disbelieved the version put forth by the petitioner. Even otherwise, the petitioner has failed to rebut the statutory presumptions attached to the cheque under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 20. Both the learned Courts below have disbelieved the version put forth by the petitioner. Even otherwise, the petitioner has failed to rebut the statutory presumptions attached to the cheque under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This is not one of those exceptional cases where there is glaring defect in or there is manifest error on the point of law and therefore, there is no further question of there being a flagrant miscarriage of justice, rather the instant case is a classical example where the petitioner a retired government servant getting more than Rs.25,000/- as pension and having considerable income from agricultural pursuits because of bad intention does not want to pay the amount. These observations are being made on the basis of the records of the proceedings as would be evident from the following sequence of events: (i) On 18.6.2015 this revision petition came up for consideration for the first time and this Court suspended the sentence imposed upon the petitioner subject to his depositing the entire compensation amount within a period of eight weeks, if not already deposited. (ii) On 21.8.2015 on failure to comply with the order by depositing the amount, the petitioner moved an application being Cr.MP No. 832 of 2015 praying therein for extension of time to deposit the compensation amount and also furnishing the bail bonds. The reason given for extension was that due to ill-health and despite best efforts the petitioner could not arrange the amount and had already applied for a loan from the H.P. State Co-operative Agriculture and Rural Development Bank Ltd., Shimla which was under process. This court taking into consideration the contents of the application duly supported by the affidavit of the petitioner granted extension of four weeks and the matter was ordered to be listed on 24.9.2015. (iii) On 24.9.2015 the order was not complied with, therefore, this Court directed the petitioner to appear in person on 01.10.2015. (iv) On 01.10.2015 the petitioner appeared before this Court and stated that he proposed to liquidate the entire amount by obtaining loan, but such submission was not accepted and the petitioner was directed to file application to this effect. (v) On 15.10.2015 the application filed by the petitioner for extension of time was allowed and this Court graciously granted the petitioner time to deposit the entire compensation amount and furnish the bail bonds up to 31.12.2015. (v) On 15.10.2015 the application filed by the petitioner for extension of time was allowed and this Court graciously granted the petitioner time to deposit the entire compensation amount and furnish the bail bonds up to 31.12.2015. However, it was made clear that no further time in any circumstances would be granted to the petitioner. (vi) On 31.12.2015 the learned counsel for the petitioner made a statement that the petitioner had already moved the application for obtaining the loan and liquidating the amount in question. The petitioner was directed to file an affidavit to this effect. (vii) However, when the case came up for consideration on 7.1.2016, affidavit filed by the petitioner was not available on the record, but copy thereof was handed over in the open Court and taking into consideration the averments contained therein which indicated that the petitioner had moved an application for obtaining the loan, this Court magnanimously granted time to the petitioner to deposit the amount up to 31.3.2016. (viii) On 7.4.2016 the petitioner was again directed to appear before the Court as the respondent/complainant represented that the petitioner had not deposited/paid the compensation amount. (ix) On 28.4.2016 the petitioner appeared and handed over a sum of Rs.20,000/- to the respondent and undertook to pay the remaining amount within a period of six weeks and the matter was adjourned to 23.6.2016. (x) On 23.6.2016, the compensation amount save and except Rs.20,000/-had not been paid and it was made clear that in case the orders passed by this Court on previous dates are not complied with, then the consequences would follow. The petitioner thereafter had made an oral request for extension of time to deposit the amount on the ground that he expected a bumper apple crop. It was during the course of these proceedings that the petitioner himself informed the court that he was a pensioner getting more than Rs.25,000/- per month as pension. The petitioner as per his affidavit is 60 years, which obviously means that he has only recently retired and must have got a considerable pensionary benefits, that apart, he is getting a pension of Rs.25,000/- per month and claimed to be having a considerable agriculture income, but then he does not have the intention to pay the compensation awarded by the learned Courts below. 21. 21. Even today i.e. on 1.7.2016 the petitioner has failed to comply with the orders of the Court. 22. The above narration of facts clearly indicate that the petitioner was granted more than ample time stretching over one year to comply with the orders and deposit the compensation amount, but the petitioner has not chosen to deposit the amount. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, not only is there no merit in this petition, even the petitioner appears to have taken this Court for a ride whereby despite his bad intention, the Court magnanimously granted as many as 12 opportunities over one year in order to accommodate the petitioner, who unfortunately was not only out to deceive the respondent but was also out to betray the indulgence shown by this Court from time to time. Consequently, there is no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications if any.