JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. This appeal seeks to challenge judgment and order dated 16.07.2009 passed by Shri Yogesh Kumar Sharma, (RHJS), Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 3, Bharatpur Camp Bayana (for short 'the trial court') whereby the accused- appellant Sher Singh was convicted for offence under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The accused-appellant has further been convicted for offence under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default whereof he was to further undergo simple imprisonment of one month. He has also been convicted for offence under Section 201/511 IPC and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 200/-, in default whereof, he was to further undergo simple imprisonment of 15 days. 2. Skeletal facts leading to this appeal are that one Bheema submitted a written report (Exhibit P-2) to S.H.O., Police Station Roopwas, Bharatpur at 9.30 P.M. on 30.12.2007 alleging that his daughter Mithlesh, aged about 22-23 years, was married to Sher Singh son of Nawab Singh by caste Banjara resident of Lodha Kheriya about three years ago. Her in-laws started harassing her on demand of dowry ever since the marriage. Nawab Singh, Vijay Singh, Sher Singh, Nahar Singh had set her on fire about two years ago due to which she sustained serious burn injuries. The complainant by spending lot of money got her daughter treated. Her in-laws used to demand motor cycle and cash in dowry, as they wanted to repay their loan. The complainant was not in a position to meet their demand. His daughter was staying with him for the last about four months and returned back to in-laws house only one month ago. Dantaram Banjara of village Kheriya Lodha telephonically informed the complainant's son Himmat that Mithlesh and Sher Singh were absent from their house since 29.12.2007 and enquired whether Mithlesh had come to complainant's house. Thereupon, his son Himmat replied that Mithlesh had not come to their village. His son Himmat and Rajaram went to village Kheriya Lodha in the morning and learnt that Mithlesh has been murdered. His son told the complainant about this on telephone, who also reached village Kheriya Lodha with certain other villagers and informed the police. Thereupon, his son Himmat replied that Mithlesh had not come to their village. His son Himmat and Rajaram went to village Kheriya Lodha in the morning and learnt that Mithlesh has been murdered. His son told the complainant about this on telephone, who also reached village Kheriya Lodha with certain other villagers and informed the police. On enquiry by the police, brother of the appellant, Vijay Singh told the informant and those present there that dead body of Mithlesh was lying in the jungle of Ibrahimpur. When they reached said jungle with Vijay Singh, dead body of Mithlesh was found lying there with injuries on left side of the neck and other parts of the body. Complainant alleged that Sher Singh and his brother and father have murdered his daughter for inability of the complainant in satisfying their demand of dowry and threw away her body in the jungle. 3. The police on the basis of aforesaid report, registered regular FIR No. 602/2007 (Exhibit P-3) for offences under Sections 304-B/201 IPC and commenced investigation. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused-appellant Sher Singh, his father Nawab Singh and brother Vijay Singh. The trial court framed charges against them under Sections 498-A, 304- B and 201 IPC, which they denied and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses and exhibited 22 documents. Thereafter, the accused-appellant and other accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein they pleaded innocence. No witness was produced by the appellant in his defence. The trial court, on conclusion of the trial, acquitted co-accused Vijay Singh of the charge under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC but convicted him for offence under Section 201/511 IPC and sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 200/-, in default whereof he was to further undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. The trial court vide aforesaid judgment and order convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant in the manner as indicated hereinabove. 4. We have heard Mr. Dheeraj Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant; Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General; Ms. Sonia Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor; Mr. Suresh Sahni, Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Mr. Rajesh Choudhary and Mr. The trial court vide aforesaid judgment and order convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant in the manner as indicated hereinabove. 4. We have heard Mr. Dheeraj Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant; Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General; Ms. Sonia Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor; Mr. Suresh Sahni, Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Mr. Rajesh Choudhary and Mr. V.R. Bajwa, learned counsel who appeared as intervenors on being invited by the Court to address on the question whether in view of nature of allegation and evidence in the present case, conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 304-B IPC can be altered to one for the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder under Section 302 IPC. 5. Mr. Dheeraj Singhal, learned counsel for the accused-appellant argued that impugned judgment passed by the trial court is against the weight of evidence on record and well established principles of law. The trial court has committed serious error and material irregularities, while conducting the trial and convicting the accused-appellant under Section 304-B IPC. The trial court wrongly framed charges against the accused appellant which has seriously prejudiced case of the accused-appellant. Trial court has not read and appreciated the evidence available on record correctly and in the right perspective. There are material improvements and contradictions between statements of the prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and those recorded before the trial court. The prosecution has failed to prove guilt of the accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt. All the witnesses are relative of the deceased and interested persons. The prosecution has failed to examine the independent witnesses and, therefore, entire prosecution case is doubtful. The trial court ought to have drawn adverse inference against the prosecution for not producing independent witnesses. 6. It is submitted that the trial court has not considered the fact that Bheema (P.W.1), father of the deceased Mithlesh, has clearly stated in his cross examination that at the time of marriage, no demand was made but now since his daughter had been murdered, therefore, he lodged the FIR. He also stated that he had good relationships with Nawab Singh and Dantaram till his daughter had not died. He further stated that his daughter was burnt by her in-laws, but he never lodged any complaint about this incident. He also stated that he had good relationships with Nawab Singh and Dantaram till his daughter had not died. He further stated that his daughter was burnt by her in-laws, but he never lodged any complaint about this incident. Allegation of the complainant Bheema (P.W.1) that the deceased earlier sustained burn injuries should not be believed because no FIR of that incident was lodged by the complainant. There is no proof that how his daughter was burnt and nor any document was placed on record about her treatment. Statement of the complainant that he got her daughter treated for those burn injuries for as long as 13 months should also not be believed because neither any witness nor any proof of treatment was produced to prove the same. There is also no evidence on record to show that demand of dowry was made at any point of time. Learned counsel argued that trial court has committed serious error in not considering the fact that Dantaram (P.W.10), who allegedly informed the complainant about the incident, has also not supported the story of prosecution and turned hostile. There is no eye witness of the incident and the accused appellant has been falsely implicated only on the basis of presumption. The accused-appellant was not even present at home at the time of incident and also there is no direct evidence on record against the accused-appellant. All evidence available is hearsay evidence, therefore, the order of conviction is liable to be quashed and set aside. 7. Mr. Dheeraj Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant argued that trial court has not considered principles of criminal jurisprudence that there should be 'mens-rea' to commit any crime and in the present case there is no evidence that accused appellant had any motive to commit crime. There is no evidence on record to show that demand of dowry was made soon before her death. Therefore, in absence of motive, the order of conviction of the appellant is liable to be set aside. It is argued that material witnesses namely; Ajab Singh (P.W.3); Harvilas (P.W.7); Arun (P.W.8); Shiv Singh (P.W.9) and Dantaram (P.W.10) have not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is argued that material witnesses namely; Ajab Singh (P.W.3); Harvilas (P.W.7); Arun (P.W.8); Shiv Singh (P.W.9) and Dantaram (P.W.10) have not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel for the appellant alternatively argued that sentence of life imprisonment for offence under Section 304-B IPC is too excessive and disproportionate and the same is liable to be reduced. 8. Mr. Dheeraj Singhal, learned counsel for the appellant relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 SC 2023 argued that the Supreme Court in that case categorically held that even if trial court convicted accused for lesser offence than charged one and no appeal has been filed by the State thereagainst, though it filed appeal in another case against same accused, High Court is not competent to alter conviction to graver offence in former case while dealing with appeal in latter case. It is, therefore, prayed that present appeal may be allowed and impugned judgment may be set aside and the accused-appellant may be acquitted of all the charges framed against him. 9. Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State argued that evidence in the present case clearly proves that deceased did not die suicidal death. Post Mortem Report (Exhibit P-12), as proved by Dr. Kedar Gupta (P.W.11) would show that deceased sustained total seven injuries, out of which six were incised wounds. Cause of her death was opined to be multiple injuries leading to hemorrhagic shock. These injuries had been inflicted by the accused-appellant by use of axe ('kulhada'), which has been recovered at his instance vide Exhibit P-15 from a well near a dam. Even though the axe ('kulhada') was thrown into the well with full of water, yet the FSL report (Exhibit P-17) has proved that the axe ('kulhada') was having traces of human blood, though blood group could not be determined. 10. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that the trial court in the present case has erred in law in not framing specific charge for offence under Section 302 IPC against the accused- appellant. However, if the contents of charge no. 10. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that the trial court in the present case has erred in law in not framing specific charge for offence under Section 302 IPC against the accused- appellant. However, if the contents of charge no. 2 and 3 are read together in the light of statements of various prosecution witnesses, it would be revealed that the accused-appellant fully understood that he was being tried for murder of his wife in suspicious circumstances. No prejudice would, therefore, be caused to the accused appellant if he is convicted for offence under Section 302 IPC by this Court because already he has been sentenced to life imprisonment for offence under Section 304-B IPC. Learned Additional Advocate General, in support of his arguments, has relied upon judgments of the Supreme Court in Pal Singh & Another Vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 11 SCC 508 . Reliance is also placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kamalanantha & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 5 SCC 194 and Dalbir Singh Vs. State of U.P., (2004) 5 SCC 334 . 11. Ms. Sonia Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor also opposed the appeal and argued that accused-appellant ought to have been convicted for offence of murder because evidence fully proved that accused-appellant was last seen going along with his wife (deceased) towards the jungle. Reliance has been placed on judgments of the Supreme Court in Mohan Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2011) 9 SCC 272 ; Sushil Sharma Vs. State (NCT Delhi), (2014) 4 SCC 317 . It is argued that the Court may presume that the accused knew about the incriminating material or the dead body due to his involvement in the offence when he discloses the location of such incriminating material without disclosing the manner in which he came to know about the same. Reliance in this connection has been placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 . Learned Public Prosecutor further argued that Section 106 of Evidence Act is exception to the rule in which the burden is shifted on the accused to explain those situations, which are specially in his knowledge because it would be impossible for the prosecution to prove those facts. In support of her arguments, learned Public Prosecutor relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in Joshinder Yadav Vs. In support of her arguments, learned Public Prosecutor relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in Joshinder Yadav Vs. State of Bihar, JT 2014 (2) SC 316 and Balram Prasad Agarwal Vs. State of Bihar & Others, (1997) 9 SCC 338 . 12. Mr. Suresh Sahni, learned counsel appearing as intervenor submitted that in the facts of present case when the evidence justifies conviction for offence under Section 302 IPC and the contents of the charges also convey so, this Court while considering appeal of the accused-appellant would be well within its jurisdiction in altering the conviction of the appellant. Learned counsel, in support of his argument, relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Nani Gopal Biswas Vs. Municipality of Howrah, AIR 1958 SC 141 . 13. Mr. Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel also appearing as intervenor referred to Section 464(2) Cr.P.C. and argued that if the court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned, it may in the case of an omission to frame a charge, order that a charge be framed and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge or in the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge and direct a new trial to be held upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit. However, in the present case, according to him, the trial court committed grave error by not framing a charge for offence under Section 302 IPC. Even then, article no. 2 of the charges conveyed to the appellant that the deceased was put to murder by him in suspicious circumstances within seven years of her marriage and he thereby caused her 'dowry murder' which is an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. Learned counsel submitted that Section 386 Cr.P.C. amply empowers this Court to set right the mistake committed by the trial court. Section 386(b)(ii) empowers this Court to alter the finding, while maintaining the sentence. Section 386(e) Cr.P.C. provides that this Court may make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. These powers are subject to only two provisos. First is that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. Section 386(e) Cr.P.C. provides that this Court may make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. These powers are subject to only two provisos. First is that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. Second is that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence, which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the court passing the order or sentence under appeal. Since in the present case already sentence of life imprisonment has been awarded by the trial court to the accused-appellant, this Court would only be required to alter the conviction of the accused-appellant for offence under Section 304-B IPC to one under Section 302 IPC with the same amount of sentence. In support of his argument, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Janakiraman Vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police, CBI, SPE, Madras, (2006) 1 SCC 697 . Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jasvinder Saini & Others Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 256 . It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Jasvinder Saini & Others (supra) clarified its direction given in earlier decision in Rajbir Alias Raju & Another Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116 with regard to framing charge of Section 302 IPC, along with charge of Section 304-B IPC. In the present case, evidence on record fully justified framing of charge under Section 302 IPC against the accused-appellant but the trial court erred in not framing that charge. Even then, charge no. 2 sufficiently conveys so. Therefore, no prejudice would be caused to the appellant even if his conviction for offence under Section 304-B IPC is altered to one under Section 302 IPC. 14. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, learned counsel also appearing as intervenor submitted that as per the provisions of Section 218 Cr.P.C., separate charge has to be framed by the trial court for every distinct offence of which any person is accused. 14. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, learned counsel also appearing as intervenor submitted that as per the provisions of Section 218 Cr.P.C., separate charge has to be framed by the trial court for every distinct offence of which any person is accused. If the charge has not been framed against the accused for offence under Section 302 IPC and this Court is of the view that conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC would not be justified, only course available to this Court would be to direct the trial court to frame a charge under Section 302 IPC and remit the matter to trial court to recommence the trial from the point immediately after the framing of the charge, as per Section 464 (2) (b) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel, in support of his arguments, relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sohan Lal @ Sohan Singh & Others Vs. State of Punjab, JT 2003 (Suppl.2) SC 556. 15. Mr. Rajesh Choudhary, learned counsel appearing as intervenor relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in Arvind Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 6 SCC 407 and argued that that was a case of bride burning in which the trial court convicted the husband under Section 304-B IPC, but the High Court enhanced husband's conviction from Section 304-B IPC to Section 302 IPC mainly on the assumption that he burnt his wife for marrying again. The Supreme Court held that conversion to be improper on facts and also set aside conviction of the accused for offence under Section 304-B IPC. Learned counsel also relied on judgments of the Supreme Court in Jasvinder Saini & Others Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 256 and Vijay Pal Singh & Others Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 15 SCC 163 . 16. We have given our anxious consideration to submissions made at the Bar, perused the material on record and studied the cited precedents. 17. Perusal of the impugned judgment, as seen from its para 7, clearly indicates that when the Public Prosecutor opened argument on behalf of the prosecution before the trial court, he submitted that the accused started demanding dowry from the deceased soon after the marriage and when their demand was not met, they started beating the deceased and once even tried to set her ablaze and then murdered her. And thereafter, with an intention to conceal the proof, accused took her dead body to the agricultural field to hide it. They had even arranged for her clandestine funeral. Most of the prosecution witnesses in their statements have made allegation of murder against the accused-appellant. Moreover, the accused-appellant in his explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has also understood the trial to be on the charge of murder and accordingly set up his defence. Even the arguments of defence counsel, as noted in paras 24 to 26 of the impugned judgment, proceeds on that footing. We are, however, amazed to find gross negligence of law on the part of the Presiding Officer, who framed the charges and later on the Presiding Officer, who delivered the judgment. First charge against the accused was of subjecting the deceased to beating and also causing burn injuries, thus subjecting her to physical and mental cruelty, attracting offence of Section 498-A IPC. Second charge, which is the crucial one, was to the effect that the accused, who was married to deceased Mithlesh, on 29.12.2007 at Moja Jungle, Ibrahimpur, put her to death in suspicious circumstances within seven years of marriage and thereby committed offence of 'dowry murder' punishable under Section 304-B IPC. In this charge, first part referred to death of Mithlesh caused by the accused in suspicious circumstances and second part related to his committing offence of 'dowry murder' punishable under Section 304-B IPC. Significantly, the trial court, rather than using the word ‘dowry death’ here in the context of Section 304-B IPC, repeatedly used word ‘dowry murder’. Third charge against the accused was that he, after committing 'dowry murder' of Mithlesh on the date, point of time and the place referred to in the previous charge, dumped her dead body in an agricultural field having harvest of mustard and started preparation for burning it with a view to destroy the proof of 'dowry murder'. He, thus, committed offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. It is in the light of aforesaid charges that statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded in the present case. 18. In order to ascertain as to what offence has been committed by the accused-appellant, we deem it appropriate to threadbare discuss statements of the prosecution witnesses. 19. He, thus, committed offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. It is in the light of aforesaid charges that statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded in the present case. 18. In order to ascertain as to what offence has been committed by the accused-appellant, we deem it appropriate to threadbare discuss statements of the prosecution witnesses. 19. Bheema (P.W.1), father of the deceased has stated that all the accused started harassing the deceased after marriage for demand of dowry, especially, for motor cycle and cash. They even attempted to put Mithlesh on fire two years ago before this incident by pouring kerosene over her body. At that time, he got this information from a peddler (‘feriwala') and found her daughter hospitalized in a hospital near Phatak at Roopwas. When he went to hospital at Roopwas, he found that ear, nose, skin around her eyes and chest were having burns. His daughter told him that Sher Singh poured Kerosene over her body and lit the fire. He incurred expenditure on her treatment for as long as 13 months. Thereafter, Sher Singh along with his uncle Dantaram (P.W.10) came to his house and promised that they would not subject the deceased to cruelty. On this promise, he again allowed Mithlesh to go back to her in-laws. Thereafter, his daughter once came to him, but then she again returned back to her in-laws with the accused. About 20-25 days thereafter, he received information that her daughter and accused have both gone missing. This information was received by his son on cell phone of Rajaram (P.W.5) from Dantaram (P.W.10). He was at that time at Sapotara and his son informed him on phone. When he came to Bayana his son again informed that Mithlesh has already died and their in-laws were trying to cremate her body. He then made a telephonic call to Roopwas Police Station from Sidh Temple of his village and thereafter reached village Kheriya Lodha with Rajaram (P.W.5), Mohan, Bhagwan Singh (P.W. 2), Ramswaroop and other persons. By the time they arrived there, police had already reached. Vijay Singh informed the police about location of the dead body. In cross-examination, this witness also stated that though at the time of wedding no demand of dowry was made by the accused. Her daughter came to his house 2-3 times in a year thereafter. By the time they arrived there, police had already reached. Vijay Singh informed the police about location of the dead body. In cross-examination, this witness also stated that though at the time of wedding no demand of dowry was made by the accused. Her daughter came to his house 2-3 times in a year thereafter. He had filed criminal case against the accused because his daughter had been murdered. Although he has also stated that no one had witnessed accused committing murder of his daughter. He was subjected to intensive cross-examination by defence wherein also he made specific allegation of murder of his daughter against the accused-appellant. 20. Bhagwan Singh (P.W.2) has also made allegation of demand of dowry against the accused and stated that earlier once accused put Mithlesh on fire and her father Bheema (P.W.1) incurred expenses in getting her treated in the hospital and then brought her to his house. It was thereafter that accused-appellant promised not to ill-treat her and Bheema (P.W.1) allowed his daughter to go back to her in-laws. One month thereafter she was murdered. Bhagwan Singh (P.W.2) has also made specific allegation that the deceased was murdered. He was also subjected to intensive cross- examination by the defence. In his cross-examination, he has stated that when he saw the dead body of Mithlesh, it was having at least seven injuries by axe (‘kulhada’) right from head to neck. She also had a cut injury on the right hand and also on the left leg. Although, he stated that he did not see the accused inflicting those injuries by axe (‘kulhada’) on the person of the deceased, but the deceased indeed had multiple injuries by axe (‘kulhada’). He has stated that reference of these cut injuries were made in Panchnama (Exhibit P-1), on which he put his thumb impression. 21. Himmat (P.W.4), brother of the deceased has also alleged that the deceased was put to fire by the accused two years after the marriage because they were not able to satisfy the demand of motor cycle and Rs. 50,000/- cash in dowry. When the deceased was put to fire in earlier incident, Dantaram (P.W.10) informed them. They spent about Rs. 15,000 - 20,000 in her treatment and she stayed in their house for as long as 13-14 months. 50,000/- cash in dowry. When the deceased was put to fire in earlier incident, Dantaram (P.W.10) informed them. They spent about Rs. 15,000 - 20,000 in her treatment and she stayed in their house for as long as 13-14 months. Then, Sher Singh came to their house with his uncle Dantaram (P.W.10) and promised not to ill-treat the deceased. On this promise, they allowed Mithlesh to go back to her in-laws. About a month thereafter, Mithlesh was subjected to multiple cut injuries, which were inflicted on her body. This time again Dantaram (P.W.10) informed them on the day of incident at about 7.00-8.00 P.M. that Mithlesh has been killed and they should immediately come. They reached village Kheriya Lodha on the following morning. He also informed his father, Bheema (P.W.1), who at that time was at Sapotara. His father in turn informed Police Station Roopwas about the incident. When police pressurized Vijay Singh, brother of the accused-appellant, he disclosed location of the dead body. This witness, at more than one occasion in the examination in chief, repeated the allegation that his sister Mithlesh was cut into multiple pieces or murdered. This witness was also subjected to detailed cross-examination wherein in opening line he stated that on receiving information from Dantaram (P.W.10) that Mithlesh has been murdered, he and Rajaram reached village Kheriya Lodha at about 2.00 P.M. in the afternoon. Dantaram (P.W.10) happens to be father-in-law of his another sister Memo. When the deceased was earlier subjected to burn injuries by the accused, accused did not give information to them. It was only Dantaram (P.W.10), who informed them 4-5 days after the incident. He further stated in cross-examination that although it was a fact that he did not see any one committing murder of Mithlesh. When they reached village Kheriya Lodha, no villager told them that any one has committed murder of the Mithlesh. 22. Rajaram (P.W.5), who accompanied Himmat (P.W.4), brother of the deceased, to village Kheriya Lodha, has stated that Dantaram (P.W.10) informed on his cellphone that Mithlesh and accused-appellant both were missing. On the next day, i.e. 30.12.2007, he along with Himmat (P.W.4) went to village Kheriya Lodha and reached there about 2.00 P.M. They had already informed Bheema (P.W.1), father of the deceased, who also followed them to village Kheriya Lodha with Ramswaroop, Bhagwan Singh (P.W.2), Radhey Shyam and Rajaram (P.W.5). On the next day, i.e. 30.12.2007, he along with Himmat (P.W.4) went to village Kheriya Lodha and reached there about 2.00 P.M. They had already informed Bheema (P.W.1), father of the deceased, who also followed them to village Kheriya Lodha with Ramswaroop, Bhagwan Singh (P.W.2), Radhey Shyam and Rajaram (P.W.5). Police had already reached village Kheriya Lodha before arrival of these persons. They went along with the police towards cremation ground where the pyre was ready. Police then pressurized Vijay Singh, brother of the accused-appellant to disclose location of the dead body. Vijay Singh took them to an agricultural field having harvest of mustard in the jungle of Ibrahimpur, where dead body of Mithlesh was lying concealed. The deceased had the marks of injuries on her neck; leg was also cut; head was also having injuries. Earlier also, the accused had subjected the deceased to burn injuries, treatment of which was arranged by Bheema (P.W.1). Only a month before the incident, Mithlesh again went back to her in-laws with the accused- appellant. In cross-examination, this witness stated that they first saw the dead body of Mithlesh in agricultural field. Her clothes, i.e. blouse, petticoat and sari were all soaked in blood. He was confronted with his police statement (Exhibit D-3) and asked to explain whether he informed the police about number of injuries he noticed on the body of Mithlesh including cut on the leg, this witness stated that since the police did not ask him, he did not say so. 23. Ramswaroop (P.W.6) is a witness, who accompanied Bheema (P.W.1) to village Kheriya Lodha, too has stated that about a year ago, Mithlesh had received burn injuries and his father Bheema (P.W.1) got her treated. When he went to village Kheriya Lodha with Bheema (P.W.1), police personnel had already reached. Dead body of Mithlesh was found in an agricultural field having harvest of mustard. Dead body had multiple cut injuries including one on the neck. He was an attesting witness to inquest report (Exhibit P-1). 24. Harvilas (P.W.7); Arun (P.W.8) and Shiv Singh (P.W.9) are those witnesses, who were produced by the prosecution to prove extra judicial confession of the accused-appellant, but they did not support case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Dead body had multiple cut injuries including one on the neck. He was an attesting witness to inquest report (Exhibit P-1). 24. Harvilas (P.W.7); Arun (P.W.8) and Shiv Singh (P.W.9) are those witnesses, who were produced by the prosecution to prove extra judicial confession of the accused-appellant, but they did not support case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Even Dantaram (P.W.10), uncle of the accused-appellant, who happens to be father-in-law of another daughter of complainant Bheema (P.W.1), has also not supported prosecution case and turned hostile. 25. Mahendra Singh (P.W.14), who has proved Panchnama (Exhibit P-1), has stated that Mithlesh was murdered by accused-appellant Sher Singh and Panchnama (Exhibit P-1) was prepared in his presence and contains his signature. Clothes of the deceased were also seized vide Exhibit P-7 to which he was an attesting witness. Gopal (P.W.15) and Janak Singh (P.W.16), attesting witnesses to the recovery of axe (‘kulhada’) have not supported case of the prosecution and turned hostile. Hardum Singh (P.W.-12), constable of Police Chowki Ghatoli has proved site plan (Exhibit P-6) and seizure memo of control soil and blood smeared soil (Exhibit P-5). 26. Satyendra Singh Ranawat (P.W.18), the Circle Officer, who prepared recovery memo (Exhibit P-14) and site plan of the place of recovery (Exhibit P-15), has proved them and also proved thumb impression of the accused on the memos. This witness stated that accused informed him about place where he murdered his wife and also the well in which he threw ‘tanchiya’ (also mentioned at certain placed as ‘kulhada’). He recorded that information and prepared Exhibit P-21 and recovered ‘tanchiya’ (kulhada) weapon of offence vide Exhibit P-14. He has also proved FSL Report (Exhibit P-17), which proved that there was blood of human origin on the saree and blouse of the deceased, which was of B Group. FSL Report (Exhibit P-17) also proved presence of human blood on petticoat and bra of the deceased. Blood smeared soil and controlled soil lifted from the place of occurrence, were also found positive for the presence of human blood. Even axe (‘kulhada’) recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant was found positive for the presence of human blood, but the blood was not sufficient to determine its group. This witness was subjected to detailed cross-examination wherein he has stated that deceased had total seven injuries on her body. Even axe (‘kulhada’) recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant was found positive for the presence of human blood, but the blood was not sufficient to determine its group. This witness was subjected to detailed cross-examination wherein he has stated that deceased had total seven injuries on her body. Her hands and legs had deep cuts but were not amputed. Condition of dead body was mentioned in Panchnama (Exhibit P-1). He in his investigation did not find any direct evidence of the accused Sher Singh causing injuries to the deceased. One Vishambhar Banjara though told him that accused Sher Singh informed him on his telephone/PCO that he murdered his wife, but he (this witness) did not take telephone number of his PCO. 27. Balkrishan (P.W.-13), another constable of Police Station Ghatoli has proved that he received telephonic information at about 2.30 P.M. that Sher Singh of village Kheriya Lodha has murdered his wife. He along with Hardum Singh (P.W.-12) went to village Kheriya Lodha. Nawab Singh, father of the accused-appellant Sher Singh informed that his son had gone to jungle with his wife for cutting wood with axe (‘kulhada’) and has yet not returned back and that Sher Singh informed him on telephone on 29.12.2007 at around 7.00 P.M. that he has murdered his wife and her dead body was lying in the jungle of Ibrahimpur. When he enquired from Vijay Singh, brother of the accused-appellant, he took them to the jungle of Ibrahimpur where dead body was lying concealed in an agricultural field having harvest of mustard. Father of the deceased and her brother Himmat (P.W.4) and 10-15 persons also accompanied them to the agricultural field. The dead body had injuries on neck, hands and legs. Even this witness has been subjected to intensive cross- examination by defence wherein he stated that dead body had marks of multiple injuries caused by axe (‘kulhada’). 28. Inquest Report (Exhibit P-1) clearly indicates that the deceased had injuries on her neck, on left side of the head, two injuries on right side shoulder, on the foot of left side leg and also below knee and the head. Thus, she had total seven injuries. Inquest Report (Exhibit P-1) also indicates that deceased had old burn injuries on both her breast. These are those burn injuries wherefor the allegations have been made by many of the prosecution witnesses against the accused-appellant. 29. Dr. Thus, she had total seven injuries. Inquest Report (Exhibit P-1) also indicates that deceased had old burn injuries on both her breast. These are those burn injuries wherefor the allegations have been made by many of the prosecution witnesses against the accused-appellant. 29. Dr. Kedar Gupta (P.W.11) has proved Post Mortem Report (Exhibit P-12), according to which the deceased had following seven injuries on her body:- “1. Incised wound with fracture on left parietal bone 2” x 0.5” bone deep with clotted blood. 2. Incised wound 3” x 0.5” bone deep below the head with clotted blood. 3. Incised wound 3” x 1” muscle deep on left side of neck (steno clodo mesto muscle) with clotted blood. 4. Incised wound 2” x 1” muscle deep on right shoulder. 5. Incised wound 5” x 2” above breathing pipe. 6. Incised wound 6” x 3” muscle deep frontal part of right leg with trapping. 7. Incised wound 0.5” x 0.5” on tibia bone of left leg with clotted blood.” 30. We are not inclined to accept the argument that since motive, which assumes significance in a case where there is no direct evidence, has not been proved in the present case and that in the absence of motive, the circumstances referred to above would not furnish sufficient proof to justify conviction of the accused- appellant. This cannot be accepted as a factor of universal application that whenever motive is absent, howsoever strong the circumstances may be, they may be disregarded. On this aspect of the matter, we propose to rely on the judgment of the Supreme court in Vivek Kalra Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 12 SCC 439 wherein it was observed as under:- “6. ….. where prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence only, motive is a relevant fact and can be taken into consideration under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but where the chain of other circumstances establishes beyond reasonable doubt that it is the accused and the accused alone who has committed the offence, and this is one such case, the Court cannot hold that in the absence of motive of the accused being established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be held guilty of the offence. In Ujjagar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 90 , this Court observed: '17.... In Ujjagar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 90 , this Court observed: '17.... It is true that in a case relating to circumstantial evidence motive does assume great importance but to say that the absence of motive would dislodge the entire prosecution story is perhaps giving this one factor an importance which is not due and (to use the cliché) the motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy.” 31. The aforesaid line of reasoning was reiterated by the Supreme Court in a recent judgment in Kiriti Pal Vs. State of West Bengal, (2015) 11 SCC 178, wherein it was observed as under: “26. It is true that motive is an important factor in cases where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence but that does not mean in all cases of circumstantial evidence if the prosecution is unable to prove the motive satisfactorily, the prosecution must fail. In this case, of course, the prosecution has not adduced evidence as to what was the motive for committing murder of Anjali. But it is a matter of common knowledge that murders have been committed without any pre-eminent motive. It is well established that the mere fact that the prosecution has failed to translate the mental disposition of the accused into evidence, that does not mean that no such mental condition existed in the mind of the accused.” 32. We are also not inclined to countenance the argument that presence of human blood on 'kulhada' (axe), weapon of offence, should not be relied as a circumstance against the accused only because in serological test blood was found insufficient to determine its group. We, in this connection, may again rely upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Kiritipal (supra) wherein it was observed that, “Detection of blood on the seized wooden butts cannot be discarded on the ground that it was insufficient for serological test. There is no legal proposition, the detection of blood is unworthy of acceptance merely because it was insufficient for serological test and the case of the prosecution cannot be doubted on that score.” 33. There is no legal proposition, the detection of blood is unworthy of acceptance merely because it was insufficient for serological test and the case of the prosecution cannot be doubted on that score.” 33. Even though the charge was framed by the trial court for offence under Section 304-B IPC, findings recorded and discussion made by the learned trial court in para 24, 25 and 26 of the impugned judgment clearly holds him guilty of offence of murder of his wife Mithlesh on the basis of evidence of all the prosecution witnesses. The trial court has begun para 24 of the impugned judgment by posing the question that whether the accused Sher Singh has committed dowry murder of Mithlesh or she was put to death in mysterious circumstances and then proceeded to discuss Post Mortem Report (Exhibit P-12) and took note of the fact that she sustained seven incised wounds at different parts of the body. The trial court has noted statements of Bheema (P.W.1); Bhagwan Singh (P.W.2); Himmat (P.W.4); Rajaram (P.W.5); Ramswaroop (P.W.6), in which they verily alleged that accused-appellant Sher Singh has murdered Mithlesh and then lastly concluded in this para that allegation against the accused-appellant that he committed murder of Bheema's daughter Mithlesh, is proved against him beyond reasonable doubt. 34. In para 25 of the impugned judgment, learned trial court has noted argument of the defence that there was no direct evidence to hold the accused-appellant guilty, but then it observed that such inference has to be drawn by the court on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Then the trial court has taken note of the statement of Balkirshan (P.W.13) that he received telephonic call at 2.30 P.M. on 30.12.2007 in the Police Station about incident and this information was given by Bheema (P.W.1) that Sher Singh of Village Kheriya Lodha has murdered his wife. He along with constable Hardum Singh went to village Kheriya Lodha to verify this fact. On enqiury, Nawab Singh, father of the accused-appellant Sher Singh told him that he (Sher Singh) with his wife had gone to jungle with a 'Kulhada' (axe) to cut the wood (fuel), but has not yet returned and Sher Singh informed him (Nawab Singh) on telephone on 29.12.2007 that he has murdered his wife and concealed dead body in the jungle of Ibrahimpur. Balkrishan (P.W.13) stated that he learnt that family of the accused had collected wood for clandestine cremation of the deceased at Marethiya which fact he verified and again returned back to the house of the appellant. This time, he asked brother of the accused-appellant Vijay Singh and father Nawab Singh as to the location of the dead body. After much persuasion, Vijay Singh disclosed that dead body of Mithlesh was lying in the agricultural field having harvest of mustard and ultimately took them to the said place. 35. In fact, in para 26 of the impugned judgment also the trial court has noted argument of the defence counsel that false allegation has been made against the accused-appellant Sher Singh that he murdered his wife and threw her dead body in the agricultural field and that investigating officer in cross-examination admitted that wood, cow dung etc., allegedly collected by family of the accused, are generally available in the village. Trial court has then noticed defence version of the accused gave in examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. where he denied having murdered Mithlesh and also stated that he did not telephonically inform anyone that he murdered Mithlesh. He rather loved her. The trial court then further noted that after murdering his wife by 'kulhada' (axe), accused-appellant Sher Singh informed his family about the same on telephone, but Harvilas (P.W.7); Arun (P.W.8) and Shiv Singh (P.W.9), who could have proved this fact have turned hostile. Then, the trial court has taken note of the conduct of the appellant that while incident took place on 29.12.2007, his father Nawab Singh and brother Vijay Singh both were arrested on 31.12.2007 vide memos of arrest Exhibit P-18 and Exhibit P-19 respectively, but the accused-appellant was arrested as late as on 15.01.2008. The trial court noted that it is only after his arrest that weapon of offence 'kulhada' (axe) (also described as 'tanchiya' at certain places) could be recovered vide Exhibit P-14 and sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, report of which was (Exhibit P-17). This report has proved presence of human blood on 'kulhada' (axe), but it was not sufficient for determination of blood group. This report has proved presence of human blood on 'kulhada' (axe), but it was not sufficient for determination of blood group. The trial court then concluded this part by positive finding that circumstance clearly prove that accused-appellant murdered his wife Mithlesh, but then additionally added that since this was done by him in furtherance of demand of dowry, he was guilty of offence under Section 304-B IPC. 36. The accused-appellant, in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., tried to set up defence of alibi, but has not produced any evidence to prove such a defence. Dead body of Mithlesh was recovered on 30.12.2007. Exhibit P-20 indicates that accused was arrested on 15.01.2008. The accused-appellant was thus absconding by this time for as long as 17 days after the incident, therefore, he in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. took a defence of alibi by asserting that he had gone to earn his livelihood out of the village, but he failed to prove his defence of alibi. This very fact is an additional incriminating circumstance against him wherefor no explanation is forthcoming from the accused-appellant. 37. Critical analysis of the prosecution evidence thus proves the following circumstances against the accused-appellant:- (1) That the accused-appellant Sher Singh and the deceased Mithlesh were last seen together going towards the jungle. (2) That the accused-appellant, while going to jungle, was carrying 'tanchiya' (axe) for the purpose of cutting wood (fuel). (3) That the accused-appellant and the deceased did not return to their home for at least two days. (4) That Dantaram (P.W.10) informed brother of the deceased Himmat (P.W.4) on 30.12.2007 that accused-appellant Sher Singh and his wife Mithlesh were missing for last two days and enquired whether Mithlesh had come to them. (5) That the family of the accused-appellant had the information about exact location of dead body of Mithlesh and had prepared for her clandestine funeral, which was prevented by timely intervention of the police. (6) That there are enough circumstances to infer that the brother of the accused-appellant Vijay Singh, who informed the police about location of the dead body of Mithlesh got such information from the accused-appellant. (7) That the accused-appellant was absconding for as long as 17 days after the incident. (8) That 'tanchiya' (axe) was recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant from the well near dam after his arrest. (7) That the accused-appellant was absconding for as long as 17 days after the incident. (8) That 'tanchiya' (axe) was recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant from the well near dam after his arrest. (9) That 'tanchiya' (axe) so recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant was found to contain blood of human origin in the FSL Report (Exhibit P-17). (10) That all the aforesaid circumstances were put to accused-appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. but he failed to give any explanation thereabout. 38. It is indeed surprising that despite entire case having been prosecuted on the basis of allegation of murder against the accused-appellant and the entire evidence of the prosecution, including that of witnesses, who were examined to prove extra judicial confession made by the accused, though they ultimately did not support the case of the prosecution and turned hostile, the police filed charge sheet for offence under Section 304-B IPC. The trial court committed grave error by framing charge under Section 304-B IPC though it otherwise indicated this offence to be a 'dowry murder', rather than describing it 'dowry death'. Article of Charge no. 2 and 3, if read conjointly, sufficiently conveyed to the appellant that allegation against him was of causing murder of his wife Mithlesh wherein it was mentioned that he put his wife to death in suspicious circumstances and thereby caused her 'dowry murder' and also that he after committing her 'dowry murder', concealed her dead body in the agriculture field having harvest of mustard and was attempting to cremate the dead body with a view to destroying evidence. And most surprising is the aspect that findings recorded by the trial court in the reasoning part as reflected from discussion made in paras 24, 25 and 26 of the impugned judgment finds the accused-appellant guilty of the offence of murder, yet in the concluding part it convicted him for offence under Section 304-B IPC. 39. Nature of the charges and the evidence in the present case are such that the accused-appellant fully knew that charge against him was of causing murder of his wife. 39. Nature of the charges and the evidence in the present case are such that the accused-appellant fully knew that charge against him was of causing murder of his wife. All the incriminating circumstances, statement of the witnesses including Panchnama (Exhibit P-1), Post Mortem Report (Exhibit P-12), recovery of ‘tanchiya’ (axe), weapon of offence (Exhibit P-14) were put to accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. And it is evident from the concluding answer of the accused-appellant in response to question no. 14 in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he fully understood that allegation against him was of committing murder of his wife, which would be evident from the following English translation of his answer in Hindi to that question:- “I did not demand any dowry from Mithlesh or from my in-laws. I did not commit murder of Mithlesh. My family members informed me about Mithlesh that she had gone to Jungle for fetching wood (fuel) and died there. I had gone outside to earn my livelihood. I was not present in the house at the time of incident. I had gone to outside village to dig well (‘chakki’). I returned back to my house 15-20 days after the incident. I did not make telephonic call to any one in the village that I murdered Mithlesh. I always loved her.” 40. Relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh & Others (supra) can be of no help to the appellant because in that case, the trial court convicted the accused-appellant for lesser offence than the charged one and no appeal was filed by the State there-against. However, in the appeal filed by the State against similar order passed in respect of same accused, the High Court altered the conviction of the accused-appellant therein to graver offence in former case while dealing with appeal in latter case. The Supreme Curt held that the High Court was not competent to do so. Similarly another relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Arvind Singh (supra), was a case where High Court converted husband's conviction under Section 304-B to one under Section 302 IPC. The Supreme Curt held that the High Court was not competent to do so. Similarly another relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Arvind Singh (supra), was a case where High Court converted husband's conviction under Section 304-B to one under Section 302 IPC. The Supreme Court, holding that neither there was evidence of burning of wife, nor of dowry demand available on record, not only acquitted the accused therein of charge under Section 302 IPC but also of charge under Section 304-B IPC holding that the High Court proceeded on the wrong presumption that the husband must be interested in committing such offence so that he could perform another marriage. Such are not facts of the present case where there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence against the accused-appellant to prove his guilt. 41. The Supreme Court in Rajbir Alias Raju & Another Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116 directed all the trial courts in India to ordinarily add Section 302 to charge of Section 304-B IPC so that death sentence can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women. Later on, the Supreme Court then in Jasvinder Saini & Others (supra) clarified the directions issued by it vide its earlier judgment in Rajbir Alias Raju (supra) holding that where charge sheet is filed for offence under Section 304-B IPC, charge under Section 302 IPC may not be mechanically added especially when the evidence prima facie did not support a case of murder. The Supreme Court, however, held that the court, in view of Section 216 Cr.P.C., has unrestricted power to add or alter any charge whenever court finds that defective charge has been made or addition of new charge becomes necessary after commencement of trial. It was held that whether the alleged offence is murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or a dowry death punishable under Section 304-B IPC depends upon the fact situation and the evidence in the case. If there is evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, to prima facie support a charge under Section 302 IPC, the trial court can and indeed ought to frame a charge of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. 42. If there is evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, to prima facie support a charge under Section 302 IPC, the trial court can and indeed ought to frame a charge of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC. 42. The Supreme Court in Vijay Pal Singh and Others (supra) held that it is generally seen that where a married woman dies within seven years of marriage, otherwise than under normal circumstances, no inquiry is usually conducted to see whether there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, as to whether the offence falls under Section 302 IPC. Sometimes, Section 302 IPC is put as an alternate charge. In cases where there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that the offence falls under Section 302 IPC, the trial court should frame the charge under Section 302 IPC even if the police has not expressed any opinion in that regard in the report under Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. Section 304-B IPC can be put as an alternate charge, if the trial court so feels. 43. In Mohan Singh (supra), the accused was convicted by the trial court for offence under Section 120-B IPC for criminal conspiracy for murder sentenced to life imprisonment with fine and under Section 387 IPC for extortion sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of seven years with fine. Conviction and sentence aforesaid were affirmed by the High Court. Argument in appeal before the Supreme Court was raised that since there was no charge for offence under Section 302 IPC, the accused could not be awarded sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, relying on catena of its previous judgments on this point, in para 27 and 28 of the report held as under:- “27. In view of such consistent opinion of this Court, we are of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant for non-mentioning of Section 302 IPC in the charge since all the ingredients of the offence were disclosed. The appellant had full notice and had ample opportunity to defend himself against the same and at no earlier stage of the proceedings, the appellant had raised any grievance. Apart from that, on overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case we do not find that the appellant suffered any prejudice nor has there been any failure of justice. 28. Apart from that, on overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case we do not find that the appellant suffered any prejudice nor has there been any failure of justice. 28. In the instant case, in the charge it has been clearly mentioned that the appellant-accused has committed the murder of Anil Jha. By mentioning that the accused has committed the murder of Anil Jha all the ingredients of the charge have been mentioned and the requirement of Section 211 sub-section (2) has been complied with. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the aforesaid grievance of the appellant.” 44. In Dalbir Singh (supra), the accused appellant was charged under Section 302 IPC for committing murder of his wife and two daughters. He was further charged for offence under Section 304-B IPC for causing dowry death of his wife and also under Section 498-A for subjecting her to cruelty. Trial court convicted the accused for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to death. He was also convicted for offence under Section 498-A IPC, but acquitted of charge under Section 304-B IPC. High Court in appeal acquitted the accused of offence under Section 302 IPC, but observed that he could have been held guilty of offence under Section 306 IPC for having abetted commission of suicide by his wife by setting her on fire wherein two daughters also died. The High Court, however, relying on the judgment in Sangaraboina Sreenu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 5 SCC 348 held that since no charge under Section 306 IPC was framed, therefore, the accused could not be convicted. Thus, conviction of the accused was maintained only under Section 498-A IPC, which was challenged before the Supreme Court both by State of U.P. and also the accused. In those facts, the Supreme Court analysing provisions of Section 222 and 464 Cr.P.C. held in para 14 of the report as under:- “14. Here the Court proceeded to examine the question that if the accused has been charged under Section 302 IPC and the said charge is not established by evidence, would it be possible to convict him under Section 306 IPC having regard to Section 222 Cr.P.C.? Here the Court proceeded to examine the question that if the accused has been charged under Section 302 IPC and the said charge is not established by evidence, would it be possible to convict him under Section 306 IPC having regard to Section 222 Cr.P.C.? Sub- section (1) of Section 222 lays down that when a person is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. Sub-section (2) of the same Section lays down that when a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it. Section 222 Cr.P.C. is in the nature of a general provision which empowers the Court to convict for a minor offence even though charge has been framed for a major offence. Illustrations (a) and (b) to the said Section also make the position clear. However, there is a separate chapter in the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely Chapter XXXV which deals with Irregular Proceedings and their effect. This chapter enumerates various kinds of irregularities which have the effect of either vitiating or not vitiating the proceedings. Section 464 of the Code deals with the effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in, charge. Sub-section (1) of this Section provides that no finding, sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. This clearly shows that any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges shall not result in invalidating the conviction or order of a competent Court unless the appellate or revisional Court comes to the conclusion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp. This clearly shows that any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges shall not result in invalidating the conviction or order of a competent Court unless the appellate or revisional Court comes to the conclusion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In Lakhjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 173 though Section 464 Cr.P.C. has not been specifically referred to but the Court altered the conviction from Section 302 to 306 IPC having regard to the principles underlying in the said Section. In Sangaraboina Sreenu Vs. State of A.P., (1997) 5 SCC 348 the Court completely ignored to consider the provisions of Section 464 Cr.P.C. and keeping in view Section 222 Cr.P.C. alone, the conviction of the appellant therein under Section 306 IPC was set aside.” 45. Section 464 (1) Cr.P.C. provides that no finding sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. It would be thus seen from sub-section (1) of Section 464 Cr.P.C. that even if there be no charge or there be any error, omission or irregularity in charge including any misjoinder of charge, the appellate court would not set aside finding of conviction and an order of sentence passed by the trial court provided it records a satisfaction that no failure of justice has occasioned thereby. Sub- section (2) of Section 464 Cr.P.C. provides that if the Court of appeal is of opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned, it may; (a) in the case of an omission to frame a charge, order that a charge be framed and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge; and (b) in the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge, direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit. Sub- section (1) of Section 465 Cr.P.C. provides that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-section (2) of Section 465 Cr.P.C. further provides that in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. 46. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Willie (William) Slaney Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116 was dealing with a case where there was error in not framing charge under Section 302 IPC. It held that even if there is total absence of charge for offence under Section 302 IPC from start to finish, a trial must be examined on the touchstone whether the trial is fair. Observations of the Supreme Court in para 44 and 98 of the report are worth quoting which read as under:- "44. Now, as we have said, sections 225, 232, 535 and 537 (a) between them, cover every conceivable type of error and irregularity referable to a charge that can possibly arise, ranging from cases in which there is a conviction with no charge at all from start to finish down to cases in which there is a charge but with errors, irregularities and omissions in it. The Code is emphatic that `whatever' the irregularity it is not to be regarded as fatal unless there is prejudice. It is the substance that we must seek. Courts have to administer justice and justice includes the punishment of guilt just as much as the protection of innocence. Neither can be done if the shadow is mistaken for the substance and the goal is lost in a labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities. Broad vision is required, a nice balancing of the rights of the State and the protection of society in general against protection from harassment to the individual and the risks of unjust conviction. Neither can be done if the shadow is mistaken for the substance and the goal is lost in a labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities. Broad vision is required, a nice balancing of the rights of the State and the protection of society in general against protection from harassment to the individual and the risks of unjust conviction. Every reasonable presumption must be made in favour of an accused person; he must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. The same broad principles of justice and fair play must be brought to bear when determining a matter of prejudice as in adjudging guilt. But when all is said and done, what we are concerned to see is whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. If all these elements are there and no prejudice is shown the conviction must stand whatever the irregularities whether traceable to the charge or to a want of one. 98. In cases where a charge has been framed and there is an omission or irregularity in it, it is difficult to see how the mode of trial is affected. In any event, the Code expressly provides that in such cases the conviction need not be set aside, unless, in fact a failure of justice has resulted." 47. The Supreme Court in Willie (William) Slaney (supra) held that in judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, courts must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities, and their main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main fats sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. Viewed in the context of this, we find ourselves unable to hold that the accused was prejudiced due to error, omission or irregularity in the charge framed by the trial court. 48. Viewed in the context of this, we find ourselves unable to hold that the accused was prejudiced due to error, omission or irregularity in the charge framed by the trial court. 48. The Supreme Court in Kamalanantha & Others (supra) held that if separate charge and trial for each distinct offence is not done, it is not an illegality but an irregularity curable under Sections 464 or 465 Cr.P.C. provided no failure of justice had occasioned thereby. To ascertain that is the duty of the court to see whether an accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full fair chance to defend himself. The Supreme Court in para 50 of the judgment observed as under:- "50. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that misjoinder of charges is not an illegality but an irregularity curable under Section 464 or Section 465 CrPC provided no failure of justice had occasioned thereby. Whether or not the failure of justice had occasioned thereby, it is the duty of the Court to see, whether an accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself." 49. The Supreme Court in Darbara Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 476 while considering the argument with regard to alleged defect in framing of the charge observed that this has to be decided on the touch stone of prejudice caused to the accused resulting in failure of justice. There would be 'failure of justice', not only by unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of guilty. Discussion on this aspect was made by the Supreme Court in para 20 and 21 of the report, which are reproduced as under:- "20. There would be 'failure of justice', not only by unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of guilty. Discussion on this aspect was made by the Supreme Court in para 20 and 21 of the report, which are reproduced as under:- "20. The defect in framing of the charges must be so serious that it cannot be covered under Sections 464/465 CrPC, which provide that, an order of sentence or conviction shall not be deemed to be invalid only on the ground that no charge was framed, or that there was some irregularity or omission or misjoinder of charges, unless the court comes to the conclusion that there was also, as a consequence, a failure of justice. In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in framing the relevant charges, has led to a failure of justice, the court must have regard to whether an objection could have been raised at an earlier stage during the proceedings or not. While judging the question of prejudice or guilt, the court must bear in mind that every accused has a right to a fair trial, where he is aware of what he is being tried for and where the facts sought to be established against him, are explained to him fairly and clearly, and further, where he is given a full and fair chance to defend himself against the said charges. 21. 'Failure of justice' is an extremely pliable or facile expression, which can be made to fit into any situation in any case. The court must endeavour to find the truth. There would be 'failure of justice'; not only by unjust conviction, but also by acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust failure to produce requisite evidence. Of course, the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and also safeguarded, but they should not be overemphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in respect of the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. 'Prejudice' is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial, and not with respect to matters falling outside their scope. 'Prejudice' is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial, and not with respect to matters falling outside their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there has been serious prejudice caused to him, with respect to either of these aspects, and that the same has defeated the rights available to him under criminal jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the orders of the court. (Vide Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v. State of U.P., (2011) 8 SCC 300 , p. 320, para 36; Rattiram v. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 516 and Bhimanna v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 9 SCC 650 )." 50. The Supreme Court in Pal Singh & Another Vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 11 SCC 508 was dealing with a case where FIR was lodged against five accused for committing murder. Charges were framed against all of them for offence under Sections 148, 120- B and 302/149 IPC. Trial court convicted all of them for aforesaid offences. Before High Court, one accused died and two were acquitted, while two appellants were convicted for offence under Section 302 simplicitor. In appeal before the Supreme Court, their contention was that no charge for offence under Section 302 IPC simplicitor has been framed, therefore, their conviction under that Section deserves to be set aside. The Supreme Court relying on its earlier judgment in Darbara Singh (supra) held that unless convict is able to establish that defect in framing charges has caused real prejudice to him and that he was not informed as to what was the real case against him and that he could not defend himself properly, no interference is required on mere technicalities. 51. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372 , the Supreme Court considering provisions of Section 464 Cr.P.C. held that whether there is failure of justice or not is to be proved by the accused. In the instant case no such argument was made by the appellant before the trial court or before this court, therefore, we are satisfied that no failure of justice has occasioned in any way to the accused-appellant in the present case. In Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy & Others Vs. In the instant case no such argument was made by the appellant before the trial court or before this court, therefore, we are satisfied that no failure of justice has occasioned in any way to the accused-appellant in the present case. In Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy & Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 12 SCC 546 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the same question and referred to Section 464 Cr.P.C. In para 55 of the report it was held that if the ingredients of the section are obvious or implicit, conviction in regard thereto can be sustained irrespective of the fact that the said section has not been mentioned in the charge. 52. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in K. Prema S. Rao & Another Vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao & Others, (2003) 1 SCC 217 was dealing with a case in which charge against the accused was framed under Section 304-B IPC. In alternative, charge under Section 498-A IPC was also framed. Trial court convicted all the accused under Section 498-A IPC, but acquitted them of the offence under Section 304-B IPC. The Supreme Court while interpreting provisions of Section 215 Cr.P.C. held that this provision allows the criminal court to ignore any error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, if the accused was not , in fact, misled by such error or omission in framing the charge and it has not occasioned a failure of justice. Observations made by the Supreme Court in para 22 and 25 of the report are worth quoting, which read as under:- “22. Mere omission or defect in framing charge does not disable the criminal court from convicting the accused for the offence which is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The Code of Criminal Procedure has ample provisions to meet a situation like the one before us. From the statement of charge framed under Section 304-B and in the alternative Section 498-A IPC (as quoted above) it is clear that all facts and ingredients for framing charge for offence under Section 306 IPC existed in the case. The mere omission on the part of the trial Judge to mention Section 306 IPC with 498-A IPC does not preclude the court from convicting the accused for the said offence when found proved. The mere omission on the part of the trial Judge to mention Section 306 IPC with 498-A IPC does not preclude the court from convicting the accused for the said offence when found proved. In the alternate charge framed under Section 498-A of IPC, it has been clearly mentioned that the accused subjected the deceased to such cruelty and harassment as to drive her to commit suicide. The provisions of Section 221 of Cr.P.C. take care of such a situation and safeguard the powers of the criminal court to convict an accused for an offence with which he is not charged although on facts found in evidence, he could have been charged for such offence. Section 221 of Cr.P.C. needs reproduction:- "221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed.- (1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged. In the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. (2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub- section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it. 25. As provided in Section 215 of Cr.P.C. commission to frame charge under Section 306 IPC has not resulted in any failure of justice. We find no necessity to remit the matter to the trial court for framing charge under Section 306 IPC and direct a retrial for that charge. The accused cannot legitimately complain of any want of opportunity to defend the charge under Section 306 IPC and a consequent failure of justice. The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction of the appellant under Section 498A for cruel treatment of his wife, make out a case against him under Section 306 IPC of having abetted commission of suicide by the wife. The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction of the appellant under Section 498A for cruel treatment of his wife, make out a case against him under Section 306 IPC of having abetted commission of suicide by the wife. The appellant was charged for an offence of higher degree causing "dowry death" under Section 304-B which is punishable with minimum sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act could also be raised against him on same facts constituting offence of cruelty under Section 498-A, IPC. No further opportunity of defence is required to be granted to the appellant when he had ample opportunity to meet the charge under Section 498A, IPC.” 53. Section 214 Cr.P.C. provides that in every charge words used in describing an offence shall be deemed to have been used in the sense attached to them respectively by the law under which such offence is punishable. Section 215 Cr.P.C. provides that no error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice. When we read charges framed against accused-appellant, especially Article of Charges No. 2 and 3, use of words, “putting deceased to death in suspicious circumstances” and repeated use of the words “dowry murder” clearly convey that after putting her to 'dowry murder', the accused concealed her dead body and were preparing to burn the same to destroy the evidence. Basic ingredients of offence under Section 302 IPC were not only mentioned in the charge but were also stated by several prosecution witnesses, who have in their statements made allegations against the accused-appellant of committing murder of Mithlesh. That aspect has been so understood by the defence, which has subjected all these witnesses to intensive cross- examination, so much so that the accused-appellant, in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has fully understood that allegation against him is of committing murder of his wife, Mithlesh and therefore, his categorical defence was that he had not committed murder of Mithlesh. No doubt, Presiding Officers, who framed the charges or who conducted trial and ultimately, who delivered the impugned judgment, have been grossly negligent in not framing proper charge/not amending the charge by indicating Section 302 IPC therein. And surprisingly, despite all this, entire discussion made in para 24, 25 and 26 of the impugned judgment reflects that the defence counsel argued as if he was defending accused on charge of murder and the trial court also apparently found the accused guilty of the offence of murder, yet finally concluded that charge under Section 304-B IPC stands proved against him. Though there is obvious inherent contradiction in the finding recorded by the trial court but in the facts of the present case, no prejudice would be caused to accused-appellant, if his conviction is altered from Section 304-B IPC to one under Section 302 IPC, as he had fully understood that allegation against him was of murder of his wife and he had made effective defence in that light. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the accused-appellant was misled by error or omission in not mentioning Section 302 IPC in the Articles of Charges or that it would occasion failure of justice if his conviction is so altered. 54. Section 386 Cr.P.C. provides for powers of the appellate court that after perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under Section 377 or Section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may (a) xxxxxx (b) in an appeal from a conviction- (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial; or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence; (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same. It further provides in Clause (e) that appellate court may make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. All these powers are subject to two provisos. It further provides in Clause (e) that appellate court may make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. All these powers are subject to two provisos. First proviso stipulates that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. Second proviso is to the effect that Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal. A conjoint reading of Clause (b) (ii) and Clause (e) of Section 386 supra thus clearly shows that Appellate Court, while maintaining the sentence, can alter the finding and make any amendment or any consequential order that may be just or proper. 55. Not much law has developed on the interpretation of the aforesaid provision in situation like the present one, but the earliest available judgment on the subject is in the case of Begu & Others Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1925 Privy Council 130. In that case, it was argued that conviction of the appellant before the Judicial Committee under Section 201 IPC was recorded without a charge under that Section and this was a serious departure from the procedure laid in Code of Criminal Procedure. Initially, the conviction was for offence under Section 302 IPC, but the High Court set aside that conviction and substituted the same under Section 201 IPC. After discussing the provisions of Sections 236 and 237 of the Old Code, analogous to Sections 216 and 217 of the New Code, following observations were made by the Privy Council,- “A man may be convicted of an offence, although there has been no charge in respect of it, if the evidence is such as to establish a charge that might have been made”. 56. But here it should be noted that in that case before the Privy Council, alteration was not only in respect of the Section, but also of the substance of the accusation to lesser offence under Section 201 IPC, which had been made out by the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution, which was primarily for an offence of murder. The Privy Council sustained such alteration. 57. The Privy Council sustained such alteration. 57. Another judgment of the Privy Council which has rather more directly used the aforesaid provision was in the case of Thakur Shah Vs. Emperor, AIR 1943 Privy Council 192 where the provisions of 423 (1) (d) of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure were pressed into service by the High Court to alter the charge at the appellate stage. The appellant in that case was convicted for abetment of forgery under Section 466 combined with Section 109 IPC. The appellant was charged with abetting one Jagannath Singh and one Matuk Chandra Das in forging a certain decree sheet and compromise petition, which were court records and was found guilty by the Sessions Judge of Santhal Paragana. This conviction was upheld by the High Court at Patna. The appellant was accused of abetting both these persons in the offence of forging the two documents. Direct evidence of the commission of the substantive offence by Jagannath and Matuk was given by one Chandrama Singh, whose story was to some extent corroborated and was accepted by the Sessions Judge in spite of the view that the witness must be regarded as an accomplice. The High Court also thought him to be in the position of an accomplice, but contrary to the view of the trial Judge thought him to be insufficiently corroborated to justify a conviction for forgery against either of the two persons accused of that crime. Accordingly, the High Court acquitted Matuk and Jagannath of the crime of forgery. Nevertheless the High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant and one Jagannath for abetment. While Jagannath did not appeal against his conviction, appellant Thakur Singh filed appeal. It was held by the High Court that there was no one other than the appellant who could have had any motive for desiring the insertion of the extra piece of land amongst those given to the appellant under the decree. The question which, therefore, arose before the Privy Council was whether (a) the Court could alter the charge to abetment of forgery by a person or persons unknown or could convict the accused of such an offence without amending the charge and (b) whether in the circumstances, such a change should have been made. The question which, therefore, arose before the Privy Council was whether (a) the Court could alter the charge to abetment of forgery by a person or persons unknown or could convict the accused of such an offence without amending the charge and (b) whether in the circumstances, such a change should have been made. Privy Council in this case relied on its earlier judgment in Begu & Others (supra) and also additionally considered scope of Section 423 (1) (d) of Old Code, which is analogous to Section 386 (e) of the New Code and held as under:- “Under English law, it would have been more difficult and it may be impossible to justify such a variation of the charge. The history of the growth of criminal law in this country, its lines of development and the technicalities consequent thereon, all militate against such a course. Indian law is subject to no such limitation but is governed solely by the Indian Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, always of course, subject to the limitation that no course should be taken by reason of which the accused may be prejudiced either because he is not fully aware of the charge made or is not given a full opportunity of meeting it and putting forward any defence open to him on the charge finally preferred. As to the first question their Lordships are of opinion that the High Court had power to amend the charge so as to turn it into a charge of abetment of a person or persons unknown, or having justifiably found Jagannath guilty of abetment of forgery to accept a charge against the appellant of abetting that abetment under Explanation 4 of S. 108, Penal Code. Section 423, Criminal P.C., and in particular sub s. (1) (d) of that section gives wide powers of amendment in a criminal appeal and in their Lordships’ view the amendment sanctioned by the High Court falls within the terms of that section. The High Court in India approached the matter from a somewhat different angle. “Abetment,” they said, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, relates not to an offender but to an offence. Here the prosecution case is that the abetment was by conspiracy as defined in the clause ‘Secondly’ of section 107 of the Code. The High Court in India approached the matter from a somewhat different angle. “Abetment,” they said, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, relates not to an offender but to an offence. Here the prosecution case is that the abetment was by conspiracy as defined in the clause ‘Secondly’ of section 107 of the Code. They went on to hold that the essential part of the charge was that Thakur abetted the commission of the offence and that it was immaterial that the offence was not committed by the persons named in the charge provided at any rate that the appellant engaged in a conspiracy with one of the named persons for the purpose of effecting the forgery. In their opinion the substance of the charge is the abetment of the particular offence and the persons by whom it is committed is a secondary consideration. Their Lordships think this view right in so far as it decides that an amendment in the persons alleged to have committed the offence is an amendment within s. 423, Criminal P.C., and not the charging of a fresh offence. But the High Court goes on to hold their action justified under s. 237, Criminal P.C., and to support that view by citing the decision of the Board in (25) 12 A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 130. That case undoubtedly recognizes a wide power in a Court trying a criminal case to convict of a crime not the subject of the charge provided (a) that the crime of which the accused are found guilty is established by the evidence and (b) that having regard to the information available to the prosecuting authorities it was doubtful which of one or more offences would be established by the evidence at the trial. The charge in that case was against five persons for murder, and two of them were found guilty. The other three were found not guilty of murder, but without any further charge being made were convicted of causing the disappearance of evidence by removing the body of the murdered man. In India, in a case not dissimilar to this, it has been held that where a charge was preferred against a prisoner of (1) murder and (2) abetting a named person to commit murder, not only might a conviction be upheld of abetting a person unknown under s. 227, Criminal P.C., but that under Ss. In India, in a case not dissimilar to this, it has been held that where a charge was preferred against a prisoner of (1) murder and (2) abetting a named person to commit murder, not only might a conviction be upheld of abetting a person unknown under s. 227, Criminal P.C., but that under Ss. 236 and 237 of that Code, the accused might be convicted of the offence which he had actually committed, i.e., of abetting a person unknown. ‘In the present case,’ said Sargent C.J., ‘It was doubtful whether the evidence connecting the prisoner with the offence would establish the offence of murder abetment of murder, by the second prisoner or of murder committed by some one unknown. He might have been charged with committing all or any of these offences as indeed he was, of two of them and therefore even assuming there was no charge properly framed, the learned Judge might, under S. 237, have accepted the verdict returned by the jury and entered it on the record :’ (84) 8 Bom. 200, Queen-Empress v. Appa Subhana Mendre. Upon this latter point their Lordships do not think it necessary to come to a conclusion in the present case, since as already indicated, they think that an amendment of the charge could properly be made under S. 423, Criminal P.C., and they prefer to rest their decision upon the powers of amendment so given. There remains the question whether it was proper to make such an amendment having regard to the finding which the High Court reached. No doubt the power must be used with discretion. If there is any chance of injustice being done or of the accused having been prevented from giving or of his having failed to give evidence material to his defence by reason of the amendment of the charge, the Court should at least make him the offer which was made in 8 Bom. 200 i.e., offer a new trial on the charge as amended. But it is not always necessary to do so. See the decision already referred to in 52 I.A. 191. More particularly it is not necessary where it does not appear that any fresh case could be made or fresh evidence given on behalf of the person convicted given on behalf of the person convicted. But it is not always necessary to do so. See the decision already referred to in 52 I.A. 191. More particularly it is not necessary where it does not appear that any fresh case could be made or fresh evidence given on behalf of the person convicted given on behalf of the person convicted. In the present case their Lordships cannot see that any further evidence would have assisted the appellant or that without stultifying himself he could have set up any further defence.” 58. In Nani Gopal Biswas (supra), the appellant before the Supreme Court encroached upon an area on the road side land of the Hawrah Municipality to which provisions of Calcutta Municipality Act (for short 'the Act') applied. A notice was served on him to remove the encroachment. Upon his failure to do so within given time, the prosecution was launched against him before the Municipal Magistrate, who convicted the appellant for offence under Section 299 of the Act. On appeal, however, learned Sessions Judge acquitted him on the ground that prosecution has been launched beyond three months, the prescribed period of limitation under Section 534 of the Act. The Municipality moved the High Court of Calcutta in its revisional jurisdiction. Division Bench of that Court set aside the order of acquittal and directed the appeal to be reheard, after giving the Municipality an opportunity of formally bringing on record certain official documents showing the date of institution of the complaint. Thereupon, the Additional Sessions judge confirmed the conviction and the sentence and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then again moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The High Court accepted the argument raised on behalf of the appellant that on the facts found, namely, that the offending structure was a compound wall and not something which was a part and parcel of the main building, the offence, if any, would come under Section 300 and not Section 299 read with Section 488 of the Act. The High Court, however, took the view that as the accused was fully aware of the nature of the accusation against him, it would not cause any prejudice to him if the conviction and the sentence were altered into those under Section 300 read with Section 488 of the Act. The High Court, however, took the view that as the accused was fully aware of the nature of the accusation against him, it would not cause any prejudice to him if the conviction and the sentence were altered into those under Section 300 read with Section 488 of the Act. Relying on the judgment of the Privy Council in Begu & Others (supra), the Supreme Court held that the alteration of the conviction from Section 299 to Section 300 read with Section 488 of the Act, was not alteration in the substance of the accusation, but only in the section more particularly applicable to the facts found. It was also argued that notice served on the appellant was under Section 299 of the Act and therefore, conviction under Section 300 of the Act was illegal. Repelling the argument, the Supreme Court in para 3, 4 and 5 of the report held as under:- “3. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx In the case in hand, it is manifest that the facts sought to be proved and found by the Courts below remained the same even after the alteration of the conviction from S. 299 to S. 300 read with S. 488 of the Act. There was, therefore, no illegality in the alteration of the conviction under one section to the other. 4. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx It is the substance and not the form of the notice that has to be regarded. The effective part of the notice quoted above, leaves no doubt in the mind of the parties concerned that the requisition is to remove the encroachment caused by the compound wall. As it has not been contended that the appellant had not received the notice, and it is common ground that the appellant had not carried out the terms of the notice, there cannot be the least doubt that the appellant has incurred the penalty under S. 488 (1) (c), read with S. 300. It must, therefore, be held that notwithstanding the label given to the notice, the requisition had been lawfully made in the sense that the appellant had made the encroachment complained of, and that the Municipality was entitled to call upon him to remove the encroachment. The appellant was bound to carry out the terms of the requisition, and as he admittedly failed therein, he had incurred the penalty of the law. 5. The appellant was bound to carry out the terms of the requisition, and as he admittedly failed therein, he had incurred the penalty of the law. 5. It was next sought to be contended that there was substantial prejudice to the appellant inasmuch as if the conviction were under S. 299 and not S. 300 read with S. 488, he may have been entitled to claim compensation. There are several answers to this contention. In the first instance, he himself invited the High Court to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the lower Courts. If the High Court has set right the technical defect, as it was bound to do when the matter had been brought to its notice, the appellant has no just grievance, keeping in view the fact that the amount of fine has been reduced as a result of the alteration in the section. Secondly, if he has any rights to clam compensation in a civil Court, the judgment and order of the criminal Court is wholly irrelevant; and thirdly, the prejudice must have reference to any irregularity in the trial of the case. It has not been shown that the appellant had, in any way, been prejudiced in the trial of the case as a result of the alteration in the section, that is to say, that he was deprived of some opportunity to make a proper defence to the prosecution if the right section had been named in the notice or in the charge, if any. Nor has he been able to show that he was misled as a result of any such technical error.” 59. The Supreme Court in a judgment of later origin in R. Janakiraman (supra) had the opportunity to directly deal with the provisions of Section 386 (b) (ii). The appellant in that case was convicted and sentenced under Section 5 (1) (e) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by the Special Judge. In appeal against the said conviction, High Court neither modified the finding of guilt under Section 5 (1) (e), nor the sentence under Section 5 (2). The appellant in that case was convicted and sentenced under Section 5 (1) (e) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by the Special Judge. In appeal against the said conviction, High Court neither modified the finding of guilt under Section 5 (1) (e), nor the sentence under Section 5 (2). All that it did while affirming the finding of guilt recorded by the Special Judge in regard to the disproportionate wealth, was to recalculate the exact amount of disproportionate wealth on the basis of the evidence, which is permissible under Section 386 (b) (ii), which provides that the appellate court may, in an appeal from a conviction, alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, no prejudice shall be caused to the accused. The Supreme Court observed as under:- "33. The facts of this case are completely different. The Special Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant under section 5 (1) (e) read with section 5 (2) of the Act. In an appeal by the accused against the said conviction and sentence, the High Court neither modified the finding of guilt under Section 5 (1) (e) nor the sentence under Section 5 (2). All that it has done is while affirming the finding of guilt recorded by the Special Judge in regard to the disproportionate wealth, to recalculate the exact amount of disproportionate wealth with reference to the evidence, which is permissible under section 386 (b) (ii) which provides that the appellate court may, in an appeal from a conviction, alter the finding, maintaining the sentence. If an appellate court may alter the finding of guilt of the accused from one section to another, while maintaining the sentence, we see no reason why the extent of the offence should not be changed in an appeal against conviction. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in exercising the power of appeal under section 386 CrPC." (Emphasis Ours) 60. Section 221 Cr.P.C. deals with a situation where it is doubtful what offence has been committed. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court did not exceed its jurisdiction in exercising the power of appeal under section 386 CrPC." (Emphasis Ours) 60. Section 221 Cr.P.C. deals with a situation where it is doubtful what offence has been committed. Section 221 (1) Cr.P.C. provides that if a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charge may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. Section 221 (2) Cr.P.C. further provides that if in such a case the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it. Thus, it is clear from the analysis of Section 221 Cr.P.C. that in a case if the accused is charged with one offence and it appears that he committed different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), of Section 221 Cr.P.C. he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it. 61. In State of A.P. Vs. Thadi Narayana, AIR 1962 SC 240 , the Supreme Court, while interpreting phraseology “alter the finding”, considered provisions of Section 423 (1) (b) of the Old Code which corresponds to Section 386 (b) of the New Code. In that case, the accused was tried for offences under Sections 302 and 392 IPC. The Sessions Judge acquitted the accused under Sections 302 and 392 IPC, but convicted her under Section 411 IPC. The accused appealed to the High Court against the conviction under Section 411 IPC. The State did not appeal against the acquittal in respect of the charges under Sections 302 and 392 IPC. The High Court, while setting aside the order of conviction under Section 411 IPC, also set aside the order of acquittal under Sections 302 and 392 IPC and ordered a retrial on the original charges. The State did not appeal against the acquittal in respect of the charges under Sections 302 and 392 IPC. The High Court, while setting aside the order of conviction under Section 411 IPC, also set aside the order of acquittal under Sections 302 and 392 IPC and ordered a retrial on the original charges. The Supreme Court held that while exercising power under Section 423 (1) (b) of the Old Code (corresponding to Section 386 (b) of the New Code) in an appeal against conviction, the High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused by the Sessions Judge. It was pointed out that as Section 423 (1) (b) Cr.P.C. was confined to appeals against the orders of conviction and sentence and matters incidental thereto; and if the order of acquittal is not challenged in an appeal and if the High Court does not take action in exercise of its powers of revision, the order of acquittal becomes final and cannot be challenged indirectly in an appeal by the accused against the order of conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court in para 9 of the report observed as under:- "9. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx In a case where several offences are charged against an accused person the trial is no doubt one; but where the accused person is acquitted of some offences and convicted of others the character of the appellate proceedings and their scope and extent is necessarily determined by the nature of the appeal preferred before the Appellate Court. If an appeal is preferred against an order of acquittal by the State and no appeal is filed by the convicted person against his conviction it is only the order of acquittal which falls to be considered by the Appellate Court and not the order of conviction. Similarly, if an order of conviction is challenged by the convicted person but the order of acquittal is not challenged by the State, then it is only the order of conviction that falls to be considered by the Appellate Court and not the order of acquittal. Therefore the assumption that the whole case is before the High Court when it entertains an appeal against conviction is not well-founded and as such it cannot be pressed into service in construing the expression 'alter the finding'.” 62. Therefore the assumption that the whole case is before the High Court when it entertains an appeal against conviction is not well-founded and as such it cannot be pressed into service in construing the expression 'alter the finding'.” 62. In those facts, the question that arose before the Supreme Court in Thadi Narayana (supra) was as to the meaning to the expression “alter the finding” used in Section 423 (1) (b) (2) [corresponding to Section 386 (b) (ii) of the New Code] in the context of Sections 236, 237 and 238 of the Old Code (which are respectively in pari materia with Sections 221 (1), 221 (2) and 222 of the New Code). The Supreme Court in para 13 of the report observed as under: “13. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx The answer to this question is furnished by the provisions of Sections 236, 237 and 238. Section 236 deals with cases where it is doubtful what offence has been committed, Section 237 with cases where a person may be charged with one offence and yet he can be convicted of another, and Section 238 with cases where the offence proved includes the offence charged and another offence not so charged. Where a person is charged with a major offence, such as for instance under Section 407 of the Indian Penal Code, he may be convicted either of that offence or of a minor offence, as for instance under Section 406. That is the result of Section 238 of the Code. Now, if a trial court charges, and convicts an accused person of, an offence under Section 407 and sentences him the Appellate Court may alter the finding of guilt of the accused from Section 407 to Section 406 and in that case it may retain the same sentence or reduce it. It is, however, clear that in exercising the power conferred by Section 423 (1) (b) (2) the sentence imposed on an accused person cannot be enhanced, and that may mean that the conviction of a minor offence may not be altered into that of a major offence. In our opinion, therefore, the power conferred by Section 423 (1) (b) (1) is intended to be exercised in cases falling under Sections 236 to 238 of the Code. In our opinion, therefore, the power conferred by Section 423 (1) (b) (1) is intended to be exercised in cases falling under Sections 236 to 238 of the Code. We would accordingly hold that the power conferred by the expression 'alter the finding' does not include the power to alter or modify the finding of acquittal. The finding specified in the context means the finding as to conviction, and the power to alter the finding can be exercised in cases like those which we have just indicated.” 63. Evidently, in the above referred to judgment of Thadi Narayana (supra), the Supreme Court while interpreting Section 238 of the Old Code observed that the appellate court may alter the finding of guilt of the accused, however, in exercising the power conferred by Section 423 (1) (b), the sentence imposed on an accused person cannot be enhanced, and that may mean that the conviction of a minor offence may not be altered into that of a major offence. But in later part of the judgment, incidental observation of the Supreme Court that power conferred by Section 423 (1) (b) (l) is intended to be exercised in cases falling under Sections 236 to 238 of the Old Code and “that may mean that the conviction of a minor offence cannot be altered into that of a major offence”, should be understood in the context of the facts of that case. Ratio of the aforesaid judgment, as noticed from the facts of the case is that expression 'alter the finding' does not include the power to alter or modify the finding of acquittal, if such acquittal is not challenged by the State. And this essentially flows from interpretation of Section 238 of the Old Act. 64. It is trite that a precedent is an authority for what it actually decide and not what can be logically deduced therefrom. It is also well-settled that ratio of a judgment must be understood having regard to fact situation obtaining therein. In order therefore to cull out the ratio of a judgment, the law laid down therein has to be ascertained by analysing the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argument of both the sides. What is held in a given case should be read with reference to fact situation of that case in the context of particular statutory provision interpreted by the court. What is held in a given case should be read with reference to fact situation of that case in the context of particular statutory provision interpreted by the court. It has therefore been often reiterated as a principle on the law of precedents that a decision cannot be relied in support of a proposition which it did not decide and that the courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation of the case before it fits in the fact situation of the decision on which reliance has been placed. A little variance and difference between facts as also in the position of law and the relevant rules may make a whole deal of difference in the precedential value of the judgment cited before the court. 65. The Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 213 observed that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. Their Lordships relying on Quinn Vs. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 (HL) held that the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. In Quinn (supra), it was observed thus:- “… there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” (emphasis supplied) 66. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 dealt with the concept of ratio decidendi and while following the observations made by Sir Frederick Pollock, proceeded to state as follows:- “20....... The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Krishena Kumar Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 207 dealt with the concept of ratio decidendi and while following the observations made by Sir Frederick Pollock, proceeded to state as follows:- “20....... The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre- existing rule of law, either statutory or Judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury (4th edn., Vol. 26, para 573):- “The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear ...... it is not part of a tribunal’s duty to spell out with difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.” [Emphasis supplied] 67. Code of Criminal Procedure is a comprehensive and time tested enactment which provides for every foreseeable situation that may arise before the courts during trial. The words “dowry murder”, especially “murder” repeatedly used in the article of charges to describe the offence, would as per Section 214 Cr.P.C. have the meaning as the law making such offence punishable prescribe. Code of Criminal Procedure is a comprehensive and time tested enactment which provides for every foreseeable situation that may arise before the courts during trial. The words “dowry murder”, especially “murder” repeatedly used in the article of charges to describe the offence, would as per Section 214 Cr.P.C. have the meaning as the law making such offence punishable prescribe. If at all there was any error or omission in not specifically mentioning Section 302 IPC in the charge, such error or omission as per Section 215 Cr.P.C. would not be regarded as material unless the accused- appellant, “was misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned failure of justice”. Moreover even as per Section 464 (1) Cr.P.C., “no finding sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby”. What in the present case we are concerned is whether the accused, while he was charged for offence under Section 304-B IPC, could simultaneously be charged for offence under Section 302 IPC. This is where Section 221 Cr.P.C. is attracted, which empowers the criminal court to convict an accused for an offence with which he is not charged, although on facts proved in evidence, he could have been charged for such an offence. Apart from providing aforementioned safeguards during the course of trial, the Parliament has especially engrafted Section 386 in Code of Criminal Procedure which contain complete guidelines to be kept in view by the appellate court while considering the appeals fled against the judgment/order of conviction/sentence or acquittal. Section 386 (b) (ii) when read with Section 386 (e) Cr.P.C. clearly provides that this Court while maintaining sentence can alter the finding, if it is deemed just and proper. Section 386 (b) (ii) when read with Section 386 (e) Cr.P.C. clearly provides that this Court while maintaining sentence can alter the finding, if it is deemed just and proper. But this course is subject to certain restrictions which are contained in two provisos to Section 386 Cr.P.C. namely; that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement and secondly, that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which is its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal. Section 304-B and Section 302 IPC both contain life imprisonment as the common sentence, but while in the former, it is maximum sentence, in the latter, it is minimum sentence. Since this Court in the facts of the case, does not propose to enhance the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the accused-appellant to death penalty, therefore, neither of the provisos to Section 386 Cr.P.C. would be attracted if the finding recorded by the trial court and consequential conviction of the accused-appellant is altered from Section 304-B IPC to Section 302 IPC by invoking provisions of Sections 214, 215, 221 (2), 386 (b) (ii) read with Sections 386 (e) and 464 (1) Cr.P.C. 68. The evidence in the present case firmly proves each of the abovereferred to ten circumstances individually against the accused-appellant, as discussed in detail above and these circumstances, when joined together, form a chain of circumstances so complete as to unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused- appellant that he alone and none else, could have committed murder of Mithlesh. Chain of circumstances against the accused-appellant cannot be said to have any missing links and rule out every single hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence. In these circumstances, while we are not inclined to interfere with the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to accused-appellant, we are persuaded to alter his conviction from under Section 304-B IPC to one under Section 302 IPC. 69. Consequently, conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court to the appellant for offences under Sections 498-A and 201/511 IPC with fine is maintained. 69. Consequently, conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court to the appellant for offences under Sections 498-A and 201/511 IPC with fine is maintained. However, conviction of the appellant recorded under Section 304-B IPC is altered to one under Section 302 IPC, but sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court is maintained. Judgment and order dated 16.07.2009 passed by the trial court thus stands modified accordingly. 70. While concluding this judgment, we record our sense of appreciation for the learned Advocates, who rendered their valuable assistance in deciding peculiar and significant question of law involved in the present case. At the same time, considering negligent and reckless manner in which trial of a serious offence like murder was conducted in the present case, we deem it appropriate to direct the Registrar General of this Court to make entry thereabout in the service record of the Judicial Officers, for such action as may be deemed appropriate, who framed the charge, conducted the trial and passed the impugned judgment. 71. The present criminal appeal is disposed off with the aforesaid observations and directions.