JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Present criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the judgment rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2008 dated 25.4.2009 in “Sanjay Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh”, affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 12.3.2008, passed by Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Manali, District Kullu, HP, in Criminal Case No. 66-1/2001/21-II of 2002/395-I of 2007, whereby the petitioner-accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month under Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. Briefly stated facts necessary for adjudication of the case are that on 2.4.2001, complainant namely Ahaliya Devi along with her daughter Seema and her children was travelling in auto rikshaw bearing No. HP-01-0629 from Bashisht to Manali temple. When they reached at Chadyari turn at about 4.40 pm, the accused-driver lost his control over the vehicle due to fast speed and struck the vehicle against Lata Devi, who was walking on the road along with two other ladies and thereafter, the vehicle along with driver and all the occupants fell about 40 fts down from the road, as a result whereof, occupants sustained injuries. The injured persons were transported to the Lady Willington Hospital, Manali for treatment. Police received a telephonic message from the aforesaid Hospital at about 5.10 pm and on the basis of same, rapat No.20 Ex.PW10/A was entered in the Police Station. Subsequently, ASI Parma Nand and Constable Pawan Kumar went to the Hospital for verification. ASI parma Nand recorded the statement of the complainant Ahaliya Devi Ex.PW5/A and sent it to the Police Station for registration of the case. Subsequently, ASI Parma Nand and Constable Pawan Kumar went to the Hospital for verification. ASI parma Nand recorded the statement of the complainant Ahaliya Devi Ex.PW5/A and sent it to the Police Station for registration of the case. On the basis of FIR Ext.PW5/A was registered against the driver i.e. Ext.PA. Police visited the spot of occurrence and prepared the site plan Ext.PW10/C and photographs of the spot (Ext.P1 to Ex.P4) and of the vehicle were taken and negatives of which are Ex.P5 to Ex.P8. Police impounded the vehicle involved in the accident along with its documents vide memo Ext.PW4/A. Ex.PW8/A is the mechanical report of mechanical examination of the vehicle involved in the accident. Application Ex.PW10/B was moved before the Medical Officer, Mission Hospital, Manali for the medical examination of the injured, who prepared the MLCs of accused and other injured persons vide Ext.PW7/A to Ext.PW7/F. It is also revealed from the record that petitioner-accused was driving at that relevant time without driving licence. 3. After completion of the investigation, police filed challan in the competent court of law and charged the accused for committing offences punishable under Section 279,337, 338, 304-A IPC and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned trial Court after satisfying that prima facie case exists against the petitioner- accused, charged him for commission of offences, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. During the course of trial, prosecution with a view to prove its case examined as many as ten witnesses. The learned trial court also recorded the statement of accused under Section 313 CrPC, wherein accused denied the case of the prosecution. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record vide judgment dated 12.3.2008 convicted and sentenced the accused for committing the offences as per detail given above. 5. Feeling aggrieved with the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court, accused filed appeal under Section 374(3)(a) CrPC before the learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, HP, which was dismissed and judgment of learned trial court was upheld. Hence, the present criminal revision petition by the petitioner-accused. 6. Mr. 5. Feeling aggrieved with the judgment of conviction passed by learned trial Court, accused filed appeal under Section 374(3)(a) CrPC before the learned Sessions Judge, Kullu, HP, which was dismissed and judgment of learned trial court was upheld. Hence, the present criminal revision petition by the petitioner-accused. 6. Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, Advocate, representing the petitioner-accused, vehemently argued that the impugned judgment of the courts below are contrary to law and fact and as such, same deserve to be quashed and set-aside as they are not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence available on record, rather, evidence on record has not been appreciated in its right perspective and judgments are based upon the conjectures and surmises. He prayed that in view of the grounds taken by him in the petition, impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set-aside and accused deserves to be acquitted of the charges framed against him. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, representing respondent-State supported the judgments passed by the courts below and strenuously argued that no interference, whatsoever, of this Court is warranted in the present facts and circumstances of the case. Judgments of the courts below are based upon the correct appreciation of evidence available on record; he contended that there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that at the time of accident, offending vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently and, as such, no lenient view can be taken by this court, especially, when one of the occupant Yogesh lost his life. During his arguments, he made this Court to peruse the statements given by the prosecution witnesses i.e. occupants of offending vehicle, wherein all of them unequivocally stated that accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver-accused. Mr. Thakur also submitted before this Court that this Court has very limited powers under Section 397 Cr.PC to re-appreciate the evidence on record, especially, when both the courts below have returned concurrent finding that too after appreciating the evidence available on record very meticulously and prayed that this petition may be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record. 9. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record. 9. True, it is that this Court has very limited powers under Section 397 Cr.PC while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction but in the instant case, where petitioner-accused has been convicted and sentenced, it would be apt and in the interest of justice to critically examine the statements of the prosecution witnesses solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by learned courts below are not perverse and same are based on correct appreciation of the evidence on record. 10. As far as scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality or sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- 8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.” 11. Perusal of the material available on record leaves no doubt that vehicle in question met with an accident on 2.4.2001, while it was being plied between Bashisht to Manali Temple. It also remains undisputed that at that relevant time, vehicle was being driven by the petitioner-accused. Now question, which remains to be ascertained by this Court is that whether at that relevant time vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently by the driver/accused or not? Apart from this, this Court on the basis of material evidence available on record, needs to find out that whether accident actually caused/occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver or not. 12. In the present case, prosecution with a view to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt examined as many as fifteen prosecution witnesses namely PW1 Smt. Lata, PW2 Smt. Tulsi, PW3 Prem Lal, PW-4 Chaman Lal, PW-5 Smt. Ahilya Devi, PW-6 Mehar Chand, PW-7 Oommen George, PW-8 Budhi Singh, PW-9 Seema Devi and PW-10 ASI Parma Nand. 13. Learned Court below also recorded statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.PC, wherein, he admitted that three wheeler involved in the accident was being driven by him but he stated that he is innocent and witnesses have falsely deposed against him because accident occurred due to skidding of the vehicle in question, however, record suggests that he did not lead any evidence in his defence. 14. The complainant, who appeared in witness box as PW- 5 stated that on 2.4.2001, she along with her daughter namely Manisha, Seema and her five months old son was travelling in offending vehicle from Bashisht to Manali and at about 4:40 pm when they reached Chadhyari, it struck against a lady, as a result of which, the vehicle fell down 40 feet down from the road causing injuries to the occupants. She stated that she sustained injuries on her head, hand and stomach. It has also come in her statement that son of Seema sustained injuries on his head and had become unconscious. She categorically stated in her examination-in-chief that vehicle at that time was being driven by the accused in high speed, and accident occurred due to his fault. He also stated that she had reported the matter to police vide statement Ext.PW5/A, which was recorded by the police in the Hospital in Manali. She categorically stated in her examination-in-chief that vehicle at that time was being driven by the accused in high speed, and accident occurred due to his fault. He also stated that she had reported the matter to police vide statement Ext.PW5/A, which was recorded by the police in the Hospital in Manali. Careful perusal of cross-examination conducted by the defence of PW5 suggests that PW-5 stuck to her stand, which she actually took in her examination-in-chief. She denied all the suggestions of the defence and categorically reiterated that vehicle was being driven by the accused in an excessive speed rashly and negligently. Defence has not been able to extract anything contrary to what the complainant stated in examination-in-chief while cross-examining her. Moreover, no suggestion worth the name was put to PW1 which could be suggestive of the fact that she had motive to depose falsely against the complainant. Rather, no suggestion with regard to prior animosity/enmity of this witness with the accused was put to her. Similarly, another occupant of offending vehicle, Smt. Sema Devi (PW9) stated that on 2.4.2001 when she was travelling in the vehicle from Bashisht to manali with her mother Ahilya Devi (PW5), sister Manisha and her son Yogesh, vehicle struck with a lady and thereafter fell down from the road causing injuries to all the occupants. It has also come in her statement that offending vehicle was being driven by the accused in fast speed rashly/negligently and when they reached Chadhyari turn, driver lost his control after hitting lady and as a result of which, vehicle fell down in 40 feet deep gorge. She also supported the story of the prosecution with regard to taking of all the injured persons to Mission Hospital Manali for treatment. She also stated that her son namely Yogesh sustained head injuries and was referred to PGI Chandigarh for treatment where he breathed his last on 14th May, 2001. She categorically stated in examination-in-chief that since vehicle was driven in high speed, accused is responsible for commission of offence. In her cross-examination, she reiterated that accident took place due to negligence of accused, who failed to negotiate the curve and, as such, vehicle after hitting lady fell down from the road. This Court while perusing the statements of PWs had an occasion to peruse the cross-examination conducted by the defence of the witnesses. In her cross-examination, she reiterated that accident took place due to negligence of accused, who failed to negotiate the curve and, as such, vehicle after hitting lady fell down from the road. This Court while perusing the statements of PWs had an occasion to peruse the cross-examination conducted by the defence of the witnesses. Minute analyses of the cross-examination conducted of these witnesses clearly suggests that defence has not been able to extract anything contrary to which this PW stated in examination-in-chief. Similarly, as in the case of PW5, no suggestion with regard to any motive to falsely depose against the accused and any prior animosity or enmity with the accused was put to this prosecution witness in her cross-examination. 15. After critically analyzing the statements made by PW5 and PW9, who were the occupants of the vehicle at that relevant time, it clearly emerges that vehicle was being driven by the accused in high speed and that too negligently. Both of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses, who can be termed as eye witnesses to the accident have unequivocally deposed that three wheeler at the time of accident was being driven by the accused rashly in high speed and accident actually occurred due to his fault. Both the witnesses have stated that when vehicle reached Chadhyari turn, it struck against one lady and thereafter fell down from the road causing injuries to the occupants. Both the prosecution witnesses have stated that the accused while negotiating the curve at Chadhyari, lost the control over the vehicle and after hitting the lady, fell 40 ft. down in the gorge. Both the material witnesses, traveling in the vehicle in question at the time of the accident, have been very very consistent, specific and candid in narrating the event actually happened just before the accident, as referred above. Defence has not been able to shatter the testimonies of these witnesses, who have been very very consistent and truthful while deposing before the learned trial Court. Defence has not been able to shatter the testimonies of these witnesses, who have been very very consistent and truthful while deposing before the learned trial Court. Though, accused while making statement under Section 313 Cr.PC stated that he is innocent and witnesses have falsely deposed against him to implicate in a false case but interestingly, no suggestion qua the motive to depose against the accused or any prior enmity with the accused was put to him and as such, the version put forth by the accused in statement made under Section 313 Cr.PC cannot be relied upon, rather, same deserve to be rejected outrightly by this Court. 16. In the present case, PW1 Lata and PW2 Tulsi mother in law of PW1 were moving on foot at that time and as per the depositions made by PW5 and 9, vehicle firstly struck against PW1 and thereafter fell 40 ft. down in a gorge. 17. PW1 deposed before the learned trial court that she along with her mother in law PW2 Tulsi and another women Prem Lata was coming back from Bashisht to Manali and when they reached at Chadhyari curve, vehicle/three wheeler came from the side of the Bashisht and hit her from her back and the vehicle went down from the road. She stated that she does not know the speed of the vehicle as she was hit from her back. However, in her cross-examination, she stated that accused driver was not at fault and the vehicle had skidded of the road. 18. PW2 Tulsi also reiterated the version put forth by PW1. She stated that she along with PW1 Lata and another woman, after taking bath at Bashisht, were coming back to Manali by walking, and when they reached Chadhyari curve, a three wheeler came and struck against her daughter in law PW1, as a result of which, her daughter in law fell down and vehicle in question also fell down from the road. Though aforesaid, PW1 and PW2 have not supported the case of the prosecution that vehicle was being driven by the accused rashly and negligently and in high speed at the time of accident but careful perusal of these PWs corroborates the statement given by PWs 5 and 9 with regard to the timing and place of the accident because these two witnesses have supported the version put forth by PW5 and another occupant of the offending vehicle (PW9) where they stated that at Chadhyari turn the vehicle lost the control and after hitting one lady, fell down in the 40 ft. deep gorge. 19. Since it has specifically come in the statement of PW1 that she was hit by vehicle from her back, she could not be expected to state anything qua the speed of the vehicle. As per the statements of PW1 and PW2, when they were coming back from Bashisht after taking bath, at Chadhyari, vehicle came from the side of Bashisht and hit against PW1. PW10 specifically stated that three wheeler came from Bashisht side and struck her, meaning thereby, PW1 was not in a position to see the offending vehicle at the time of accident and, as such, non-stating /mentioning of speed by her of the vehicle in question at the time of accident is immaterial and accused cannot be allowed to take any advantage of the same. Admittedly, PWs1 and 2 in cross-examination stated that driver was not at fault at the time of accident since vehicle had skidded of the road but aforesaid admission made by PW1 cannot be given much weightage for two reasons: firstly PW5 and 9 have categorically stated that at the time of accident vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently in high speed by the accused and being occupants/eye witnesses, version put forth by them cannot be brushed easily in view of the statement given by PWs1 and 2, secondly, PW1 himself admitted that vehicle struck against her from her back and she had not seen/feigned ignorance with regard to the speed of three wheeler. Since PW1 was hit by the offending vehicle from her back, she along with PW2 was definitely coming in the downwards direction at the time of accident and as per the statements of PW1, where she herself stated that she was struck from her back by the vehicle, no statement with regard to speed of the vehicle, if any, made by PWs1 and 2, can be taken into consideration solely for the reason that they had no occasion to see vehicle coming from back. As far as skidding of vehicle from the road is concerned, admission made by PW1 cannot be relied upon because admittedly, as emerges from the statements made by all the prosecution witnesses, PW1, PW2 had no idea of any vehicle coming from her back side. Had PW1 seen the vehicle coming from her back, she would have definitely tried to save herself by taking side. Moreover, none of the other prosecution witnesses have stated that the road on the given date was wet and vehicle skidded of the road. Rather, careful perusal of the cross-examination conducted on PWs 5 and 9 suggests that suggestion put to these prosecution witnesses with regard to skidding as well as road being wet has been specifically denied by them. 20. Statement of PW4 is formal in nature and they are not required to be dealt with by this Court for determining the controversy at hand. Otherwise also PW3 as per record, took the injured to the Hospital after accident whereas PW4 and PW6 namely Chaman Lal and Mehar Chand are the witnesses to the seizure memo Ext.PW4/A vide which vehicle was taken into possession by the police. 21. PW7. Dr. Oommen George, Medical Officer, Mision Hospital, Manlai medically examined injured persons PW1 Lata Devi, Complainant Ahilya Devi, Seema Devi, Manisha, Yogesh (deceased) and accused driver Sanjay Rana and issued MLC Ext.PW7/A to Ext.PW7/F. It came in her statement that injury caused to master Yogesh were grievous injuries. She also stated that injury No. 3 sustained by injured Seema Devi could also be grievous. She also stated that except master Yogesh, who was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, all other occupants sustained simple injuries. He has stated that on 2.4.2001, he examined the injured and the injuries sustained by Yogesh (deceased) were grievous whereas other injured sustained simple injuries. 22. She also stated that except master Yogesh, who was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, all other occupants sustained simple injuries. He has stated that on 2.4.2001, he examined the injured and the injuries sustained by Yogesh (deceased) were grievous whereas other injured sustained simple injuries. 22. At this stage, it may be pointed out that deceased Yogesh at the time of accident was only five months’ old and sustained head injury. Since he had sustained head injury, he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh for treatment and unfortunately died on 14.5.2001. Accordingly, medical evidence collected on record clearly depicts that PW1 namely Lata sustained simple injuries after falling on the road. 23. PW8 Budhi Singh, examined the vehicle involved in the accident and stated that after accident, he investigated the vehicle mechanically. 24. PW1, PW5 and PW9 suffered simple injuries on account of accident whereas another occupant master Yogesh succumbed to the injury. If the statement given by PW7 is read in conjunction with the statement given by other prosecution witnesses, especially, PW 5 and 9, it can be safely inferred that vehicle in question was being driven by the accused at the time of the accident rashly and negligently, as a result of which, one person died. 25. PW8 mechanically examined the vehicle. He in his statement stated that on 3.4.2001, he examined the vehicle and issued mechanical report Ext.PW8/A. He stated that vehicle in question was found in order at the time of examination but in his cross-examination, he categorically admitted that at the time of mechanical examination, he found the vehicle in neutral gear. He also admitted that road was wet when he examined the vehicle and accident was result of skidding of vehicle from the road. From the careful perusal of the statement made by PW8, who mechanically examined the vehicle, very important/crucial fact emerge, which certainly indicates towards the rash and negligent conduct of the accused. Aforesaid witnesses in cross-examination categorically stated that at the time of mechanical examination, vehicle was found in neutral gear. Careful perusal of spot map as well as statements rendered by all prosecution witnesses suggest that at the time of accident vehicle was going down the hill. Now after taking into consideration the admission made by the mechanical examiner PW8 in cross-examination, one thing clearly emerges that at the time of accident vehicle was being driven down the hill. Careful perusal of spot map as well as statements rendered by all prosecution witnesses suggest that at the time of accident vehicle was going down the hill. Now after taking into consideration the admission made by the mechanical examiner PW8 in cross-examination, one thing clearly emerges that at the time of accident vehicle was being driven down the hill. At this stage, it can be presumed that accused driver solely with a view to save fuel put the vehicle in neutral gear as the vehicle was moving downwards and later on, it picked up speed in neutral gear and accused driver lost his control. 26. The aforesaid admission on the part of PW8, of vehicle being in neutral gear, certainly points towards the rash and negligent conduct of the accused. Learned counsel for the accused petitioner however stated that aforesaid statement of vehicle being in neutral gear at the time of mechanical examination could not be given much weightage because there is nothing apart from the statement of PW8 on record to suggest that vehicle at that relevant time was being driven in neutral gear by the accused driver. But in view of the fact, as has emerged from the records of the case, this Court after seeing the spot map and mechanical report Ext.PW8/A has reasons to presume that accused put the vehicle in neutral gear to save the fuel while driving down the hill and lost control. Another statement made by PW8 in cross examination that road was wet and accident occurred due to sudden skidding of the vehicle from the road needs to be rejected outrighly because as per his version, he mechanically tested the vehicle on 3rd April, 2001 whereas accident occurred on 2.4.2001. Since admittedly, PW8 was not present at the time of accident, which occurred on 2nd April, 2001, any statement made by him with regard to road being wet and skidding of vehicle on 2.4.2001 cannot be relied upon. Rather mechanical report i.e. Ext. PW8/A itself speaks volumes with regard to the negligent conduct of the accused that he admittedly was driving down the hill that too in neutral gear. Rather mechanical report i.e. Ext. PW8/A itself speaks volumes with regard to the negligent conduct of the accused that he admittedly was driving down the hill that too in neutral gear. Another factor which points towards the negligent driving being done by accused can be gauzed from the fact that as per the depositions made by all the PWs, accused first hit against the lady and thereafter, lost control of the vehicle and fell down the vehicle in gorge. 27. PW10 ASI Parma Nand stated that he had visited the Mission Hospital and recorded the statements of the complainant under Section 151 Cr.PC Ext.PW5/A and on the basis of which he lodged FIR. He also admitted of having obtained MLC Ext.PW7/A to Ext.PW7/F. It has also come in his statement that injured Yogesh was referred to PGI where he died later. He also proved spot plan Ext.PW10/C. 28. Careful perusal of site plan suggests that the width of road where accident actually occurred was 25 feet wide and there was 30 feet long retaining wall at that place. It also emerges from perusal of Ext.PW10/C that there was 6 inch wall on the side of the road and the vehicle after breaking that wall fell down in 40 ft. gorge. As emerges from the perusal of the spot map, road was sufficiently wide and but for high speed, there could not be any other reason for vehicle to go off the road. After perusing the site plan and mechanical report, this Court has no reason to disbelieve the version put forth by PW5 and PW9 being the occupants of the vehicle that vehicle in question was being driven by the accused petitioner rashly and negligently at the time of the accident. Factum with regard to speed as well as rash and negligent driving by the accused at the relevant time can be ascertained from the fact that at the relevant place, road was 25 ft. wide and there was six inch wall on the side of the road. It is pertinent to notice at this stage that as per the statement of accused as well as PWs1 and 2, vehicle got skidded of the road and as a result of which it struck against the PW1 but record as well as statements made available on record suggests that vehicle after striking against PW1, lost control and went off the road. Had the vehicle was being driven in normal speed, definitely, it would have stopped after hitting PW1. But in the present case, vehicle went off the road that too after crossing six inch wall on the side of the road. 29. This court also carefully perused the statement given by Investigating Officer PW10, careful perusal of which clearly suggests that he has been very very consistent, specific and candid in giving the narration of the events occurred before and after the accident. There is nothing in cross-examination of PW-10 from where, it could be inferred that he had any reason/motive to falsely implicate the accused. Rather careful perusal of photographs No. 1 to 4 and mechanical report Ext.PW8/A clearly indicates that vehicle got badly damaged in the incident. 30. Conjoint reading of all the prosecution witnesses statements made by all the prosecution witnesses as well as documentary evidence led on record has compelled this Court to draw the conclusion that vehicle at the time of accident was being driven by the accused rashly and negligently that too in high speed and as such, accused has miserably failed to prove the accident occurred due to skidding of the vehicle. Rather, perusal of site plan, photographs and, especially, mechanical report that is Ext.PW8/A clearly points towards the negligent conduct of the accused. Hence, this court sees no reason whatsoever to differ with the decisions rendered by both the courts below that vehicle was being driven on high speed and accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused. 31. During the arguments having been made by the counsel for the petitioner, it was contended that none of the prosecution witnesses have categorically stated that vehicle was being driven on high speed at that relevant time, and, as such, both the courts below have fallen in an error while concluding that vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently in high speed. He also invited attention of this Court to the statements given by PW1 and PW2 and PW8 to demonstrate that accident actually occurred when the road was wet and vehicle skidded of the road and there was no fault, if any, of the accused. He also tried to point out that none of the prosecution witnesses has specifically stated that vehicle in question was being driven at the relevant time on high speed. 32. He also tried to point out that none of the prosecution witnesses has specifically stated that vehicle in question was being driven at the relevant time on high speed. 32. At this stage learned counsel also placed reliance upon judgment of this Court reported in Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh 1990 (2) ACJ 598, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:- 14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals. Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway. Therefore, the speed on this account as well cannot be considered to be high. 15. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, there are no skid marks which eliminate the evidence of high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking to the two points; viz, the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW7, Chander Kanta, PW8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than the parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. Minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record, discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that horn by him and started crossing the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the accident and the death of the child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of the driver. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished. 33. True it is that the Hon’ble High Court while passing aforesaid judgment has observed that “prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code”. Definitely, there cannot be any quarrel with regard to the aforesaid observations made by the Court but now question arises as to what can be the method/mode for measuring the exact speed of the offending vehicle at the time of accident. Undisputedly, in the present case, offending vehicle after collusion stopped and automatically speedometer springs back to “Zero” and as such, no help at all can be taken from speedometer to ascertain the exact speed of the vehicle. To my mind, the eye witnesses of the accident can be the best persons to depose whether offending vehicle was in high speed or not. Apart from above, aspect of high speed can be gauzed from the side/direction of the offending vehicle being driven on the wrong side and certainly an inference of its being driven rashly and negligently on high speed can be drawn by perusing spot map, photographs and mechanical reports which may point towards the force/impact, as supporting evidence. But obviously, in the absence of some specific mode to gauze the speed, only eye witnesses to the accident can be the best persons to depose the high speed/actual speed of the vehicle. 34. Mr. Goel, learned counsel also invited attention of this Court to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court reported in Thana Ram versus State of Haryana 1996 (2) CriLJ 2020, the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:- 8. From a bare perusal of the testimony of Avdesh Yadav (PW.2), it is evident that it is quite vague and indefinite as regards the investigation carried out by Sub Inspector Ram Chander on the spot of occurrence. According to him, he is an eye witness. From a bare perusal of the testimony of Avdesh Yadav (PW.2), it is evident that it is quite vague and indefinite as regards the investigation carried out by Sub Inspector Ram Chander on the spot of occurrence. According to him, he is an eye witness. He has nowhere stated if any site plan of the spot of the occurrence was prepared, whether any measurements of the spot of occurrence were taken, whether any other document was prepared on the spot in his presence, and whether any persons of the nearby place who might have been present at that time were questioned or examined by the Investigating Officer. According to this witness, the truck in question was coming from the front side and he was at a distance of about 20 yards behind the deceased. In these circumstances testimony of Avdesh Yadav (PW.2) could not be said to be safe to hold that the petitioner was driving the vehicle in question in a rash and negligent manner. It appears that both the Courts were impressed with the fact that an accident had taken place in which Kishore along with cycle were crushed under the right rear wheel of the truck and as such, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was driving his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. To base conviction of an accused for the offences under Sections 279/304-A of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is bound to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and there should be nexus between such driving and death of the deceased. Therefore, there should have been some material to corroborate the testimony of Avdesh Yadav (PW.2) to prove the rash and negligent driving on the part of the petitioner. 35. Reliance is also placed on Judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court in Abdul Subhan V. State, 2007 CriLJ 1089, the relevant para of which is being reproduced herein below:- “10. I now take up examination of the question of convicting a person merely on the allegation that he was driving a vehicle at a high-speed. In State of Karnataka v. Satish (supra) the Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation. The Court observed as under:- 3. I now take up examination of the question of convicting a person merely on the allegation that he was driving a vehicle at a high-speed. In State of Karnataka v. Satish (supra) the Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation. The Court observed as under:- 3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent guilty for offences under Section 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high-speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high-speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to hold the respondent guilty. 4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high-speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high-speed". "High-speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what is meant by "high-speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitor". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The motor vehicle inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. 5. The motor vehicle inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case. 5. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court make it more than clear that a mere allegation of high-speed would not tantamount to rashness or negligence. In the present case also, I find that apart from the allegation that the truck was being driven at a very high-speed there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which could be regarded as rash or negligent. In any event there is no description or approximation of what was the speed at which the truck was being driven. The expression "high-speed" could range from 30 km per hour to over 100 km per hour. It is not even known as to what the speed limit on Mathura Road was and whether the petitioner was exceeding that speed limit. Therefore, in the absence of material facts it cannot be said, merely because there is an allegation that the petitioner was driving the truck at a high-speed, that the petitioner is guilty of a rash or negligent act. Clearly the petitioner cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of PW 3 which itself suffers from various ambiguities. 36. There cannot be any quarrel as far as the observation having been made by the Hon’ble Courts in cases referred above, however, this Court after seeing the overwhelming evidence on record is unable to accept the aforesaid contention put forth by the counsel for the accused. 36. There cannot be any quarrel as far as the observation having been made by the Hon’ble Courts in cases referred above, however, this Court after seeing the overwhelming evidence on record is unable to accept the aforesaid contention put forth by the counsel for the accused. PWs No. 5 and 9, who were the occupants and the eye witnesses to the accident have categorically stated that vehicle at that relevant time was being driven rashly and negligently in high speed by the accused. As far as the statements given by the PW1, 2 and 8 are concerned, same cannot be given much weightage solely for the reason that none of them saw vehicle coming at that time. PW1 specifically stated that she was hit from her back and, as such, she could not state anything with regard to speed and as far as PW8 is concerned, his statement of road being wet and skidding of road cannot be relied upon solely for the reason that he, for the first time, saw vehicle on 3.4.2016, when he came there for mechanical examination of the vehicle, whereas accident took place on 2.4.2016. 37. In the present case, where it stands proved beyond any doubt that vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently by the accused at the time of accident, as a result of which, one person namely Yogesh lost his life, no fault, if any, can be found with the judgments passed by both the Court below. 38. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused also prayed that accused may be given the benefit of probation under Section 4(b) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 keeping in view his age and his being first offender. He also stated that mitigating circumstance in this case is that more than 15 years have passed after happening of that incident and 6 years have been passed after passing the judgment dated 12.3.2008, whereby the accused was convicted and he has already suffered agony during the pendency of the appeal in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Kullu as well as in High Court of Himachal Pradesh. In support of the aforesaid arguments, Mr. Goel, also invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by this Hon’ble Court in Yudhbir Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh 1998(1)S.L.J. 58, wherein it has been held as under:- 9. In support of the aforesaid arguments, Mr. Goel, also invited the attention of this Court to the judgment passed by this Hon’ble Court in Yudhbir Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh 1998(1)S.L.J. 58, wherein it has been held as under:- 9. The only mitigating circumstance that appears to be there is that the time gap of about six years between the date of occurrence as well as the date of decision of this revision petitioner. During this entire period sword of present case looming over the head of the petitioner was always there. That being so, this court is of the view that instead of sending the petitioner to jail as ordered by the courts below, he is given the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Accordingly, it is ordered that he shall furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- to the satisfaction of the trial Court within a period of four weeks from today to keep peace and to be of good behavior for a period of one year from the date of execution of the bond before the court below as well as not to commit any such offence. In addition to being given benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, petitioner is further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000/- each to PWs Baldev Singh and Dilbagh Singh injured as compensation. Shri R.K. Gautam submitted that this amount of compensation be deposited with the trial Court on or before 31.8.1997, who will thereafter pay the same to said persons. 39. On the other hand, Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, invited attention of this Court to the judgment passed in the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dalbir Singh versus State of Haryana 2000 (5) SCC 82 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under :- 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles. 14. Thus, bestowing our serious consideration on the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant we express our inability to lean towards the benevolent provision in Section 4 of the PO Act. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 40. This Court also cannot lose sight of the stern observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Saurabh Bakshi 2015 (5) SCC 182 . While dealing with the accident case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken serious view of reduction of sentences by the courts below. Their lordships in the aforesaid judgment in paras No. 1, 14, 24 and 25 have held as under; “1. Long back, an eminent thinker and author, Sophocles, had to say: “Law can never be enforced unless fear supports them.” Though the aforesaid statement was made centuries back, it has its pertinence, in a way, with the enormous vigour, in today’s society. It is the duty of every right thinking citizen to show veneration to law so that an orderly, civilized and peaceful society emerges. It is the duty of every right thinking citizen to show veneration to law so that an orderly, civilized and peaceful society emerges. It has to be borne in mind that law is averse to any kind of chaos. It is totally intolerant of anarchy. If any one defies law, he has to face the wrath of law, depending on the concept of proportionality that the law recognizes. It can never be forgotten that the purpose of criminal law legislated by the competent legislatures, subject to judicial scrutiny within constitutionally established parameters, is to protect the collective interest and save every individual that forms a constituent of the collective from unwarranted hazards. It is sometimes said in an egocentric and uncivilised manner that law cannot bind the individual actions which are perceived as flaws by the large body of people, but, the truth is and has to be that when the law withstands the test of the constitutional scrutiny in a democracy, the individual notions are to be ignored. At times certain crimes assume more accent and gravity depending on the nature and impact of the crime on the society. No court should ignore the same being swayed by passion of mercy. It is the obligation of the court to constantly remind itself that the right of the victim, and be it said, on certain occasions the person aggrieved as well as the society at large can be victims, never be marginalised. In this context one may recapitulate the saying of Justice Benjamin N. Cardizo “Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser too”. And, therefore, the requisite norm has to be the established principles laid down in precedents. It is neither to be guided by a sense of sentimentality nor to be governed by prejudices. 14. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in Balwinder Singh (supra) wherein the High Court had allowed the revision and reduced the quantum of sentence awarded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for the offences punishable under Section 304A, 337, 279 of IPC by reducing the sentence of imprisonment already undergone that is 15 days. The court referred to the decision in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana and reproduced two paragraphs which we feel extremely necessary for reproduction:- (Balwinder Singh case, SCC pp. 186-87, para12) “12…1. The court referred to the decision in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana and reproduced two paragraphs which we feel extremely necessary for reproduction:- (Balwinder Singh case, SCC pp. 186-87, para12) “12…1. When automobiles have become death traps any leniency shown to drivers who are found guilty of rash driving would be at the risk of further escalation of road accidents. All those who are manning the steering of automobiles, particularly professional drivers, must be kept under constant reminders of their duty to adopt utmost care and also of the consequences befalling them in cases of dereliction. One of the most effective ways of keeping such drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of the vehicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.” (Dalbir Singh case, SCC pp. 84-85 & 87, paras 1 & 13)” 24. Needless to say, the principle of sentencing recognizes the corrective measures but there are occasions when the deterrence is an imperative necessity depending upon the facts of the case. In our opinion, it is a fit case where we are constrained to say that the High Court has been swayed away by the passion of mercy in applying the principle that payment of compensation is a factor for reduction of sentence to 24 days. It is absolutely in the realm of misplaced sympathy. It is, in a way mockery of justice. Because justice is “the crowning glory”, “the sovereign mistress” and “queen of virtue” as Cicero had said. Such a crime blights not only the lives of the victims but of many others around them. It ultimately shatters the faith of the public in judicial system. In our view, the sentence of one year as imposed by the trial Magistrate which has been affirmed by the appellate court should be reduced to six months. 25. Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving where the other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers should scrutinize, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.” 41. After giving my thoughtful consideration to the law cited by Mr. In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the law-makers should scrutinize, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC, so with immense anguish.” 41. After giving my thoughtful consideration to the law cited by Mr. Goel, Advocate representing the accused in the present case, I am of the view that same cannot be made applicable in the present case for granting the benefit of Section 4 of probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment cited above has deprecated the practice of courts in settling the matter by awarding compensation or releasing the accused by giving the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, where there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that vehicle was driven by the accused in most rash and negligent manner, no leniency can be shown to the accused. 42. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court has no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments of courts below, which are apparently based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence on record. However, this Court after careful perusal of the material evidence available on record as well as facts and circumstances is of the view that sentences imposed by the court below under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code is harsh and excessive and same needs to be modified accordingly. Accordingly, sentence imposed by the learned court below under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code is reduced to three months instead of one year. The petitioner-accused is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Manali, vide separate order dated 13.3.2008 and further modified by this Court vide this judgment. Needless to say that order dated 21.8.2009, passed by this Court, whereby sentence imposed by the Court below was suspended, shall stand vacated automatically. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.