ORDER : 1. Imploring annulment of order dated 29th of April 2016, passed by Addl. District & Sessions Judge No.5, Udaipur (for short ‘learned revisional Court’), accused-petitioner has preferred the instant misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 2. By the order impugned, learned revisional Court has declined to interfere with the order dated 15th of December 2015, passed by Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Udaipur (for short, ‘learned trial Court’) rejecting petitioner’s application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to issue summons to police officer for production of documents. 3. The facts, apposite for the purpose of this petition are that second respondent complainant submitted a written report before SHO, Mahila Police Station, Udaipur City against the petitioner culminating into registration of FIR against him for offence under Section 498A and 406 IPC. The Investigating Officer carried out investigation in the matter and submitted final report before the learned trial Court attributing aforesaid offences against him. After submission of charge-sheet, petitioner made endeavour to summon statements of two alleged independent witnesses recorded during investigation and some of the documents by laying application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. before the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court examined the application objectively and, upon consideration of the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner as well as Public Prosecutor, declined his prayer. 4. Feeling dismayed with the order passed by learned trial Court, the petitioner invoked revisional jurisdiction by preferring revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. The learned revisional Court examined the record of proceedings pending before trial Court in the matter for evaluating correctness, legality or propriety of the order under challenge. After considering the matter in its entirety, the learned revisional Court while recording its satisfaction about correctness, legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned trial Court, declined to interfere in the matter. The learned revisional Court, while acknowledging that the order passed by the learned trial Court is in accordance with the recognized principles of criminal jurisprudence, rejected the revision petition. For declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, the learned revisional Court also recorded a definite finding that the order passed by the learned trial Court has not resulted in miscarriage of justice. Faced with this situation, the petitioner has laid the instant petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. For declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, the learned revisional Court also recorded a definite finding that the order passed by the learned trial Court has not resulted in miscarriage of justice. Faced with this situation, the petitioner has laid the instant petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Pankaj Sharma, strenuously urged that the order impugned passed by the learned revisional Court is dehors the mandate of Section 91 Cr.P.C. which requires interference to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel would contend that while submitting final report, investigating agency has withheld statements of two witnesses and certain documents at its whims and fancies and the learned trial Court, without appreciating the afflictions of the petitioner objectively, rejected the application of the petitioner under Section 91 Cr.P.C. and the learned revisional Court has also miserably failed to examine the matter in right perspective. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that instant case is a glaring example wherein the fountain of justice is throttled by both the Courts requiring interference under inherent powers to secure the ends of justice. For substantiating his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Bombay High Court in Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2013 Cri.L.J. 858). 6. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. M.S. Panwar, has vehemently argued that the prosecuting agency is required to file copies of statements of those witnesses only on which it is relying with the final report and there is no obligation on its part to file copies of the statements of other witnesses. He, therefore, submits that this vital aspect has been appropriately examined by both the Courts below and as such no interference in the matter is warranted. Lastly, learned Public Prosecutor has urged that inherent powers of this Court are not substitute for second revision and in absence of any proof about abuse of the process of the Court, the impugned order is not liable to be tinkered with. Learned Public Prosecutor, in support of his argument, has placed reliance on a decision of Delhi High Court in Ashok Chawla Vs. Ram Chander Garvan (2011 Cri.LJ 2353). 7. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced at Bar and thoroughly scanned the materials available on record. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor, in support of his argument, has placed reliance on a decision of Delhi High Court in Ashok Chawla Vs. Ram Chander Garvan (2011 Cri.LJ 2353). 7. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced at Bar and thoroughly scanned the materials available on record. 8. The cardinal issue which requires adjudication in the instant petition is nature of the power conferred on the Court or any officer in-charge of a police station under Section 91 Cr.P.C. For convenience, Section 91 Cr.P.C. is reproduced as under: S.91. (1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed- (a) to affect sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872 ), or the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 (13 of 1891 ) or (b) to apply to a letter, postcard, telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the postal or telegraph authority. 9. A plain reading of the above quoted provision makes it abundantly clear that powers conferred therein are enabling in nature, aimed at arming the Court or any officer of a police station concerned to enforce and to ensure production of any document or other things, “necessary or desirable”, for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code, by issuing a summons or a written order to those in possession of such materials. Therefore, sine qua non of an order under this Section is consideration of the Court that the production of the documents concerned is desirable and necessary for the purposes of trial. 10. Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in late sixties had the occasion to examine powers of the Court under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1998, which is para materia to Section 91 Cr.P.C., and opined in clear and unequivocal terms that power is within the sole discretion of the trial Court and therefore High Court should not interfere with the discretion conferred on the trial Court in the matter of summoning documents except for very good reasons. The Court held: “This section does not empower a Magistrate to direct the prosecution to give copies of any documents to an accused person. That much appears to be plain from the language of that section. It was impermissible for the High Court to read into Section 94, Criminal Procedure Code the requirements of Section 173(4), Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court was not justified, in indirectly applying to cases instituted on private complaints the requirements of Section 173(4), Criminal Procedure Code. That apart we do not think that the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion of the learned Magistrate. Whether a particular document should be summoned or not is essentially in the discretion of the trial court. In the instant case the Special Public Prosecutor had assured the learned trial Magistrate that he would keep in readiness the statements of witnesses recorded by the Customs authorities and shall make available to the defence Counsel the statement of the concerned witness as and when he is examined. In view of that assurance, the learned Magistrate observed in his order: "The recording of the prosecution evidence is yet commence in this case and at present there are no materials before me to decide whether or not the production of any of the statements and documents named by the accused in his application is desirable or necessary for the purpose of the enquiry or trial. As stated at the outset, the learned Special Prosecutor has given an undertaking that he would produce all the relevant statements and documents at the proper time in the course of the hearing of the case. As stated at the outset, the learned Special Prosecutor has given an undertaking that he would produce all the relevant statements and documents at the proper time in the course of the hearing of the case. The request made for the issue of the summons under Section 94, Criminal Procedure Code is also omnibus." The reasons given by the learned Magistrate in support of his order are good reasons. The High Court has not come to the conclusion that the documents in question, if not produced in court are likely to be destroyed or tampered with or the same are not likely to be made available when required. It has proceeded on the erroneous basis that the accused will not have a fair trial unless they are supplied with the copies of those statements even before the enquiry commences. Except for very good reasons, the High Court should not interfere with the discretion conferred on the trial courts in the matter of summoning documents. Such interferences would unnecessarily impede the progress of cases and result in waste of public money and time as has happened in this case.” 11. Therefore, undoubtedly, it can be said that Section 91 Cr.P.C. does not confer absolute right on accused and if the Court thinks that documents have no relevance to the case in hand, in its discretion, may reject the application. 12. Although in the instant matter, learned revisional Court has made sincere endeavour to examine correctness, legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned trial Court, but I am afraid, whether revision petition itself was maintainable. As a matter of fact, sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. puts an embargo for exercising revisional jurisdiction in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry or trial or other proceeding. As such, maintainability of revision petition itself is under cloud. 13. My aforesaid view finds support by a decision of Supreme Court in Sethuraman Vs. As a matter of fact, sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. puts an embargo for exercising revisional jurisdiction in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry or trial or other proceeding. As such, maintainability of revision petition itself is under cloud. 13. My aforesaid view finds support by a decision of Supreme Court in Sethuraman Vs. Rajamanickam [ (2009) 5 SCC 153 ], wherein the Court held: Secondly, what was not realised was that the orders passed by the trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant-complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders i.e. one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed. 14. Be that as it may, now I proceed to examine the orders passed by the learned revisional Court as well as learned trial Court on merits. 15. Essentially, the endeavour of accused petitioner before the learned trial Court was to summon statements of two independent witnesses and documents which did not form part of the charge-sheet submitted by the investigating agency. As per petitioner, the police withheld these documents without any justifiable reason and therefore it is necessary and desirable to summon these documents from the investigating agency. While repelling the contention of the petitioner, learned trial Court has observed that prosecution is well within its right to produce only those statements on which it is relying. As per petitioner, the police withheld these documents without any justifiable reason and therefore it is necessary and desirable to summon these documents from the investigating agency. While repelling the contention of the petitioner, learned trial Court has observed that prosecution is well within its right to produce only those statements on which it is relying. Furthermore, the learned trial Court has also observed that accused-petitioner can very well examine those witnesses as defence witnesses and can also produce further documents in his defence. With the same reasonings, learned revisional Court has also rejected the revision petition. 16. The judgment of Bombay High Court, in Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil & Ors. (supra), on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, was a case of bomb blast in Mumbai local trains allegedly by members of SIMI - a terrorist organization. Therefore, while considering the alleged role of the accused as conspirators, the Court was pleased to direct the investigating agency to produce documents desired by the accused persons. While discussing powers of the Court under Section 91 Cr.P.C., the Court held: “Section 91 of the Code empowers a Court to issue summons to a person ‘to produce before the Court, a document or thing believed to be in possession of such person if the Court considers the production of such documents or other things necessary or desirable for the purpose of inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. The scope of Section 91 is very wide and obviously, it cannot be restricted only to the documents on which the prosecution relies, nor to the stage contemplated by Section 233 or 243 of the Code. There may be cases where for an effective cross-examination of a witness, the cross-examiner would require certain documents in his hand. Without the availability of such documents, the rights and obligations of a cross-examiner under Sections 153 and 145 of the Evidence Act, cannot be effectively discharged or exercised by him. To overcome such a situation, he can urge the Court to supply such documents to him. If they are in the Court, copies thereof can be supplied, but if they are not, the Court would be expected to use the powers under Section 91 of the Code, whenever it finds it necessary or desirable. To overcome such a situation, he can urge the Court to supply such documents to him. If they are in the Court, copies thereof can be supplied, but if they are not, the Court would be expected to use the powers under Section 91 of the Code, whenever it finds it necessary or desirable. To overcome an unfair or unjust result, the court certainly would be entitled to exercise the powers under Section 91 of the Code, which section is widely framed and contains nothing to indicate otherwise. It is not that the documents called for by the accused, must be called by the court, just for asking, but, surely, that the prosecution is not relying on such documents cannot be a consideration that should weigh in deciding such application made by an accused.” 17. Looking to the nature of accusation in the case aforesaid, Bombay High Court has exercised power under Section 91 Cr.P.C. by invoking Article 21 of the Constitution, i.e. right to fair trial for the accused persons. The fact situation in the instant case is entirely different. It is pure and simple case wherein complainant has alleged harassment against accused petitioner during subsistence of matrimony and he has been charged for offence under Section 498A and 406 IPC. Therefore, the judgment aforesaid is clearly distinguishable. 18. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bhola @ Yadvinder Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan [2013(1) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 3], while considering powers of the Court under Section 91 Cr.P.C. in conjunction with sub-section (5) of Section 173 Cr.P.C., recorded a definite finding that prosecution is obliged to submit only the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. While relying on a decision of Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Pandhi [ (2003) 2 SCC 711 ], the Court held: “Even at the stage of consideration of charges under Section 227 Cr.P.C. also only the documents which are filed along with the result of investigation under Section 173 Cr.P.C. can be considered as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Pandhi, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 711 . Thus the prayer made by the accused in this case that he may be provided with the statements of the other witnesses apart from the relied upon witnesses cannot be accepted. Thus the prayer made by the accused in this case that he may be provided with the statements of the other witnesses apart from the relied upon witnesses cannot be accepted. If at all the accused desires to examine the other witnesses who were examined in the investigation but are not relied upon then he has a liberty to do so in his defence. However, the statements of such witnesses recorded under Section161 Cr.P.C. cannot even be utilised for confronting the witnesses particularly when the accused himself calls the witness in defence. Thus, there cannot be any justification or utility of summoning on record the statements of the witnesses, who are not the relied upon witnesses of the prosecution recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. On this trite legal proposition, reliance can also be profitably made to a decision of Delhi High Court in Ashok Chawla (supra), on which the learned Public Prosecutor has placed reliance. The Court, while relying on decision of Supreme Court in Debendra N. Padhi (supra), elaborately discussed the scope of Section 91 Cr.P.C. and held: “In State of Orissa v. Debendra N. Padhi (Supra) while considering the scope of Section 91 Code of Criminal Procedure the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: “25. Any document or other thing envisaged under the aforesaid provision can be ordered to be produced on finding that the same is 'necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code'. The first and foremost requirement of the section is about the document being necessary or desirable. The necessity or desirability would have to be seen with reference to the stage when a prayer is made for the production. If any document is necessary or desirable for the defence of the accused, the question of invoking Section 91 at the initial stage of framing of a charge would not arise since defence of the accused is not relevant at that stage. When the section refers to investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings, it is to be borne in mind that under the section a police officer may move the Court for summoning and production of a document as may be necessary at any of the stages mentioned in the section. In so far as the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. In so far as the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. When the section talks of the document being necessary and desirable, it is implicit that necessity and desirability is to be examined considering the stage when such a prayer for summoning and production is made and the party who makes it whether police or accused. If under Section 227 what is necessary and relevant is only the record produced in terms of Section 173 of the Code, the accused cannot at that stage invoke Section 91 to seek production of any document to show his innocence. Under Section 91 summons for production of document can be issued by Court and under a written order an officer in charge of police station can also direct production thereof. Section 91 does not confer any right on the accused to produce document in his possession to prove his defence. Section 91 presupposes that when the document is not produced process may be initiated to compel production thereof. 26. Reliance on behalf of the accused was placed on some observations made in the case of Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI. In that case the application filed by the accused for summoning and production of documents was rejected by the Special Judge and that order was affirmed by the High Court. Challenging those orders before this Court, reliance was placed on behalf of the accused upon Satish Mehra's case (supra). The contentions based on Satish Mehra's case have been noticed in para 4 as under: "4. The learned Counsel for the Appellant reiterated the stand taken before the courts below with great vehemence by inviting our attention to the decision of this Court reported in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Admn., laying emphasis on the fact the very learned Judge in the High Court has taken a different view in such matters, in the decision reported in Ashok Kaushik v. State. Mr. Mr. Altaf Ahmed, the learned ASG for the Respondents not only contended that the decisions relied upon for the Appellants would not justify the claim of the Appellant in this case, at this stage, but also invited, extensively our attention to the exercise undertaken by the courts below to find out the relevance, desirability and necessity of those documents as well as the need for issuing any such directions as claimed at that stage and consequently there was no justification whatsoever, to intervene by an interference at the present stage of the proceedings.” 27. In so far as Section 91 is concerned, it was rightly held that the width of the powers of that section was unlimited but there were inbuilt inherent limitations as to the stage or point of time of its exercise, commensurately with the nature of proceedings as also the compulsions of necessity and desirability, to fulfill the task or achieve the object. Before the trial court the stage was to find out whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding to the next stage against the accused. The application filed by the accused under Section 91 of the Code for summoning and production of document was dismissed and order was upheld by High Court and this Court. But observations were made in para 6 to the effect that if the accused could produce any reliable material even at that stage which might totally affect even the very sustainability of the case, a refusal to look into the material so produced may result in injustice, apart from averting an exercise in futility at the expense of valuable judicial/public time, these observations are clearly obiter dicta and in any case of no consequence in view of conclusion reached by us hereinbefore. Further, the observations cannot be understood to mean that the accused has a right to produce any document at stage of framing of charge having regard to the clear mandate of Sections 227 and 228 in Chapter 18 and Sections 239 and 240 in Chapter 19. 28. We are of the view that jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Code when invoked by accused the necessity and desirability would have to be seen by the Court in the context of the purpose - investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. 28. We are of the view that jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Code when invoked by accused the necessity and desirability would have to be seen by the Court in the context of the purpose - investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. It would also have to be borne in mind that law does not permit a roving or fishing inquiry. As held in Sidhartha Vashisht (Supra) the accused cannot claim an indefeasible legal right to claim every document of the police file. Even giving an expanded application to the doctrine of disclosure, the Petitioner is neither entitled to these documents, nor is it the stage necessitating production under Section 91 Code of Criminal Procedure nor the transfer of investigation to another officer amounted to reinvestigation forbidden under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C and does not call for issuance of a writ in terms of the dictate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.C. Basappa (Supra).” 19. Therefore, viewed from any angle, in my considered opinion, learned trial Court as well as revisional Court has not committed any manifest error of law warranting interference in exercise of inherent powers of this Court. Apparently, there is no reason in the instant case to exercise powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. I am at loss to say that present one is not a case wherein inherent powers is to be exercised ex debitio justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exists inasmuch as learned trial Court has observed that petitioner can examine those independent witnesses as defence witnesses. In totality, the order passed by the trial Court is in consonance and conformity with the mandate of sub-sec.(5) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. and therefore no interference is warranted. 20. The upshot of above discussion is that I feel dissuaded to interfere in the matter and consequently the petition fails and same is hereby dismissed.