JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing of award dated 26.11.2008 passed by the Presiding Judge, Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, H.P. in Reference No. 385/2002. 2. Brief facts of the case necessary for adjudication of the present case are that a Reference was received by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Dharamshala, from the appropriate Government, as to whether the claimant had been illegally terminated w.e.f. 21.10.1999 as a Beldar by the Executive Engineer, HPSEB, Jogidner Nagar Division in violation of the provisions of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and whether the claimant was entitled for any relief and compensation? 3. On notice, the claimant filed his statement of claim, in which it was stated that he was engaged as a daily waged Beldar by the Board on muster rolls basis on 25.02.1999. He served as such till 20.10.1999. His services were terminated on 21.10.1999. According to the claimant, during the period of his employment, he was given artificial breaks of 305 days by the Board from 25.02.1999 to 20.10.1999. These artificial breaks were given to him without any reason and according to the workman, he was entitled to the benefit of continuity of service as per the provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to him, the respondent/Board had violated the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the HPSEB Establishment Standing Orders while dispensing with the services of the workman, which Standing Orders were framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. No inquiry was conducted before retrenching him and the Board had also not followed the principle of ‘last come first go’ as envisaged under Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. As per the claimant, other workers, namely, Man Singh son of Kalyan Singh, Prithi Chand son of Bhoop Singh, Safi Mohammad son of Hamid Ahmed, Durga Dass son of Kalu Ram etc. who were junior to him and were retained in service at the time of his retrenchment. He also alleged violation of the provisions of Section 25-H and Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. In reply filed to the statement of claim, the Board admitted that the claimant was engaged as daily wage Beldar on 25.02.1999 but vehemently refuted the allegation of workman that he was given frictional breaks as alleged. He also alleged violation of the provisions of Section 25-H and Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. In reply filed to the statement of claim, the Board admitted that the claimant was engaged as daily wage Beldar on 25.02.1999 but vehemently refuted the allegation of workman that he was given frictional breaks as alleged. According to the Board, the claimant worked only for a period of 60 days from 25.02.1999 to 20.10.1999 and used to remain absent from duty and ultimately he abandoned the job after 20.10.1999. As per the Board, in this view of the matter, the workman was neither charge-sheeted nor he was paid any compensation. It was further stated that in view of the willful absence of claimant from the work from time to time, his case was not covered by the provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act and keeping in view the fact that the claimant had not worked for 90 days during the period he remained in the employment of the Board, his name was not included in the list of temporary workmen. It was further the case of the Board that as the claimant had abandoned the job on his own, there was no question of complying with the principle of ‘last come first go’ nor it could be said that the Board had breached the provisions of Clause 14(2) of the Standing Orders. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned Labour Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent w.e.f. 21.10.1999 is violative of the provisions of the I.D. Act, 1947 and certified Standing Orders framed by State Electricity Board? …. OPP 2. Whether the petition is not maintainable? … OPR 3. Whether the petition is barred by time? ... OPR 4. Whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the petition due to his act and conduct? … OPR 5. Relief. 6. On the basis of material placed on record by the parties, the issues so framed by the learned Labour Court were answered as under:- Issue No. 1: Yes. Issue No. 2 : No. Issue No. 3 : No. Issue No. 4: No. Relief : As per operative part of the Award, the petition is partly allowed. 7. Relief. 6. On the basis of material placed on record by the parties, the issues so framed by the learned Labour Court were answered as under:- Issue No. 1: Yes. Issue No. 2 : No. Issue No. 3 : No. Issue No. 4: No. Relief : As per operative part of the Award, the petition is partly allowed. 7. Learned Labour Court held that in his statement as PW-1 the claimant maintained that he was engaged as Beldar and he worked as such from 25.02.1999 to 20.10.1999. His services were dispensed with on 21.10.1999 without any notice or chargesheet, whereas persons junior to him were retained. Learned Labour Court held that seniority issued by the Additional Superintending Engineer, Electrical Division HPSEB, Jogidner Nagar, vide letter dated 05.09.2002 Ext. PA demonstrated that Man Singh, Prithi Chand, Safi Mohammad, Durga Dass and Gian Chand, whose names figure at serial numbers 112B, 113, 114, 115 and 116 had been engaged between 01.05.1999 to 11.10.1999 i.e. after the date of engagement of the claimant. On the said basis, learned Labour Court held that the stand taken by the Board witness Mr. V.S. Thakur to the effect that the said persons were senior to the claimant was incorrect and false. On these basis, learned Labour Court held that the Board had in fact violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act. It further held that the Board had also violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act because no material had been produced on record by the Board to substantiate its contention that the claimant had abandoned the job on his own. 8. The learned Labour Court thus held that in the present case the Board has violated the provisions of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act and it partially allowed the claim petition by holding the claimant to be entitled to be reinstated in the same capacity as in which he was working at the time of retrenchment. The learned Labour Court further held that the claimant was not entitled to continuity of service nor he was held entitled to back wages. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Labour Court, the petitioner/Board has filed the present writ petition. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 11. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Labour Court, the petitioner/Board has filed the present writ petition. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 11. The case of the claimant to the effect that the Board had violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act is based on Ext. PA, which is the seniority list issued by the Additional Superintending Engineer, Electrical Division HPSEB Joginder Nagar vide letter dated 05.09.2002. As per the said seniority list, as is evident from the award passed by the learned Labour Court, Man Singh, Prithi Chand, Safi Mohammad, Durga Dass and Gian Chand, figure at serial numbers 112B, 113, 114, 115 and 116. The respective dates of their engagements are 01.05.1999, 21.06.1999, 21.07.1999, 21.09.1999 and 11.10.1999. On the other hand, the date of engagement of the claimant is 25.02.1999. Ext. PA thus categorically demonstrates that the persons who were engaged by the Board after the engagement of the claimant were continued after the disengagement of the claimant, meaning thereby that the Board has not followed the principle of ‘first come last go’. The Board has not been able to place on record any material to substantiate its case that the claimant has abandoned the job on his own. 12. Keeping this fact in view that on one hand the Board has not able been to substantiate that the claimant has abandoned the job and on other hand it stands proved on record that persons engaged by the Board after the claimant have been retained, though the services of the claimant have been terminated, in my considered view, the findings returned by the learned Labour Court to the effect that the termination of the services of the claimant was in violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, are correct. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out as to how the said findings returned by the learned Labour Court were either perverse or were not borne out from the material produced on record. 13. Similarly, in my considered view there is no infirmity with the findings which have been returned by the learned Labour Court with regard to the violation of the provisions of Section 25-H by the Board in the present case. 13. Similarly, in my considered view there is no infirmity with the findings which have been returned by the learned Labour Court with regard to the violation of the provisions of Section 25-H by the Board in the present case. It stands proved on record that whereas on one hand the claim was disengaged/terminated without complying with the provisions of Section 25-G. On the other hand, the Board engaged fresh hand without first giving an opportunity to the claimant to be re-engaged. 14. Now coming to the relief which has been granted by the learned Labour Court to the claimant, it has only directed the Board to re-engage the claimant and no other relief has been granted in favour of the claimant. Keeping in view this aspect of the matter that it stands proved on record that the Board had terminated the services of the claimant while retaining the services of the persons engaged after him, clearly the provisions of Section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes were violated. Accordingly, in my considered view, there is neither any infirmity nor any infirmity with the findings returned in this regard by the learned Labour Court. The conclusions arrived at by the learned Labour Court are on the basis of material which was placed before it by both the parties. The findings returned by the learned Labour Court to the effect that services of the claimant were terminated without complying with the provisions of Sections 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be said to be not borne out from the material on record by the parties. Further, in my considered view, the relief which has been granted in favour of the claimant by the learned Labour Court is also a very reasonable relief as he has only been held entitled to be reinstated and no relief of continuity of service or back wages has been given to the claimant by the learned Labour Court. 15. It has been held by this Court in LPA No. 4 of 2016 titled State of H.P. and another Vs. Shankar Lal and other connected matters, decided on 02.01.2016, as under:- “The awards passed by the Labour Court are based on the facts and the evidence led by the parties. 15. It has been held by this Court in LPA No. 4 of 2016 titled State of H.P. and another Vs. Shankar Lal and other connected matters, decided on 02.01.2016, as under:- “The awards passed by the Labour Court are based on the facts and the evidence led by the parties. It is well settled principle of law that the Writ Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court and set aside the award made by the Labour Court, which is based on evidence and facts. 16. Thus, it is evident that as far as the awards passed by the learned Labour Courts are concerned, the finding of fact so recorded by the learned Labour Court should not be interfered until and unless the findings so returned by the learned Labour Court are perverse or not borne out from the material on record. 17. In the present case, it cannot be said that the findings returned by the learned Labour Court are either perverse or not borne out from the material on record, therefore, the same do not warrant any interference. 18. Accordingly, I concur with the award passed by the learned Labour Court and hold that there is no merit in the present writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.