JUDGMENT Ram Surat Ram (Maurya),J. Heard Sri Prashant Rai for the petitioners and Sri Bal Mukund Singh for the respondents. 2. This petition has been filed against the orders of Executing Court dated 10.1.2015 and Additional District Judge dated 5.3.2016. 3. Udai Narayan Yadav (now represented by respondents-3 to 5) filed a suit (registered as O.S. No. 653/1994) for mandatory as well as prohibitory injunction against the petitioner from interfering in his possession over plot no. 844 (area 1.374 kari). This suit was decreed ex parte by order dated 9.3.1997. Thereafter, the respondents filed an application for execution of the decree on 30.10.2003, alleging therein that in compliance of the decree, earlier the encroachments have been removed, but later on the judgment debtor had again on 29.10.2003, affixed a door in his house towards the land of the petitioner, therefore, they had violated the injunction order. The Executing Court, after hearing the parties, by order dated 10.1.2014, directed for removal of the construction and delivery of possession in the execution of the decree. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in revision, which has been dismissed by the Additional District Judge. 4. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the decree was passed on 3.9.1987, while the execution application was filed on 30.10.2003. Thus, the execution proceeding was time barred as under Article 165, limitation of three years has been provided for mandatory injunction and under Article 136, limitation of 12 years has been provided for any other decree of civil Court, but the Executing Court has illegally proceeded with the execution. He submits that in the execution application, a false allegation has been made that in compliance of the ex parte decree, the petitioner has vacated the land in dispute before the Panchayat in the year 1993 and a fresh encroachment was made on 29.10.2003. He submits that there is no evidence to show that any panchayat was held on 17.9.1993, or the petitioner was directed to remove his construction at that time over the land in dispute, as such, the decree has become time barred and execution ought to have been dismissed. 5. In reply to the aforesaid arguments, the counsel for the respondents submits that under Proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the decree of perpetual injunction can be executed at any time as and when its violation take place. 5. In reply to the aforesaid arguments, the counsel for the respondents submits that under Proviso to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, the decree of perpetual injunction can be executed at any time as and when its violation take place. In the present case, the decree is a composite decree and it is for mandatory as well as perpetual injunction. In this case, two times the Court Amin was issued for executing the decree. The Court Amin by his reports dated 9.9.2011 and 3.8.2012 found that fresh encroachment has been made by the petitioner, apart from the earlier encroachment. Thus, the allegation of the decree holder that the earlier encroachment was removed and a fresh encroachment was made, has been established and the court below has believed it. Therefore, no interference is required by this Court. 6. I have considered the arguments of counsel for the parties. 7. A perusal of the decree of trial court shows that it was a composite decree of permanent injunction as well as mandatory injunction. So far as part of the mandatory injunction is concerned, from the Amin's report, it was found that the earlier encroachments alleged in the suit were not there, but a fresh encroachment has been made. Thus, according to the decree holder, fresh encroachment was made in the year 2003. As the decree is for perpetual injunction, as such, in view of proviso to Article 136, it could be executed at any time as and when violation take place. No interference is required by this Court. The petition has no merit and is dismissed.