State of Maharashtra, Through the Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, Irrigation Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai v. Jagan Sitru Dondone
2016-07-21
A.S.CHANDURKAR
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : A.S. Chandurkar, J. Rule. Heard finally with the consent of the Counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioners are aggrieved by the judgment dated 4-9-2013 passed by the Industrial Court in the complaint filed under Section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, the Act of 1971) and directing the petitioner to bring the respondents on Converted Regular Temporary Establishment - C.R.T.E. on completion of five years of continuous service. 3. It is the case of the respondents that they were engaged as labours for doing the work of distribution of water from the canal to various cultivators. Though the services of the respondents were continuous in nature, the same were not regularized. By amending the complaint and seeking benefits of the Kalelkar award, the respondents sought relief in that regard. The petitioners opposed the claim as made by the respondents. After the parties led evidence, the Industrial Court recorded a finding that each respondent had worked continuously for a period of five years and hence, they were entitled to be brought on C.R.T.E. Accordingly, by the impugned order, the complaint was allowed and the petitioners were directed to bring the respondents on C.R.T.E. The difference of wages were directed to be paid from the date of the complaint. 4. Ms. Tajwar Khan, the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that none of the respondents had completed 240 days service in a year and therefore, they were not entitled for being brought on C.R.T.E. after completion of five years. She submitted that continuous service for 240 days as envisaged by Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act of 1947) had not been completed and therefore, no relief could have been granted to the petitioners. In support of her submissions, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench in The Executive Engineer Bhandara Irrigation Division and Anr. v. Duryodhan S/o Dheklal Nagalwade 2011 (3) ALL MR 244. 5. Shri M.R. Pillai, the learned Counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order. According to him, the completion of continuous service for a period of five years did not envisage working for 240 days in a year. The only requirement under Clause 28 of the Kalelkar Award was of having worked for five years irrespective of the number of days.
Shri M.R. Pillai, the learned Counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order. According to him, the completion of continuous service for a period of five years did not envisage working for 240 days in a year. The only requirement under Clause 28 of the Kalelkar Award was of having worked for five years irrespective of the number of days. He placed reliance upon the judgment of learned Single Judge in State of Maharashtra v. M.V. Ghalge and another 1991 Mh.L.J. 1557, Chima Shravan Shinde & Ors; v. M.V. Patil & Ors. 1994 II CLR 1111 and the judgment of the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.225 of 2007 in Writ Petition No.4492/2005 (The State of Maharashtra and others v. Bharat Rajaram Meshram and others). 6. I have heard the respective Counsel for the parties at length. The Industrial Court after considering the evidence on record has in para 14 of its judgment observed that each respondent had completed five years service though the same was not for 240 days. The aforesaid finding regarding each complainant have worked for a period of five years is not under challenge. The challenge is principally based on the requirement of continuous service for a period of 240 days for five years. 7. In M.V. Ghalge (supra), a similar contention that unless the complainant had actually worked for 240 days in a year, he could not be entitled for benefit of Clause 28 for being brought on CRTE was considered. It was held that what was necessary was actual work being rendered for five years irrespective of the number of days of service in one year. In Chima Shravan Shinde (supra), a similar submission based on provisions of Section 25B of the Act of 1947 was considered and it was observed that the expression "continuous service" was for the purposes of Chapter VA of the Act of 1947. It was held that there was no requirement of completion of 240 days in a year for getting benefit of Clause 28 of the Kalelkar Award. The judgment in M.V. Ghalge (supra) was considered by the Division Bench in Bharat Rajaram Meshram (supra) after which relief was granted to the complainants therein.
It was held that there was no requirement of completion of 240 days in a year for getting benefit of Clause 28 of the Kalelkar Award. The judgment in M.V. Ghalge (supra) was considered by the Division Bench in Bharat Rajaram Meshram (supra) after which relief was granted to the complainants therein. It is thus, clear that this Court has held that completion of 240 days continuous service in one year is not necessary in so far as seeking benefit of Clause 28 of the Kalelkar award is concerned. 8. In Duryodhan Dheklal Nagalwade, the facts indicate that the complainant therein had challenged the termination of his services by approaching the Labour Court. The Labour Court allowed the complaint but did not grant back wages. This order was challenged by the employer before the Industrial Court which set aside the judgment and remanded the proceedings. After remand, the complaint was amended and the relief of regularisation was sought by relying upon the Kalelkar Settlement. The Labour Court, however, dismissed the complaint. The Industrial Court allowed the revision application and directed grant of benefits under the Kalelkar Settlement to the complainant. In these facts, the Division Bench observed that the relief of regularisation as sought could not have been granted by the Industrial Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 44 of the Act of 1971. The Labour Court before the complaint had been filed had no jurisdiction to entertain the prayer for regularization. The Division Bench then found that the Industrial Court failed to apply its mind to the material aspect regarding number of working days. The Industrial Court had presumed that the workman had worked continuously which the Division Bench found was a wrong approach. The Division Bench thereafter granted liberty to the workman to approach the Industrial Court in case he had a grievance regarding non-implementation of the Kalelkar Award. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is that the Industrial Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction could not have considered the prayer for regularisation which relief could not be sought in a complaint filed before the Labour Court. Hence, reliance placed by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on this judgment to canvass that completion of 240 days continuous service for five years is misplaced. In fact, the judgment of the Division Bench in Bharat Rajaram Meshram (supra) binds this Court. 9.
Hence, reliance placed by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on this judgment to canvass that completion of 240 days continuous service for five years is misplaced. In fact, the judgment of the Division Bench in Bharat Rajaram Meshram (supra) binds this Court. 9. Considering the findings recorded by the Industrial Court which are based on the material available on record, I do not find any case made out to interfere in writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed by discharging the Rule. There would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.