JUDGMENT : B.R. SARANGI, J. This intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellant challenging judgment dated 31.08.2012 passed in W.P.(C) No. 25031 of 2011, whereby the learned Single Judge has, while declining to entertain the writ petition, dismissed the same by applying the principle underlying under Rule 1 Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’). 2. The factual matrix of the case, as is borne out from the records, is that “Sri Ladukesh Mohesh Bije”, Sarankul is managed by the Nayagarh Debottar. Banchanidhi Mohapatra was the recorded hereditary ‘Mali Sebasee’ (priest) of the said deity and in that capacity he was enjoying some properties of the deity in lieu of rendering ‘sevapuja’. Banchanidhi Mohapatra had a daughter, namely, Dukhi, who married to the present appellant. Respondent no.1 is the adopted son of Banchanidhi Mohapatra. In Title Appeal No.2 of 1989 {arising out of O.S. No. 35 of 1974 (1)} the status of respondent no.1, as adopted son, was declared and the same was confirmed by this Court in Second Appeal. 3. On the basis of an application filed by respondent no.1 before the Executive Officer, Debottar, Nayagarh, which was registered as D. Misc. Case No. 14 of 1991 to appoint him as ‘Mali Sebasee’ of the deity “Sri Ladukesh Mohesh Bije” by order dated 19.12.1992 the Sub-Collector-cum-Executive Officer allowed 50% sevayati right in favour of respondent no.1 and the rest 50% in favour of Dukhi, the daughter of Banchanidhi Mohapatra. 4. Challenging the said order dated 19.12.1992, the present appellant filed Misc. Appeal No.1 of 1993 whereas respondent no.1 filed Misc. Appeal No.2 of 1993 before the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Orissa Bhubaneswar. The appellant’s claim in his appeal was twofold; firstly on the strength of an unregistered agreement dated 07.04.1956 whereby Banchanidhi Mohapatra purportedly transferred his sevayati right in favour of the present appellant, and secondly, through his wife, Dukhi. respondent no.1 in his appeal claimed full sevayati right being the adopted son of Banchanidhi Mohapatra, as admittedly the sevayati right was hereditary right. respondent no.1 in his appeal claimed full sevayati right being the adopted son of Banchanidhi Mohapatra, as admittedly the sevayati right was hereditary right. The Assistant Commissioner of Endowments heard the appeals analogously and by order dated 25.09.1996 (Annexure-5) disposed of both the appeals appointing respondent no.1 as ‘Mali Sebasee’ of the deity in place of deceased-Banchanidhi Mohapatra and conceded him the right to enjoy all the properties of the deity which Banchanidhi Mohapatra was possessing in lieu of ‘sevapuja’ of the deity and rejected the claim of the appellant. 5. The appellant’s wife, Dukhi, challenged the said order dated 25.09.1996 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments by filing Revision Case No. 24 of 1996 before the Commissioner of Endowments, Orissa Bhubaneswar. The appellant never challenged the order passed by the said Assistant Commissioner of Endowments before the Commissioner of Endowments. The revision filed by Dukhi was disposed of by the Commissioner of Endowments by order dated 10.04.1997 (Annexure-6) confirming the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments. The Commissioner gave a clear finding on the basis of evidence on record that Banchanidhi Mohapatra died in the year 1955 and hence his daughter had no right of succession. 6. Assailing the order dated 25.09.1996 (Annexure-5) passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and its confirming order dated 10.04.1997 (Annexure-6) passed by the Commissioner of Endowments, Dukhi filed OJC No. 7203 of 1997 before this Court. The said writ application, in which the present appellant was opposite party no.1, was ultimately dismissed on 22.09.2004, against which a review petition is stated to be pending before this Court for adjudication. 7. Challenging the very same orders dated 25.09.1996 (Annexure-5) and dated 10.04.1997 (Annexure-6) respectively passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and Commissioner of Endowments, the appellant had filed a belated writ application before this Court in the year 2008 bearing W.P.(C) No.5075 of 2008, but the said writ application was dismissed, as withdrawn, vide order dated 02.08.2011. 8. 7. Challenging the very same orders dated 25.09.1996 (Annexure-5) and dated 10.04.1997 (Annexure-6) respectively passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and Commissioner of Endowments, the appellant had filed a belated writ application before this Court in the year 2008 bearing W.P.(C) No.5075 of 2008, but the said writ application was dismissed, as withdrawn, vide order dated 02.08.2011. 8. Again, challenging the very same orders dated 25.09.1996 (Annexure-5) and dated 10.04.1997 (Annexure-6) respectively passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments and Commissioner of Endowments, the appellant filed W.P.(C) No.25031 of 2011 and the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 31.08.2012 dismissed the same by holding that, in view of the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of CPC, the appellant cannot be allowed to institute the writ application for the very same cause of action, and that the appellant, having abandoned his right in the earlier writ application by withdrawing it without permission of the Court, he cannot be permitted to file a fresh one in respect of selfsame subject matter. Hence, this appeal. 9. Mr. B. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 raised a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the writ appeal against the judgment and order dated 31.08.2012 passed in W.P.(C) No.25031 of 2011, in view of the fact that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the said writ petition, has exercised the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. Mr. S.N. Satpathy, learned counsel for the appellant states that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ application cannot sustain in the eye of law. The present appeal, having been preferred against such unsustainable order, is maintainable. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment passed by the apex Court in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal & others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 , Satyabhama Pandey v. Bhagirathi Jaipuria & others, 1988 (II) OLR 420 and Union of India v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation, Ranchi & others, 1996 (I) OLR 422 (SC) stating that the erroneous decision cannot stand on the way and it cannot operate as res judicata. 11. In reply, Mr. B. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 strenuously urged that if the writ appeal is not maintainable, question of going into the merits of the case does not arise. 11. In reply, Mr. B. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 strenuously urged that if the writ appeal is not maintainable, question of going into the merits of the case does not arise. He, however, contended that the order dated 25.09.1996 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments was confirmed by the Commissioner of Endowments vide order dated 10.04.1997 passed in Revision Case No.24 of 1996. Both the orders were assailed by Dukhi in OJC No.7203 of 1997 and the said writ application was dismissed on 22.09.2004. Challenging the very same orders, after a long lapse of more than 11 years, the appellant filed W.P.(C) No.5075 of 2008 and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 02.08.2011. Once again, challenging the said orders, the appellant having filed W.P.(C) NO.25031 of 2011, learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the said writ petition by applying the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of CPC. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality or irregularity in dismissing the writ petition preferred by the present appellant. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it proper to take up first the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for respondent no.1 with regard to maintainability of the writ appeal against the judgment and order dated 31.08.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.25031 of 2011 dismissing the writ application. 13. The question with regard to maintainability of the intra-Court appeal has been considered by the apex Court in Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 9 SCC 1 and the apex Court, relying upon the various judgments, held that Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers a power on a High Court to issue writs, orders, or directions mentioned therein for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. This is neither an appellate nor a revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This is neither an appellate nor a revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution exercises original jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. This jurisdiction, though original in character as contrasted with its appellate and revisional jurisdictions, is exercisable throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and may, for convenience, be described as extraordinary original jurisdiction. If that be so, it cannot be contended that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a continuation of the proceedings under the Act concerned. The order passed by the Civil Court is only amenable to be scrutinized by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Once it is exclusively assailable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, no intra-Court appeal is maintainable. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, a letters patent appeal or an intra-Court appeal in respect of an order passed by the learned Single Judge dealing with an order arising out of a proceeding from a civil court would not lie before the Division Bench. No writ can be issued against the order passed by the civil court and, therefore, no letters patent appeal would be maintainable. 14. Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order, the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. If the judgment under appeal falls squarely within four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-Court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. If the judgment under appeal falls squarely within four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-Court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. On the other hand, if the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuance of certain writ under Article 226, although Article 227 is also mentioned, and principally the judgment appealed against falls under Article 226, the appeal would be maintainable. What is important to be ascertained is the true nature of order passed by the learned Single Judge and not what provision he mentions while exercising such powers. A statement by a learned Single Judge that he has exercised power under Article 227, cannot take away the right of appeal against such judgment if power is otherwise found to have been exercised under Article 226. The vital factor for determination of maintainability of intra Court appeal is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the party and the true nature of principal order passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. Consequently, maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and the type of directions issued, regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context. Whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie against the order passed by the learned Single Judge that has travelled to him from the other tribunals or authorities, would depend upon many a facet. It is clarified that in certain enactments, the District Judges function as Election Tribunals from whose orders a revision or a writ may lie depending upon the provisions in the Act. In such a situation, the superior court, that is, the High Court, even if required to call for the records, the District Judge need not be a party. But how the jurisdiction under the letters patent appeal is to be exercised cannot exhaustively be stated. It will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge and as such, there cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same. But the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has to be guided by the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court. It will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge and as such, there cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same. But the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has to be guided by the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court. The apex Court in Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji (supra) summarised the guidelines in paragrtaph-45, which reads as follows: “45. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to summarise our conclusions as follows: 45.1. Whether a letters patent appeal would lie against the order passed by the learned Single Judge that has travelled to him from the other tribunals or authorities, would depend upon many a facet. The court fee payable on a petition to make it under Article 226 or Article 227 or both, would depend upon the rules framed by the High Court. 45.2. The order passed by the civil court is only amenable to be scrutinised by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is different from Article 226 of the Constitution and as per the pronouncement in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 , no writ can be issued against the order passed by the civil court and, therefore, no letters patent appeal would be maintainable. 45.3. The writ petition can be held to be not maintainable if a tribunal or authority that is required to defend the impugned order has not been arrayed as a party, as it is a necessary party. 45.4. The tribunal being or not being party in a writ petition is not determinative of the maintainability of a letters patent appeal.” 16. This Court had got an occasion to deal with the similar question in Saswati Patras v. Saraswati Biswal, 2016 (II) OLR 3 , in which the election to a Member of Zilla Parishad, Puri was under challenge. The question was as to whether under Section 32 of the Zilla Parishad Act, the District Judge has got jurisdiction to try the election petition. While considering the same, this Court held that in an intra-Court appeal, order passed by the Civil Judge is only amenable to be scrutinized by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While considering the same, this Court held that in an intra-Court appeal, order passed by the Civil Judge is only amenable to be scrutinized by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Once it is exclusively assailable under Article 227 of the constitution of India, no intra-Court appeal is maintainable. As such, jurisdiction under Article 227 is distinct from the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. A letters patent appeal or an intra-Court appeal in respect of an order passed by the learned Single Judge dealing with the order arising out of proceeding from the civil court would not lie before the Division Bench. No writ can be issued against the order passed by the civil court, and therefore, no letters patent appeal will be maintainable. 17. In Rabindranath @ Rabindranath Jena v. Bijaya Kumar Bhuyan & ors. 2016 (II) ILR –CUT-28, this Court has already taken into consideration the maintainability of the writ appeal while considering the provisions contained under Section 31 of the Odisha Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 and this Court has taken similar view as has been held by the apex Court in Jogendrasinhji Vijaysinghji (supra) which has also been taken note of judgment of the apex Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423 and this Court has also taken similar view in Smt. Swarnaprava Pattnaik @ Das v. Dibakara Satpathy (Dead) through L.Rs. Lilly Satpathy @ Panda and others (Writ Appeal No.346 of 2012) dismissed on 08.12.2016 since the order passed by the learned Single Judge by exercising power under Article 227 of Constitution of India, the writ appeal is not maintainable. 18. Considering the law laid down by the apex Court as well as this Court, as discussed above, we are of the considered view that, as the learned Single Judge, while deciding W.P.(C) No. 25031 of 2011, has exercised the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the present writ appeal is not maintainable. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondent no.1 is thus answered in his favour. Since we have held that the writ appeal is not maintainable, we are not inclined to enter into the merits of the case. 19. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed as not maintainability. No order as to cost.