ORDER : K. Ravichandrabaabu, J. 1. (i) Application No. 8191 of 2015 is filed seeking for the following relief: "To pass an order, directing the respondent herein, to disclose the details of fixed assets and bank accounts (along with the credit balance in the same) held by them in India?" (ii) Application No. 8192 of 2015 is filed seeking for the following relief: "To pass an order, directing the respondent herein to furnish security to a sum of Us$ 3,087,432.36/- as on 19.12.2015 as per award dated 25.08.2015 and additional award 25.10.2015, within such time as may be directed by this Hon'ble Court, failing which this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an order of attachment of the bank account of the respondent in ING Vysya Bank, Mount Road, Branch, vide Current Account number CA A/c. No. 407011007792 (Amended as per order dated 29.02.2016 in Appln. No. 991 of 2016. (iii) Application No. 8193 of 2015 is filed seeking for the following relief: "To pass an order directing the respondent herein an order directing the respondent to furnish security to a sum of US$. 1,582,789.19/- as on 19.12.2015, within such time as may be directed by this Hon'ble Court, failing which this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an order of attachment of the bank account of the respondent in ING Vysya Bank, Mount Road Branch, vide current Account number C. A/c No. 407011007792' (Amended as per order dated 29.02.2016 in Appln. No. 992 of 2016). All these applications are filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. The case of the applicant is as follows: (i) The applicant is engaged in the business of providing marine services and supply vessels to the Indian Oil and Gas Offshore Sector. The respondent is an entity incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, USA and it is a foreign company and it is the wholly owned subsidiary of M/s. Hardy Oil and Gas PLC, UK. The applicant was the owner of the Vessel MV Jade, an Indian flag vessel. The respondent chartered the said vessel from the applicant by entering into a Time Charter party dated 26.07.2007, hereinafter called as 'the contract'. The firm period of the charter party was upto 31.07.2010 and the respondent had the option to extend the period by two times, one year each. The respondent chartered the said vessel from the applicant by entering into a Time Charter party dated 26.07.2007, hereinafter called as 'the contract'. The firm period of the charter party was upto 31.07.2010 and the respondent had the option to extend the period by two times, one year each. The rate of Hire was US$ 3,584.00 per day and 90 days of hire was payable, in case of early termination. The Charter Party was extended for two further periods. The respondent availed the applicant's Vessel acting on behalf of ONGC, HOEC and TPL and therefore, the respondent is liable to pay the charter hire for the Vessel. However, the respondent did not pay the charter higher and hence, dispute arose between the parties and as per the Arbitration clause contained in the Contract, the dispute was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. (ii) The Arbitral proceedings was conducted before the Honourable Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three Arbitrators. The respondent participated in the Arbitration and filed their statement of defence. On 25.02.2015, the Arbitral Tribunal passed the award. Certain inadvertent errors in the award passed were pointed out vide Application under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Tribunal and the same was allowed and necessary corrections were effected and the additional award dated 29.10.2015 was passed in furtherance to the award already made on 25.02.2015. Thus, it was held by the Tribunal that the respondent herein is liable to pay the applicant a sum of UDS 1,332,875.12/- within interest at the rate of 5% per annum from 19.03.2012 on USD 1,332,875.12/- until payment or recovery. (iii) The applicant issued a notice of demand dated 17.11.2015 to the respondent to pay the award amount. Till date, no payment has been made. Hence, in order to protect the interest of the applicant and to secure the award amount, the applicant has filed the present applications seeking for interim protection. (iv) The respondent is a foreign company and the applicant is not aware of its financial position or its assets in India. The respondent is under grave financial difficulties. According to the holding Company's Annual Report for the financial year as on 31.03.2015, the respondent company, for its operations in India has suffered an Operating Loss of 23,462.641 which has increased drastically from the previous years loss of $. The respondent is under grave financial difficulties. According to the holding Company's Annual Report for the financial year as on 31.03.2015, the respondent company, for its operations in India has suffered an Operating Loss of 23,462.641 which has increased drastically from the previous years loss of $. 2,845,229 and the respondent has shown no Operating Income, including from its India assets, in the financial year ended 2014 and year ended 2015. According to the Annual Report, the India segment has borrowings of $. 106,682,121 against Nil income and their India operations have been shut down since 2011. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent's parent company Hardy Oil has shown a total loss after taxation for the period has been US$. 4,793,638. It's total assets for the year ending 31.03.2014 was USD 123,233,116/- and has considerably reduced to US$ 98,978,935/-. It is also pertinent to state that the total current liability for the year ending 31.03.2014 was US$ 4,984,155/- which increased to USD 5,041,782/-. However, the respondent has got no tangible assets in India to the knowledge of the applicant. Hence, the applicant is also seeking to call upon the respondent to give a statement of its assets in India. The applicant apprehends that since the respondent is a foreign company with no known assets in India and no operating income, the prospects of recovering the said arbitral award from the respondent may be very difficult unless the award amount is secured by this Hon'ble Court by exercising its powers under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This Hon'ble Court has the right to call upon the respondent to disclose the assets owned by them. No prejudice would be caused to the respondent, if they disclose the said list of assets, subject to the payment of the award amount to the applicant herein. The balance of convenience is in favour of the applicant and grave prejudice and injury would be caused if the respondent does not furnish security towards the arbitral award amount in favour of the applicant. If interim protection as prayed for pending executing of the award dated 25.08.2015 and 25.10.2015 is not given, the applicant will not be able to execute the award and this will frustrate the process of justice. 3. If interim protection as prayed for pending executing of the award dated 25.08.2015 and 25.10.2015 is not given, the applicant will not be able to execute the award and this will frustrate the process of justice. 3. A common counter is filed by the respondent wherein it is stated as follows: These applications are abuse of process of this Court. In the guise of seeking interim protection, the applicant is indirectly trying to execute the Award. The relief sought for is not in the nature of interim protection. The applicant has failed to make out a case for grant of an order in these applications. Mere non-payment of the award amount by the respondent itself will not constitute cause to initiate proceedings for interim protection. The applicant has not averred or established that the respondent is about to dispose of its assets with a view to defeat the enforcement of the award. The averment with regard to the financial difficulties of the respondent are without merits. None of the grounds necessarily and mandatorily required under law to sustain a claim for furnishing security has been pleaded. The cash and cash equivalent held by the respondent herein is in excess of USD 21 million which is far higher than the claim of the applicant. The India operations of the respondent have not been shut down since 2011. The respondent has three off-shore oil and gas assets, CY-OS-90/1 (OY-3 field)-18% partnered with ONGC, Tata Petrodyne Limited (TPL) and Hindustan Oil exploration co. (HOEC); GS-OSN-2000/1(GS-01) -10% partnered with reliance industries; and CY-OS/2-75% partnered with GAIL. The accounts of the respondent provide for the above mentioned oil and gas assets value of $5.8, $5.0 and $51.1 million respectively. With such large exploration assets within the Country, the allegation of the applicant that the respondent has no operations in India since 2011 is clearly wrong. No case has been made out that there is any attempt on the part of the respondent to dissipate its assets or move or transfer it assets outside the jurisdiction of the Indian courts. The factum of the respondent being a foreign company cannot be a ground for seeking that relief of furnishing security. No case has been made out that there is any attempt on the part of the respondent to dissipate its assets or move or transfer it assets outside the jurisdiction of the Indian courts. The factum of the respondent being a foreign company cannot be a ground for seeking that relief of furnishing security. The respondent has been successful in an International Arbitration in CY-OS/2 block and based on the award passed in favour of the Respondent, there is an contingent revenue to the extent of US$ 45.6 million net to the respondent as of 31st March 2015 to be received from Government of India on execution of the Award. The respondent has no intention to defeat the award as alleged by the applicant. 4. A rejoinder affidavit is filed on behalf of the applicant wherein it is stated as follows: As per their own statements, in the half yearly results as on 30th September, 2015, the said parent company was holding cash and short term investments of USD 19.3 million and not USD 21 million as falsely claimed by the Respondent, which is a diminishing balance. The tangible assets of the respondent herein being the Indian entity are not separately shown in any of the Annual Reports of the parent company Hardy Oil and Gas PLC. The last available accounts of the Respondent pertains to the financial year 2011-2012 Annual Accounts, for year ending 31st March, 2012, where the Tangible assets are purported to be approximately $7 million. There are no updated figures for the subsequent financial years. That the PY-03 field has been shut since July, 2011 and as such, there has been no income from that field since that date. The total operating income for Hardy in previous years (prior to accounting year 2011-2012) was derived only from this one oil producing field. The last available Audited Annual Report 2011-2012 of the Respondent company, as on 31st March, 2012, their cash and cash equivalents were approximately $2.9 million. The report is not indicative of how much of this is encumbered cash against bank guarantees issued to the Government of India, and how much is free cash. The applicants have no access to any Audited Accounts for years beyond 2011-2012, hence they are unable to confirm the current unencumbered cash and cash holdings of the respondents. 5. Mr. The report is not indicative of how much of this is encumbered cash against bank guarantees issued to the Government of India, and how much is free cash. The applicants have no access to any Audited Accounts for years beyond 2011-2012, hence they are unable to confirm the current unencumbered cash and cash holdings of the respondents. 5. Mr. A.R.L. Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant in all these applications, apart from reiterating the factual contentions raised in the applications further submitted as follows: (i) The respondent is a Company registered at Delaware USA, a subsidiary of UK Company called Hardy Explosion. They do not have any immovable asset in India. Since the award is passed, the interest of the applicant has to be protected by ordering these applications. The documents filed in support of these applications annexed in the typed set of papers would show that the respondent company is in loss. Therefore, unless these interim reliefs are granted, the applicant will not be in a position to enjoy the fruits of the award when it is put into execution. When the applicant is not in a position to specify the property, against which, they are seeking protection by way of furnishing security or attachment, it is for the respondent to state the assets owned by them. The power in this Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act can be exercised before the commencement of the Arbitral proceedings or during the pendency of such proceedings or after an award is passed and before the same is to put into execution. Therefore, this Court can exercise power under Section 9, even after the award is passed in this case. The principle contemplated for exercising the power under Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. cannot be applied to the present case, since such provision under C.P.C. is to be exercised before the judgment and decree are passed in the suit. Once, the decree is passed, the same analogy or principle as applicable under Order 38 Rule 5, cannot be pressed into service and different yardstick has to be applied. The application under Order 21 Rule 41 C.P.C. seeking for furnishing of the assets from the defendant can be made even before filing the Execution Petition and it is an independent action. Such power is therefore, available under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as well. The application under Order 21 Rule 41 C.P.C. seeking for furnishing of the assets from the defendant can be made even before filing the Execution Petition and it is an independent action. Such power is therefore, available under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as well. The applicant is not seeking any harsh remedy against the respondent and disclosing assets is not going to cause any hardship or prejudice. (ii) In support of this submission, learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions. An unreported decision of this Court made in O.A. No. 598/2013 and A. No. 3575 of 2013 dated 23.10.2013,2014(3) Bombay (CR) 624, 2013 (3) Bombay (CR) 205 (Tata Capital Financial Services Limited v. M/s. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited). 6. Per contra, Mr. Vijayanarayanan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, after inviting this Court's attention to various provisions under the C.P.C. as well as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, submitted as follows: (i) The Power under Section 9(2)(b) of the said Act is to be exercised only for securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration. Therefore, the principle applicable to Order 38 Rule 5 has to be followed, while considering the application under Section 9, as well. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC can be exercised only when the defendant intends to obstruct or delay the execution of the decree; when the defendant is about to dispose of whole or any part of his property in order to defeat the interest of the decree holder and the defendant should be removing the part of the property from the jurisdiction of the Court. No pleadings were made to that effect by the applicant and therefore, no ingredients are made out for exercising and passing Order under Section 9(2)(b), which power is equal to the one under Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. The obligation to disclose the asset by the respondent would arise, as contemplated under Order 21 Rule 41 CPC, only during the execution of the proceedings and disclosure of assets cannot be sought for as an interim way of protection under Section 9(1)(e). Therefore, these applications are filed indirectly to achieve the execution of the award. Funds are about 46 million dollar available with the respondent company and therefore, the apprehension of the applicant is baseless, as the same is an outcome of non-verification of the accounts in full. Therefore, these applications are filed indirectly to achieve the execution of the award. Funds are about 46 million dollar available with the respondent company and therefore, the apprehension of the applicant is baseless, as the same is an outcome of non-verification of the accounts in full. The respondent company is a debt free company and they are not going to run away from their liability. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied on the following decisions. (ii) 2007 (7) SCC 123 (Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd.), unreported decision of this Court made in Application No. 686/2010 dated 19.4.2013 (Kris Heavy Engineering v. PNHB LANCO KHEQ, 2012 (1) CTC 225 , unreported decision made in OSA. No. 231/2011 dated 27.7.2011, 2014 SCC Online Gujarat 6737 (Essar Oil limited v. United India Insurance Company Limited), 2001 SCC Online Bombay 583 (Saraswat Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Chandrakant Maganial Shal & others), 2008-1-L.W. (Crl.) 623 : 2008 (8) SCC 305 (Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryoti Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd.), Unreported decision made in Application Nos. 1850 & 1851/2015 dated 09.10.2015 (Madura Costs (P) Ltd. v. Kaveri Gas Power Ltd. & another). 7. I have heard the learned senior counsel appearing on either side and carefully perused the materials placed before this Court as well as the respective case laws cited by them. 8. The point for consideration in these applications is as to whether the applicant is entitled to the reliefs sought for herein. Insofar as Application Nos. 8192 and 8293/2015 are concerned, the applicant seeks for a direction to the respondent to furnish security. Insofar as Application No. 8191/2015 is concerned, the applicant is seeks for a direction to the respondent to disclose the details of assets and bank accounts held by them within this country. 9. In respect of the dispute arose between the parties arising out of the respective agreement entered into between them, proceedings were initiated by constituting an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three retired Judges of the Honourble Supreme Court and the applicant herein made claim petition before such Tribunal and ultimately, an award came to be passed on 25.08.2015 later corrected on 25.10.2015. The said award is put to challenge before this Court in O.P. No. 111/2016, at the instance of the respondent herein. The respondent therein took time to file counter and thus, the same is pending. The said award is put to challenge before this Court in O.P. No. 111/2016, at the instance of the respondent herein. The respondent therein took time to file counter and thus, the same is pending. Therefore, neither the merits and contentions of rival parties in respect of the claim made before the arbitral Tribunal nor the sustainability of the award passed thereafter, can be gone into in these applications, as they are to be considered and decided only in the said main O.P. However, these applications were filed by the applicant independently under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on 18.12.2015, immediately after passing of the award and well before the filing of the said main petition challenging the said award. Therefore, this Court has to now see as to whether the applicant has made out a case for grant of these interim reliefs, keeping in mind that these applications are filed subsequent to the passing of the award. 10. It is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant that the applicant is entitled to get these reliefs since their claim before the Arbitral Tribunal has been accepted and resulted in passing an award in their favour and therefore, pending realisation of the award, the interest of the applicant has to be protected by passing orders on these applications. He further contended that the respondent company, to the knowledge of the applicant, is not having any assets or bank accounts within this country and therefore, for the purpose of securing the interest of the applicant by way of attaching those properties, if the applicant fails to furnish securities, disclosure of those details of fixed assets and bank accounts of the respondent which are held by them within this country is highly essential. By contending so, the learned senior counsel relied on the provisions made under Order 21 Rule 41 C.P.C. and submitted that filing of an application under such provision can be done independently even before filing the execution petition and that since similar power is conferred under section 9 of the above said Act, the present application is also maintainable. It is his further contention that the principle applicable to the application filed under Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. cannot be made applicable to the present case, since these applications are, admittedly, relatable to post award reliefs. It is his further contention that the principle applicable to the application filed under Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. cannot be made applicable to the present case, since these applications are, admittedly, relatable to post award reliefs. It is his further contention that even assuming that the respondent is not intending to alienate or dispose of its property, a direction to furnish securities can always be made once an award is passed. In support of such submission, learned senior counsel relied on the unreported decision of the learned single Judge of this Court, made in O.A. No. 598/2013 and Application No. 7535/2013 dated 23.10.2013 wherein at paragraph No. 30, it is stated as follows: "Therefore, I am of the view that though the respondent does not appear to be alienating or disposing its property within a view to delay and obstruct the execution of the award against them, the financial position of the company is weakening day by day. Therefore, even without a voluntary act on the part of the respondent, to delay and defeat the rights of the applicant, the position of the company may become so weak that the amounts payable cannot be recovered. In such circumstances, a direction to the respondent to furnish security is inevitable." A decision of Bombay High Court reported in 2013 (3) Bombay CR 205 (Tata Capital Financial Services Limited v. M/s. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited) and 2014 (3) Bombay CR 624 (Tata Capital Financial Services Limited v. M/s. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited) are relied on by the learned senior counsel for the applicant in support of his submissions for disclosure of assets. 11. On the other hand, the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent is that when none of the material averments are pleaded and established before this Court as required under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC, directing the respondent to furnish security, does not arise. Insofar as the claim for disclosure of assets is concerned, it is his contention that such exercise can be made only during the execution proceedings of the award and not by way of making any independent application that too under Section 9. In other words, according to him, such disclosure of assets is not a relief of an interim measure or way to protect the rights of the applicant as contemplated under Section 9 of the said Act. In other words, according to him, such disclosure of assets is not a relief of an interim measure or way to protect the rights of the applicant as contemplated under Section 9 of the said Act. Learned senior counsel for the respondent relied on 2007 (7) SCC 125 (Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd.) to contend that power under Section 9 is not an independent right but should go with the principles governing C.P.C. At paragraph No. 21 of the said judgment, it has been observed as follows: "Therefore, on the whole, we feel that it would not be correct to say that the power under Section 9 of the Act is totally independent of the well-known principles governing the grant of an interim injunction that generally govern the courts in this connection." 12. Learned counsel relied on the decision reported in 2008-1-L.W. (Crl.) 623 : 2008 (2) SCC 305 (Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd.) and an unreported decision of the learned single Judge of this Court made in Application No. 686/2010 dated 19.4.2013 in support of his contention that this Court can pass orders under Section 9 of the said Act only when the condition stipulated under Order 38 Rule 5, are fulfilled. Further reliance is placed on the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2012 (1) CTC 225 (C.S.S. Corp Pvt. Ltd. v. Space Matrix Design Consultants Pvt. Ltd.) in support of the contention that in the absence of any specific averments that the respondent is acting in a manner to defeat the award, no interim order directing furnishing security can be passed. In paragraph No. 20, the Honourable Division Bench had observed as follows: "20. Of course the power under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act is wide. Interim order passed under Section 9 of the Act is a drastic order. In the decision of the Bombay High Court relied upon by the respondent, National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia v. Sentrans Industries Limited, AIR 2004 Bom. 136 , the court has held that the court has to keep in mind the drastic nature of such arm order. Clear case has to be made out not only on the merits of the claim, but also the Applicant should establish that denial of order would result in grave injustice to the party seeking protection. 136 , the court has held that the court has to keep in mind the drastic nature of such arm order. Clear case has to be made out not only on the merits of the claim, but also the Applicant should establish that denial of order would result in grave injustice to the party seeking protection. The statutory discretion given to the court under Section 9(ii)(b) of the act must be exercised judicially in accordance with the established legal principles and having regard only to the relevant considerations. In the absence of any specific averment that Appellant is having obstructive conduct or that acting in a manner to defeat the award, no interim order directing furnishing security could be passed. 13. An unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court made in OSA. No. 231/2011 dated 27.07.2011 is relied on to contend that granting an interim orders under section 9 of the said Act, cannot be a matter of routine. Paragraph No. 11 of the said decision reads as follows: 11. Therefore, it is evident from the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court that whenever the powers of the court are invoked with the objective of supporting the arbitration, the courts must act cautiously. The Court would not be justified in granting interim orders and relief merely for the asking of it. In fact, if a similar analogy is worked out in case of attachment of immovable property and seeking security under Order 38 Rule 5 of CPC, the Honourable Supreme court as well as this court have time and again held that the intention of the parties to deprive the other party from enforcing the decree should be manifestly clear, pleaded, proved and orders of attachment cannot be granted as a matter of routine. The same principle will also apply to the cases governing Section 9 of the Act. Here is a case where the appellant has not made out any case or produced any material to show that there is an apprehension or danger that the amount could not be recovered by them form the respondent, especially when the appellant alleged that the respondent is going to start a new company in India itself for the very same purpose. Under those circumstance, we are of the considered view that the learned Judge is right in hold holding that the application filed by the appellant under Section 9 of the Act was filed only with an intention to mount pressure on the respondent to settle the amount, we do not find any reason, much less justifiable reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Judge. 14. The Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in 2014 SCC Online Gujarat 6737 and 2015 (3) GLH 28 (Essar Oil limited v. United India Insurance Company Limited) is sought to be relied on by the learned senior counsel for the respondent to contend that powers under section 9 of the Arbitration Act has to be exercised by the Court, guided by the provisions of C.P.C. AIR 2002 Bombay 203 (Saraswat Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Chandrakant Maganial Shal & others); the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court is relied on to contend that passing an order of attachment before judgment is not to be made lightly based on bald averments, since such attachment would lead to serious consequences to the debtor. An unreported decision of this Court (order passed by me) made in Application Nos. 1850 and 1851/2015 in O.P. No. 225/2015 dated 09.10.2015 is relied on to contend that once an award is challenged under Order 34, the same becomes unexecutable and consequently, no interlocutory orders can be passed. At paragraph No. 15 of the said order, it has been observed as follows: In 2004 (1) SCC 540 , National Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Prasateel & Fabrications (P) Ltd., the Apex Court observed that an award when challenged under section 34 within the time stipulated therein, becomes unexecutable and there is no discretion left with the court to pass any interlocutory order except to adjudicate on the correctness of the claim made by the applicant therein. No doubt, the said observation of the Apex Court is in respect of the power and duty of the court under section 34 of the above said Act, whereas section 9 of the said Act contemplates that the court is empowered to exercise its jurisdiction to protect the interest of the parties even after an award is passed and before, it is executed under section 36. On facts, as this court finds that there is no necessity to issue any such direction as sought for in these applications as the applicant has not made out any case for grant of such direction, the above applications deserve to be rejected. 15. I have given careful consideration of all the above submission. These applications are filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is an admitted fact that in this case the award has been passed already and the present applications are filed thereafter. There cannot be any dispute to the position of law with regard to the scope and ambit of Section 9 of the said Act, that this Court can exercise the power conferred under such provision and grant interim reliefs by way of interim measure, either before initiation of arbitration proceedings or during the pendency of such proceedings and even after passing of an award and however, before its execution under section 36. Therefore, the exercise of power under section 9, even after passing an award, cannot be construed as an enforcement of the award in any manner. Equally, it should be kept in mind that enforcement is a different action from the action of securing or protecting for effecting such enforcement. 16. It is mainly contended by the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the applicant has not made out a case by making specific averments as contemplated under Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. seeking for furnishing security. As both sides have elaborately advanced their arguments mainly on this aspect of law, it is for this Court to go into such legal aspect and express its view on the same. First of all, I would like to point out that the scope of exercising power under Order 38 Rule 5 C.P.C. and the relevancy of the requirement of material averments to be made in support of an application made under such provision, cannot be equivated with an application filed in respect of a matter where a decree is already passed in the suit. Undoubtedly, the applications under Order 38 Rule 5are filed seeking for attachment before judgment and therefore, it goes without saying that at the time of making such application, the rights of the parties to the suit are yet to be crystalised, established or determined. Undoubtedly, the applications under Order 38 Rule 5are filed seeking for attachment before judgment and therefore, it goes without saying that at the time of making such application, the rights of the parties to the suit are yet to be crystalised, established or determined. However, only based on the apprehension of the plaintiff that the defendant is either trying to dispose of the property or remove the same from the jurisdiction of this Court so as to defeat the interest of the plaintiff, in the event of conferring a decree in his favour by the Court, at a later point of time, such application under Order 38 Rule 5 is entertained and decided. Therefore, the material averments which are essential are certainly to be made by the applicant in support of his apprehension and justify his prayer. At that stage, the Court is not called upon to decide the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant in the suit. On the other hand, it is only a protective action of the Court to safeguard the interest of the plaintiff as an interim measure before deciding the merits of the suit. In fact, the very language used under Order 38 Rule 5 would show that power under such provision of C.P.C. is to be exercised by the Court when the Court is satisfied, during the pendency of the suit, that the defendant would obstruct or delay the execution of 'any decree that may be passed against him', by indulging in disposing of the whole or any part of his property or about to remove whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Court. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the purpose of exercising such power under the above said provision is only to protect the plaintiff's interest by preventing the defendant from obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree that may be passed against him. Thus, at that stage, the right of the plaintiff having not been crystalised, established or determined, he is certainly bound to satisfy the Court that the defendant's action would obstruct or delay the execution of an 'expected decree'. Thus, at that stage, the right of the plaintiff having not been crystalised, established or determined, he is certainly bound to satisfy the Court that the defendant's action would obstruct or delay the execution of an 'expected decree'. On the other hand, such is not the position, where a decree is passed and the plaintiff's right is established, crystalised, determined and declared by the Court by making a judgement and decree in the suit after conducting full fledged trial. In fact, pursuant to the decree, the status of the parties gets altered from the one of plaintiff and defendant to the one of decree holder and judgment debtor. Certainly, both status are not equal, since the plaintiff, after becoming the decree holder, is having an upper hand. At that stage, the question of considering the intention of the defendant to obstruct or delay the execution or the requirement of the plaintiff to satisfy the Court and establish such intention, does not arise. Needless to say that when a decree is passed, unless and until the same is set aside or modified or stayed by the Appellate Forum, the judgment debtor is bound to honour the decree, not necessarily only when the same is put into execution. In fact, while passing a decree in favour of the plaintiff, it is not the requirement or intention of law that the defendant can wait to honour the decree till it is put into execution. On the other hand, if the defendant is not aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, he is duty bound to honour the same, without waiting for the plaintiff to put such decree into execution by following the other procedures contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. But the ground reality is otherwise, which this Court is also fully aware of. Therefore, it is not right on the part of the respondent to contend that the applicant has not made out a case for furnishing security, in these applications. Admittedly, an award came to passed after contest and no doubt, the same is put to challenge before this Court. It is also not in dispute that this Court has not granted any interim stay of such award. Admittedly, an award came to passed after contest and no doubt, the same is put to challenge before this Court. It is also not in dispute that this Court has not granted any interim stay of such award. Hence, pending adjudication of the petition challenging the award, the applicant who got the award in their favour is entitled to seek for protection of their right, not based on any apprehended action of the respondent, but as a matter of right, since they are already armed with an award, delaying of its execution would undoubtedly cause hardship to them. 17. I have already pointed out that either directing the respondent to furnish security or passing any other order as an interim measure to protect the interest of the applicant pursuant to the passing of award, cannot be construed as a measure of execution. Needless to say that if the security is furnished, both the parties are entitled to an appropriate relief depending upon the final outcome of main petition in respect of the security so furnished during its pendency. Therefore, interest of the parties are only protected and not affected. 18. In fact, except the two decisions, all other decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the respondent are cases where Order 38 Rule 5 CPC was the appropriate application filed in those proceedings, since finality of the claim of the respective parties has not reached. Therefore, when the rights of the parties are yet to be decided, rightly, the principle applicable under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC was applied in those cases. When such being the position, I do not think that those decisions will help the respondent in any manner in respect of the present case on hand. 19. No doubt, the other two decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the respondent are in respect of post award matters. When such being the position, I do not think that those decisions will help the respondent in any manner in respect of the present case on hand. 19. No doubt, the other two decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the respondent are in respect of post award matters. Insofar as the decision of the Gujarat High Court reported in 2014 SCC Online Gujarat 6737 (Essar Oil Limited v. United India Insurance Company Limited) is concerned, though it is stated therein that the Court exercising power under Section 9 of the said Act either in pre-award or post-award situation has to be guided by the provisions of C.P.C. such as Order 38 Rule 5 CPC, the Division Bench at paragraph 6.2 of its decision left the larger question open as to whether while exercising powers under section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the provisions of CPC stricto senso would apply for or not. It is also to be noted at this juncture that the principle contemplated under Order 21 Rule 41 CPC and its applicability to proceedings under Section 9 has not come up for consideration in that case. 20. The other decision relied on by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent is made in Application Nos. 1850 and 1851/2015. First of all, it is to be noted that the said decision came to be made by following the earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of applications filed pending main O.P. challenging the award, admittedly, filed earlier to the amendment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Therefore, in my considered view, the said decision of this Court cannot be of any binding value more particularly, under the circumstances that the amendment of the Act came into effect subsequent to the said decision bringing lot of changes in the scheme of the Act. Further, the points raised in this case, viz., the scope of Order 38 Rule 5 and Order 21 Rule 41 CPC and argued elaborately were not raised and considered in detail in that case. Therefore, as I find that the above order is also factually distinguishable apart from the fact that the same came to be passed earlier to the amendment, the said decision will not help the respondent in any manner. 21. Therefore, as I find that the above order is also factually distinguishable apart from the fact that the same came to be passed earlier to the amendment, the said decision will not help the respondent in any manner. 21. It is to be noted that what is sought for herein is not an attachment before judgment but an attachment after judgment. Therefore, when a decree is made, such a decree itself imposes a mandate on the judgment debtor to comply with the decree without there being a demand made by the plaintiff. On the other hand, after the decree, if the defendant fails to honour the same, even after a demand is made, certainly, the decree holder is entitled to call upon the judgment debtor to furnish security or in failure, to attach the properties. In this case, after the award was made on 25.08.2015 followed by the additional award dated 25.10.2015, the applicant has issued a demand notice on 17.11.2015 to the respondent. Since the respondent has not come forward to honour the decree even after such demand is made, the present applications seeking furnishing of security are filed, which, in my considered view, cannot be said as inappropriate. 22. Insofar as the other application seeking for furnishing details of the assets and bank accounts are concerned, admittedly, the respondent is a foreign company and the applicant has stated that they are not having any details with regard to such assets owned by the respondent. Therefore, they filed the present application and seeks the details of assets and bank accounts owned by the respondent in India. This application is opposed by contending that such course of action is available only during the execution proceedings and not by way of an independent action, that too, under Section 9 of the said Act. 23. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to Order 21 Rule 41 of C.P.C., which reads as follows: 41. Examination of judgment-debtor as to his property- (1) Where a decree is for the payment of money the decree-holder may apply to the Court for an order that? 23. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to Order 21 Rule 41 of C.P.C., which reads as follows: 41. Examination of judgment-debtor as to his property- (1) Where a decree is for the payment of money the decree-holder may apply to the Court for an order that? (a) The judgment-debtor, or (b) [where the judgment-debtor is a corporation], any officer thereof, or (c) any other person, be orally examined as to whether any or what debts are owing to the judgment-debtor and whether the judgment-debtor has any and what other property or means of satisfying the decree; and the Court may make an order for the attendance and examination of such judgment-debtor, or officer or other person, and for the production of any books or documents. [(2) Where a decree for the payment of money has remained unsatisfied for a period of thirty days, the Court may, on me application of the decree-holder and without prejudice to its power under sub-rule (1), by order require the judgment-debtor or where the judgment-debtor is a corporation, any officer thereof, to make an affidavit stating the particulars of the assets of the judgment-debtor. (3) In case of disobedience of any order made under sub-rule (2), the Court making the order, or any Court to which the proceeding is transferred, may direct that the person disobeying the order be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding three months unless before the expiry of such term the Court directs his release.] 24. First of all, a perusal of the above provision would show that the attachment contemplated herein is not the one and the same as has been done under Order 38 Rule 5C.P.C. Undoubtedly, the attachment referred to under Order 21 Rule 41 is in pursuance to the decree. Though an attempt is made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent that such an application can be filed only during the course of the execution proceedings, I am unable to appreciate such contention for the reason that the details of assets sought for in this application is not to execute the award but to attach the same, when the respondent fails to furnish security to the claim made by the applicant. Needless to state that attachment should follow, if the respondent fails to furnish such security as ordered by the Court within the time stipulated. Needless to state that attachment should follow, if the respondent fails to furnish such security as ordered by the Court within the time stipulated. No doubt, in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, though it is stated that the respondent has Offshore Oil and Gas assets, appears to be within this country and sought to give some details of the same, the value of those Offshore Oil and Gas assets with clear cut details and description has not been given, especially when it is contended by the applicant that they are not aware of the details of such assets. Therefore, it is necessary for the respondents to furnish those details. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent made an attempt to contend that the application seeking for furnishing of details of assets cannot be construed as an interim measure or interim relief contemplated under section 9 of the said Act. I am not convinced to accept the said contention for the reason that those details are sought for by the applicant only to seek for consequential or follow up relief in the event of the respondent's failure to furnish securities. Therefore, as the relief sought for in this application is having a direct bearing on the relief sought for in the other applications seeking for furnishing securities, it cannot be said that this relief seeking for details of the assets is outside the scope of Section 9. Therefore, I find that the application filed seeking for details of the assets is also maintainable. Accordingly, all the applications are allowed. (a) The respondent is directed to furnish security in Application No. 8192/2015 for a sum of US$. 3,087,432.36/- as on 19.12.2015 as per award dated 25.08.2015 and additional award dated 25.10.2015 and also to furnish security in Application No. 8193/2015 for a sum of US$. 1,582,789.19/- as on 19.12.2015 within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order to the credit of O.P. No. 111/2016 pending on the file of this Court. (b) The respondent is directed to furnish details of the fixed assets and bank accounts held by them in India to the applicant within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.