JUDGMENT : S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. This appeal is against an order passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench, Mumbai, dated 17th December, 2015. 2. The application for stay was dismissed because the appellant failed to comply with the mandatory condition of pre-deposit of 7.5% of the tax amount demanded. The Tribunal relied upon the amended section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which was brought on the Statute Book with effect from 6th August, 2014. The present appeal, which raises substantial questions of law, is, therefore, admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- (1) The right of appeal being a vested right, whether the provisions of law as applicable at the commencement of the lis would apply or the amended provisions as on the date of filing of appeal would apply. (2) Whether the second proviso to the amended section 35F can be interpreted as providing expressly or by necessary intendment that amended section 35F would apply to all appeals filed after 6.8.2014, even if the lis in respect of the same has arisen prior to 6.8.2014. (3) Whether the amended section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944, w.e.f. 06.08.2014, reduces or puts fetters upon the vested right of appeal that an appellant has or the same increased the scope of the appellate package, thereby not impinging upon the vested right of the appellant? 3. With the consent of both sides and since a short point is involved, we took up the appeal for hearing and final disposal. It is, therefore, disposed of, by consent, finally by this order. 4. The appeal is preferred by the assessee who entered into an agreement dated 28th February, 2006, with the Board of Cricket Control in India (“BCCI” for short). In terms of this agreement, it was granted a licence of media rights on an exclusive basis in respect of international cricket matches, test matches and one day internationals conducted by the BCCI from 2006 to 2010. The licence authorised the appellant to uplink to the satellite, the live coverage of the match for the purpose of broadcasting it on television and internet. The claim of the appellant is that it sub-licensed its television rights to the entities mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Memo of Appeal by an agreement dated 1st March, 2006. The licence authorised the appellant to uplink to the satellite, the live coverage of the match for the purpose of broadcasting it on television and internet. The claim of the appellant is that it sub-licensed its television rights to the entities mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Memo of Appeal by an agreement dated 1st March, 2006. There was an enquiry and investigation into this deal and on completion thereof, a show cause notice was issued to the appellant alleging that the transaction amounts to a taxable service rendered in terms of section 65(55a) of the Finance Act of 1994, and, therefore, the appellant ought to have discharged the service tax liability to the tune of Rs.246,22,73,817/- under the head of Intellectual Property Services. It is claimed that a reply was filed denying these allegations and contending that it was no taxable service. However, the adjudicating authority was not satisfied and on a personal hearing being granted, upheld the demand and imposed equivalent penalty. That order-in-original dated 16th June, 2015, was challenged by way of an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short “CESTAT”). An application was made before the CESTAT and it was claimed that the un-amended provision would apply and that would govern the appeal. If that governs the appeal, then, there is no requirement of deposit and a mandatory one of 7.5% of the tax amount demanded but there is a discretion in the Tribunal to waive this condition of pre-deposit on the appellant satisfying it that there is a strong prima facie, case and that undue hardship would be caused in the event the stay is refused. 5. Upon such an application, after hearing both sides, the Tribunal opined that the amended provisions are clear. Once there is a proviso and styled as second proviso to the sub-section of section 35F and so long as that governs and holds the field, it will not be possible to agree with the appellant. Holding thus and following the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ganesh Yadav vs. Union of India, 2015 (39) Excise Tax Reporter 177, the Tribunal directed compliance with the amended section 35F and failing which it held that the appeal is not maintainable and dismissed it. 6. It is this order which is challenged before us in this further appeal. 7. Mr. 6. It is this order which is challenged before us in this further appeal. 7. Mr. Dada, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant invited our attention to the facts and submitted that there is an appellate package and if that appellate package is not applicable to the appellant's case as the lis in the case of the appellant commenced in the year 2008, then, the Tribunal's view is patently erroneous and unsustainable. Mr. Dada submits that there is a vested right of appeal and that cannot be curtailed by a subsequent amendment. He would submit that the Tribunal's view and which is to be found in paragraph 9 of the impugned order is manifestly incorrect inasmuch as it did not appreciate the nature of the right vesting in the appellant before this Court, the impact of the amendment to the law. The right is a package, then, that appellate package could not have been destroyed by relying upon a subsequent provision. Mr. Dada would submit that if the vested right could be curtailed by an express enactment or necessary intendment, but in the present case, the explanatory note to clause 98 of the Finance Act of 2015 by which section 35F was amended has been wrongly applied by the Tribunal. That explanatory note could not have been applied because it suggested that the amended provision would apply to appeals filed after 6th August, 2014. The finding of the CESTAT is based on a complete misreading of this explanatory note. The second proviso to amended section 35F only clarifies what is a obvious position in law. That proviso cannot be read to mean that the amended section 35F would apply to all appeals filed after 6th August, 2014. That is not the intention of the legislature. The proviso only takes care of an ambiguity and present to the mind of the adjudicating authorities. Therefore, that could not have been applied and to refuse the stay application or the prayer of stay in terms of the request incorporated in the stay application. For all these reasons, he would submit that the view taken by the Tribunal be interfered with and, therefore, its order be set aside. 8. Mr. Dada has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions. For all these reasons, he would submit that the view taken by the Tribunal be interfered with and, therefore, its order be set aside. 8. Mr. Dada has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions. (1) Super Threading (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2015 (323) ELT 119 (P&H) (2) Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2015 (320) ELT 51 (Ker.) (3) Ganesh Yadav vs. Union of India, 2015 (320) ELT 711 (All.) 9. On the other hand, Ms. Cardozo appearing on behalf of the Revenue would submit that there is no merit in the appeal. The view taken by the Tribunal is in consonance with the amended section 35F and the second proviso thereto. She would submit that once the legislative intent is apparent and is expressed in plain and unambiguous language, then, there is no scope for any interpretation. This is not a case of right of appeal being curtailed or taken away or rendered illusory. It is only that the appeal cannot be entertained by the Tribunal unless the tax demand and to the extent of 7.5% is secured by the assessee. The condition, as imposed, is reasonable, fair, just and not at all excessive or onerous. Therefore, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order and proceed to dismiss the appeal. Apart from the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Ganesh Yadav (supra), Ms. Cardozo also brings to our notice the order passed by the High Court of Madras in the case of Dream Castle vs. Union of India Writ Petition No. 13431 of 2015 and Writ Appeal No. 1424 of 2015 decided on 18th April, 2016. 10. Apart from the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Ganesh Yadav (supra), Ms. Cardozo also brings to our notice the order passed by the High Court of Madras in the case of Dream Castle vs. Union of India Writ Petition No. 13431 of 2015 and Writ Appeal No. 1424 of 2015 decided on 18th April, 2016. 10. For properly appreciating the rival contentions, we would make a reference to the power and conferred in the Tribunal vide section 35F as it stood prior to its amendment and post amendment, which read thus:- SECTION 35F PRIOR TO AMENDMENT:- “Section 35F: Deposit, pending appeal, of duty demanded or penalty levied - Where in any appeal under this Chapter, the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of goods which are not under the control of the Central Excise authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, the person desirous of appealing against such decision or order shall, pending the appeal, deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied: Provided that where in any particular case, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to such person, the Commissioner (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Appellate Tribunal, may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interests of the revenue. Provided further that where an application is filed before the Commissioner (Appeals) for dispensing with the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied under the first proviso, the Commissioner (Appeals) shall where it is possible to do so, decide such application within thirty days from the date of its filing. Explanation - For the purposes of this section “duty demanded” shall include:- (i) amount determined under section 11D; (ii) amount of erroneous Cenvat credit taken; (iii) amount payable under rule 57CC of Central Excise Rules, 1944; (iv) amount payable under rule 6 of Cenvat Rules, 2001 or Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 or Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; (v) interest payable under the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder.” SECTION 35F POST AMENDMENT: “Section 35F. Deposit of certain percentage of duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal - The Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals), as the case may be, shall not entertain any appeal:- (i) under sub-section (1) of section 35, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half percent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of a decision or an order passed by an officer of Central Excise lower in rank than the Principal Commissioner of Central Excise or Commissioner of Central Excise; (ii) against the decision or order referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against; (iii) against the decision or order referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35B, unless the appellant has deposited ten per cent of the duty, in case where duty or duty and penalty are in dispute, or penalty, where such penalty is in dispute, in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against: Provided that the amount required to be deposited under this section shall not exceed rupees ten crores: Provided further that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the stay applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014. Explanation - For the purposes of this section “duty demanded” shall include:- (i) amount determined under section 11D; (ii) amount of erroneous Cenvat credit taken; (iii) amount payable under rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2001 or the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 or the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.” 11. By the un-amended provision it is apparent that where in any appeal under the Chapter in which section 35F falls, the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of the goods which are not under the control of the Central Excise authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, the person desirous of appealing against such decision or order shall, pending the appeal, deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied. However, by the proviso which is the proviso No.1, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal has discretion and if he or it is of the opinion that the demand of duty or penalty would cause hardship, then, he or it may dispense with such deposit subject to any conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interest of the Revenue. Then, by the second proviso, where an application is filed for dispensing with the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied, then, the Commissioner (Appeals), wherever it is possible to do so, decide such application within thirty days from its filing. We are not concerned with the further part of section 35F, namely, the explanation. 12. Now, by the amended provision, there is a clear legislative mandate that the appeal shall not be entertained under sub-section (1) of section 35 unless the appellant has deposited seven and a half per cent of the duty demanded or penalty imposed or both in pursuance of a decision or an order passed by an officer of the Central Excise lower in rank than the Commissioner of Central Excise. Against the decision or order referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 35B unless the appellant has deposited the said percentage of duty or penalty and in relation to any appeal which is postulated by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 35B unless the appellant has deposited ten per cent of the duty demanded or penalty imposed in pursuance of the decision or order appealed against. However, the first proviso makes it clear that the amount required to be deposited under this section shall not exceed rupees ten crores and the second proviso is very important for our purpose. It states that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the stay applications and appeals pending before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of the Finance Act No.2 of 2014. It is common ground that the date of the commencement of this Finance Act is 6th August, 2014. It is further common ground that section 35B provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal whereas by section 35F what is contemplated is deposit of certain duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal. It is common ground that the date of the commencement of this Finance Act is 6th August, 2014. It is further common ground that section 35B provides for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal whereas by section 35F what is contemplated is deposit of certain duty demanded or penalty imposed before filing appeal. By section 35F as amended, the Tribunal or the Commissioner, as the case may be, shall not entertain any appeal unless compliance is made of the above condition. 13. Although the second proviso clarifies and amply that the section itself will not apply to the stay application and pending appeals before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of the Finance Act No.2 of 2014, it is urged by Mr. Dada that an appellate package flowing from section 35B cannot be interfered with in such a way so as to nullify the vested right of appeal or to make it illusory. 14. The three judgments that Mr. Dada relies upon, are commencing with an interim order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Super Threading (supra). There, on a writ petition, the argument was that the requirement of pre-deposit in terms of the instructions to deposit seven and a half per cent of the duty and/or penalty should not be entertained. The petitioner before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana relied upon an order passed by a learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the case of Muthoot Finance Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2015 (320) ELT 51. The High Court of Punjab & Haryana did not assign any independent reasons, but following this view of the Kerala High Court, directed that the appeal shall not be treated as not maintainable on account of the failure to deposit the amounts as per amended section 35F. The Court did not explain the ambit and scope of this provision. 15. In Muthoot Finance, the petitioner before the single Judge of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam challenged an order of confirmation of demand of the service tax and penalty. The petitioner was engaged in the business of lending money and we are not concerned with the merits of that matter. The argument was that there is an alternate remedy available of filing an appeal. The petitioner was engaged in the business of lending money and we are not concerned with the merits of that matter. The argument was that there is an alternate remedy available of filing an appeal. However, that could not be entertained unless the appellant/petitioner before the High Court of Kerala complies with the condition imposed by the amended section. The argument was that the settled law that the institution of a suit carries with it an implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit and the date of institution of the suit or proceeding would be the governing law to be applicable to the vested right of appeal. The law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of filing of the appeal would not be the governing law. The landmark decision in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 and M/s. Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. reported in AIR 1953 SC 221 was applied. The Kerala High Court went by the principle of commencement of lis. 16. The argument here also is that the lis commenced even before the show cause notice was issued which, in any event, was issued in the year 2012, but there was three and a half year time lag in its adjudication. It is no fault of the appellant and that is why the governing law would be the one which was prevailing at the date of commencement of the lis and not the one which was sought to be applied by the Tribunal. 17. This view is consistently taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of an appeal guaranteed by section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That is an appeal to challenge an original decree and judgment of the trial court in a suit. As far as that is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that the law applicable on the date of commencement of the lis would be the governing law and would continue to govern even the vested right of appeal guaranteed by section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. As far as that is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that the law applicable on the date of commencement of the lis would be the governing law and would continue to govern even the vested right of appeal guaranteed by section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. As against this, we have a view which has been taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In the case of Ganesh Yadav, the service tax demand confirmed by the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Allahabad, was sought to be impugned. The argument was that even if the appellate remedy can be resorted to that is rendered illusory by a mandatory requirement of pre deposit of seven and a half per cent and, therefore, a declaration was claimed that such a mandatory prescription is ultra vires or unconstitutional. 19. The Division Bench, speaking through the then Hon'ble Chief Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, took up for consideration the challenge. It referred to all the judgments including the one which have been relied upon before us. The Allahabad High Court in paragraphs 9 and 10 considered this larger challenge and after referring to the judgments, some of which have been relied upon by Mr. Dada, held as under:- “17. Thus, the principle of law which emerges is that the right of appeal is a vested right and the right to enter a superior Court or Tribunal accrues to a litigant as on and from the date on which the lis commences although it may actually be exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. Such a right is governed by the law which prevails on the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of the decision or on the date of the filing of an appeal. Moreover, the vested right of an appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 18. Moreover, the vested right of an appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 18. Justice G.P. Singh in his treatise on Statutory Interpretation has succintly elucidated the principles to be applied in determining whether a statute is retrospective or not, in the following words: "(ii) Statutes dealing with substantive rights - It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is "deemed to be prospective only 'nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis [2 c. Int. 392]." In the words of LORD BLANESBURG, "provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment." "Every statute, it has been said", observed LOPES, L.J., "which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect". As a logical corollary of the general rule, that retrospective operation is not taken to be intended unless that intention is manifested by express words or necessary implication, there is a subordinate rule to the effect that a statute or a section in it is not to be construed so as to have larger retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. In other words close attention must be paid to the language of the statutory provision for determining the scope of the retrospectivity intended by Parliament." (Emphasis supplied) 19. Parliament while substituting the provisions of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 by Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, has laid down that the Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals) "shall not entertain any appeal" unless the appellant has deposited the duty or, as the case may be, a penalty to the stipulated extent. Parliament while substituting the provisions of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 by Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, has laid down that the Tribunal or the Commissioner (Appeals) "shall not entertain any appeal" unless the appellant has deposited the duty or, as the case may be, a penalty to the stipulated extent. These words in Section 35F of the Act would indicate that on and after the enforcement of the provision of Section 35F of the Act, as amended, an appellant has to deposit the duty and penalty as stipulated and unless the appellant were to do so, the Tribunal shall not entertain any appeal. This provision would, therefore, indicate that it would apply to all appeals which would be filed on and from the date of the enforcement of Section 35F of the Act. 20. The intendment of Section 35F of the Act is further clarified by the second proviso which stipulates that the provisions of the section shall not apply to stay applications and appeals which were pending before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of Finance (No.2) Act, 2014. The second proviso is a clear indicator that Parliament has exempted the requirement of complying with the pre-deposit as mandated by Section 35F (1) of the Act as amended only in the case of those stay applications and appeals which were pending before any appellate authority prior to the commencement of Finance (No.2) Act, 2014. Consequently, both by virtue of the opening words of Section 35F(1) of the Act as well as by the second proviso to the provision, it is clear that appeals which are filed on and after the enforcement of the amended provision on 6 August 2014 shall be governed by the requirement of pre-deposit as stipulated therein. The only category to which the provision will not apply that would be those where the appeals or, as the case may be, stay applications were pending before the appellate authority prior to the commencement of Finance (No.2) Act, 2014.” 20. The Division Bench thus clarified that the prescription that the Tribunal or the adjudicating authority shall not entertain any appeal would apply to all appeals which would be filed on and from the enforcement of section 35F. The Division Bench thus clarified that the prescription that the Tribunal or the adjudicating authority shall not entertain any appeal would apply to all appeals which would be filed on and from the enforcement of section 35F. In paragraph 20, the Division Bench held that by virtue of the opening words of section 35F(1) as well as by the second proviso, it is clear that appeals which are filed on or after the enforcement of the amended provision of 6th August, 2014, shall be governed by the requirement of pre-deposit as stipulated therein. The only category to which the provision would not apply would be those appeals and stay applications which were pending prior to the commencement of the Finance Act No.2 of 2014. The Division Bench expressed its disagreement with the view of the Kerala High Court. The Division Bench held that the express language of the amended provisions of section 35F(1), particularly the provisos cannot be ignored. 21. Having perused this judgment of the Division Bench and its reasoning, we are clear that section 35F cannot be held to be unconstitutional. Section 35F only ensures that the appeal shall not be entertained unless the amount to the extent mentioned therein is secured. The interest of the Revenue which has to be secured was the paramount consideration in both the un-amended and amended provision. Now there is a specific stipulation and the extent to which the interest of the Revenue has to be secured is also clarified. Once there is a clear indication from the language of the Statute and which is plain and unambiguous, then, we do not think that the view taken by the Kerala High Court can be accepted. We would prefer to agree with the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ganesh Yadav (supra). This is not a case where the principle in Garikapatti Veeraya (supra) relied upon by Mr. Dada can be applied and for the reasons which have been assigned by the Allahabad High Court. 22. The view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in Dream Castle (supra), with respect, is also in consonance with the statutory prescription and the intent. It has referred to all the decisions in the field and the rival contentions. 22. The view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in Dream Castle (supra), with respect, is also in consonance with the statutory prescription and the intent. It has referred to all the decisions in the field and the rival contentions. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and all other judgments, including of the Kerala High Court have been extensively referred to. The independent reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras is, with respect, rightly construing and interpreting the statutory provision. As held by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, the substantive provision section 35F after its amendment, is not capable of any other interpretation. Though the second proviso was referred, but the Division Bench independent thereof, agreed with the contention of the Revenue which is that the amended provision would have to be applied to all such appeals as falling within the second proviso. 23. We also arrive at the same conclusion and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to reproduce each and every paragraph from the judgment of the High Court of Madras. Once we broadly agree with Ms. Cardozo that the prescription as is carved out by section 35F would apply to all such appeals and stay applications as are referred to in the second proviso, then, it is not possible to agree with the appellant's senior counsel. More so, when the order-in-original was challenged in appeal which is filed in this case after 6th August, 2014 and the stay application was also after this date. Hence, the amended section is rightly applied to the above undisputed factual position. 24. We do not think that any provision of the nature pointed out in this appeal defeats or renders the vested right of appeal illusory. A very reasonable condition has been imposed and that, to our mind, in no way affects the vested right of appeal. 25. For the aforesaid reasons, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. We dismiss the appeal. There will be no order as to costs. 26. At this stage, Mr. Dada learned senior counsel submits that this Court should grant six months time to the appellant to comply with the statutory requirement and deposit the seven and a half per cent of the demand of duty and/or penalty in terms of the amended provision. There will be no order as to costs. 26. At this stage, Mr. Dada learned senior counsel submits that this Court should grant six months time to the appellant to comply with the statutory requirement and deposit the seven and a half per cent of the demand of duty and/or penalty in terms of the amended provision. This request is opposed by Ms. Cardozo. 27. Having heard both sides on this point, we direct that if the appellants deposit the sum mandated by section 35F(1) with its provisos within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, the Tribunal shall entertain the said appeal and decide it on merits and in accordance with law. On failure, its earlier direction would stand and then it will not be open for the appellant to avail of the appellate remedy. We would not extend this time under any circumstances.