JUDGMENT Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant on disposal of delay condonation application no. 89598/2016 in filing the second appeal (def.) no. 87 of 2016, and perused the records. 2. Original suit no. 927/2004 (Rameshwsar v. Omkar) for specific performance of contract was dismissed by the ex-parte judgment dated 25.8.2007 by Civil Judge (SD), Agra. Thereafter Civil Appeal No. 104 of 2007, Rameshwar v. Omkar was preferred and in which judgment of trial court dated 25.8.2007 was set aside and original suit was decreed for the relief of Specific Performance of Contract Act. 3. Civil appeal no. 104 of 2007, Rameshwar v. Omkar was preferred against the judgment of trial court, which was heard and allowed by the judgment dated 20.08.2009 of the Additional District Judge, Court No.-5, Agra, by which the judgment of trial court dated 25.8.2007 was set aside and original suit was decreed for the relief of specific performance of contract. Then present second appeal was preferred against the judgment of the first appellate court by the defendant of original suit. 4. The memorandum of present appeal was filed on 16.03.2016, which was beyond 6 years and 119 days after lapse of period of limitation. The grounds of delay condonation are mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 5 of affidavit of appellant Omkar, which are quoted as under: "2. Because deponent appeared in appeal filed by the plaintiff but it was detected in 2008 that son of deponent namely Dharmendra is suffering from Cancer and deponent remain busy in his treatment and could not attend the court and unfortunately in 2014 son of deponent expired. 3. Because due to mental shock deponent could not file appeal before this Hon'ble Court and now he is filing the present second appeal and it may be treated within time. 4. Because it was due to circumstances beyond the control of deponent that appeal could not be filed within time. 5. Because delay in filing the present appeal is not deliberate and it was due to circumstances that appeal could not be filed within time". 5. If facts of affidavit are correct then the son of appellant was ill since year 2008, i.e. before the judgment dated 20.8.2009 passed by lower appellate court. 5. Because delay in filing the present appeal is not deliberate and it was due to circumstances that appeal could not be filed within time". 5. If facts of affidavit are correct then the son of appellant was ill since year 2008, i.e. before the judgment dated 20.8.2009 passed by lower appellate court. It is not explained that if for about one year after detection of alleged ailment of cancer, appellant had contested the first appeal without any problem, then how the same ailment prevented him to file second appeal. If averments of affidavit are taken to be correct then son of appellant had died in year 2014. Even after that unnecessary time has been taken by appellant in filing memorandum of second appeal without any explanation for the same. It is nowhere mentioned in the affidavit that during ailment of his son from year 2008 till filing of memorandum of second appeal in this Court in the year 2016, the appellant was not in a position to prosecute his litigation in lower appellate court or before this Court. Such plea could not be taken by him because he had been contesting the appeal in lower appellate court for long time after detection of the alleged ailment of cancer in year 2008. Therefore in the same way he could prosecute his litigation and prefer second appeal within time before this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that appellant contended that delay in filing this appeal was not deliberate and intentionally so it should be condoned. The grounds for delay condonataion are mentioned in paragraphs 2 to 5 of affidavit of applicant/appellant as above, which makes it clear that the non filing of the appeal within period of limitation was willful and deliberate act of appellant, and contentions of learned counsel for the appellant in this regard are found found incorrect and unacceptable. 7. In Popat and Kotech Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Hon'ble Apex Court had held as under: - "7. The period of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken writ diligence and to prevent oppression. 7. In Popat and Kotech Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510 , Hon'ble Apex Court had held as under: - "7. The period of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken writ diligence and to prevent oppression. The statute i.e. the Limitation Act is founded on the most salutary principle of general and public policy and incorporates a principle of great benefit to the community. It has, with great propriety, been termed a statute of repose, peace and justice. The statute bar discourages litigation by burying in one common receptacle all the accumulations of past times which are unexplained and have not from lapse of time become inexplicable. - - - 9. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time. - - -" 8. In Damodaran Pillai & others v. South Indian Bank Ltd., AIR 2005 S.C. 3460 , Hon'ble Apex Court had held as under: - "14. It is also trite that the civil court in absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court cannot invoke its inherent power. 15. It is also trite that the civil court in absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court cannot invoke its inherent power. 15. It is well settled that when a power is to be exercised by a civil court under an express provision, the inherent power cannot be taken recourse to." "20. The principles underlying the provisions prescribing limitation are based on public policy aiming at justice, the principles of repose and peace and intended to induce claimants to be prompt in claiming relief. 21. Hardship or injustice may be a relevant consideration in applying the principles of interpretation of statute, but cannot be a ground for extending the period of limitation." 9. This legal position is explicitly clear that the principles underlying provisions of limitation are based on public policy aiming that justice should be furnished to all the parties and hardship or injustice may be relevant consideration in applying the discretion for condoning the delay. But such hardship of both the parties should be considered. In condoning the delay beyond period of limitation provided by the statute there must be cogent and satisfactory reasons. Such reasons are lacking in present matter. 10. The application for condonation of delay has been moved by appellant under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under: "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 11. There is period prescribed for initiation of every legal proceedings in Limitation Act, and such period may be extended in accordance with mandatory provisions of the Act. The said provisions of Section-5 make it explicitly clear and mandatory that an application for extension of prescribed period of limitation may be allowed only if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Courts that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. The said provisions of Section-5 make it explicitly clear and mandatory that an application for extension of prescribed period of limitation may be allowed only if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Courts that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As discussed above, for deciding the matter of limitation not only the case of applicant/appellant should be considered, but the principles underlying the provisions the Act, which are based on public policy alongwith hardship and injustice to other party should also be considered. In the present matter, every consideration leads to inference against applicant-appellant. It has also been proved that applicant-appellant had failed to satisfy this Court that he had sufficient cause for filing the second appeal; therefore under the provisions of Section-5 of Limitation Act his application for condonation of delay in filing second appeal should not be allowed. In absence of any reasonable or sufficient ground, the Delay Condonation Application is liable to be rejected. 12. In view of the above, the grounds for condonation of delay of about six and a half years in filing second appeal against the judgment of first appellate court are not sufficient. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay on behalf of appellant-applicant is hereby dismissed.