JUDGMENT & ORDER : S. Serto, J. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 11.8.2015 passed by the District Magistrate, Bishnupur, respondent No.1, whereby and where under the respondent No1, in exercise of powers conferred under sub section (3) of section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, passed the order of detention in Cril.1/NSA/DM.BPR/2016 against the detenu namely Heisnam Ibomcha Singh after being satisfied that in order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order it has become necessary to do so. 2. The grounds on which order of detention was passed are that the detenu joined a banned organization namely Kanglei Yaol KanbaLup (KYKL) in April, 2001 at the instance of one Angom Inaocha @ Nanao @ Chinglemba of Phayeng Sabal Leikai. After the detenu joined the said organization, he started giving shelter to the members of the said banned organization in his house where they used to conceal arms and ammunitions. Subsequently, when the detenu was found in possession of illegal arms, he was arrested in connection with Moirang PS case No.38(5) 2001 instituted u/s 10/13 UA(P) Act and 25(1-B)of the Arms Act. In course of time, the detenu was released on bail but again started working for the said organization and therefore in the year 2010 he was again arrested in connection with Moirang PS Case No.100(7) 2010 instituted u/s 20 UA(P) Act. However, he was released. After being released, the detenu stayed at his home started leading normal life but in May, 2014 he again came in contact of self-styled Sgt. Major Ningthoujam Ningthem Singh and again re-joined the said organization. After joining the detenu, as per the instruction of said N. Ningthem Singh, started raising fund for the said organization by extorting money from the people. In that process, detenu extorted money from Dr. K. Modhu Singh and also from Moirang College and Moirang Block Office. Further case is that in the first week of Aug/2014 one R.K. Raghunath handed over two hand grenades along with some money through some unknown women to hurl it at the house of M. Prithvi Raj, the then MLA as he had refused to pay money. K. Modhu Singh and also from Moirang College and Moirang Block Office. Further case is that in the first week of Aug/2014 one R.K. Raghunath handed over two hand grenades along with some money through some unknown women to hurl it at the house of M. Prithvi Raj, the then MLA as he had refused to pay money. On 10.8.2014 the detenu called one S. Abung @ Umesh Singh to his house and instructed him to hurl hand grenade at the house of M. Prithvi Raj Singh. This work was to be done by said Umesh Singh along with one H. Somen Singh. Accordingly, the detenu handed over two hand grenades and also some cash for doing the said act. Accordingly, on 11.8.2014 at 7:35 PM they hurled one hand grenade at the court yard of M. Prithvi Raj which got exploded for which Moirang PS case No.60(8)14 was registered u/s 307/427/326/34 IPC and also u/s 20 UA(P)Act and 3 Expl. Subs.Act. On 14.6.2015 said H. Somen Singh was arrested by a police team of CDO/ Bishnupur who disclosed about the manner in which the act has been done and accordingly S. Abung @ Umesh Singh was arrested. On their disclosure one grenade was seized from the house of detenu and thereby a case was registered as Moirang PS case No.59(6)/15 u/s 20 UA(P) Act and 5 Expl. Subs. Act. The detenu was arrested in the said case and then he was also remanded in a case arising out of Moirang PS case No.60(8)14. 3. On such ground the respondent No.1, after recording that the detenu, a member of the banned organization, KYKL is acting in the manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, passed order of detention on 11.8.2015. A copy of the detention order was served along with the grounds of detention upon the detenu while he was lodged in Jail. Order of detention was approved on 20.8.2015 and it was confirmed on 7.9.2015. The aforesaid order of detention and its approval as well as confirmation have been challenged on several grounds. 4. A copy of the detention order was served along with the grounds of detention upon the detenu while he was lodged in Jail. Order of detention was approved on 20.8.2015 and it was confirmed on 7.9.2015. The aforesaid order of detention and its approval as well as confirmation have been challenged on several grounds. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner did confine his argument with respect to only one ground which is with regard to materials being absent for recording the satisfaction by the detaining authority that there is every possibility of detenu being released on bail and therefore any order of detention based on such satisfaction without having any basis would suffer from illegality. 5. As against it Ms. Manomala, learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that from the order of detention it would appear that the Detaining Authority after having taken notice of the facts that the detenu, an accused in the case, has filed an application, has recorded in the grounds of detention that the detenu having availed bail facilities would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and only after recording such satisfaction the order of detention has been passed which never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. Learned counsel went on submitting that even if satisfaction as is required under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 is not reflected from the detention order but if the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents justifies the order of detention, the order of detention can never be taken to be bad. In this regard, learned counsel has referred to a decision rendered in a case of G. Reddeiah – Vrs – Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr; (2012) 2 SCC 389 . Learned counsel submitted that the order of detention was passed after due consideration of the fact including the police paper that possibility is there of the detenu being released on bail and that he would go on indulging himself continue involvement in the activities prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order after being released on bail and thereby order of detention never warrants to be quashed. 6. It goes without saying that in a case of preventive detention no offence is proved and justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability. 6. It goes without saying that in a case of preventive detention no offence is proved and justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability. There is no conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence; whereas Article 21 of the Constitution of India declares that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by a law. In such situation a machinery was definitely needed to examine the question of lawful detention with utmost promptitude. The applicant must show a prima facie case of his unlawful detention. Once, however, he shows such a cause and the return is not good and sufficient, he is entitled to be released by the High Court and Supreme Court upon issuance of writ of habeas corpus. 7. It be stated that the Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clause (1) & clause (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer and the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this deterrent law, the law of preventive detention is to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory and vital. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Rattan Singh –v- State of Punjab reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 853, wherein Their Lordships has observed: “4......... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralyzed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenu.” In this context, we may refer to another decision rendered in the case of Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh -Vrs –B.K. Jha, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 22 : 1987 SCC(Cri) 244 wherein it has been held: “5.. . . . . The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard.” 8. Keeping in view the said principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently in the case of Union of India –Vs- Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 : 2004 SCC(Cri) 239 recorded requirements to be made by the Detaining Authority passing order of detention when the detenu is in custody, which reads as follows: “14........Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated..... The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC(Cri) 88. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail.” 9. In that event at the cost of repetition, we may record that Detaining Authority while passing order of detention in a case of detenu being in custody, needs to observe following safeguards meticulously: (i) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (ii) If there is reason to believe on the basis of available materials placed before him – (a) that there is every possibility of being released; and (b) that on being so released he would be in all probability to indulge in prejudicial activities; (iii) If it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. 10. Thus, in the context of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have to examine as to whether aforesaid safeguards have been observed meticulously by the Detaining Authority who has passed the order of detention when the detenu was in custody. 11. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that accused was in custody. 11. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that accused was in custody. There has been no denial of the proposition of law that the order of detention can be passed in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of a criminal case. However, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Huidrom Konungjao Vs. State of Manipur & Ors (2012) 7 SCC 181 , it was held that if such detention order is challenged, detaining authority ought to satisfy the court following facts: (i) the authority was fully aware of the fact that detenu was actually in custody; (ii) there was reliable materials before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there is reliable possibility of release on bail and further on being released, he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to the public order. Further, it has been observed that in cases where this fact does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated. 12. In the light of the decision, if we examine the legality of detention order, we would find that the detaining authority, though has recorded that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail, but what are the materials on which such satisfaction was recorded, it is neither there in the order of detention or in the grounds of detention or in any other documents. Therefore, the impugned order of detention can be said to have been passed on mere ipse dixit statement which is not sustainable in the eye of law. 13. However, learned counsel by referring to a decision rendered in the case of G. Reddeiah –Vs – Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh (Supra) submits that even if satisfaction is not reflected from the detention order that would not render the detention order bad provided statements made in the affidavit justifies the order of detention. It was further pointed out in the instant case, it has been specifically pleaded in the affidavit-in-opposition that the order of detention was passed after due consideration of the fact that possibility is there of detenu being released on bail. Thereby the order of detention being quite legal never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. It was further pointed out in the instant case, it has been specifically pleaded in the affidavit-in-opposition that the order of detention was passed after due consideration of the fact that possibility is there of detenu being released on bail. Thereby the order of detention being quite legal never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. If we take into account the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India – Vs – Paul Manickam & Anr. (Supra), the learned counsel appearing for the State can be said to have wrongly construed the observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G. Reddeiah –Vs – Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh (Supra). In the said decision the observation which have been made upon which much emphasis have been given is there in para-22. Relevant portion of which reads as follows: “22. In a matter of detention, the law is clear that as far as subjective satisfaction is concerned, it should either be reflected in the detention order or in the affidavit justifying the detention order. Once the detaining authority is subjectively satisfied about the various offences labeled against the detenu, habituality in continuing the same, difficult to control him under the normal circumstances, he is free to pass an appropriate order under Section 3 of the 1986 Act by fulfilling the conditions stated therein......” 14. From such observation, one would never get that the safeguard laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India – Vs – Paul Manickam&Anr. (Supra),need not be observed by the Detaining Authority. Rather it has to be observed meticulously. Upon observance of such safeguards, if it requires justification that can be justified by way of affidavit. In this respect we would like to refer to a case of Elangbam Mangijao Singh – Vs – State of Manipur &Anr. decided by this Court in W.P.No.10 of 2013 wherein similar plea had been taken on behalf of the State. However Their Lordships did observe as follows: “17. When in this case, the basic requirement in so far as subjective satisfaction of the first limb itself was missing, then it cannot be substituted by mere production of the record in the form of affidavit before the court on the basis of law laid down in G. Reddeiah’s case. However Their Lordships did observe as follows: “17. When in this case, the basic requirement in so far as subjective satisfaction of the first limb itself was missing, then it cannot be substituted by mere production of the record in the form of affidavit before the court on the basis of law laid down in G. Reddeiah’s case. In our view, this is a case where we can hold that detaining authority failed to record its subjective satisfaction on the first limb of the issue, namely that detenue was likely to be released on bail in near future in connection with the offense in which he was arrested, because as is clear, the detention order is silent on this issue.” 15. That apart, it be stated that in case of Reddeiah –Vs – Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (Supra), detenu on the day of passing of the detention order was never in custody rather, he had already been released on bail and therefore, the issue with respect to observance by the Detaining Authority of the safeguards enunciated in case of Paul Manickam & Anr. (Supra), regarding possibility being there of detenu being released was never there. And as such whatever observation has been made by Their Lordships in para-22 of the case of Reddeiah –Vs – Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (Supra) it can never be taken to be in respect to the issue involved in this case. 16. Thus, we do find that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority accused being released on bail is not based on any factual aspect and thereby order of detention being bad is hereby quashed. Consequently, the detenu namely Heisnam Ibomcha Singh, s/o (L) H. Iboton Singh of Moirang Shribon Leikai PS Moirang, District Bishnupur is directed to be released forthwith if he is not otherwise wanted in connection with any other case. This writ petition stands disposed of.