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2016 DIGILAW 1297 (GUJ)

Surat Vankar Sahakari Sangh Ltd. v. Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-5

2016-07-12

G.R.UDHWANI, K.S.JHAVERI

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'A' (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'), the assessee has preferred the present Tax Appeals assailing the following orders: Tax Appeal No. Date of Tribunal’s order ITA/CO No. Assessment Year 93 of 2008 01/05/07 3848/Ahd/2002 1991-92 94 of 2008 01/05/07 3849/Ahd/2002 1992-93 95 of 2008 01/05/07 3850/Ahd/2002 1993-94 96 of 2008 01/05/07 3851/Ahd/2002 1994-95 2. These matters were admitted by this Court for consideration of the following substantial question of law: TAX APPEAL No. 93 OF 2008 Whether the assessee co-operative society was entitled under sec. 80P(2)(d) of the entire interest of Rs. 10,17,976/- received by it from the cooperative Bank? TAX APPEAL No. 94 OF 2008 Whether the assessee co-operative society was entitled under sec. 80P(2)(d) of the entire interest of Rs. 9,97,298/- received by it from the cooperative Bank? TAX APPEAL No. 95 OF 2008 Whether the assessee co-operative society was entitled under sec. 80P(2)(d) of the entire interest of Rs. 12,19,538/- received by it from the cooperative Bank? TAX APPEAL No. 96 OF 2008 Whether the assessee co-operative society was entitled under sec. 80P(2)(d) of the entire interest of Rs. 9,01,062/- received by it from the cooperative Bank? 3. In all the four appeals, the common issue is grant of net deduction u/s. 80P(2)(d) of the Act, in respect of interest and dividend received by the assessee from co-operative societies i.e. bank in this case. The Assessing Officer allowed deduction u/s. 80P(2)(d) to the extent of net interest instead of gross interest as claimed by the assessee and disallowed the excess claim of deduction in this regard for all the years under consideration. The amount disallowed by the Assessing Officer and deduction granted by the Assessing Officer is tabularized and recorded as under: Particular Assessment Years 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 Dividend - From coop societies 9743 48000 3491 42674 Interest (As shown in the return of income) 1022699 1214259 1220756 902765 Deduction u/s. 80P(2)(d) of the Act as per return 1027719 1045298 1223026 943736 Disallowed by Assessing Officer 477863 640219 641273 76116 Deduction granted u/s. 80P(2)(d)of the Act by Assessing Officer 549856 405079 581753 867618 4. Mr. Mr. Manish Shah, learned advocate appearing for the assessee has drawn the attention of this Court to Sections 28, 36(1), 56, 57 and 80P of the Act and contended that same deductions were allowed in the previous years. He submitted that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Excel Industries reported in 358 ITR 295, the respondent could not have taken a stand different than previous year. He has also relied upon the following decisions: (I) Bai Bhuriben Lallubhai vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay North Cutch and Saurashtra reported in [1956] 29 ITR 543 (Bom) (II) Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Doaba Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd reported in [1998] 230 ITR 774 (P & H) (III) Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax reported in [1996] 220 ITR 194 (Guj). 5. Mr. Shah further submitted that the Tribunal in the case of Income Tax Officer vs. Petlad Taluka Purchase & Sales Union Ltd. reported in (1992) 42 ITD 442 has held that the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of the whole amount of interest from investments received by it. He submitted that the revenue has already accepted the said decision and has not challenged the same and therefore the stand taken by the revenue in the present case is contradictory in itself. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal and Another reported in [2001] 249 ITR 219 (SC) wherein the Apex Court has held that it was not open to the revenue to accept the earlier judgment in the case of one assessee and challenge its correctness without just cause in the case of the other assessees. 6. Mr. Sudhir Mehta, learned advocate appearing for the revenue has drawn the attention of this Court to the observations made by the Tribunal and contended that the same being just and proper does not call for any interference by this Court. He has drawn the attention of this court to the deductions granted by the Assessing Officer and submitted that the funds were borrowed for business purpose and therefore the assessee cannot get benefit of both the sections. He has drawn the attention of this court to the deductions granted by the Assessing Officer and submitted that the funds were borrowed for business purpose and therefore the assessee cannot get benefit of both the sections. He has relied upon the decisions in the following cases: (I) Sabarkantha Zilla Kharid V. Sangh Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income tax reported in 203 ITR 1027: (II) Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Surat District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Ltd reported in [1995] 211 ITR 726 (Guj) (III) Commissioner of Income tax vs. Rajasthan Rajya Sahkari Upbhokta Sangh Ltd reported in [1995] 215 ITR 448 (Raj) (IV) Commissioner of Income - tax - I, Lucknow vs. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Factories reported in [2013] 37 taxmann.com 58 (Allahabad) 6.1 Mr. Mehta submitted that the income exempted under Section 80P(2) has to be arrived at separately in order to determine the income under Section 80P(2) and it can never be envisaged that the total income which has been so received could be allowed without deducting the expenditure incurred in earning the income. He submitted that the authorities below have come to a concurrent finding and therefore this Court may not entertain the present appeal. 7. Heard learned advocates for both the sides. So far as the contention regarding the benefit given to the assessee for earlier years is concerned, we are of the opinion that the same is required to be accepted. The Apex Court in the case of Kaira District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. (supra) has held that however wide the socpe for taking action under Section 148 of the Income tax Act, 1961, it does not confer jurisdiction on a change of opinion as to the interpretation of a particular provision earlier adopted by the assessing authority. We are therefore of the opinion that the assessee when had been once granted the benefit of deduction for the earlier years, he should have been granted for the relevant assessment years also. 7.1 It is required to be noted that the Tribunal has not challenged the decision of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Petlad Taluka Purchase and Sales Union (supra) and thereby has accepted the same. 7.1 It is required to be noted that the Tribunal has not challenged the decision of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Petlad Taluka Purchase and Sales Union (supra) and thereby has accepted the same. The Apex Court in the case of Kaumudini Narayan Dalal (supra) has already held that it was not open to the revenue to accept the earlier judgment in the case of one assessee and challenge its correctness without just cause in the case of other assessees. Similarly, the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the point was otherwise covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Petlad Taluka Purchase and Sales Union (Supra) and even the revenue's Reference Application against the said decision was rejected. The Revenue has not challenged the said order further thereby accepting the same. Even on the said ground, the contention of the assessee is required to be accepted. 8. We have considered the decisions cited by learned advocate for the assessee as well as the revenue. We feel that the decisions cited by the learned advocate for the assessee shall be applicable on the facts of the present case. In the case of K. Nandakumar (supra), the Kerala High Court has held as under: "4. The effect of Section 80AB is that, for the purpose of computing the deduction under Section 80L, the amount of income of that nature as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act shall alone be deemed to be the amount of income of that nature. What the section means is that the net income by way of interest computed in the manner provided by the provisions of the Act shall alone be taken into account for computing the benefit. But it must be noted that payment of interest under a loan transaction incurred for the purpose of deriving income from business is not an item which arises in the computation of interest income "in accordance with the provisions" of the Act. The said amount has to be paid irrespective of whether any interest income is otherwise received or not. Though the interest is payable to the same bank, the fact remains that the amount of income by-way of interest is not calculated under the provisions of the Act with reference to such outgoings which fall under different heads. The said amount has to be paid irrespective of whether any interest income is otherwise received or not. Though the interest is payable to the same bank, the fact remains that the amount of income by-way of interest is not calculated under the provisions of the Act with reference to such outgoings which fall under different heads. The assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 37 of all expenditure incurred for the purpose of deriving the business income, and it is under that head that the interest paid on the loan taken from the bank is deducted. The net amount of interest contemplated by Section 80AB should take in the net amount arrived at after meeting the expenses deductible from that item under the provisions of the Act as explained above. That is not the case here. Therefore, Section 80AB has no application to the facts of these cases. The interest paid on the loan transactions has to be deducted from the business income, and not from the interest received from the bank on the fixed deposits. The assessees were therefore right in the submissions which they made before the Commissioner of Income-tax in the revision petitions which they filed. This aspect of the matter has been overlooked by the Commissioner in passing the order, exhibit P-5." 8.1 Similarly, in the case of Doaba Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held as under: "5. The contention of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, is that the Tribunal was wrong in allowing deduction under Section 80P(2) (d) of the Act because it is not established that the assessee had derived the interest by investing all the amount of surplus funds. It is further contended by Mr. Gupta that the assessee has paid interest to Jalandhar Central Co-operative Bank and has also received interest from the said cooperative bank, thereby showing that the assessee has on the aggregate paid interest to the bank and, therefore, no deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) can be allowed. To appreciate this argument, we have to look to the provisions of Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, For facility of reference, it is reproduced as under: "80P. (2)(d) in respect of any income by way of interest or dividends derived by the co-operative society from its investments with any other cooperative society, the whole of such income." 6. To appreciate this argument, we have to look to the provisions of Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, For facility of reference, it is reproduced as under: "80P. (2)(d) in respect of any income by way of interest or dividends derived by the co-operative society from its investments with any other cooperative society, the whole of such income." 6. So far as the principle of interpretation applicable to a taxing statute is concerned, we can do no better than to quote the by-now classic words of Rowlatt J., in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC [1921] 1 KB 64, 71: "... In a taxing Act, one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used," 7. The principle laid down by Rowlatt J., has also been time and again approved and applied by the Supreme Court in different cases including the one, Hansraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Customs, AIR 1970 SC 755 , 759. 8. Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act allows whole deduction of an income by way of interest or dividends derived by the co-operative society from its investment with any other co-operative society. This provision does not make any distinction in regard to source of the investment because this Section envisages deduction in respect of any income derived by the co-operative society from any investment with a co-operative society. It is immaterial whether any interest paid to the cooperative society exceeds the interest received from the bank on investments. The Revenue is not required to look to the nature of the investment whether it was from its surplus funds or otherwise. The Act does not speak of any adjustment as sought to be made out by learned counsel for the Revenue. The provision does not indicate any such adjustment in regard to interest derived from the co-operative society from its investment in any other co-operative society. Therefore, we do not agree with the argument advanced by learned counsel for the Revenue. In our opinion, the learned Tribunal was right in law in allowing deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of interest of Rs. Therefore, we do not agree with the argument advanced by learned counsel for the Revenue. In our opinion, the learned Tribunal was right in law in allowing deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of interest of Rs. 4,00,919 on account of interest received from Nawanshaln Central Co-operative Bank without adjusting the interest paid to the hank. Therefore, the reference is answered against the Revenue in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee." 8.2 Moreover, the Bombay High Court in the case of Bai Bhuriben Lallubhai (supra) has held that the purpose for which the assessee borrowed money had no connection whether direct or indirect with the income which she earned from the fixed deposit and that she was not entitled to the deduction claimed under Section 12(2). The High Court held that if an assessee had no option except to incur an expenditure in order to make the earning of an income possible, then undoubtedly the exercise of that option is compulsory and any expenditure incurred by reason of the exercise of that option would come within the ambit of section 12(2) of the Indian Income-Tax Act but where the option has no connection with the carrying on of the business or the earning of the income and the option depends upon personal considerations or upon motives of the assessee, that expenditure cannot possibly come within the ambit of Section 12(2). In the present case, the loan was taken for business purpose more particularly purchase of yarn and not for fixed deposits. 9. In view of the above, the questions raised in the present appeals are answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The order passed by the Tribunal is accordingly quashed and set aside.