ORDER : Invoking the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short ‘the Code’) the petitioner-company through its partner has moved this Court for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding including the F.I.R. being Vigilance P.S. Case No.20 of 2012 which was instituted under Sections 409, 420, 201, 109, 120B, 468 and 469 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act. 2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts which is relevant for the proper adjudication of the issue involved in this case, in short, is that on the basis of written report of one Ram Sagar, Deputy Director, Welfare Department, Govt. of Jharkhand, the aforesaid vigilance case was instituted with allegations that an area of 0.75 acres of Plot No.167 appertaining to Khata No.164 of Mouza-Kadri was transferred to the Welfare Department for construction of Haj House at an estimated cost of Rs.4,88,72,700/-. The work was handed over to be executed by the Jharkhand State Housing Board. Whereafter the construction work was started on 17.07.2007 but on 20.09.2009 when the casting of portico of the Haj House was going on, the entire structure of portico collapsed causing injury to nine labourers. Due to fall of the said portico, the authority presumed that construction of Haj House was sub-standard and irregularities have been committed by the engineers as well as contractors. Thereafter, the State Government handed over the investigation to Vigilance, who entrusted the inquiry to a Technical Expert Committee and the said Committee after inquiry submitted the report showing irregularity, negligence, lack of control over the construction work and non-approval of Architectural Drawing. On the basis of the said report, the aforesaid case was instituted as indicated above showing this petitioner and others as accused. 3. It would be proper to mention here that for the same offence one F.I.R. bearing Doranda/Argora P.S. Case No.371 of 2009 was earlier instituted immediately after the collapse of the portico by one Belal Khan as informant. However, during investigation of this case, the matter was handed over to the State Vigilance, whereafter the Vigilance Case No.20 of 2012 was instituted on 12.09.2012. The Vigilance Department started investigation based on the allegation made in the second F.I.R. and the investigation is still pending. However, during investigation of this case, the matter was handed over to the State Vigilance, whereafter the Vigilance Case No.20 of 2012 was instituted on 12.09.2012. The Vigilance Department started investigation based on the allegation made in the second F.I.R. and the investigation is still pending. Hence, this criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of entire criminal proceeding as well as the second F.I.R. lodged at the instance of Vigilance being Vigilance P.S. Case No.20 of 2012. 4. Mr. Kashyap, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner assailing the continuation of the criminal proceeding on the basis of the second F.I.R. as bad in law seriously contended that the investigating agency has to proceed only on the information about the commission of cognizable offence which is first entered in the police station diary under Section 154 of the Code and any subsequent F.I.R. or second F.I.R. information given to the police would be covered under Section 162 of the Code and so the continuation of the proceeding on the basis of second F.I.R. is an abuse of the power of court. It was also submitted that the duty has been cast upon the Investigating Officer not merely to investigate the cognizable offence reported in the F.I.R. but also include connected informations if found to have been committed in course of same transaction and the second information cannot be treated as an F.I.R. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on T.T. Antony Versus State of Kerala & Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 181 and the case Babubhai Versus State of Gujarat & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 254 . Learned senior counsel, Mr. Kashyap further contended that the petitioner was not even contractor appointed by any agency for the construction of the Haj House and even there is no document on record or any agreement or chit of paper that any payment was ever made to the petitioner out of the construction of the Haj House. It was also submitted that both the F.I.Rs. are arising out of the same incidence and the only difference between the two F.I.Rs. are that the first F.I.R. was lodged immediately after the incident by a private person of the locality and the second F.I.R. was lodged almost after three years at the instance of Department of Vigilance. It was also submitted that both the F.I.Rs. are arising out of the same incidence and the only difference between the two F.I.Rs. are that the first F.I.R. was lodged immediately after the incident by a private person of the locality and the second F.I.R. was lodged almost after three years at the instance of Department of Vigilance. The second F.I.R. was lodged under Prevention of Corruption Act besides the provisions of Indian Penal Code but none of the provision of Prevention of Corruption Act has any application against the petitioner as he is not a public servant. Further, relying upon Annexure-2 letter of Principal Secretary, Welfare Department, Government of Jharkhand enclosed with the rejoinder filed by the petitioner submitted that entire admitted amount of Rupees One Crore was sanctioned and given to the Jharkhand State Housing Board, Ranchi for the construction of Haj House and even in enquiry report submitted by Enquiry Committee which is Annexure-1 to the rejoinder, there is no whisper about the name of this petitioner though the committee has found several technical, architectural and structural defect and both the F.I.R. cannot run together. As such lodging of the second F.I.R. on the same allegations is not permissible in the eye of law and since it is not in conformity with the scheme of Cr.P.C., it is fit to be quashed. 5. Mr. Shailesh, learned counsel appearing for the Vigilance, per contra submitted that as the earlier F.I.R. was lodged at the instance of private person and there was no any subsequent progress in the investigation, subsequently the State Government decided to hand over the investigation to Vigilance and the second F.I.R. was lodged at the instance of Vigilance after preliminary enquiry. It was also submitted that at the nascent stage of investigation when prima facie there is ample material to show the complicity of the petitioner, merely on the basis of the fact that two F.I.Rs. are there, the entire criminal proceeding as well as the second F.I.R. cannot be quashed. Learned counsel further relying upon the case Nirmal Singh Kahlon Versus State of Punjab & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 441 wherein two F.I.Rs. are there, the entire criminal proceeding as well as the second F.I.R. cannot be quashed. Learned counsel further relying upon the case Nirmal Singh Kahlon Versus State of Punjab & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 441 wherein two F.I.Rs. were lodged first at the instance of State Vigilance and second by C.B.I. submitted that when new discoveries were made on factual foundations and larger conspiracy came on surface, it was open to the State to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is distinct and separate from the one for which F.I.R. had already been lodged. 6. In the instant case, admittedly, two F.I.Rs. have been lodged. First, at the instance of one private person of the locality, immediately after the alleged incidence and the second F.I.R. was lodged at the instance of the vigilance to whom the investigation work was handed over subsequently by the State Government which was lodged against several persons including the present petitioner for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 201, 109, 120B, 468 and 469 I.P.C. and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Hence, in that background, it is necessary to examine the rival contention raised before this Court. A question has come up for consideration before this Court whether the First Information Report lodged at the instance of the private person and another by the Vigilance Department of the State relates to the same cause of action? Here, I would like to discuss the two F.I.Rs. A bare perusal of the first F.I.R. dated 21.09.2009 lodged at the instance of informant Belal Khan bearing no. Doranda/Argora P.S. Case No.371 of 2009, it would appear that the same was lodged under Sections 406, 420, 120B, 288 and 337/34 I.P.C. with the allegation that he is the resident of Village Kadru in which the construction of Haj House was going on by the contractor, Md. Quaser Khan and in the said construction Government norms and estimates were ignored and several irregularities were there in the construction work. The information regarding irregularities were given to different authorities and also to the Manager, who is looking after construction work but they always ignored the grievances of the informant and other persons. Quaser Khan and in the said construction Government norms and estimates were ignored and several irregularities were there in the construction work. The information regarding irregularities were given to different authorities and also to the Manager, who is looking after construction work but they always ignored the grievances of the informant and other persons. It is also alleged that on 20.09.2009 at about 4.45 p.m. he saw that casting of portico of the Haj House was going on and almost 50-60 labourers were working, suddenly the entire portico collapsed causing injuries to several labourers. The said case was lodged against the accused persons namely contractor- Md. Quaser Khan, petty contractor Md. Nadim, Assistant Engineer, members of committee of Haj House. It was presumed that construction of the Haj House was sub-standard. Pursuant to the said F.I.R., the Investigating Officer proceeded to investigate and during investigation of the said case the second F.I.R. was lodged implicating Chief Engineer, Housing Board, Executive Engineer, Md. Sabbir Ali, Assistant Engineer, Housing Board, Anurag Kumar, Junior Engineer and the contractor- Md. Quiyamuddin Khan & Company, the petitioner relying upon the report submitted by technical expert committee which was made part of the second F.I.R. showing the involvement of the accused persons including the petitioner. Undoubtedly, two F.I.Rs. have been lodged with regard to the same incidence but the second F.I.R. was lodged by the Vigilance Department considering the discovery of new factual foundations and larger conspiracy part. Inspite of the offence being serious, the earlier investigation was not being done with all seriousness. Thereafter, vigilance took over the investigation after getting a new case separately registered which discloses not only the larger part of the conspiracy, misappropriation but also of forgery and offences under Prevention of Corruption Act with new factual foundation. In such a situation, lodging of second F.I.R. vis-a-vis continuation of criminal proceeding cannot be said to be illegal and abuse of process of the Court. In such a situation, lodging of second F.I.R. vis-a-vis continuation of criminal proceeding cannot be said to be illegal and abuse of process of the Court. In the case Nirmal Singh Kahlon (supra) as cited by learned counsel for the Vigilance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering almost a similar issue wherein the first F.I.R. was lodged at the instance of the Vigilance Department of the State Government and the second F.I.R. was lodged on the basis of a notification issued by the State Government handing over the investigation to C.B.I., held in Paragraph 67 of the said judgment as follows:- “The second F.I.R., in our opinion, would be maintainable not only because there were different versions but when new discovery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding, as for example, in a case of this nature. If the police authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of its investigation, in our opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it was open to the State and/or the High Court to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is distinct and separate from the one for which the F.I.R. had already been lodged.” Similarly in Ram Lal Narang Versus State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 2 SCC 322 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a case wherein two F.I.Rs. had been lodged. The first one form part of a subsequent larger conspiracy which came to light on receipt of fresh information. Some of the conspirators were common in both the F.I.Rs. and the object of conspiracy in both the cases was not the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the question as to whether investigation and further proceedings on the basis of both the F.I.Rs. was permissible held as follows:- “We are clear in the present case, that the conspiracies which are the subject matter of the two cases cannot be said to be identical though the conspiracy which is the subject matter of first case may, perhaps, be said to have turned out to be part of the conspiracy which is the subject matter of the second case.” 7. In the first F.I.R., though provision of conspiracy under Section 120B I.P.C. has been alleged but in the second F.I.R. besides clear allegation of larger conspiracy, provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act has also been added which is based on a report of technical expert committee. The canvass of the two F.I.Rs. is absolutely different and the numbers of accused are also different and the subsequent F.I.R. includes several engineers of different ranks also on the basis of larger conspiracy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Nirmal Singh Kahlon (supra) considering the scope of the two F.I.Rs. held in Paragraphs 57 and 58 as follows:- 57. The instant case, in our opinion, stands on a better footing vis-à-vis Ram Lal Narang in the sense that whereas the first F.I.R. did not make any allegation as regards existence of a conspiracy, the second F.I.R. did. The canvass of the two F.I.Rs. is absolutely different. The numbers of accused in both the F.I.Rs. are also different. 58. We must also bear in mind the distinction between crime committed by an individual or a group of persons vis-a-vis a scam which means „to get money or property from another, under false pretences, by gaining the confidence of the victim, also includes swindle; defraud. 8. Admittedly, the name of the petitioner also came in the list of accused persons in the second F.I.R. lodged at the instance of the Vigilance Department and on perusal of the case diary of the Vigilance Case No.20 of 2012, it appears that there are sufficient material to show that huge amounts have been given to Md. Quaser Khan of M/s Md. Quiyamuddin Khan & Company-the petitioner, in connection with the work done in Haj House and the signature of Md. Quaser Khan is also there on the payment receipts. It is also apparent from the case diary that for construction of big brick flat, soiling, P.C.C. and R.C.C. work huge amounts were made on different dates to the petitioner and the witnesses during investigation have all supported the fact that construction work was given to the petitioners company. So the statements of the witnesses clearly make out a prima facie case in the light of principles as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. So the statements of the witnesses clearly make out a prima facie case in the light of principles as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions. It is also a fact that after institution of case by vigilance, the entire records of the police case, have been transferred to the file of Vigilance Bureau and the information to that effect has been given to the vigilance court. 9. In another case Upkar Singh Versus Ved Prakash & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 292 the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the conspiracy part in Paragraph 23 held as under:- “Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony’s case, is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code. 10. In the preceding Paragraphs, I have discussed the settled legal position and the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. There does not appear to be any illegality on the part of the vigilance to lodge a fresh F.I.R. I have gone through the two judgments T.T. Antony (supra) as well as Babubhai (supra) as cited by the learned senior counsel for petitioner and I find that the facts of those two cases are different from the facts of the instant case and as such the principles as laid down in the above two cases have no application in the case at hand. In the case of Babubhai (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the facts of that case held in Paragraph 21 as follows:- “In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.” Hence, it is clear from above judgment also that the two F.I.Rs. can continue at the same time in respect of the same incidence, if contrary is proved. The facts of the case T.T. Antony (supra) is absolutely different and after lodgment of the first case there was change in the Government in the State and the second F.I.R. was lodged and considering the facts and investigation report submitted in the two F.I.Rs. of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the subsequent F.I.R. and directed the court concerned to follow the procedure as laid down in Section 173 of the Code and if the court feels can direct for further investigation of the case. On conjoint reading of the F.I.R. and the case diary of the instant case, the part which I have discussed above, it cannot be presumed that there is not legal acceptable evidence in support of prosecution. 11. Apparently, the investigation is at its nascent stage and no charge-sheet has been submitted even by the Vigilance. It is well settled that quashing of F.I.R. at the very initial stage would tentamount to “kill a still born child”. The prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The investigation or the F.I.R. cannot be quashed at the threshold if the allegation has any substance as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. The prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The investigation or the F.I.R. cannot be quashed at the threshold if the allegation has any substance as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora & Ors; 2013 (10) SCC 581 in Paragraphs 30 and 31. In view of the discussions made above, in my opinion, this is not the stage to quash the second F.I.R. which is not impermissible in law. 12. The criminal miscellaneous petition, being devoid of any merit, is hereby, dismissed. However, it will be open to the petitioner to raise all the questions at an appropriate stage in the proceeding or during trial.