ORDER : Akil Abdul Hamid Kureshi, J. 1. The petitioner is an individual and had filed return of income for assessment year 2008-2009. Such return was accepted under section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short) without scrutiny. The Assessing Officer issued impugned notice dated 21.9.2015 under section 148 of the Act seeking to reopen such assessment. At the request of the petitioner, he also supplied reasons for issuing such notice which reads as under: "Assessee Shri Murlibhai Fatandas Sawlani is one of the Director in M/s. Shantai Reality (India) Ltd. He was having more than 10% share holding of the said company. During the A.Y. 2008-09, M/s. Shantai Reality (India) Ltd. has shown following reserves in balance sheet. (a) Reserves on account on share premium Rs. 6,75,38,100/- (b) Reserves on account of profit Rs. 1,92,19,545/- Total Reserves Rs. 8,68,57,645 2. During F.Y. 2007-08 relevant to A.Y. 2008-09, company had given advance of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- to Shri Murlibhai Fatandas Sawlan as "advance to suppliers" and the balance is Still continuing till A.Y. 2013-14. As the advance given was remained unchanged till A.Y. 2013-14 hence it is concluded that advances given to Shri Murlibhai Fatandas Sawlani was not in ordinary course of business. In view of the same, provisions of sec. 2(22)(e) are applicable here. Advance given to assesses by M/s. Shantai Reality (India) Ltd. is deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) and is required to be added to total Income of assessee." 3. In view of the above, I have reason to believe that income of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for the A.Y. 2008-09 on account of failure on the part of assessee and the said case is fit for issue of notice u/s. 148 of the IT Act." 2. The petitioner raised objections to the notice for reopening contending that the Assessing Officer had no tangible materials and reopening is only for fishing inquiry which was not permissible. Such objections were rejected by order dated 21.9.2015. Hence this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Assessing Officer had no tangible materials to form a belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Reopening cannot be permitted for mere fishing inquiry. Even in case of non scrutiny assessment, reopening would be permissible only if the Assessing Officer had formed a belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Reopening cannot be permitted for mere fishing inquiry. Even in case of non scrutiny assessment, reopening would be permissible only if the Assessing Officer had formed a belief that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. In this context counsel relied on decision in case of Atam Prakash Batra Prop of Guria Textiles v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax Circle-5 reported in 36 taxmann.com 123 (Gujarat) and in case of Bakulbhai Ramanlal Patel v. Income Tax Officer reported in 56 DTR 212. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Sudhir Mehta for the department submitted that the original assessment was not framed after scrutiny. Question of change of opinion therefore, would not arise. The Assessing Officer having formed a bona fide belief that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, notice for reopening could not be quashed. He submitted that such reason had to be based on prima facie consideration and not a final conclusion. 5. Counsel drew our attention to the affidavit in reply filed by the Assessing Officer in which it is pointed out that the petitioner who was the director of M/s. Shantai Reality (India) Ltd. had purchased 88,300 shares of the said company for the assessment year 2008-2009 by investing fund of Rs. 1,76,60,000/-. He thus had share holding in excess of 10% of the said company during the year under consideration. In the same year the company had shown total reserves of Rs. 8.68 crores (rounded off). Out of premium collected by the company from the petitioner, a sum of Rs. 1 crore was transferred back to the petitioner and shown as advance to the suppliers. It was in this context that the Assessing Officer formed a belief that provisions of section 2(22)(e) of the Act would apply. 6. We may recall that the original assessment in the present case was not framed after scrutiny. This being a case of accepting the return of assessee under section 143(1) of the Act, there was no question of Assessing Officer forming any opinion on the claims made by the assessee. Concept of change of opinion therefore, cannot be applied. 7. 6. We may recall that the original assessment in the present case was not framed after scrutiny. This being a case of accepting the return of assessee under section 143(1) of the Act, there was no question of Assessing Officer forming any opinion on the claims made by the assessee. Concept of change of opinion therefore, cannot be applied. 7. In this context, we may refer to the decision of Supreme Court in case of Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. reported in (2007) 291 ITR 500 (SC) in which after noticing the amendments made in section 143 of the Act and comparing the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 143 and sub-section (3) thereof, the Apex Court held and observed as under: "16. Section 147 authorises and permits the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess income chargeable to tax if he has reason to believe that income for any assessment year has escaped assessment. The word reason in the phrase reason to believe would mean cause or justification. If the Assessing Officer has cause or justification to know or suppose that income had escaped assessment, it can be said to have reason to believe that an income had escaped assessment. The expression cannot be read to mean that the Assessing Officer should have finally ascertained the fact by legal evidence or conclusion. The function of the Assessing Officer is to administer the statute with solicitude for the public exchequer with an inbuilt idea of fairness to taxpayers. As observed by the Delhi High Court in Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1991 (191) ITR 662], for initiation of action under section 147(a) (as the provision stood at the relevant time) fulfillment of the two requisite conditions in that regard is essential. At that stage, the final outcome of the proceeding is not relevant. In other words, at the initiation stage, what is required is reason to believe, but not the established fact of escapement of income. At the stage of issue of notice, the only question is whether there was relevant material on which a reasonable person could have formed a requisite belief. Whether the materials would conclusively prove the escapement is not the concern at that stage. At the stage of issue of notice, the only question is whether there was relevant material on which a reasonable person could have formed a requisite belief. Whether the materials would conclusively prove the escapement is not the concern at that stage. This is so because the formation of belief by the Assessing Officer is within the realm of subjective satisfaction (see ITO v. Selected Dalurband Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1996 (217) ITR 597 (SC)]; Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO [1999 (236) ITR 34 (SC)]. 17. The scope and effect of section 147 as substituted with effect from April 1, 1989, as also sections 148 to 152 are substantially different from the provisions as they stood prior to such substitution. Under the old provisions of section 147, separate clauses (a) and (b) laid down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past assessment years could be assessed or reassessed. To confer jurisdiction under section 147(a) two conditions were required to be satisfied firstly the Assessing Officer must have reason to believe that income profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment, and secondly he must also have reason to believe that such escapement has occurred by reason of either (i) omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully or truly all material facts necessary for his assessment of that year. Both these conditions were conditions precedent to be satisfied before the Assessing Officer could have jurisdiction to issue notice under section 148 read with section 147(a) But under the substituted section 147 existence of only the first condition suffices. In other words if the Assessing Officer for whatever reason has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment it confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. It is however to be noted that both the conditions must be fulfilled if the case falls within the ambit of the proviso to section 147. The case at hand is covered by the main provision and not the proviso. 18. So long as the ingredients of section 147 are fulfilled, the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceeding under section 147 and failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render the Assessing Officer powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation under section 143(1) had been issued." 8. 18. So long as the ingredients of section 147 are fulfilled, the Assessing Officer is free to initiate proceeding under section 147 and failure to take steps under section 143(3) will not render the Assessing Officer powerless to initiate reassessment proceedings even when intimation under section 143(1) had been issued." 8. This decision in addition to recognising a greater leverage to the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessments which are accepted without scrutiny, also highlights that question of reason to believe could be examined from the standpoint of the relevant materials on which a reasonable person would form requisite belief and it would not be germane whether material would conclusively prove escapement. Thus the question of reason to believe at the stage of challenge to reopen must be examined in the context whether the Assessing Officer had prima facie material to form such a belief. It would not be necessary to demonstrate conclusively the escapement of income. The Supreme Court in the context referred to and relied upon decision in case of Raymond Woolen Mills Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer reported in (1999) 236 ITR 34 (SC). 9. We are conscious that in the decision in case of Inductotherm (India) P. Ltd. v. M. Gopalan, Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax reported in (2013) 356 ITR 481 (Guj.), Division Bench of this Court even in context of notice for reopening for non scrutinized assessment cases, has recognised that reopening of assessment would be permissible provided that the Assessing Officer had some tangible materials on the basis of which he could form a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. It was held as under: "13. Despite such difference in the scheme between a return which is accepted under section 143(1) of the Act as compared to a return of which scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) of the Act is framed, the basic requirement of section 147 of the Act that the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment is not done away with. Section 147 of the Act permits the Assessing Officer to assess, re-assess the income or re-compute the loss or depreciation if he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. Section 147 of the Act permits the Assessing Officer to assess, re-assess the income or re-compute the loss or depreciation if he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. This power to reopen assessment is available in either case, namely, while a return has been either accepted under section 143(1) of the Act or a scrutiny assessment has been framed under section 143(3) of the Act. A common requirement in both of cases is that the Assessing Officer should have reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. 16. It would, thus, emerge that even in case of reopening of an assessment which was previously accepted under section 143(1) of the Act without scrutiny, the Assessing Officer would have power to reopen the assessment, provided he had some tangible material on the basis of which he could form a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. However, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd., (supra) and several other decisions, such reason to believe need not necessarily be a firm final decision of the Assessing Officer. 17. If we accept such proposition, the petitioner's apprehension that the Assessing Officer would arbitrarily exercise powers under section 147 of the Act to circumvent the scrutiny proceedings which could not be framed in view of notice under section 143(2) having become time barred, would be taken care of. To reiterate, even for reopening of an assessment which was accepted previously under section 143(1) of the Act without scrutiny, the Assessing Officer should have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we notice that in two out of four reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment, he stated that he need to verify the claims. In the second ground, he had recorded that admissibility of the bad debts written off required to be verified. In the fourth ground also, he had recorded that admissibility of royalty claim was required to be verified. We are in agreement with the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that for mere verification of the claim, power for reopening of assessment could not be exercised. In the fourth ground also, he had recorded that admissibility of royalty claim was required to be verified. We are in agreement with the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that for mere verification of the claim, power for reopening of assessment could not be exercised. The Assessing Officer in guise of power to reopen an assessment, cannot seek to undertake a fishing or roving inquiry and seek to verify the claims as if it were a scrutiny assessment." 10. Coming back to the facts of the case, we have noticed that the assessee during the year under consideration was a director of the company and had purchased 88,300 shares by investing Rs. 1.76 crores out of which Rs. 1 crore was paid back to the petitioner by the company as advance. It was in this context, the Assessing Officer formed a belief that section 2(22)(e) of the Act would apply. His assertion that the petitioner was holding in excess of 10% of the value of shareholding has nowhere been denied by the petitioner. In the objections raised, the petitioner merely called upon the Assessing Officer to reveal the source from which he had gathered such information. If the case of the petitioner was that he in fact, did not hold more than 10% of shares of the company, it was easy for him to asset and demonstrate the same. 11. Under the circumstances petition is dismissed. We have merely briefly examined reasons from the standpoint of the sufficiency and have not expressed any opinion on the question of escapement of income and contentions of the petitioner are kept open.