JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard Shri H.S. Paonam, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner; Shri B.P. Sahu, the learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri M. Tapan, the learned counsels appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for the following reliefs :- (i) To issue rule nisi and call for the records; (ii) To issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction quashing and setting aside the order dated 04-09-2015 and consequently declare the suspension order dated 20-12-2014 as non-est in the eyes of law; (iii) To quash and set aside the impugned letter dated 16-01-2016; (iv) To direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to participate in the recruitment process for filling up the post of Principal (MIT) by forwarding the application submitted by the petitioner or otherwise; (v) In the interim allow the petitioner to participate in the recruitment process for filling up the post of Principal (MIT) in terms of the Advertisement dated 16-12-2015 pending disposal of the present case; and (vi) Pass any further orders/directions which this Hon’ble Court may seem fit and proper to secure the ends of justice. So far as the above prayers (iv) and (v) are concerned, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that this court need not pass any other order in respect thereof except to the effect that the same may be considered by the respondents in accordance with law. It is ordered accordingly. 3.1. According to the petitioner, he initially joined his service as Lecturer Engineering in Civil at the Government Polytechnic, Imphal on the recommendation of a DPC held in association with the MPSC vide order dated 16-10-1986. After having served for about eight years as Lecturer in the Government Polytechnic, Imphal, he was deputed to the Manipur Institute of Technology (MIT), Takyelpat, Imphal vide order 24-09-2004 as Professor (Civil Engineering) w.e.f. 01-01-2004 and thereafter, the petitioner along with four others were absorbed in the MIT by Resolution No. 3 of the 9th Executive Committee Meeting of the Manipur institute of Technology Society held on 10-10-2005 w.e.f. 01-01-2004. 3.2. 3.2. While the petitioner was serving as the Professor (Civil Engineering) at MIT, the Registrar, Manipur University issued an order dated 20-12-2014 placing him under suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. However, no disciplinary proceeding has so far been initiated against him and only after a lapse of more than eight months, the Vice-Chancellor, Manipur University issued an order dated 04-09-2015 extending the terms of suspension for a period of 180 days. 3.3. The petitioner came across an Advertisement dated 16-12-2015 inviting applications from amongst the eligible candidates for appointment to various posts in the Manipur University including the post of Principal (MIT). The petitioner being eligible for appointment to the said post of Principal, has applied for it through proper channel on 14-01-2015. To the shock and surprise of the petitioner, he was informed by the in-charge Principal (MIT) vide its letter dated 16-01-2016 that his application had not been forwarded to the Manipur University in view of the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and FR 53(2). Being aggrieved by the said actions of the respondents, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. The stand of the Manipur University, the respondent No. 1 as indicated and reflected in its affidavit dated 08-03-2016 is that the petitioner is still under suspension and no disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against him till date as the approval of the Central Vigilance Commission is awaited; that the order of suspension has not lapsed, as it was/ is reviewed, from time to time, on the recommendation of the Review Committee; that the period of suspension was extended for the first time vide order dated 19-03-2015 issued by the Registrar, Manipur University for a period of 180 days w.e.f. 20-03-2015 and that the petitioner has concealed this material fact that the office order dated 19-03-2015 was issued in time. An affidavit-in-opposition has also been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 wherein it is stated that since the petitioner continues to be employee of the MIT during suspension, his application cannot be forwarded to the competent authority and there is no illegality at all in doing that. An affidavit-in-opposition has also been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 wherein it is stated that since the petitioner continues to be employee of the MIT during suspension, his application cannot be forwarded to the competent authority and there is no illegality at all in doing that. In reply to the said affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been stated by the petitioner that the order dated 19-03-2015 extending the term of suspension for 180 days, was never communicated to the petitioner and as such, it cannot be said to have effect in the eyes of law as the order becomes effective only when the same is served upon the affected parties and the petitioner came to know about the existence of the order dated 19-03-2015 only after a copy thereof is filed by the respondent No. 1, Manipur University along with its counter affidavit. 5. It has been submitted by Shri H.S. Paonam, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that there is no provision in the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1964 which prohibits forwarding of application of an employee for direct recruitment and non-forwarding of his application has deprived the petitioner of his right for consideration for appointment to the post of Principal; that since the order of suspension was not reviewed within the period of 90 days, it had become invalid and the extension of the suspension vide 04-09-2015 cannot validate the order of suspension in view of the provisions of Rule 10 (7) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and that the extension of the suspension after the expiry of 90 days has been held to be invalid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions including the one passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & ors. Vs. Deepak Mali, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 222 . During the course of hearing, it has also been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that even assuming that the suspension has been extended, from time to time, after reviewing it, the petitioner cannot be placed under suspension indefinitely in view of the fact that no disciplinary proceeding has so far been initiated against him. During the course of hearing, it has also been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that even assuming that the suspension has been extended, from time to time, after reviewing it, the petitioner cannot be placed under suspension indefinitely in view of the fact that no disciplinary proceeding has so far been initiated against him. On the other hand, Shri B.P. Sahu and Shri M. Devananda, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents, justifying the continuance of suspension, have submitted that there is no provision in the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 prescribing a time limit for placing an employee under suspension and that it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 6. In support of and to substantiate their contentions, the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner and the respondents have relied upon the same decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 . While the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon para Nos. 6, 20 and 21, the learned counsels appearing the respondents have relied upon para No. 12 and 21 of the said decision. Para 6, 12, 20 & 21 are reproduced herein-below: – “6. The learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the original suspension was in contemplation of a departmental inquiry which could not be commenced because of a directive of the Central Vigilance Commission prohibiting its commencement if the matter was under the investigation of the CBI. The sanction for prosecution was granted on 1.8.2014. It was also submitted that the Charge-sheet was expected to be served on the Appellant before 12.9.2014, (viz., before the expiry of the fourth extension). However, we need to underscore that the Appellant has been continuously on suspension from 30.9.2011. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that - "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” 20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond a period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., 1973 to moderate suspension orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary enquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal. 21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.” 7. The facts of the above case, namely Ajay Kumar Chaudhary’s case, are that the appellant therein who was posted at the relevant time as the Defence Estate Officer, was placed under suspension vide order dated 30-09-2011 on the allegation that he had issued NOCs in respect of four acres of land belonging to Union of India and held by Director General, Defence Estate. The appellant assailed the suspension which had been extended and continued for quite some time without any charge sheet or a memorandum of charge being served upon him. The appellant assailed the suspension which had been extended and continued for quite some time without any charge sheet or a memorandum of charge being served upon him. The Central Administrative Tribunal vide its order dated 22-05-2013 has inter-alia opined that no employee can be indefinitely suspended and the disciplinary proceedings have to be concluded within a reasonable period. The CAT also directed that if no charge memo was issued to the appellant before the expiry on 21-06-2013, he would be reinstated in service. Being aggrieved by the CAT’s order, the Union of India filed a writ petition which was allowed by the Hon’ble High Court and it held that CAT’s view was nothing but a substitution of a judicial determination to that of the authority possessing the power, i.e., the executive Government as to the justification or rationale to continue with the suspension. An appeal was preferred before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of a special leave which was duly granted by it. Disposing of the said appeal and in view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S.Nayak, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the conclusion of the Hon’ble High Court cannot be sustained and in other words, the order dated 22-05-2013 passed by the CAT has been upheld. But keeping in mind the facts of that case that the appellant has by then been served with a charge-sheet, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has refrained itself from issuing any direction. 8. As regards the suspension, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was agreeable to the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in respect of the law laid down in a series of judgments including that of O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 328 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has enunciated that the suspension of an employee is injurious to his interest and must not be continued for an unreasonably long period and therefore, an order of suspension should not be lightly passed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed: “11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed: “11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay.” Ultimately, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier judgments and its own observation in the preceding para, has come to the conclusion that the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interest of justice. On a careful perusal of this decision, this court is of the view that although the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not laid down any specific law as regards the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension, it is well settled that the suspension must not be continued for an unreasonably long period. 9. The facts of the said Ajay Kumar Chaudhary case are similar to that of the present case. In the present case also, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 20-12-2014 issued by the Registrar, Manipur University in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. According to the respondents, the suspension has been extended from time to time and probably, till date. But since the office order dated 19-03-2015 allegedly issued by the Registrar, Manipur extending the term of suspension has been questioned by the petitioner, the same will be dealt with separately later. At this juncture, it may be noted that the purpose for which the order of suspension was issued, is that a disciplinary proceeding is intended to be initiated in the near future. But on the contrary, the fact remains that no memorandum of charge has been served upon the petitioner till date. Therefore, the short question that arise for consideration by this court is as to whether the suspension, extended from time to time, is justified, when even the memorandum of charge has not been served upon the petitioner even after a lapse of more than one and half years or not. Therefore, the short question that arise for consideration by this court is as to whether the suspension, extended from time to time, is justified, when even the memorandum of charge has not been served upon the petitioner even after a lapse of more than one and half years or not. The answer will be “no” for the reason that the respondent No. 1, Manipur University has miserably failed to initiate a disciplinary proceeding within a reasonable time. The only reason assigned by the respondent No.1, Manipur University as to why the disciplinary proceeding has not been initiated against the petitioner is that the approval of the Central Vigilance Commission is being awaited. It is an internal matter between the respondent No. 1, Manipur University and the Central Vigilance Commission and the delay in granting the approval by the Central Vigilance Commission cannot be attributed to the petitioner. It is unbelievable and moreover, it shows the lack of sincerity on the part of the respondent No. 1, Manipur University or a failure in the discharge of duties by the Central Vigilance Commission, when the interest of an employee is being affected by the inaction on the part of the respondent No. 1, Manipur University. It is understandable if the suspension is continued during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner is being placed under suspension without a disciplinary proceeding being initiated against him. It is quite uncertain as to what will happen to the petitioner in the event of the approval not being granted by the Central Vigilance Commission for a long time, say till his retirement. It appears that the respondent No. 1, Manipur University has never thought about it. The purpose of suspension is to facilitate and also to enable the concerned authority to complete the enquiry smoothly without any interference from the charged officer but not to harass him. In the past, there were instances wherein the employees were placed under suspension indefinitely without assigning any reason thereof and such instances had led to the amendment of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 by inserting sub-rule (6) & (7) in Rule 10 sometime in the year, 2004. Therefore, considering the facts of the present case and after having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, this court is of the view that the suspension and its continuance further is highly unfair and unreasonable. Therefore, considering the facts of the present case and after having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, this court is of the view that the suspension and its continuance further is highly unfair and unreasonable. 10. The other issue is as to whether the order of suspension, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is liable to be declared as nonest as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. In view of the above observation made in the preceding para, there is no point of considering it but since the learned counsel for the petitioner has made submission in respect thereof, this court proposes to consider and decide it. It has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that although the order of suspension was issued on 20-12-2014, it was not reviewed within 90 days as required in law and it was reviewed only on 04-09-2015, as a result the order of suspension had become invalid and therefore, the same shall be declared as nonest. His contention is refuted by the counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, Manipur University contending that it was reviewed in time on 19-03-2015, to which the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner replied that no copy of such an order was served upon him and therefore, it could not be said to have any effect in law. It is not in dispute that a copy of the Office order dated 19-03-2015 has been filed along with the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondent No.1, Manipur University and on perusal of it, it is seen that the said office order is signed by the Registrar, Manipur University and the respondent No. 1, Manipur University being a Government institution, the said Office order can be presumed to be genuine, until and unless the contrary is proved by the petitioner. It may be noted that in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is nowhere alleged that the said office order is not genuine or backdated nor is the action of the respondent No. 1, Manipur University malafide. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is devoid of any merit and is not acceptable to this court. 11. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is devoid of any merit and is not acceptable to this court. 11. For the reasons stated herein above, the instant writ petition is disposed of with the following directions: (a) If a memorandum of charge is not issued to the petitioner on or before 29-08-2016, the order of suspension dated 20-12-2014 issued by the Registrar, Manipur University and other office orders issued extending its term, shall stand quashed and the petitioner be reinstated in service immediately thereafter; (b) In the event of a memorandum of charge being issued to the petitioner as aforesaid, the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him shall be completed, within a reasonable time, keeping in mind the various decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard.