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2016 DIGILAW 1311 (JHR)

Shailendra Kumar Sinha, son of Late Paras Nath Ambastha v. State of Jharkhand

2016-08-24

PRAMATH PATNAIK

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ORDER : In the accompanied writ application, the petitioner has inter-alia prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction for quashing the order dated 25th February, 2008, as contained in letter No. 340 issued under the signature of respondent No. 4 and the petitioner has further prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction commanding upon the respondents to forthwith release arrears of subsistence allowance with effect from 18.12.2007 till to date along with interest. Further, I.A. No. 1209 of 2011 was filed on 18.04.2011 by the petitioner in which petitioner prays for amendment in the prayer portion of the main writ application which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 22.11.2012, wherein, petitioner prays for quashing the notification dated 10.02.2011 as contained in Memo No. 244 (Annexure-10 to the I.A.) passed by the respondents, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed with retrospective effect from 31.07.2007 i.e., the conviction in R.C.- 43 (A)/96 (Annexure-9 to the rejoinder). 2. The facts, as delineated in the writ application, in a nutshell is that the petitioner while being posted as Veterinary Officer was put under suspension vide order dated 12.02.1999 as contained in memo number 144 passed on the ground of his alleged involvement in a case being RC 50 (A)/96 with a direction for payment of subsistence allowance in pursuance to Rule 96 of the Service Code. From the date of suspension, the petitioner has been paid subsistence allowance till 17.12.2007 but thereafter the same has been withheld. Being aggrieved by non-payment of subsistence allowance, the petitioner has made representation before the respondent authorities as evident from Annexure-6 to the writ application but the representation submitted by the petitioner failed to evoke any response from the respondent authorities. Left with no other efficacious, alternative and speedy remedy, the petitioner has been constrained to approach this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievances. 3. Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged before the Court that the impugned order (Annexure-5) is not legally permissible in the eyes of law as it is against the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala and Another Vs. Ram Niwas Bansal (Dead) through L.Rs. As reported in AIR 2014 SC 1264 : [2014 (2) JLJR (SC) 178]. Ram Niwas Bansal (Dead) through L.Rs. As reported in AIR 2014 SC 1264 : [2014 (2) JLJR (SC) 178]. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there is no concept of deemed dismissal in the service jurisprudence since the petitioner even though under suspension continued till 10.02.2011 as per the impugned notification (Annexure-10 to I.A. No. 1209 of 2011), the petitioner was entitled to subsistence allowance till the impugned order was issued. 4. Mr. Rakesh Kumar Shahi, learned J.C to A.A.G. appearing for the respondents has vehemently contended that the writ petition is wholly misconceived and it is settled law that in the matter of conviction, the employee has no right to continue in services and therefore, Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India has got no application. It has further been submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a matter reported in (1995) 3 SCC 377 (Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) Madras Vrs. S. Nagoor Meera), has been pleased to, inter alia, hold that on being convicted and punished in a case bearing number R.C. 50(A)/96-Pat, the petitioner has no right to continue in service and to get any salary/subsistence allowance. With the aforesaid submissions, the prayer has been made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to subsistence allowance for the aforesaid period. In the supplementary counter affidavit, the details of punishment awarded to the petitioner is mentioned, which is as under:- S. Nos. Cases Nos. Sentence/Punishment Awarded to the petitioner 1 R.C 50 (A)/ 96 Pat 6 years RI, 20 Lacs Fine, In default of payment of fine, further 6 Months RI 2 R.C. 44 (A)/96 Pat 6 years RI, 7 Lacs Fine, In default of payment of fine, further 4 Months SI 3 R.C. 46 (A)/96 Pat 5 years RI, 5 Lacs Fine, In default of payment of fine, further 1 Year SI 4 R.C. 49 (A)/96 Pat 6 years RI, 75 Lacs Fine, In default of payment of fine, further 1 Year RI 5. During course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his prayer for payment of arrears of subsistence allowance from 18.12.2007 till date of dismissal from services and reserves his liberty to assail order of dismissal in the event of his acquittal in criminal cases. 6. During course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his prayer for payment of arrears of subsistence allowance from 18.12.2007 till date of dismissal from services and reserves his liberty to assail order of dismissal in the event of his acquittal in criminal cases. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the documents on records, it appears that the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance, in view of the following facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements:- (i) Moreover, the issue pertaining to retrospective dismissal has been illuminatively dealt by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala and Another Vs. Ram Niwas Bansal (Dead) through L.Rs. as reported in AIR 2014 SC 1264 : 2014 (2) JLJR (SC) 178, wherein paragraph nos. 14 and 15 reads as under:- 14. The three issues that eminently emerge for consideration are, (i) whether the employer Bank could have, in law, passed an order of dismissal with retrospective effect; (ii) whether the delinquent officer stood superannuated after completion of thirty years as provided under the Regulations on 25.2.1992; and (iii) whether the legal heirs of the deceased-employee are entitled to get the entire salary computed till the actual passing of the order of dismissal, that is, 22.11.2001 or for that matter till the date of superannuation, that is, 25.2.1992. 15. Regard being had to nature of controversy, we shall proceed to deal with first point first, that is, whether the order of removal could have been made with retrospective effect. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the employee,has submitted that the disciplinary authority could not have passed an order of removal by making it operational from a retrospective date. He has commended us to a three-Judge Bench decision in R. Jeevaratnam v. State of Madras. In the said case, the appellant-therein instituted a suit for a declaration that the order of dismissal from service was illegal and void. The trial Court dismissed the suit and the said decree was affirmed in appeal by the High Court. One of the contentions raised before this Court that the order of dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with retrospective effect, i.e., May 29, 1949, was illegal and inoperative. The trial Court dismissed the suit and the said decree was affirmed in appeal by the High Court. One of the contentions raised before this Court that the order of dismissal dated October 17, 1950 having been passed with retrospective effect, i.e., May 29, 1949, was illegal and inoperative. This Court opined that an order of dismissal with retrospective effect is, in substance, an order of dismissal as from the date of the order with the superadded direction that the order should operate retrospectively as from an anterior date. The two parts of the order are clearly severable. Assuming that the second part of the order is invalid, there is no reason why the first part of the order should not be given the fullest effect. The said principle has been followed in The Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation v. Shri P.H. Brahmbhatt. (ii) In the service jurisprudence, there is no concept of deemed dismissal based on conviction in criminal cases without an order to that effect. Since in the instant case, the impugned notification of dismissal was issued on 10.02.2011, the petitioner was deemed to be continuing till the said date. In view of the aforesaid decision, the dismissal of petitioner takes effect from the date of notification i.e. 10.02.2011 not anterior to that date and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance with effect from 18.12.2007 till 10.02.2011. 7. On the conspectus of the facts and judicial pronouncements referred to hereinabove and the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance with effect form 18.12.2007 till 10.02.2011. The respondents are directed to make payment of subsistence allowance within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. Liberty is reserved for petitioner to assail the notification of dismissal in the event of his acquittal in criminal cases. 8. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this writ petition stands disposed of.