JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant, a former Development Officer serving with the Life Insurance Corporation of India, has prayed for the following reliefs; "(a) quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 26.7.93(Annexure 'I') (b) quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 25.4.95 (Annexure 'L') (c) granting such other and further reliefs, and passing such other and further orders, as the circumstances of the case may require; (d) award the costs of this petition. "19(a) directing the respondent-Corporation to consider with regard to the quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner and to modify suitably the penalty to a lesser penalty and further direct the respondent-Corporation to reinstate the petitioner in service as Development Officer." 2. The facts of this case may be summarized as under; 3. The writ applicant jointed the Life Insurance Corporation (for short the "LIC") in the year 1989 as a Development Officer. On 20th December, 1991, he was served with a departmental charge-sheet, containing the following charges; "1. That on 08.03.1991 you collected a blank cheque No. 552373 dated 08.03.91 drawn on the Saranpur Co. Op. Bank, Ltd., Maskati Market, Ahmedabad from Shri Rajesh Lekhraj Chawla, B-13, Nirankar Society, Bhairavnath Road, Maninagar, Ahmedabad towards yearly premium due on 28.12.90 under Policy No. 69157058 on the life of his son Kumar Honey. You were to a write the amount in the cheque and after calculating the interest for late payment. You collected the cheque though you are not authorized to collect renewal premium; 2. That you wrote the amount of Rs. 2725/- on the cheque and struck off the Policy No. 69157058 written by Shri R.L. Chawla on the reverse of above cheque and wrote another Policy No. 830818495 and tendered the same to Kadi B.O. on 13.03.91 in payment yearly premium of Rs. 2725/- due 15th March, 1991 under Policy No. 830818495 on the life of Shri H.A. Panchal; 3. You also collected unauthorisedly cheque No. 298 dtd. 04.02.90 for Rs. 2725/- drawn on Bank of Baroda, Rakhial Branch from Shri Hasmukh A. Panchal, Life Assured under Policy No. 830818495 in payment of yearly premium of Rs. 2725/- due 15.03.91 thereunder. 2725/- due 15th March, 1991 under Policy No. 830818495 on the life of Shri H.A. Panchal; 3. You also collected unauthorisedly cheque No. 298 dtd. 04.02.90 for Rs. 2725/- drawn on Bank of Baroda, Rakhial Branch from Shri Hasmukh A. Panchal, Life Assured under Policy No. 830818495 in payment of yearly premium of Rs. 2725/- due 15.03.91 thereunder. Instead of tendering this cheque in payment of the above referred premium you tendered it to Kadi Branch Office on 06.02.91 in payment of First Deposits under four proposals as per particulars stated below : Sr. No. Propl. No. Policy No. BOC No. Date Amt. Name of Policy Holder 1. 8407 850412300 426260 06/02/91 311 MH Parmar 2. 8454 850412333 426261 06/02/91 694 NG Makwana 3. 8409 850445419 426259 06/02/91 874 MN Chauhan 4. 8441 850412328 426258 06/02/91 846 BD Rajput That You have misused the Cheque No. 298 dated 04.02.90 drawn on Bank of Baroda and Cheque No. 552373 dated 08.03.91 drawn on the Sarangpur Co. Op. Bank Ltd. You have thus indulged in temporary misappropriation of moneys belonging to L.I.C. By your aforesaid acts, you failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, failed to serve the Corporation honestly and faithfully, acted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and prejudicial to good conduct and thereby committed breach of Regulation 21 and 24 read with Regulations 39(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, for which any one or more of the penalties specified under Regulation 39(1) (1) to (g) of the aforesaid (staff) Regulations, 1960 can be imposed upon you." 4. The writ applicant filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet, which was served upon him referred to above. The explanation offered by the writ applicant to the charge-sheet is as under; "1. I have not collected any cheque from Mr. R.L. Chawla B-13, Nirankar Socy. Bhairavnath Road, Maninagar, Ahmedabad. As per my renewal come. Bill of Dec. 90 and Jan. 91. I found that Mr. Chawla had not paid the premium for Pol. No. 69157058 and 830826267 due in the month of December, 1990 favouring to Kum. Honey and Kum. Namrata respectively. Being a public relation man related to L.I.C the grant Public- Sector with a human heart. I thought it may duty to inform our customer that his policy will lapse if the premium is not paid immediately. No. 69157058 and 830826267 due in the month of December, 1990 favouring to Kum. Honey and Kum. Namrata respectively. Being a public relation man related to L.I.C the grant Public- Sector with a human heart. I thought it may duty to inform our customer that his policy will lapse if the premium is not paid immediately. Therefore, I telephoned Mr. Chawla about the same. On the telephone itself, Mr. Chawla said that his office boy was given a form of health Declaration from C.A.B Ahmedabad to be filled in by him. He further requested me to see him immediately. As I was no more an agent but a Dev. Officer of the esteemed organisation at Kadi, I had expressed my inability in visiting him at Ahmedabad. Thereafter, Mr. Chawla sent me 2 cheques (Nos. 552372) drawn on Sarangpur Co-operative Bank Ltd. Maskati A'bad favouring LIC of India by post to on my residential address at Kadi in the 1st week of March, 1991 alongwith he fully completed H.D. Form. 2. Mr. H.A. Panchal, one of my friends, serving in Bank of Baroda, Rakhial Branch, Ahmedabad introduced me to his friends Mr. Parmar, Makwana, Rajput and Chauhan in February, 1991. Mr. Panchal informed me that they were to them what really Life Insurance is being an evergreen earlier of Insurance I took up the task very enthusiasticly. In the end they were so much impressed that they asked me to help proposed their lives. They also informed me that they will be paying the proposal amount after reaching Ahmedabad. But Mr. Panchal intervened and offered to give a cheque on their lives. Thereafter, Mr. Panchal, handed me over cheque No. 00298) drawn on Bank of Baroda-Rakhial Branch Ahmedabad for the same only the cheque No. 00298 is not for his renewal premium falls due on 13.3.91. Unfortunately, in the 1st week of March the premium of Mr. Panchal got attached with the blank cheque of Mr. Chawla favouring L.I.C. When I realised the mistake I contacted Mr. Panchal and explained that his premium for policy No. 830818495 had been paid by someone else's cheque. Mr. Panchal requested me to collect the amount sometime latter due to some unavoidable circumstances I could not collect the amount until the second week of May. After having collected the amount I paid the premium Rs. Panchal and explained that his premium for policy No. 830818495 had been paid by someone else's cheque. Mr. Panchal requested me to collect the amount sometime latter due to some unavoidable circumstances I could not collect the amount until the second week of May. After having collected the amount I paid the premium Rs. 2230 + 69.70 interest on it vide policy No. 69157058 favouring Kum. Honey Chawla. Thereafter, I sent the receipt, a cheques for Rs. 425.00 drawn on Mahila Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd., Shastrinagar Branch Ahmedabad and his cheque No. 552372 of Sarangpur Co-operative Bank Ltd. For policy No. 890226267 to Mr. Chawla. By above statements your honoured self must be convicted I am obliged for providing me a cheque to explain myself. Thanking you for your kind positive and passionate response." 5. An Inquiry Officer was appointed for conducting the departmental inquiry. The Inquiry Officer reached to the conclusion that the charges were established. 6. Considering the report of the Inquiry Officer, a second show-cause notice was issued dated 2nd February, 1993 calling upon the writ applicant to show-cause why the writ applicant should not be removed from the service. The writ applicant replied to the said notice on 20th April, 1993, raising the following grounds; "1. That I am unable to take stock of the clear finding of the Inquiry Officer as to the charges levelled against me in view of the fact that I am stated to have been found guilty on 'provisional basis'. The definition as specified in Oxford English Dictionary to the word 'provisionally' is 'temporarily' 2. That the Disciplinary Authority is not clear in his mind to inflict the proposed punishment under Regulation 39(1)(f) of (Staff) Regulations, 1990 in view of the fact that proposed action to be implemented is also 'provisional' as stated in para 8 of show-cause notice dated 9.8.1993. 3. That 'provisionally' having found guilty to the accused person clearly establishes that authority competent to inflict punishment on provisional basis is not fully satisfied with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and thereby he is unable to arrive at any final, correct and firm decision as to the judgment of the proceedings conducted by Inquiry Officer and also to be consequential action in fairness of natural justice. 4. 4. That the Inquiry Officer has failed to offer an opportunity to the employee to put up his written counter arguments through his Assisting employee by not providing any copy of the summing-up report dated 15.9.92 from Presenting Officer on behalf of the management and thereby Inquiry Officer is purely guided by the report of the Presenting Officer without hearing the charge-sheeted employee. Having not received a copy of summing-up report of Presenting Officer, my Assisting Employee was compelled not to submit his counter arguments to the said Presenting Officer's summing-up. 5. During the course of inquiry proceedings, none of the management witness has deposed that Policy No. on the back of the cheque in question was erased by the petitioner. Hence having treated the charge cited as Para 2 of the charge-sheet dated 20.12.91 as proved by Inquiry Officer is quite far from evidence and based upon Presenting Officer's summing-up, copy of which is not supplied to the petitioner. 6. That the Inquiry Officer was tried to establish the charges by incorrect statement that we do not issue March 91 O.R.s in Feb'91 as stated under Para 20 on Page 8 (Line Nos. 19, 20, 21) of Inquiry Officer's Report dated Nil. In fact, L.I.C is not issuing April'91 O.R.s in March'91. 7. That the Inquiry Officer has failed to offer adequate opportunity to the petitioner by not examining Mr. R.L. Chawla and Mr. H.A. Panchal to testify the documents at Exhibit Nos. D-1 and D-2. Simply stating that these documents are 'after-thought' actions, is against natural justice and prejudicial in view of the fact that Inquiry Officer himself has indulged in writing Registered Letters ref: GDO; EO dt: 12.8.92 to Shri R.L. Chawla and ref: GDO;EO dt: 12.8.92 to Shri H.A. Panchal requesting them to remain present before him on 24.8.92. 8. In fact, Mr. R.L. Chawla and Mr. H.A. Panchal are also management witnesses, on the strength of which the petitioner was issued as charge-sheet dated 20.12.91 and by not making any expression of these persons in the charge-sheet, charge framed is also prejudicial to that extent resulting in denial of opportunity to examine and cross-examine these persons. 9. If statements made at Para 7 above are supposed to be in-correct, it is beyond one's common understanding as to how the Inquiry Officer was inspired to call upon Mr. Chawla and Mr. 9. If statements made at Para 7 above are supposed to be in-correct, it is beyond one's common understanding as to how the Inquiry Officer was inspired to call upon Mr. Chawla and Mr. Panchal to remain present before him, simultaneously saying that these witnesses are 'afterthought'. 10. That the Inquiry Officer has failed to bring on record the entire picture that took place against the petitioner before issuing charge-sheet dated 20.12.91. 11. That law of Natural Justice does not provide any opportunity to any side to act upon 'provisionally' especially in the matter of one's existence or death from lively-hood. 12. That the so- called 'provisional' proposed action is too harsh as compared to the manner in which the inquiry proceedings were conducted without affording proper opportunity to the petitioner to defend the case. The petitioner is a poor employee having a broad family to maintain." 7. Finally, the Senior Divisional Manager, in his capacity as the Disciplinary Authority, passed the order dated 26th July, 1993, removing the petitioner from the service. The order reads as under; "4. Concurring with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the Show-Cause Notice dated 09.02.93 was issued to Shri A.H. Parikh provisionally proposing to impose upon him the penalty of removal from service in terms of Regulation 39(i)(F) of Live Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulation -1960 and directing him to Show-Cause as to why the said penalty should not be imposed on him. I find that the said Show-Cause notice was delivered to Shri A.H. Parikh on 17.02.93 alongwith the copy of enquiry report dated 12.11.92. 5. Whereas Shri Parikh has submitted his reply to the Show Cause Notice dated 20.04.93. In his said reply he has said that he was extremely sorry for the mistake committed by him on account of his inexperience. He has also observed that he did not realise the seriousness of his mistake. He has however pleaded for mercy on the ground that if he is removed from service at the young age of 35 years he and his family will ruined. I find that in his reply to the Show Cause Notice Shri Parikh has not brought out any new point in his defence and he is amply pleading for mercy. 6. He has however pleaded for mercy on the ground that if he is removed from service at the young age of 35 years he and his family will ruined. I find that in his reply to the Show Cause Notice Shri Parikh has not brought out any new point in his defence and he is amply pleading for mercy. 6. In view of the foregoing I hold Shri Parikh guilty of the charge leveled against him violating in the process the provisions of Regulations 21,234 and 39(i) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulation 1960. Looking to the gravity is no cogent reason to warrant the interference in imposition of penalty of removal from the service proposed in the said Show Cause Notice issued to him. Therefore, I order that the penalty of removal from service by and hereby imposed on Shri Parikh in terms of Regulation 39(i) (F) of LIC of India (Staff) Regulation-1960 with immediate effect." 8. It appears that, thereafter, the writ applicant challenged the order referred to above by filing Special Civil Application No. 1451 of 1994. The said writ application was disposed of vide order dated 28th December, 1994 in the following terms; "Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the petition and prays that necessary direction be given to the respondent No. 2 to consider the representation which may be made by the petitioner with regard to subject matter of the petition. Permission as prayed for is granted. The petitioner is directed to make appropriate representation to the respondent No. 2 within one week from today. The respondent No. 2 is directed to consider the same sympathetically as early as possible and preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the representation. It is clarified that if the decision is rendered against the petitioner, the petitioner would be entitled to challenge the same before appropriate forum. Subject to the foregoing directions and clarification, notice is discharged with no order as to costs. The petition stands disposed of as having been withdrawn." 9. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court referred to above, the writ applicant preferred an appeal/representation addressed to the Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay, raising manifold grounds. 10. Subject to the foregoing directions and clarification, notice is discharged with no order as to costs. The petition stands disposed of as having been withdrawn." 9. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court referred to above, the writ applicant preferred an appeal/representation addressed to the Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay, raising manifold grounds. 10. The Zonal Manager, by an order dated 25th April, 1995, rejected the representation holding as under; "(a) In so far as the contentions of Shri Parikh that the enquiry conducted was an eye-wash as the same was over within 4 hearings, that he was not given sufficient opportunity to defend his case, that the complainants at whose behest action was taken against him were not examined by the corporation to establish the case against him, that the evidence produced by him in the shape of two letters obtained by him from the complainants shri Panchal and Shri Chawla stating inter-alia that they now have no complaint were not taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer, that he was given to understand that if he did not contest the case and accepted the charges a lenient view would be taken, that the Disciplinary Authority was of the view to impose a lighter penalty. I find that the enquiry proceedings were held on four occasions, that the Enquiry Officer had given sufficient opportunity to Shri Parikh to represent his case inasmuch as he was allowed to take the assistance of Shri C.P. Patel, Co-employee to present his case in the above matter and that he was also asked to lead documentary evidence as well as present his witnesses. I further observe that he was given opportunities to cross examine the prosecution witnesses to refute the depositions made by them but on every occasion Shri Parikh and his assisting employee did not cross examine the prosecution witnesses, that Shri Parikh also failed to present Shri Panchal and Shri Chawla to depose as defence witnesses though he had given their names as his witnesses to the Enquiry Officer, that Shri Parikh did not present any documentary evidence except the two letters from the complainants stating that they had no complaint against Shri Parikh. I find that In the original letter of complaint Shri Chawla in addition to requesting for investigation into his complaint had also stated that he was contemplating taking legal action against Shri Parikh. I find that In the original letter of complaint Shri Chawla in addition to requesting for investigation into his complaint had also stated that he was contemplating taking legal action against Shri Parikh. (b) In respect of Shri Parikh's argument that the two letters produced by him were not taken into consideration by the Enquiry Officer, I observe that this point has been adequately dealt with by the Enquiry Officer in his Report. As these letters were produced by Shri Parikh from these complainants, it is for him to prove the same before the Enquiry Officer so that the Presenting Officer would have had an opportunity of confronting them with their earlier letters of complaint, based on which the proceedings ere instituted. Further I observe that Shri Parikh in his reply dated 13.01.1992 to the charge sheet has described Shri Panchal as one of his best friends. If that was so he could have easily produced him as his witness before the Enquiry Officer. The charges were held proved against Shri Parikh on the basis of documentary evidence and the depositions of the three witnesses. (c) The main plant of the defence of shri Parikh is the deposition made by Shri N.G. Shah, Agent, as a witness of the Management during the enquiry proceedings held on 24.08.1992. I find that in reply to a pointed question from the Presenting Officer viz. "how you have collected the deposit amount towards first premium under the above proposals?", Shri Shah replied " I have collected third partly cheque of Shri H.A. Panchal for all three proposals amounting to Rs. 2,725/-. Although neither Shri Parikh nor his assisting employee cross-examined the said witness when he was asked to do so by the Enquiry Officer, now in his representation on page 6 thereof Shri Parikh has contended that if the aforesaid statement of the witness is to be believed and accepted then the charge relating to the so called unauthorised collection of Rs. 2,725/- from Shri H.A. Panchal is baseless or the testimony of the witness is wrong. In this connection, it is pertinent to state that this attempt to profit from the testimony of Shri N.G. Shah does not in any way help the cause of Shri Parikh but actually shows the inherent weakness in his case when his other submissions in this behalf are examined viz. In this connection, it is pertinent to state that this attempt to profit from the testimony of Shri N.G. Shah does not in any way help the cause of Shri Parikh but actually shows the inherent weakness in his case when his other submissions in this behalf are examined viz. The photostat copy of an affidavit dated 23.01.1994 of Shri H.A. Panchal wherein he had inter-alia stated " I say that I am a friend of Shri Ashok H. Parikh, Development Officer, Kadi Branch. I had taken LIC policy for myself and I had given the cheque towards the premium of the same. This by implication would mean that Shri Panchal had handed over the cheque to Shri Parikh. In his reply dated 13.01.1992 to the charge sheet dated 20.12.1991, Shri Parikh had inter alia stated "thereafter Shri Panchal handed me over cheque No. 00298 drawn on the bank of India, Rakhial Branch, Ahmedabad for the same, only the cheque No. 00298 is not for his annual premium falling due on 13.03.1991. Unfortunately, in the first week of March a premium notice of Mr. Panchal got attached with the blank cheque of Shri Chawla favouring LIC. When I realised the mistake I contacted Shri Panchal and explained that his premium for policy No. 830818495 had been paid by someone else's cheque". This part of his reply clearly shows that the cheque in question of Shri Panchal was not received personally by Shri N.G. Shah but the same was personally received by Shri Parikh only. (d) As regards the contention of Shri Parikh that he accepted the mistake as he was given to understand that if he did not contest the case, a lenient view would be taken appears to me as baseless and lacking in credibility in view of the reasoned findings of the Enquiry Officer in his Report. I find that the complainant, Shri Chawla preferred a complaint in May 1991 which he intended to withdraw by his letter dated 20.03.1992. Shri Panchal on the other hand had complained to the office by his letter dated 6.10.1991 and subsequently by his letter dated 19.03.1992 he had stated that he had no complaint against Shri Parikh. I find that the complainant, Shri Chawla preferred a complaint in May 1991 which he intended to withdraw by his letter dated 20.03.1992. Shri Panchal on the other hand had complained to the office by his letter dated 6.10.1991 and subsequently by his letter dated 19.03.1992 he had stated that he had no complaint against Shri Parikh. It is evident that the complainants sought to withdraw the same after a lapse of 10 and 5 months respectively from the date of their complaints and that too after the issue of the said charge sheet. In view of this, it is obvious that these letters were obtained by Shri Parikh in order to save himself from the consequences that flow for the serious misconduct of misappropriation. (e) The charges proved against Shri Parikh clearly indicate not only temporary misappropriation but fraud as well. I find that one of the pleas advanced by Shri Parikh in his reply to the Show Cause Notice was that he was inexperienced and in his present appeal he has mentioned that he had carelessly stated that he admitted his mistake or the lapse. In this context, I observe that Shri Parikh is a B.Com. And that he was an agent of the corporation for 6 years before becoming a Development Officer since 1990. In this background, his above arguments do not stand for a moment's scrutiny." 11. Hence, this writ application. 12. Mr. Tanna, the learned senior advocate appearing for the writ applicant vehemently submitted that his client, vide reply dated 13th January, 1992 to the charge-sheet, had explained in what manner the confusion had arisen and had also prayed for mercy. 13. Mr. Tanna submitted that his client had made himself very clear that it was on account of a mistake that the premium collected from the one policy holder was paid in the account of another policy holder. 14. Mr. Tanna also submitted that later on both the policy holders made themselves clear that they had no complaints of any nature, or any grievance against the writ applicant. According to Mr. Tanna, even if the entire case, as put up by the Corporation is believed to be true, the case is one which warranted any penalty other than the major penalty of removal or dismissal from the service. 15. On the other hand, Mr. According to Mr. Tanna, even if the entire case, as put up by the Corporation is believed to be true, the case is one which warranted any penalty other than the major penalty of removal or dismissal from the service. 15. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed this writ application and submitted that the charges against the writ applicant were held to be established by the Inquiry Officer. The report of the Inquiry Officer was ultimately considered and accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority thought fit to impose the major penalty of removal from the service. The order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was also considered by the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority also deemed fit to affirm the order of the Disciplinary Authority. In such circumstances, no interference is warranted in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. Mr. Tanna has placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court; (1) in the case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 88 and (2) in the case of Nagraj Shivarao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank, Head Office, Manipal & Anr., 1991(3) SCC 219 . 17. In M.V. Bijlani (supra), the Supreme Court made the following observations on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the writ applicant. "21. While making the enquiry as against the Appellant, the Enquiry Officer made adverse comments about the correctness or otherwise of the statements made by the witnesses examined on behalf of the department without assigning any reasons therefor. They were examined by the department. If they deposed falsely, they should have been cross-examined. Only because their evidence was totally against the department, the same per se would not mean that they deposed falsely." 23. Evidently, the evidences recorded by the Enquiry Officer and inferences drawn by him were not commensurate with the charges. If it was a case of misutilisation or misappropriation, the Appellant should have been told thereabout specifically. Such a serious charge could not have been enquired without framing appropriate charges. The charges are otherwise vague. 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Such a serious charge could not have been enquired without framing appropriate charges. The charges are otherwise vague. 25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidences to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with." 18. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the Corporation committed any error in dismissing the writ applicant from the service. 19. It appears that the Corporation received a complaint from one Rajesh Chavla dated 8th May, 1991 levelling the allegations of fraud alleged to have been committed by the writ applicant herein. The complaint reads as under; "Sir, Re: Fraud committed by L.I.C Agent Shri Ashok H. Parikh (presently Dev. Officer at Kadi Branch). I had purchased the Insurance Cover Vide Pol. No. 69157058 on the life of my son Honey in Dec. 1985 for Rs. 1,00,000/- through LIC Agent Shri Ashok H. Parikh then career Agent. Who is at present working as Development Officer at L.I.C. Kadi Branch. Officer at Kadi Branch). I had purchased the Insurance Cover Vide Pol. No. 69157058 on the life of my son Honey in Dec. 1985 for Rs. 1,00,000/- through LIC Agent Shri Ashok H. Parikh then career Agent. Who is at present working as Development Officer at L.I.C. Kadi Branch. As usual, he visited my office on 8.3.91 to collect the cheque towards payment of premium payable yearly due 28.12.90 on my above policy, Since premium on said policy had remained unpaid for more than one month of grace hence on his instruction, I had issued a cheque in favour of LIC of India A/C Payee Bearer No. 552373 dated 8.3.91 drawn on the Sarangpur Co-op Bank Ltd. Amount of cheque was not filled in since he informed me that he would fill up the same after knowing the amount of Late fee that LIC would charge on Rs. 2230/- due 28.12.90 on my said policy. Yesterday, to my surprise I got a letter by post from your LIC Br. CAB intimating me about the non payment of premium due 28.12.90 on the same policy. Immediately I referred to my Bank statement and find that the cheque is presented before my Banker on 19.3.91 and it is for Rs. 2725/- against premium due Rs. 2230/- I am surprised how the difference of Rs. 495/- could be charged as late fee. by LIC. I immediately rushed to my Bankers and asked them to show me the said cheque. They were kind enough to provide me Xerox copy of the same, which is enclosed herewith for your information. Agent has cancelled the policy No. 69157058 which I had written on the back of the cheque and has shown pol. No. 830818495, this does not pertain to any of my different policies. I feel that I am defrauded. Agent has misused my cheque for payment of premium on someone's policy. The cheque was written in favour of LIC of India by me. I had also written the policy No. on the back of it in my handwriting. I therefore request you to investigate into the matter and take proper action against the agent (now Development Officer) of your office. I am also contemplating a legal action against him. The cheque was written in favour of LIC of India by me. I had also written the policy No. on the back of it in my handwriting. I therefore request you to investigate into the matter and take proper action against the agent (now Development Officer) of your office. I am also contemplating a legal action against him. I hope that your good office shall take such steps that in future no body would dare to defraud the policy holders like me who carry high image of L.I.C and its staff. Thanking You in anticipation." 20. It also appears that the writ applicant made a clean breast of what has been alleged by Shri Rajesh Chavla in his complaint referred to above. It is true that, later on, he adjusted everything and Mr. Chavla as well as Mr. Panchal were persuaded to inform the Corporation that they had no further grievance or any complaint against the writ applicant. 21. However, the Corporation received a jolt on account of the complaint referred to above. The case in hand is one of loss of confidence. Since the loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee, the allegation of loss of confidence amounts to a stigma and, therefore, a regular departmental inquiry was initiated which ultimately resulted in the order of dismissal from the service. 22. The Supreme Court, in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 583 , while considering the nature of proof required in a departmental enquiry on the scope of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226, observed as under; "It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 417 ). In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena and Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 417 ). In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate Authority. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. ( 1995 (6) SCC 749 ) the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors. ( 1999 (8) SCC 90 ) in paragraphs 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits." 23. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Supreme Court observed as under: "A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 24. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 24. The Supreme Court, in the case of Michael & Anr. Johnson Pumps Ltd., AIR 1975 SC 661 , indicated that the loss of confidence is often a subjective feeling or an individual reaction to an objective set of facts and motivations. Therefore, in a reasonable case of a confidential or responsible post being misused or a sensitive or strategic position being abused, it may be a high risk to keep the employee, once suspicion has started. When a termination order, after a full fledged departmental inquiry is based on the ground of misconduct or loss of confidence, and the same is not a colourable one, then a Court should be slow to interfere, but such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere whim or fancy and it should be bona fide and reasonable and must rest on some tangible basis. The punishment of dismissal from the service having been inflicted after considering the materials and after giving opportunity to the writ applicant, this Court should not enter into the question of merit of the finding either of the Inquiry Officer or with regard to the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority with regard to the quantum of punishment. This Court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it is shown that the same is arbitrarily imposed or is beyond the competence of the Disciplinary Authority or is apparently disproportionate or is impermissible in law. 25. Having regard to the overall facts of the case, it is difficult for me to say that the punishment imposed was arbitrary or apparently disproportionate with the guild of the charges proved or incompetent or impermissible in law. 26. When an employer loses his confidence on a person, no Court can compel such an employer to retain such an employee to the peril of its own business. The Court is not interested in the business of the employer. Therefore, even if a view is taken, the same can be different from the view that might be taken by the employer. The Court is not interested in the business of the employer. Therefore, even if a view is taken, the same can be different from the view that might be taken by the employer. It is the employer who is interested in its own business. He has different way of looking with which this Court should not interfere. In such circumstances, if the employer found that it cannot retain a person because it has lost his confidence on him, the Court should not compel him to retain such a person. 27. The learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant pointed out that in the year 2003, when this matter was heard by a learned Single Judge, it fell from the Court that the punishment imposed was quite harsh. The Corporation was asked to look into the same and consider substituting the punishment with one of stoppage of increments and reinstate the applicant in service without back wages. 28. It appears from the materials on record that apropos to what was suggested by this Court way back in the year 2003, a letter was addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the Corporation in this regard. 29. The Corporation, vide reply dated 25th September, 2003, addressed to its learned counsel, replied as under; "We refer to your FAX message Ref. LIC/SCA 8133. 1988/146/2003 dated 17.9.2003 sent to our Regional Manager (L&HPF), W.Z.D Mumbai in the aforesaid matter. In this regard we have received a FAX message Ref. Legal/A.S. Dated 24.9.2003 from our Regional Manager (L&HPF), W.Z.O, Mumbai, The same is reproduced here under; "we have gone through the said letter from our Advocate. With due respect to the suggestions made by the Hon'ble Court the competent Authority felt that the offences committed by the petitioner are not only of criminal nature but also cut at the very root of basic behaviour of the offence officers of his Cadre who are expected to win and retain the confidence of the policy holders by their honest and faithful action towards them thereby maintaining and enhancing the prestige of the organisation. In view of this we are still of the opinion that penalty as imposed by the Disciplinary Authority can not at all be called excessive. We cannot afford to have officials like Shri Parikh in our organisation, who is dishonest especially in the dealing with policyholders. In view of this we are still of the opinion that penalty as imposed by the Disciplinary Authority can not at all be called excessive. We cannot afford to have officials like Shri Parikh in our organisation, who is dishonest especially in the dealing with policyholders. In view of the above, we are unable to consider imposing a lesser punishment upon the petitioner. You are requested to please bring this decision of the Competent Authority to the kind notice of the Hon'ble High Court. Please keep us informed of the developments in the matter from time to time." 30. Almost 26 years have passed. If the writ applicant would have been in service, he would have retired in the year 2018 on attaining the age of superannuation. After a period of almost 26 years, there is no question of reinstating the writ applicant in service for a period of two years. A request was made that a lumpsum amount can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. Having reached to the conclusion that no interference is warranted, it is difficult for me to accede to such a request. 31. As a result, this writ application fails and is hereby rejected. Rule is discharged.