JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. 1. This petition is directed against Order dated 25.6.2016 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, HP in Criminal Revision No. 15 of 2015. 2. "Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of the present petition are that a sample of Pineapple ice-cream was lifted by the Food Inspector on 27.3.2008 from Sh. Sanjeev Kumar of M/s Kullu Ice Cream Corner, Kullu. One part of the sampled commodity was forwarded to the public analyst, Kandaghat, who vide its report dated 6.5.2008 found the sample to be adulterated as the milk fat content was found to be 9.23% against the prescribed standard of 10% and total solids were found to be 34.19% against 36%. On the basis of the report of the public analyst, the then Food Inspector made a request to the Chief Medical Officer, Kullu on 26.5.2008 for written consent to launch prosecution against Sanjeev Kumar of M/s Kullu Ice Cream Corner and all the directors/partners of M/s Devyani Food Industries Private Limited, Plot No. 1-21 EPIP, Phase-II, Village Thana, Baddi, Nalagarh, District Solan, HP. Chief Medical Officer granted written consent to launch prosecution against Sh. Sanjeev Kumar of M/s Kullu Ice Cream Corner and against M/s Devyani Food Industries Private Limited, Plot No. 1-21 EPIP, Phase-II, Village Thana, Baddi, Nalagarh, District Solan, HP. Thereafter, Food Inspector filed a complaint under Sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act against Sanjeev Kumar of M/s Kullu Ice Cream Corner, Kullu and MD of M/s Devyani Food Industries Private Limited, Plot No. 1-21 EPIP, Phase-II, Village Thana, Baddi, Nalagarh, District Solan, HP under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) read with Section 7(i)(iii), Section 2(i-a)(m) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 3. The Food Safety Officer moved an application under Section 319 CrPC before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu for imp leading the petitioner i.e. M/s Devyani Food Industries Private Limited, Plot No. 1-21 EPIP, Phase-II, Village Thana, Baddi, Nalagarh, District Solan, HP as necessary party through its partners/directors/responsible persons. According to the averments made in the application, proceedings were launched against Sanjeev Kumar as accused No.1 and Managing Director of M/s Devyani Food Industries Limited as accused No.2 whereas above company through its partners/directors being responsible persons, has inadvertently been left out from the list of accused persons. Application was allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu on 14.10.2015 4. Application was allowed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu on 14.10.2015 4. Petitioner feeling aggrieved by order dated 14.10.2015, filed a criminal revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Kullu bearing No. 15/2015. He dismissed the same on 25.6.2016. Hence, this petition. 5. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate, has vehemently argued that the application annexure P-4 was preferred after more than five years of the launching of the prosecution against the accused. He then argued that the inherent defect could not be cured under Section 319 CrPC. 6. Mr. Neeraj K. Sharma, Deputy Advocate General has supported the order dated 25.6.2016. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 8. It is evident from the record that sample was lifted by the then Food Inspector on 27.3.2008. It was found to be adulterated. Chief Medical Officer was requested by Food Inspector to give written consent to launch prosecution against Sanjeev Kumar and all the Directors/Managing Directors/partners of M/s Devyani Food Industries Private Limited, Plot No. 1-21 EPIP, Phase-II, Village Thana, Baddi, Nalagarh, District Solan, HP. It is in these circumstances, application under Section 319 CrPC was preferred by the Food Inspector. Trial was going on when application under Section 319 CrPC was filed for impleadment of the company through is Managing Director/partners. These persons were necessary parties for the full adjudication of the matter. Company, as per complaint, has committed an offence and was a necessary party. Chief Medical Officer has granted permission to launch proceedings against the Managing Director/all the directors/partners but it was due to inadvertence on the part of Food Inspector that he did not array the company as party through its other Directors/partners. Learned trial Court has rightly relied upon Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act while allowing application. Matter was tried by the Magistrate and thus, power under Section 319 CrPC could be exercised by him adding the company as accused through its Managing Director/all directors/partners. There is no undue delay in filing application under Section 319 CrPC taking into consideration the chequered history of the case. Rather, this Court in Cr MMO No. 4036 of 2013 decided on 20.8.2015 has directed the trial Court to decide the application preferred by the Food Inspector under Section 319 CrPC as expeditiously as possible. Copy of this order is annexure P-3. Rather, this Court in Cr MMO No. 4036 of 2013 decided on 20.8.2015 has directed the trial Court to decide the application preferred by the Food Inspector under Section 319 CrPC as expeditiously as possible. Copy of this order is annexure P-3. There is no merit in the contention of Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Senior Advocate that non-impleadment of company at the time of initiation of trial was an inherent infirmity. 9. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 , have held that object of Section 319 CrPC is that the real culprit should not get away unpunished. This is part of concept of ‘fair trial’ and provision is based on the doctrine of judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur. Constructive and purposive interpretation should be adopted so as to advance the object and cause of justice. Courts should give full respect to the words used in the provision. Their lordships have further held that power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised at any time after commencement of inquiry into an offence by court i.e. inquiry commences before court with filing of charge-sheet/complaint before court and before conclusion of trial, except during stage of Sections 207 to 209 which is not a judicial step in the true sense. Their lordships have held as under: “12 Section 319 Cr.P.C. springs out of the doctrine judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted) and this doctrine must be used as a beacon light while explaining the ambit and the spirit underlying the enactment of Section 319 Cr.P.C. 13. It is the duty of the Court to do justice by punishing the real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 Cr.P.C.? 18. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, the court is not powerless in calling the said accused to face trial. The question remains under what circumstances and at what stage should the court exercise its power as contemplated in Section 319 Cr.P.C.? 18. The legislature cannot be presumed to have imagined all the circumstances and, therefore, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the words used by the legislature so as to encompass any situation which the court may have to tackle while proceeding to try an offence and not allow a person who deserves to be tried to go Scot free by being not arraigned in the trial in spite of possibility of his complicity which can be gathered from the documents presented by the prosecution 19. The court is the sole repository of justice and a duty is cast upon it to uphold the rule of law and, therefore, it will be inappropriate to deny the existence of such powers with the courts in our criminal justice system where it is not uncommon that the real accused, at times, get away by manipulating the investigating and/or the prosecuting agency. The desire to avoid trial is so strong that an accused makes efforts at times to get himself absolved even at the stage of investigation or inquiry even though he may be connected with the commission of the offence. 27. The stage of inquiry commences, insofar as the court is concerned, with the filing of the charge-sheet and the consideration of the material collected by the prosecution, that is mentioned in the charge-sheet for the purpose of trying the accused. This has to be understood in terms of Section 2(g) Cr.P.C., which defines an inquiry as follows: “2(g) “inquiry” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.” 39. Section 2(g) Cr.P.C. and the case laws referred to above, therefore, clearly envisage inquiry before the actual commencement of the trial, and is an act conducted under Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate or the court. The word ‘inquiry’ is, therefore, not any inquiry relating to the investigation of the case by the investigating agency but is an inquiry after the case is brought to the notice of the court on the filing of the charge-sheet. The word ‘inquiry’ is, therefore, not any inquiry relating to the investigation of the case by the investigating agency but is an inquiry after the case is brought to the notice of the court on the filing of the charge-sheet. The court can thereafter proceed to make inquiries and it is for this reason that an inquiry has been given to mean something other than the actual trial. 40. Even the word “course” occurring in Section 319 Cr.P.C., clearly indicates that the power can be exercised only during the period when the inquiry has been commenced and is going on or the trial which has commenced and is going on. It covers the entire wide range of the process of the pre-trial and the trial stage. The word “course” therefore, allows the court to invoke this power to proceed against any person from the initial stage of inquiry up to the stage of the conclusion of the trial. The court does not become functus officio even if cognizance is taken so far as it is looking into the material qua any other person who is not an accused. The word “course” ordinarily conveys a meaning of a continuous progress from one point to the next in time and conveys the idea of a period of time; duration and not a fixed point of time. (See: Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi (Now Rajasthan) v. M/s. East West Import & Export (P) Ltd. (Now known as Asian Distributors Ltd.) 84. The word “evidence” therefore has to be understood in its wider sense both at the stage of trial and, as discussed earlier, even at the stage of inquiry, as used under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The court, therefore, should be understood to have the power to proceed against any person after summoning him on the basis of any such material as brought forth before it. The duty and obligation of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously on such material after evidence has been led during trial.” 10. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganeshmal Jashraj v. Govt. The duty and obligation of the court becomes more onerous to invoke such powers cautiously on such material after evidence has been led during trial.” 10. Their lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ganeshmal Jashraj v. Govt. of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1980 SC 264 , have held that “We would, therefore, strongly urge upon the Food Inspection Department not to remain content with paying homage to anti-adulteration law by catching small tradesmen but direct the full fury of their investigative machinery against the wholesalers and manufactures who are in a large majority of cases really responsible of adulteration of the food stuff which is being sold by the small retailers. Then only would the true purpose of the prevention of food adulteration law be fulfilled and the great gap between expectation and fulfillment in respect of welfare laws be bridged.” 11. There is neither any perversity nor any illegality in Order dated 3.7.2015 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla. 12. Accordingly, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. Since, the trial has already been delayed considerably, learned trial Court is directed to conclude the trial itself within a period of six months from today, if necessary by recording evidence on day to day basis.