JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Since the common questions of law arise in all these Tax Appeals in respect of the same assessee, whereby the Tribunal has confirmed the order passed by the CIT(A) and has dismissed the appeal of the revenue, they are being heard and decided by this common oral judgment. 2. Tax Appeal No. 894 to 898 of 2008 is admitted on the following question of law: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of land of Late Shri Vikramsinhji by his son Jyotindrasinhji of Gondal is chargeable to long term capital gain tax in the respective assessment years?" 3. Tax Appeal No. 1787 to 1788 of 2008 came to be admitted on the following question of law: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of land of Late Shri Vikramsinhji by his son Jyotindrasinhji of Gondal is chargeable to long term capital gain tax in the respective assessment years?" 4. Tax Appeal No. 396 of 2010 came to be admitted on the following questions of law: "[A] Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in confirming the order passed by CIT(A) in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,94,892/- made by the Assessing Officer on account of income from UK Trusts? [B] Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in confirming the order passed by CIT(A) in deleting the addition of Rs. 30,01,597/- made by the Assessing Officer on account of Long Term Capital Gain on sale of land?" 5. Tax Appeal No. 2167 to 2170 of 2009 came to be admitted on the following question of law, however the amount of deleting the addition is different in each of the matter: "Whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law and on facts in confirming the order passed by CIT(A) in deleting the addition of Rs. 49,46,010/- made by the Assessing Officer on account of long term capital gains?" 6. Tax Appeal No. 1955 of 2009 is admitted on the following question of law: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of land of Late Shri Vikramsinhji by his son Jyotindrasinhji of Gondal is chargeable to long term capital gain tax in the respective assessment years?" 7. Tax Appeal No. 1955 of 2009 is admitted on the following question of law: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of land of Late Shri Vikramsinhji by his son Jyotindrasinhji of Gondal is chargeable to long term capital gain tax in the respective assessment years?" 7. Tax Appeal No. 1956 to 1957 of 2009 are admitted on the following questions of law: "[A] Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of land of Late Shri Vikramsinhji by his son Shri Jyotindrasinhji of Gondal is chargeable to Long Term Capital Gain tax? [B] Whether the Appellate Tribunal has erred on facts and in circumstances of the case and in law in passing an order in respect of A.Y. 2001-02, whereas the Tribunal had already disposed off the appeal for these years vide earlier order dated 10/04/2008, appeals against which have been filed in this Hon'ble Court by the Department on the specified date?" 8. Tax Appeal No. 576 of 2009 is admitted on the following questions of law: "1. Whether the Appellate Tribunal has erred in law in not giving opportunity to the Assessing Officer as required u/s. 158A(2) of the Act, before acting on the declaration in form No. 8 furnished by the assessee in terms of Section 158A(1)? 2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of land belonging to the fore fathers of the assessee, Shri Jyotindrasinhji of Gondal is chargeable to Long Term Capital Gain Tax?" 9. Learned Counsel for the assessee has contended that issue involved in this appeals is squarely covered by a decision of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Manoharsinhji P. Jadeja [2006] 281 ITR 19 (Guj) and has placed reliance upon the following paragraphs: "The mode of computation and deductions set forth in s.48 provide the principal basis for quantifying the income chargeable under the head "Capital gains". The section provides that the income chargeable under that head shall be computed by deducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset: "(ii) the cost of acquisition of the capital asset..." What is contemplated is an asset in the acquisition of which it is possible to envisage a cost. The intent goes to the nature and character of the asset, that it is an asset which possesses the inherent quality of being available on the expenditure of money to a person seeking to acquire it. It is immaterial that although the asset belongs to such a class, it may, on the facts of a certain case, be acquired without the payment of money. That kind of case is covered by s.49 and its cost, for the purpose of s.48, is determined in accordance with those provisions. There are other provisions which indicate that s.48 is concerned with an asset capable of acquisition at a cost. Section 50 is one such provision. So also is sub-s. (2) of s.55. None of the provisions pertaining to the head "Capital gains" suggests that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost at all can be conceived. Yet there are assets which are acquired by way of production in which no cost element can be identified or envisaged. From what has gone before, it is apparent that the goodwill generated in a new business has been so regarded. The elements which create it have already been detailed. In such a case, when the asset is sold and the consideration is brought to tax, what is charged is the capital value of the asset and not any profit or gain. In the case of goodwill generated in a new business there is the further circumstance that it is not possible to determine the date when it comes into existence. The date of acquisition of the asset is a material factor in applying the computation provisions pertaining to capital gains. It is possible to say that the "cost of acquisition" mentioned is s.48 implies a date of acquisition, and that inference is strengthened by the provisions of ss.49 and 50 as well as sub-s.(2) of 55. It may also be noted that if the goodwill generated in a new business is regarded as acquired at a cost and subsequently passes to an assessee in any of the modes specified in sub-s. (1) of s.49, it will become necessary to determine the cost of acquisition to the previous owner. Having regard to the nature of the asset, it will be impossible to determine such cost of acquisition. Having regard to the nature of the asset, it will be impossible to determine such cost of acquisition. Nor can sub-s. (3) of s.55 be invoked, because the date of acquisition by the previous owner will remain unknown." (emphasis supplied) According to Mr. Vyas for the Revenue, the correct ratio of the decision commences from the Paragraph beginning with the "The point to consider then is whether if the expression "asset" in s.45..... ". Thus, it was submitted that only in case of an asset where it was not possible to envisage a cost then the ratio of the decision would be applicable and not in case of assets where it was possible to conceive a cost. Mr. Vyas, in support of the said submission, placed reliance on the observations made to the effect that "Yet there are assets which are acquired by way of production in which no cost element can be identified or envisaged.". Therefore, according to him, it was only in case where having regard to the nature of the assets it would be impossible to determine the cost of acquisition that the ratio can be invoked. That in the present case the asset in question was land and hence, it was not possible to state that it was an asset which had no cost element or for acquisition of which no cost could be envisaged. 14. As laid down by the Apex Court though Section 45 is a charging section for the purpose of imposing the charge Legislature has enacted detailed provisions in order to compute the profits or gains under that head and no provision at variance with such computation provisions can be applied for determining the chargeable profits and gains. That all transactions covered by Section 45 have to fall under the governance of the computation provision and thus, the said provisions have to be read and applied as an integrated code. The case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) came to be applied by the Apex Court itself in a subsequent decision in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad - Kartikeya V. Sarabhai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1985) 156 ITR 509 . The case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) came to be applied by the Apex Court itself in a subsequent decision in the case of Sunil Siddharthbhai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad - Kartikeya V. Sarabhai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1985) 156 ITR 509 . The question before the Apex Court was : where a partner of a firm transfers personal assets held by him to a firm as his contribution towards the capital whether such contribution would amount to a transfer and, if yes, whether there was any consideration within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act so as to charge income under the head "Capital gains". The Apex Court answered the first part of the question in favour of the Revenue holding that admittedly when a partner transfers his personal assets to a partnership firm there would be extinguishment of his exclusive rights which would amount to transfer within the meaning of Section 45 of the Act. However, in relation to the second issue relying on case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) it was held that : "..... It is impossible to conceive of evaluating the consideration acquired by the partner when he brings his personal asset into the partnership firm when neither the date of dissolution or retirement can be envisaged nor can there be any ascertainment of liabilities and prior charges which may not have even arisen yet. In the circumstances, we are unable to hold that the consideration which a partner acquires on making over his personal asset to the partnership firm as his contribution to its capital can fall within the terms of section 48. And as that provision is fundamental to the computation machinery incorporated in the scheme relating to the determination of the charge provided in section 45, such a case must be regarded as falling outside the scope of capital gains taxation altogether." 15. The case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) came to be applied by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in fact situation which is almost similar to the present one. The assessee therein was Maharaja of Ratlam who sold some lands which were part of the property inherited by the said assessee from his forefather to whom the property had been gifted by a Moghul Emperor. Madhya Pradesh High Court after taking into consideration various decisions repelled the two fold contentions raised by the Revenue viz. The assessee therein was Maharaja of Ratlam who sold some lands which were part of the property inherited by the said assessee from his forefather to whom the property had been gifted by a Moghul Emperor. Madhya Pradesh High Court after taking into consideration various decisions repelled the two fold contentions raised by the Revenue viz. that the case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) and other decisions which followed the said decision related to intangible assets and secondly where cost of acquisition could not be ascertained fair market value had to be adopted in the following words : "It is no doubt true that none of these cases relate to the sale of immovable property as in the present case. But the gist of all these decisions has been the same that if there is no cost of acquisition, then the sale price would not attract the provisions of capital gains. Thus, it would be clear that the liability for capital gains tax would arise in respect of only those capital assets in the acquisition of which the element of cost is either actually present or is capable of being reckoned and not in respect of those assets in the acquisition of which the element of cost is altogether inconceivable, as in the present case. The circular of the Board referred to above on which learned counsel for the Revenue placed reliance--though not binding on this court--only indicates that the section does not relate to only the immediate past owner but to past owners in succession. Thus, we are not persuaded to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the Revenue that in such a case as the present one, according to the provisions of section 55 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where cost cannot be ascertained, the fair market price has to be taken into consideration because the very basis of capital gains to us appears to be that at some point of time, the person who initially acquires the property at some cost in terms of money." [Commissioner of Commissioner of Income Tax v. H.H. Maharaja Sahib Shri Lokendra Singhji, (1986) 162 ITR 93]. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Markapakula Agamma, (1987) 165 ITR 386 was once again called to resolve almost a similar controversy between the assessee and the Revenue. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Markapakula Agamma, (1987) 165 ITR 386 was once again called to resolve almost a similar controversy between the assessee and the Revenue. There the assessee was a protected tenant and acquired rights in the land itself by virtue of Section 40(4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The said rights in the land came to be compulsorily acquired by the State Government pursuant to acquisition proceedings for the purpose of the Housing Board and the lands vested in the State Government. Out of the total compensation paid by the State Government the protected tenant was entitled to 60% on the basis of provision of the aforesaid Tenancy and Agricultural Act. In relation to the said compensation question arose as to whether the assessee was liable to be charged under the head 'Capital gains'. Applying the ratio in the case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) the Court held that the rights in the land though in the nature of protected tenancy rights do not have any cost of acquisition and the compensation cannot be brought within the net of capital gains. The contention on behalf of the Revenue that fair market value on the date of conferring of protected tenancy may be adopted as the cost of acquisition was also rejected. The necessity of providing an optional date for adopting cost of acquisition under Section 55 of the Act has been explained in the following words while repelling the contention of the Revenue that in absence of cost of acquisition fair market value has to be adopted as provided under Section 55 of the Act. "Learned standing counsel for the Revenue contended that in any event, the fair market value on the date of conferring protected tenancy can be considered as provided under Section 55 of the Act. Learned counsel says that by this process the element of cost of acquisition can be taken as present. Considered from a proper perspective, section 55 does not yield to this line of approach. The relevant sub-section of section 55 is an elucidation and extension of sections 48 and 49 providing for the valuation being pegged down to the date specified therein, namely January 1, 1964, at the option of the assessee. Considered from a proper perspective, section 55 does not yield to this line of approach. The relevant sub-section of section 55 is an elucidation and extension of sections 48 and 49 providing for the valuation being pegged down to the date specified therein, namely January 1, 1964, at the option of the assessee. Having in view the galloping increase in prices and abnormal low costs in the earlier years, the assessee is facilitated to opt for the date, i.e., January 1, 1964, for ascertaining the cost of acquisition. This provision presupposes the cost of acquisition but this mode of ascertaining the cost of acquisition is prescribed by shifting the date of ascertainment to January 1, 1964, from the actual date of acquisition. The effect of this section is that whatever be the cost during the period preceding January 1, 1964, the assessee may exercise the option of having the value ascertained as on January 1, 1964. This provision cannot be pressed into service where there is no cost of acquisition at all." This Court in the case of Baroda Cement and Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1986) 158 ITR 636 was called upon to decide as to whether amount received by the assessee by way of damages for breach of contract of sale was chargeable to tax under the head 'Capital gains'. The Court after referring to the case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) and extracting the relevant portion from Page 299 of the reported decision of 128 ITR held that: "..... The ratio of this decision is that the asset referred to in section 45 must be one in the acquisition whereof the assessee had incurred a cost. If the Revenue fails to show that the assessee had incurred a cost as in the present case, it would be impossible to compute the income chargeable to tax under the head "Capital gains" and what the Revenue would be charging would be the capital value of the asset and not any profit or gain." Thus, it is apparent that the asset referred to in Section 45 of the act has to be - (i) in the acquisition of which it is possible to envisage a cost; (ii) in the acquisition whereof the assessee had incurred a cost, and the onus of showing that the assessee had incurred cost is on the Revenue. If the Revenue fails to show that the assessee had incurred a cost, as in the present case, it would be impossible to compute the income chargeable to tax under the head 'Capital gains'. The Revenue cannot be permitted to charge capital value of the asset because what is chargeable is profits and gains on transfer of a capital asset. Therefore, stand of the Revenue that in absence of any cost being actually incurred the value thereof has to be taken as Nil and the entire sale consideration is taxable cannot be accepted in light of the settled legal position. The contention that when the cost of asset is Nil the entire sale consideration is required to be taxed as profits and gains under the head 'Capital gains' is also sought to be supported by the amendment in Section 55 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the Revenue the principle -- that a capital asset which does not have cost of acquisition does not fall within the charging Section is now superseded by amended provision of Section 55 of the Act. However, it requires to be noted that by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 01-04-1988 the amendment to Section 55 of the Act only ropes in taxability of goodwill on transfer of the same even if there is no cost of acquisition. Similarly, Section 55 has been amended from time to time to enable the taxation of other assets wherein no cost of acquisition is envisaged : tenancy rights, state carriage permits and, looms hours by the Finance Act, 1994 with effect from 1st April 1995; right to manufacture, produce or process any article or thing by the Finance Act 1997 with effect from 1st April 1998; trademark or brand name associated with business by the Finance Act 2001 with effect from 1st April 2002; and right to carry on any business by the Finance Act 2002 with effect from 1st April 2003. Therefore, even if the amendment is taken into consideration Section 55 can be invoked in cases of Nil cost of acquisition for the purpose of bringing to tax entire sale consideration only in relation to the specified assets. The Legislature having amended the said section from time to time has roped in only specified assets as noted hereinbefore. Therefore, even if the amendment is taken into consideration Section 55 can be invoked in cases of Nil cost of acquisition for the purpose of bringing to tax entire sale consideration only in relation to the specified assets. The Legislature having amended the said section from time to time has roped in only specified assets as noted hereinbefore. In the circumstances, the amendment instead of working to the advantage of the Revenue goes to indicate that the Legislature does not want to bring within the purview of tax net all the assets (except the specified assets) which do not have cost of acquisition and the entire sale consideration cannot be treated as profits and gains chargeable under the head 'Capital gains' by adopting the cost of acquisition as Nil. The contention of the Revenue that fair market value of the asset is required to be adopted by invoking provision of Section 55(3) of the Act has already been rejected by the Apex Court in the case of Srinivasa Setty (supra) in the following words " Nor can sub-s. (3) of s.55 be invoked, because the date of acquisition by the previous owner will remain unknown." The importance of date of acquisition cannot be lost sight of taking into consideration the scheme of the Act. Under the Act both short term gains and long term capital gains are chargeable to tax but the treatment thereof is different. Section 2(42A) defines "short term capital asset" and lays down the period beyond which if an asset is held it would become a long term capital asset, transfer whereof is liable to be taxed as long term capital gains. Therefore, for working out the specified period i.e. 36 months immediately preceding the date of transfer the date of acquisition becomes relevant. In the present case, admittedly, the assets have been acquired by a mode of acquisition specified in Section 49(1)(iii)(a) of the Act and thus the asset in question is a long term capital asset but neither the cost nor the date of acquisition are ascertainable. In light of what is stated hereinbefore, it cannot be held that the order of the Tribunal suffers from any legal error or infirmity so as to call for any interference. The Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the Income-tax authorities were not right in working out capital gains at Rs. In light of what is stated hereinbefore, it cannot be held that the order of the Tribunal suffers from any legal error or infirmity so as to call for any interference. The Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the Income-tax authorities were not right in working out capital gains at Rs. 41,11,414/- so as to bring the same to tax under the head 'Capital gains'. In the result, the question referred to the Court is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs." 10. Learned Counsel for the assessee has also drawn the attention of this Court to the similar decision of this Court in case of the same assessee decided in Tax Appeal No. 2171 to 2174 of 2009 vide order dated 15/06/2011 and in these appeals the question was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department by dismissing the appeal of the Department. 11. In light of the above factual legal position, while adopting the said view, this Court is not assigning further elaborate reasons and answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Accordingly, all these appeals are dismissed. 12. So far as Tax Appeal No. 576 of 2009 where question No. 1 is with regard to whether the Tribunal has erred in law in not giving opportunity to the Assessing Officer as required u/s. 158A(2) of the Act before acting on the declaration in form No. 8 furnished by the assessee in terms of Section 158A(1) is concerned, this Court is remitting the matter to AO for deciding the said issue afresh.