JUDGMENT AND ORDER : S. Talapatra, J. (Oral) Heard Mr. P .Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. A. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC against the judgment and decree dated 26.06.2012, delivered in Money Appeal No. 24 of 2011 by the Additional District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.5. 3. There is no dispute that in the suit, Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the Corporation was not a party. But some of its officers namely the appellants No.2 and 3 were arraigned as the defendant in the suit being Money Suit No.43 of 2008, which has been instituted for purpose of realising the damage, quantified at Rs.8,40,000/-. On 24.04.2000 at about 5.30/6.00 a.m. one Sreemati Sarkar, mother-in-law of the plaintiff No.1 came into contact with the live electric wire and she fell down. Seeing her fidgeting, her son namely Ratan Sarkar, husband of the plaintiff No.1 and father of the plaintiffs No. 2 and 3 rushed to save his mother, Sreemati Sarkar. Ratan Sarkar also got electrocuted and both Sreemati Sarkar and Ratan Sarkar died out of the said electrocution. For recovering the damage for negligence in managing the electricity line, the said suit was filed for realising the said sum of compensation against the appellants No. 2 and 3 and another. 4. By filing the written statement, the defendants, the appellant Nos. 2 and 3 and another raised the question of maintainability on the ground of non-joinder of the necessary party. Despite that no attempt even was made by the plaintiffs to add the corporation. There is no dispute that the Managing Director of the Tripura State Electricity Corporation, the Senior Manager, Electrical Kalyanpur Sub Division and Senior Manager, Electrical Teliamura Sub Division were added as the defendants in the suit and they have seriously contested the suit. 5. The suit was decreed awarding the damage at Rs.3,07,200/- and declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to get the said amount from the defendants. Against the said judgment and decree dated 16.08.2011, delivered in Money Suit No. 43 of 2008, an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC was preferred by the appellants herein. In the said appeal being Money Appeal No. 24 of 2011 the defendant No.1 was not made party. Against the said judgment and decree dated 16.08.2011, delivered in Money Suit No. 43 of 2008, an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC was preferred by the appellants herein. In the said appeal being Money Appeal No. 24 of 2011 the defendant No.1 was not made party. Even though the corporation was not the party in the suit, but the corporation was one of the appellants in the said first appeal. 6. While disposing the appeal by the impugned judgment dated 26.06.2012, the first appellate court has observed as under : "11. Ld. Counsel, Mr. G.S. Das incidentally raised another question that the Electricity Corporation was not made[sic] in the original suit, rather the Managing Director was arrayed as defendant. Ld. Counsel, however, could not show any specific law on that point that the Corporation and not it's Managing Director should be made party. Though no specific 'point for decision' was formulated by this court on that point, however, it is incumbent upon the Court not to leave this minor point too untouched as was ventilated by one of the parties. As per provision of rule 2 of Order XXIX of C.P.C., it was obligatory on the part of respondents to serve notice of the corporation upon it's secretary, director or any other principal officer of that corporation and in this case the summons was served upon the Managing Director himself. So, there is no scope for the appellants to take any such plea that just for non-mentioning of name of the Corporation in place of it's Managing Director in the cause title of the plaint, they were prejudiced or that for that reason, the Corporation could not take it's proper defence. Some laxity in ground level pleadings were always adhered to uphold the cause of substantial justice avoiding any sort of pedantic or hyper technical approach in procedural aspects." Having held thus, the finding of the trial court has been affirmed by the first appellate court. Now the Corporation has come up with this appeal. 7. At the time of admitting this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed by this court : "(i) Whether a decree can be passed against a person or authority, who is not a party in the suit, if so, whether such decree is perverse.? Now the Corporation has come up with this appeal. 7. At the time of admitting this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed by this court : "(i) Whether a decree can be passed against a person or authority, who is not a party in the suit, if so, whether such decree is perverse.? (ii) Whether a judgment and decree is perverse for non-consideration of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act read with Order 7, Rule 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure?" 8. After scrutinising the records as well as hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this court finds a very important issue involved in this appeal, namely whether the suit, by excluding the principal, the corporation herein, can be allowed to be maintained and whether in absence of the corporation as the party in the suit, the decree is passed legally. 9. To simplify the matter, this court must not fail to observe that the interpretation of Order 29, Rule 2 of the CPC is faulted inasmuch as when the corporation is made party, according to that provision the functionaries named therein may represent or accept the summons or notice. It does not even indicate as to impleadment. Without impleading the body-corporate, the principal, which is the entity, no liability through its assigns can be saddled upon it. The delegates always represent, but they are not the person. The trial court by its decree has directed 'the corporation' to pay the amount knowing fully well that 'the corporation' was not in the array of parties. The way this aspect has been addressed by the first appellate court, this court is constrained to observe that, that view cannot be sustained. That apart, the decree can hardly be executed against those officers who have been added as the defendants in the suit leaving 'the corporation' at lurch. 10. Having due regard to the aspects as discussed above, this court is of the view that for the substantive justice it would be apposite to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree dated 26.06.2012, as well as the judgment and decree dated 16.08.2011 and 30.08.2011 passed by the trial court. Accordingly, those are set aside but the suit is remanded to the trial court, with liberty to the plaintiffs to arraign 'the corporation' as the principal-defendant. Accordingly, those are set aside but the suit is remanded to the trial court, with liberty to the plaintiffs to arraign 'the corporation' as the principal-defendant. It is made clear that if the corporation is not brought on the array as the defendant in the suit or the corporation is not added for any reason, the suit shall be dismissed. If the corporation is added as the defendant, the corporation must be given opportunity to file the written statement and documents, if any. 11. If required, issues may be reframed. Thereafter the suit would proceed in accordance with law. Since the matter is pending for quite a long time, all steps be taken by the trial court for bringing the suit to its logical end within a reasonable period but not beyond 31.12.2016. 12. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. Draw the decree accordingly. LCRs be sent down thereafter to enable the trial court to proceed with the suit in terms of the direction and observations made herein above. Appeal allowed.