JUDGMENT : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. Aggrieved of the orders dated 22nd December, 2005 and 23rd January, 2006, passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, the petitioners have instituted the present writ application, with a prayer to quash and set aside the impugned orders aforesaid. 2. Briefly, the essential skeletal material facts are that the petitioners instituted a suit for declaration and injunction against the respondent No. 4 to 16, under Sections 88, 91 and 188 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short, 'the Act of 1955'), with reference to Khasra No. 55, measuring 17 Bighas and 17 Biswas, situated in Village Bodlasi, Tehsil Laxmangarh, District Sikar, on the basis of cultivatory possession of the land for more than 30 years. It is pleaded case of the petitioners that from the subject land an area of 300 Sq. yards was converted for non-agricultural purposes, under the Rajasthan Revenue (Conversion of Land in Rural Areas) Rules, 1971 (for short, 'the Rules of 1971'). The order of conversion was made on 18th September, 1990, which was subjected to appeal successfully by the respondents No. 4 to 16, and the matter was remanded back for decision afresh while quashing and setting aside the order dated 18th September, 1990. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Pawan Pareek, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application vehemently argued that the defendants/respondents filed their written statements on 23rd January, 1992 along with an application was also preferred under Order 14, Rule 2 (2) of CPC. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Fatehpur (Sikar), upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, declined the application vide order dated 24th July, 1995, which was not challenged any further by the respondents. However, another application was instituted under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC and that too was declined by the Sub-Divisional Officer. 4. The respondents, aggrieved of rejection of the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, successfully filed a Revision Petition before the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer. While allowing the Revision Petition vide impugned order dated 22nd December, 2005, the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, allowed the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC, as would be evident from the order dated 22nd December, 2005. 5. While allowing the Revision Petition vide impugned order dated 22nd December, 2005, the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, allowed the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC, as would be evident from the order dated 22nd December, 2005. 5. Thus, the petitioners are aggrieved of the order dated 22nd December, 2005, made on Revision Petition of the respondents as well as of the order dated 23rd January, 2006, declining the Review Petition of the petitioners. 6. It is further urged that once the application under Order 14, Rule 2 (2) of CPC, was declined vide order dated 24th July, 1995, and was not challenged any further, therefore, the Board of Revenue, committed gross error in fact of law in entertaining the matter in revision while allowing the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, and therefore, the orders passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, needs to be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 7. In response to the notice of the writ application, respondents No. 4 to 16, have filed their counter-affidavit, while supporting the orders dated 22nd December, 2005 and 23rd January, 2006, passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan Ajmer. 8. Learned counsel for respondents No. 4 to 16, Mr. Anoop Dhand, supporting the orders passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, strenuously argued that the writ petition is not maintainable for the same subject matter between the same parties, involving the same very subject land, was adjudicated upon by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in SBCWP 280 of 1985 (Nagarmal and others v. Board of Revenue for Rajsthan, Ajmer and Ors.) decided on 4th February, 2000. The opinion of the Single Judge dated 4th February, 2000, was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in an intra-court appeal (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) 256/2001), decided vide order dated 9th May, 2001. 9. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has relied upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta and Ors. : 2007(10) SCC 59 , Ishwar Dutt and Ors. v. Land Acquisition Collector And Ors. : (2005)7 SCC 190 , and Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors. : (2005)10 SCC 51 . 10. : 2007(10) SCC 59 , Ishwar Dutt and Ors. v. Land Acquisition Collector And Ors. : (2005)7 SCC 190 , and Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors. : (2005)10 SCC 51 . 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 11. The factual matrix as stated by the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 to 16, with reference to adjudication of the matter by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in SBCWP No. 280/1985, decided on 4th February 2000, between the same parties, involving the very same subject land; is not in dispute. The opinion aforesaid was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in intra-court appeal (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) 256/2001), declining interference, as would be evident from the order dated 9th May, 2001. Taking note of the material facts, the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 4th February, 2000, held thus : "The petitioners had filed the suit before the SDO in regard to the land bearing Khasra No. 55 measuring 17 Bigha 17 Biswa on the ground that the petitioner was the Khatedar tenant and had prayed for a decree of declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents who were the defendants in the suit. The trial court had dismissed the suit vide order dated 23.11.1971 (Annexure B). The appeal filed before the RAA was also dismissed vide order dated 28.10.1975 (Annexure C). Another challenge was made in the second appeal before the Board of Revenue, the Board of Revenue also dismissed the same vide order dated 24.12.1982 (Annexure E). A review was filed against order Annexure E which was also dismissed. The contention of the petitioner is that he was a sub-tenant even accordingly to Megh Singh the respondent and therefore, was included in definition as given in Section 5 (3) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and therefore, entitled to the decree of permanent injunction. A review was filed against order Annexure E which was also dismissed. The contention of the petitioner is that he was a sub-tenant even accordingly to Megh Singh the respondent and therefore, was included in definition as given in Section 5 (3) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and therefore, entitled to the decree of permanent injunction. It is further contention that Jagir of the respondent stood resumed in the year 1958 and at the time of resumption, the respondents were not Khudakasht and, therefore, the respondents-defendants could not have deemed to be Khatedar tenant on the land u/s 13 of the Rajasthan Tenacny Act and the petitioner who was paying rent to the state became Khatedar tenant. It is further submitted that the judgment in question are in violation of Section 19 (1-AA) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which provides that if a person is recorded as sub-tenant in December 1969, automatically becomes the Khatedar Tenant. There is no dispute so far the proposition of law as being envisaged by the counsel for the petitioner is concerned. The petitioner also relies on the judgments reported in AIR 1991 SC 663 , AIR 1977 SC 5 and AIR 1978 SC 30 for the proposition that on abolition of Jagirdari and Biswedari Act, the Biswedar cannot claim the said land as Khudkasht when admittedly the possession of the land was not with him or he is not so entered as res judicata. No doubt the proposition as envisaged now would have some force, but the finding had been written by all the three courts against the petitioner in regard to the possession relating to the relevant period. In view of the concurrent finding of fact where the petitioners have not been able to prove their case before the judicial authorities and the suit having been dismissed and both the appeals and the review also rejected, the scope of interference in the writ petition is very little and, therefore, the writ petition as such is dismissed. No order as to costs." 12. The only argument emphasized by the learned counsel for the petitioners, while assailing the legality and validity of the impugned orders dated 22nd December, 2005 and 23rd January, 2006; is that an order conversion of 300 Sq. No order as to costs." 12. The only argument emphasized by the learned counsel for the petitioners, while assailing the legality and validity of the impugned orders dated 22nd December, 2005 and 23rd January, 2006; is that an order conversion of 300 Sq. yards out of the subject land was converted for non-agricultural purposes subsequently, and therefore, a fresh cause of action, accrued in favour of the petitioners. Thus, the matter was rightly entertained and adjudicated upon by the Sub-Divisional Officer. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the principle of res judicata is not attracted. The opinion of the Supreme Court as relied upon in support thereof. The case of Ram Prakash Gupta (supra), is of no help to the petitioners for the simple reason that the observations made by the Supreme Court therein were in the backdrop of the fact that in cross-examination, no question as to limitation was asked by the respondents therein and it was at a belated stage, the respondents moved an application under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) CPC, for rejection of the claim on the ground, the suit being barred by law of limitation. The facts, of the instant case at hand, are entirely different and distinguishable, and therefore, the opinion has no application in the instant case at hand. 13. It is trite law that an adjudication between the same parties on same points of law of facts, which have been adjudicated upon, are not open for adjudication afresh keeping in view the object and purport of principle of res-judicata, as contemplated under Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of Ishwar Dutt (supra), the supreme Court, reiterating the earlier view, in the case of Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Shri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors.: (2005) 10 SCC 51 , held thus: "Yet recently in Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam in which one of us was a party, this Court observed: (SCC p.61, paras 26-27) "26. The object and purport of principle of res judicata as contained in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. The object and purport of principle of res judicata as contained in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of lis stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Such a rule was brought into the statute book with a view to bring the litigation to an end so that the other side may not be put to harassment. 27. The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create a bar as regards a plea, between the same parties in some other matter in another court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh the very point that was determined in the earlier judgment." It was further noticed: (SCC p. 64, para 42) "42. In Ishwardas v. the State of M.P. this Court held: (SCC p.166, para 7) "...In order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim..." 14. No other point raised by the learned counsel for the parties for consideration of this Court. 15. For the reasons and discussions aforesaid, the writ application is devoid of any substance and lacks in merit, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 16. Ordered accordingly. 17. No costs.