JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Matter is taken in revised cause list. 2. None appeared on behalf of opposite parties No. 6 to 8. 3. Heard Sri Yogesh Keserwani, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for opposite parties No. 1 to 3, Sri Mahfooz Alam, learned counsel for opposite parties No. 4 and 5/contesting Opposite Parties and perused the record. 4. By means of present writ petition, petitioners have challenged the order dated 9.4.2010 passed by opposite party No. 1/Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow Division, Lucknow in Appeal No. 2 of 2008-09 (Chaudhary Haider Husain and others v. Abdul Mazid and others) under Section 13 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (herein after referred as “Act”) thereby rejecting the petitioners’ application under Order XLI Rule 27(b) of CPC. 5. The undisputed facts of the present case are that in a ceiling proceedings arising out of the Act and order dated 19.6.1992 (Annexure 9) has been passed by Prescribed Authority (Ceiling), Rae Bareli, challenged by opposite parties No. 4 and 5 alongwith deceased Abdul Mueed by filing an appeal No. 6 of 1994-95 under Section 13 of the Act, allowed by order dated 30.12.1997 and the matter was remanded to the prescribed authority to decide a fresh taking into consideration the objection in regard to surplus land on merit, taking into consideration that after closure of consolidation proceedings whatever land of original tenant falls under Ceiling Limit(surplus land) should be taken by offering choice. 6. Thereafter, by order dated 3.9.1998, the prescribed authority decided the matter, challenged by filing two appeals, namely, Appeal No. 5 of 1997-98(Smt. Yasmin Nuzhat w/o Azhar Hssain v. Asghar Hussain and others) and Appeal No. 6 of 1997-98(Abdul Majeed and others v. State of U.P.). By order dated 14.5.2002, the appellate authority/Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow, rejected both the appeals. 7. By order dated 14.5.2002, the appellate authority/Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow, rejected both the appeals. 7. Order dated 14.5.2002 passed in Ceiling Appeal No. 5 of 1997-98 challenged before this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 1834(MS) of 2002, allowed vide order dated 12.6.2002, setting aside the order dated 14.5.2002 with the following directions : “In the result, the writ petition succeeds and a writ in the nature of certiorari is issued quashing the impugned order dated 14.5.2002 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow and the case is remanded back to the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow to restore the Appeal No. 5 of 1997-1998 to its original number and decide the same after considering the judgments passed by this Court as well as by other competent Courts. The Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow shall decide the appeal in accordance with law within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced.” 8. Accordingly, the matter came up for consideration before appellate authority and by order dated 16.10.2002, the appellate authority set aside the order dated 3.9.1998 passed by prescribed authority and remanded both the appeals to the prescribed authority to decide afresh in accordance with law. 9. Thereafter, an order dated 24.1.2009 has been passed by prescribed authority against the petitioners challenged by filing Appeal under Section 13 of the Act before appellate authority/Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow Division, Lucknow, registered as Appeal No. 2 of 2008-2009 (Chaudhary Haider Hussain and others v. Abdul Majid and others). 10. During the pendency of said appeal, an application on behalf of petitioners under Order XLI Rule 27 (b) CPC moved in order to bring the certain documents, namely, (a) Original agreement dated 5.12.1951 between Mst. Hajra Khatoon and Chaudhari Muzaffaruddin and (b) Order dated 29.12.1951 passed by Parganadhikari, Maharajganj, District Rae bareli in case No. 127 of 1951 (Mst. Harza Bibi v. Chaudhari Muzaffariuddin) on the basis of said compromise. 11. By order dated 9.4.2010 (Anneuxre No. 1) opposite party No. 1/Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow Division, Lucknow rejected the petitioners’ application on the ground that they have not given any sufficient reason in order to take said documents on record by way of additional evidence at the appellate stage. 12. 11. By order dated 9.4.2010 (Anneuxre No. 1) opposite party No. 1/Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow Division, Lucknow rejected the petitioners’ application on the ground that they have not given any sufficient reason in order to take said documents on record by way of additional evidence at the appellate stage. 12. Thus, in order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, it will be appropriate to go through the provisions as provided under Order XLI Rule 27 (1) (b) CPC which quoted herein below : “(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.” 13. While interpreting the provisions under Order XLI Rule 27(1) (b) Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of K. Venkataramiah v. Seetaharama Reddy and others, AIR 1963 SC 1526 , has held as under : “it is well to remember that the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “‘any other substantial cause.” There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “‘to enable it to pronounce judgment,” it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence “for any other substantial cause” under R-27(1) (b)of the Code.” 14. In the case of Shalimar Chemical Works Limited v. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries) and other, 2010 (3) ARC 603, Hon’ble the Apex Court has held as under : “Learned counsel contended that since the procedure followed by the trial Court was contrary to the procedure prescribed by Order XIII, Rule 4, in appeal against the trial Court judgment, the learned single judge of the High Court was fully justified in accepting the originals of the documents concerned in evidence and the division bench was not right in holding that the originals of the concerned documents were wrongly taken in evidence. Mr. Mr. Rao submitted that while enumerating the circumstances in which production of additional evidence may be allowed, the division bench overlooked the words “or for any other substantial reason” at the end of clause (b) of rule 27 (1). He submitted that those words greatly enlarged the scope of the provision and were especially relevant for a case like the one in hand where the plaintiff had suffered great prejudice due to the incorrect procedure followed by the trial Court. In support of his submission he relied upon the decision of this Court in K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and others, 1964 (2) SCR 35 (at page 46). “... Apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause”. There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence “to enable it to pronounce judgment,” it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence “for any other substantial cause” under Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code. “ Mr. Rao further submitted that the very narrow view of Order XLI, Rule 27 taken by the division bench has only led to frustrate the ends of justice. In order to lend strength to his submission, Mr. Rao referred to the illuminating and perennially relevant passage from the judgment of Vivian Bose, J. in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya, 1955 (2) SCR 1 (at page 8) : “Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.” 15. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.” 15. In the case of Ram Chander v. Brij Lal, 2008 (3) ARC 557, this Court has held as under : “The main function of the Court is to do substantial justice and it is because of this purpose that Order XLI, Rule 27 besides laying down certain conditions for the parties to adduce additional evidence at the appellate stage also provides that Appellate Court may also require any document to be product or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause as is provided in sub-rule (b) of Rule 27 of Order XLI of Code of Civil Procedure.” 16. Accordingly in order to deal the controversy involved in the instant matter, the crucial word to be taken in order to decide the controversy in the present case as provided under Order 41 Rule 27 (1) (b) on or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced.” 17. Further, in the present matter, it is not in dispute between learned counsel for the parties that the order dated 12..6.2002 was passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1834(MS) of 2002 (Smt. Yasmin Nuzhat and others v. Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Lucknow in the same set of facts/litigation in which a direction was issued to “decide the same after considering the judgments passed by this Court as well as by other competent Courts.” 18. Moreover, it is admitted between the parties that the order dated 29.12.1951 passed by Parganadhikari, Maharajganj, District Rae bareli in case No. 127 of 1951 (Mst. Harza Bibi v. Chaudhari Muzaffariuddin) on the basis of compromise dated 5.12.1951 in the litigation which took place between predecessor in interest to the present litigant/parties, so the order dated 9.4.2010 passed by opposite party No. 1/Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow Division, Lucknow in Appeal No. 2 of 2008-09 (Chaudhary Haider Husain and others v. Abdul Mazid and others), rejecting the petitioners’ appeal for taking additional evidence on record is contrary to the fact of the case as well as the law, liable to be set aside. 19. 19. For the foregoing reason, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 9.4.2010 passed by opposite party No. 1/Additional Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow Division, Lucknow in Appeal No. 2 of 2008-09 (Chaudhary Haider Husain and others v. Abdul Mazid and others) under Section 13 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 is set aside and the appellate authority is directed to take the evidence on record which is sought to be brought on record by the petitioners/appellants vide application dated 13.4.2009 under Order XLI, Rule 27 (1) (b) CPC and decide the appeal expeditiously.