ORDER : Jainendra Kumar Ranka, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent no. 1 filed an election petition challenging the election of petitioner on the post of Sarpanch on various grounds, praying that recounting of votes may be ordered and election of the petitioner be declared illegal. 3. Returning Officer, respondent no. 2, in reply stated that there was no irregularity in counting of the votes and the petitioner has been declared elected as he has secured highest number of votes. He further stated that counting of ballot papers started after obtaining satisfaction and consent of the agents of respective candidates. 4. During pendency of the election petition, an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC was filed on the ground that there were deficiencies/defects in the election petition and even no affidavit in support of the pleadings in the petition was filed. 5. It has been averred in the present petition that another application filed under Order 23, Rule 1 CPC also came to be decided by the court below on the same day i.e. 2.12.2015, however, no such order is available on record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that deficiencies were noticed in the application and even affidavit was undated nor even signed which being mandatory, the application was liable to be rejected and the Trial Court was unjustified in rectifying or allowing deficiencies to be rectified. He further contended that the non signing of the affidavit was fatal and any application/petition unsupported by an affidavit was required to be rejected and relied upon the judgment rendered by this court in the case of Heera Singh Chouhan v. C.D. Dewal & Ors 2004 (4) WLC (Raj.) 415. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff contended that on account of inadvertence the affidavit could not be signed nor a date was put, however, that does not mean that the application could have been rejected out-rightly, and the Trial Court allowed to rectify the deficiencies which is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff contended that on account of inadvertence the affidavit could not be signed nor a date was put, however, that does not mean that the application could have been rejected out-rightly, and the Trial Court allowed to rectify the deficiencies which is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. Rather, it was well justified on the part of the Trial Court to remove the deficiencies and such deficiencies being curable, was rightly been allowed by the Trial Court and in support thereof reliance was placed upon the judgments rendered by apex court in Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh & Others AIR 2005 SC 22 ; H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda & Others (1999) 2 SCC 217 ; Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore & Others AIR 1964 SC 1545 ; Bhikaji Keshao Joshi & Another v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani & Others AIR 1955 SC 610 ; Durga Dutt Sharma v. Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) & Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sambherlake & Ors. 2000 (3) RLR 807; Sumer Singh v. The Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate First Class Khetri & Another AIR 1979 Rajasthan 178; Dahyabhai Girdhardas v. Bobaji Dahyaji Kotwal & Others AIR 1953 Bombay 28 and Devender Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Shimla & Ors. AIR 2010 Himachal Pradesh 33. 8. I have considered the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned order and cited judgments. 9. In my view the order of Trial Court in this case is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. Merely because an affidavit was not filed along with the application, in my view this being a technical error is a defect, which has admittedly been cured by the respondent immediately when it was brought to his knowledge. Such technicalities need not come in the way when substantial justice is required to be done. In fact if the affidavit was not filed initially it was the duty of the Office also in informing the deficiency or otherwise so that such deficiency or defect could have been removed/cured immediately. Such technicalities need not come in the way when substantial justice is required to be done. In fact if the affidavit was not filed initially it was the duty of the Office also in informing the deficiency or otherwise so that such deficiency or defect could have been removed/cured immediately. Though such a finding of the Trial Court is just and proper and is not required to be supported with judgments, but even for these technical errors/deficiency the apex court in the case of Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar v. Sukh Darshan Singh (supra) where in an election petition, affidavit was not filed, the apex court observed ad infra :- "14. So is the case with the defect pointed out by the High Court in the affidavit filed in support of the election petition alleging corrupt practise by the winning candidate. The proviso enacted to sub-Section (1) of Section 83 of the Act is couched in a mandatory form inasmuch as it provides that a petition alleging corrupt practise shall be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegations of such corrupt practise and the particulars thereof. The form is prescribed by Rule 94A. But at the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that failure to comply with the requirement as to filing of an affidavit cannot be a ground for dismissal of an election petition in limine under sub-Section (1) of Section 86 of the Act. The point is no more res integra and is covered by several decisions of this Court. Suffice it to refer to two recent decisions namely G. Mallikarjunappa and anr. v. Shamanur Shivashankarappa and ors. (2001) 4 SCC 428 and Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish (2001) 2 SCC 247 , both three-Judges Bench decisions, wherein the learned Chief Justice has spoken for the Benches. It has been held that an election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86(1) of the Act if the election petition does not comply with either the provisions of "Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the RP Act". The requirement of filing an affidavit along with an election petition, in the prescribed form, in support of allegations of corrupt practise is contained in Section 83(1) of the Act. The requirement of filing an affidavit along with an election petition, in the prescribed form, in support of allegations of corrupt practise is contained in Section 83(1) of the Act. Non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 of the Act, however, does not attract the consequences envisaged by Section 86(1) of the Act. Therefore, an election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the Act, for alleged noncompliance with provisions of Section 83(1) or (2) of the Act or of its proviso. The defect in the verification and the affidavit is a curable defect. What other consequences, if any, may follow from an allegedly "defective" affidavit, is required to be judged at the trial of an election petition but Section 86(1) of the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case. 15. Having formed an opinion that there was any defect in the affidavit, the election petitioner should have been allowed an opportunity of removing the defect by filing a proper affidavit. Else the effect of such failure should have been left to be determined and adjudicated upon at the trial, as held in G. Mallikarjunappa and anr.'s case ( AIR 2001 SC 1829 )." In H.D. Revanna v. G. Puttaswamy Gowda & Others (supra) where also in an election petition the court held ad infra :- 14. The argument is no doubt attractive. But, the relevant provisions in the Act are very specific. Section 86 provides for dismissal of an election petition in limine for non-compliance of Sections 81, 82 and 117. Section 81 relates to the presentation of an election petition. It is not the case of the appellant before us that the requirements of Section 81 were not complied with though in the High Court a contention was urged that a true copy of the election petition was not served on the appellant and thus the provisions of Section 81 were not complied with. Sections 82 and 117 are not relevant in this case. Significantly, Section 86 does not refer to Section 83 and non-compliance with Section 83 does not lead to dismissal under Section 86. This Court has laid down that non-compliance with Section 83 may lead to dismissal of the petition if the matter falls within the scope of Order 6, Rule 16 or Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. Significantly, Section 86 does not refer to Section 83 and non-compliance with Section 83 does not lead to dismissal under Section 86. This Court has laid down that non-compliance with Section 83 may lead to dismissal of the petition if the matter falls within the scope of Order 6, Rule 16 or Order 7, Rule 11 CPC. Defect in verification of the election petition or the affidavit accompanying the election petition has been held to be curable and not fatal. 15. In Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore & Ors., (1964) 3 S.C.R. 573 , a Constitution Bench has held in unmistakable terms that a defect in the verification of an election petition as required by Section 83(1)(c) of the Act was not fatal to the maintainability of the petition and that a defect in the affidavit was not a sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition. Another Constitution Bench held in Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 213 , that even with regard to Section 81(3), substantial compliance with the requirement thereof was sufficient and only in cases of total or complete non-compliance with the provisions of Section 81(3), it could be said that the election petition was not one presented in accordance with the provisions of that part of the Act." The Full Bench of apex court in the case of Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore (supra), which is a judgment assailed from this Court, the relevant paras read ad infra :- "8. We now go to the second point. But before we do so, it may perhaps be stated that certain defects in the verification of Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 have been brought to our notice, as they were brought to the notice of the Election Tribunal. One of these defects was that though the verification stated that the averments made in some of the paragraphs of the petition were true to the personal knowledge of the petitioner and the averments in some other paragraphs were verified to be true on the basis of advice and information received by the petitioner from legal and other sources, the petitioner did not state in so many words that the advice and information received was believed by him to be true. The Election Tribunal took the view that this defect in verification was a matter which came within clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 and the defect could be removed in accordance With the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Election Tribunal further held that such a defect did not attract sub-section (3) of Section 90 inasmuch as that sub-section does not refer to non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 as a ground for dismissing an election petition. We agree with the view expressed by the Election Tribunal. We have pointed out that sub-section (4) of Section 90 originally referred to three sections, namely, Sections 81, 83 and 117. It said that not with standing anything contained in Section 85 the Tribunal might dismiss an election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 81, Section 83 or Section 117. Section 90 was amended by Act 27 of 1956. Sub-section (3) then said that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81, Section 82 or Section 117 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under Section 85. There was a further amendment by Act 40 of 1961 and sub-section (3) of Section 90 as it now stands has already been quoted by us in an earlier part of this judgment. It seems clear to us that reading the relevant sections in Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification which is to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings as required by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 is fatal to the maintainability of the petition. 14. Turning now to Election Petition No. 295 of 1962 the defect as to the time and place of verification is, as we have said earlier, not a fatal defect. It is a matter which comes within clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 and the defect can be remedied in accordance with the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the verification of pleadings. As to the four enclosures which were not re-produced in the copy served on the appellant, the position was this. It is a matter which comes within clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 and the defect can be remedied in accordance with the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the verification of pleadings. As to the four enclosures which were not re-produced in the copy served on the appellant, the position was this. In the original petition there was an endorsement to the following effect : "Enclosed : 1. Two copies of the grounds of election petition. 2. Original treasury receipt of Rs. 2,000/- as security deposit. 3. Certified copy of the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nomination dated 22-1-1962. 4. Vakalatnama duly stamped." In the copy served on the appellant the original treasury receipt of Rs. 2,000/- deposited by way of security was not re-produced. A certified copy of the order of the returning officer rejecting the nomination of the petitioner was appended to the copy but this certified copy was not further signed by the petitioner. As to the security deposit it was mentioned in the body of the petition (paragraph 9) that such a deposit had been made. The certified copy of the rejection of the nomination paper was verified to be a true copy and we fail to see how any further signature of the petitioner was necessary thereon. It is obvious to us that a copy of the vakalatnama was not required under sub-section (3) of Section 81 nor was it necessary to make a further endorsement that two copies of the petition had been filed along with the petition. It is not disputed that copies as required by sub-section (3) of Section 81 were filed. The only grievance made is that the endorsement "two copies" was not repeated in the enclosure portion of the copy served on the appellant. We have already explained what is meant by the word "copy" in sub-section (3) of Section 81 and we are of the view that the defects pointed out on behalf of the appellant are not of such a character as to invalidate the copy which was served on the appellant in the present case." This court in the case of Durga Dutt Sharma v. Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) & Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sambherlake (supra) has held that the defect is curable and not fatal. Dn.) & Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sambherlake (supra) has held that the defect is curable and not fatal. This Court in the case of Sumer Singh v. The Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate First Class Khetri (supra) held as under :- "2. A question relating to the defect in the verification of an election petition, presented under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 came up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore, AIR 1964 SC 1545 . It was urged that the defect in the verification was fatal, because of the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 (1) (c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Murarka Radhey Shyam's case that a defect in the verification of election petition, which has to be made in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of the pleadings, is not fatal and that such a defect in the verification could be removed in accordance with the principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be pointed out that there is no provision in the Rules to the effect that if the verification is absent or is defective, then the election petition shall be liable to be dismissed. Although, in sub-rule (2) of the Rule 79 of the Rules it has been provided that if the security for the costs of the opposite party is not deposited along with the election petition, then the said petition shall be deemed to have not been presented. In the absence of any similar provision, as is contained in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 79, which makes the making of the deposit of the amount of security for the costs of the opposite party along with the election petition, mandatory, it cannot be said that the election petition should be dismissed for want of verification or for any defect in the verification as there is no provision corresponding to the provision made for depositing security for costs. In my view, the defect in the verification, either in the election petition or in the schedules or annexures attached thereto may be allowed to be removed in the same manner as such defect could be removed in the case of pleadings under the Code of Civil Procedure." The other judgments on this proposition are Dahyabhai Girdhardas v. Bobaji Dahyaji Kotwal & Others AIR 1953 Bombay 28; Bhikaji Keshao Joshi & Another v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani & Others AIR 1955 SC 610 and Devender Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Shimla & Ors. AIR 2010 Himachal Pradesh 33. 10. In my view the judgment of this court in the case of Heera Singh Chouhan v. C.D. Dewal (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable particularly in view of the law laid down by the apex court as held in the various judgments referred to hereinbefore. 11. Accordingly, in my view I do not find any merit in this petition, the order of Trial Court is just and proper and is not required to be interfered with. The petition being devoid of any merit, is dismissed.