JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition is filed for the purpose of seeking quashing and setting aside the FIR being registered as C.R. No.I3/2013 with the Vapi Town Police Station. 2. The petition is filed by the petitioner on the premise that the petitioner has purchased Plot No.7 from its original owner on 17/05/2012 by executing sale-deed and with a view to harass, the original complainant is trying to disturb the possession of petitioner over the land in question and it is the say of the petitioner that he is bonafide purchaser of the land-in-question and still respondent no.2 has filed the complaint against the petitioner and on that premise, the petitioner has presented this petition invoking inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. On the basis of material on record of the petition, it is found that the respondent no.2 has filed an F.I.R. before the Vapi Town Police Station on 03/01/2013 by alleging that one plot of land admeasuring 1371.75 sq.ft. situated at Village-Dungra was originally held by the father of the petitioner. On 07/06/2002 with respect to the said plot, a transaction came to be entered into from one Abdul Razak Chaudhari for a sum of Rs.65,000/and in response thereto, Rs.11,000/was paid by way of Bana amount and an agreement came to be deduced in writing on a stamp paper. During that period of time, subsequently on 06/06/2005, Abdul Razak Chaudhari at his native expired and therefore, the document could not possible to be executed. However, the amount which was left out by way of consideration was given on 11/05/2012 and it was assured that proper documentation would be executed. Subsequently, despite the aforesaid fact, on 18/05/2012 it was noticed by the complainant that behind the back of the complainant one Abdul Salam Jayeshmohmmed Chadhari had purchased the land by way of saledeed the very portion of plot from Abdul Razak Chaudhari and it has been revealed that despite the fact that the father Abdul Razak died on 06/06/2005 at his native, the accused persons in connivance impersonified the deceased father and by giving such false impression executed a sale-deed on 17/05/2012 and got it registered at Sub-Registrar Office, Pardi. 4. 4. Upon an inquiry from the office of sub-Registrar, it was revealed by the complainant that infact the sale has taken place with respect to this very plot which was transacted with the complainant by father and despite the fact that sizable amount had already been pocketed behind the back of the complainant, the sale-deed got registered and thereby, in connivance to each other, both the accused persons have committed fraud with the complainant. A specific allegation was levelled in the complaint that Abdul Razak Chaudhari impersonified himself to be the father who transacted with the complainant and got the document registered and upon this specific premise, the complaint came to be filed by the respondent for the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 5. It is this FIR which has been filed on 03/01/2013 is made the subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 6. Learned advocate Mr. V.B. Malik appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the petitioner is a bonafide purchaser and has nothing to do with the allegations levelled in the complaint and by way of specific sale-deed, the land-in-question came to be purchased and therefore, in the absence of any incriminating materials against the petitioner, may not be dragged into the prosecution. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that even apart from this, the civil suit has also been filed in the year 2013 for seeking cancellation of the sale-deed, wherein, the petitioner has been joined as the respondent no.2 and therefore, the learned counsel submitted that since the transaction in question is a civil transaction, the criminal law may not be allowed to put into the motion and therefore, since the issue involved in the petition is purely of a civil nature, the complaint may not be allowed to be proceeded further. Therefore, in the background of this fact, the learned counsel submitted that the FIR be quashed and set aside. No other submissions made any further. 7. The respondent no.2 though served with the notice, has not appeared before the Court. Therefore, in the background of this fact, the learned counsel submitted that the FIR be quashed and set aside. No other submissions made any further. 7. The respondent no.2 though served with the notice, has not appeared before the Court. The Court could not notice any circumstance as to why he has not remain present, but since the respondent no.2 is served and the matter is prolonged since long, and is of 2013 the Court is of the opinion that with the aid and assistance of learned public prosecutor, the matter may proceed further as even after service respondent no.2 has chosen not to represent and therefore, the learned public prosecutor Mr. Raval appearing for the State called upon who contended that the complaint in question has specifically alleged, the collusion between the accused persons interse. It has also been brought to the notice by the learned public prosecutor that the son has stood as a father thereby has executed a sale-deed and therefore, this being a serious allegation at this stage, the investigation may not be allowed to be hampered. It has also been contended by the learned public prosecutor that there is no proposition of law that simply because the suit is pending, the criminal complaint may not be allowed to be proceeded with and thereby, the learned public prosecutor states that the jurisdiction of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. may not be exercised at this stage. It is further contended by the learned public prosecutor that there are specific allegation pertaining to the offence and by stating that the learned APP has drawn attention of the Court to certain averments contained in the complaint. On the basis of the averments, which are available on the complaint that on 06/06/2005 Abdul Razak Chaudhari had already expired at his native in U.P. and the petitioner in collusion with each-other had executed the sale-deed on 17/05/2012. Therefore, on the basis of this, it appears that the allegations which are levelled, are serious enough to be investigated. 8. Be that as it may, the following facts are emerging from the record: that the father named above has already expired on 06/06/2005 and it also appears from the complaint that some transaction has already taken place with the complainant and keeping in dark the complainant, the accused persons in collusion with the each-other got the sale-deed registered. 8. Be that as it may, the following facts are emerging from the record: that the father named above has already expired on 06/06/2005 and it also appears from the complaint that some transaction has already taken place with the complainant and keeping in dark the complainant, the accused persons in collusion with the each-other got the sale-deed registered. It further appears that there is a specific allegation contained in the complaint, which indicates that the allegations are serious in nature and therefore, the power of executive is not to be interfered with at this stage of the proceedings. 9. The Court on the basis of overall circumstances and material on record more particularly, looking to the averments contained in the complaint is of the view that this is not the stage where inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised so as to throttle the complaint at the initial stage of the proceedings. It is also proposition of law that simply because the civil suit is pending, the complaint may not always be quashed, more particularly, here in the case on hand, the serious allegations are levelled which are yet to be examined and investigated. It is the further fact which is revealed from the record that the complaint came to be filed on 03/01/2013 and simultaneously, the civil suit is also filed in the year 2013 and therefore, it is not the case that some civil suit is pending since long and complaint is filed as a afterthought measure and therefore, considering this overall position on record it is desirable in the interest of justice that Court not to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 10. The court while coming to this conclusion is taking aid of the following decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: 10.1 The proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case of Vijayander Kumar And Others Vs. State of Rajasthan And Another reported in 2014 (3) SCC 389 , wherein on analyzing the provision, the Hon'ble Court opined that simply because a civil remedy is available to the complainant that by itself cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The real test is that whether the allegations in the complaint discloses a criminal offence or not. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein after: 11. The real test is that whether the allegations in the complaint discloses a criminal offence or not. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein after: 11. No doubt, the views of the High Court in respect of averments and allegations in the FIR were in the context of a prayer to quash the FIR itself but in the facts of this case those findings and observations are still relevant and they do not support the contentions on behalf of the appellants. At the present stage when the informant and witnesses have supported the allegations made in the FIR, it would not be proper for this Court to evaluate the merit of the allegations on the basis of documents annexed with the memo of appeal. Such materials can be produced by the appellants in their defence in accordance with law for due consideration at appropriate stage. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents is correct in contending that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may also be available to the informant/complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint discloses a criminal offence or not. This proposition is supported by several judgments of this Court as noted in paragraph 16 of judgment in the case of Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka and Another vs. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners Private Limited [ (2009) 11 SCC 529 ] 13. On considering the facts of the present case it is found that the facts were properly noticed by the High Court on earlier occasion while examining the petition preferred by the appellants for quashing of FIR of this case. The same view has been reiterated by the High Court in the order under appeal for not interfering with the order of cognizance by the learned Magistrate. Hence, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the criminal proceedings against the appellants at this stage. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. 10.2 In another decision on the similar issue, the Apex Court in a case of N. Soundaram Vs. Hence, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the criminal proceedings against the appellants at this stage. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs. 10.2 In another decision on the similar issue, the Apex Court in a case of N. Soundaram Vs. P.K. Poundraj And Another reported in 2014 (10) SCC 616 has opined that the power under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. It should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution and therefore, unless there are compelling circumstance, the High Court should refrain itself from exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Just because the allegations involve factum of recovery of money, it cannot be concluded that complaint is purely of a civil nature, when other serious allegations here in the complaint and therefore, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Paras 12, 13 & 14 has opined that the High Court should exercise the power under Section 482 of the code in rarest of the rare case. “12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, we find that undisputedly there were some business transactions between the accused and the husband of the appellant which ultimately led to enmity between them. The statement of Mr. R. Bhaskar, assistant of the husband of the appellant also supports the allegations levelled against Respondent no.1. He deposed that Respondent no.1 had threatened him and said that they were taking the files and account books so that the auditor (husband of the appellant) cannot file a case against him for the money borrowed by him. He also deposed that he had written the list of books on the letter pad of Rajalakshmi Enterprises under threat and coercion by the accused party. The seizure mahazar shows that on 18-4-2002 about 51 documents were recovered from the house of one of the accused. From the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the final report furnished by Sooramangalam Police Station, it is clear that Respondent no.1, along with several coaccused entered the premises of the appellant and ransacked it. Apart from that, it is evident from the learned arbitrator's report that the accused owed some amount to the appellant's husband. From the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the final report furnished by Sooramangalam Police Station, it is clear that Respondent no.1, along with several coaccused entered the premises of the appellant and ransacked it. Apart from that, it is evident from the learned arbitrator's report that the accused owed some amount to the appellant's husband. It was also made clear by the learned arbitrator that the appellant and her husband were ready for an amicable settlement but the accused (respondent 1) was not ready.” 13. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any court and to secure the ends of justice. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. 14. An overall perusal of the materials placed before us makes out a prima facie case against the accused which requires to be decided by conducting a proper trial. At this stage the High Court cannot analyse and meticulously consider the evidence and anticipate whether it will end up in conviction or acquittal. This is not the stage to decide whether there is any truth in the allegations made but to form an opinion whether on the basis of the allegation a cognizable offence or offences alleged has been prima facie made out. The guilt or otherwise of the accused can be proved only after conducting a fullfledged trial. In the circumstances, in our opinion, it is not proper for the High Court to interfere with the proceedings and quash the final report submitted by the police” 10.3 The present case is filed for the purpose of seeking quashment of FIR and time and again this Court as well as the Apex Court has propounded that the High Court should not interfere with the criminal investigation. It is precisely because of the fact that after the investigation is over and submission of report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., the affected person has always a right and remedy available to challenge the report in accordance with law and therefore, after investigation would be completed, the affected person is not remediless and it should not be assumed that the investigation will be undertaken not in a fair and free manner and therefore, on the basis of this proposition of law, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Teeja Devi Alias Triza Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2014 (15) SCC 221 held as under: “9. We have no hesitation in holding that in the facts of the case, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the police investigation and quashing the FIR. This is not at all a rare case. Without a thorough investigation, it is not possible or proper to hold whether the allegations made by the complainant are true or not. Hence, the investigation should have been allowed to continue so that on filing of the report under Section 173 CrPC the affected party could pursue its remedy against the report in accordance with law. Keeping in view the fact that the criminal case was at the stage of investigation by the police the High Court was not justified in holding that the investigation of the impugned FIR is totally unwarranted and that the same would amount to gross abuse of the process of the court.” 10.4 It is also a sound proposition of law over the period of time prevailing on the exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. that if the facts are seriously in dispute and truth or otherwise of such fact can only be established by leading evidence at the trial and therefore, if the allegations are serious in nature and are in dispute, then as a normal trend that would not be interfered in exercise of power u/s.482 of Cr.P.C. If the facts and the allegations are highly contested and are interconnected between the civil and criminal proceedings, the High Court should desist from interfering with the process of investigation and at this stage, Court should not assumed the jurisdiction to curtail the power of investigation. The decision reported in case of Sesami Chemicals Private Limited Vs. The decision reported in case of Sesami Chemicals Private Limited Vs. State of Meghalaya & Others, 2014 (16) SCC 711 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with such eventuality and in the backdrop of the facts of the case, the Apex Court propounded which is worth to be taken note of. The relevant paragraphs are as under: “12. It is in the background of the abovementioned disputed question of fact, the learned Judge of the High Court thought it fit to quash the FIRs i.e. Case No.43(10) of 2011 dated 12-10-2011 with a cryptic order. The only relevant portion for the present purpose reads as followed: (Sanjay Kabra Case, 2013 SCC OnLine Megh 24 Para 8) “8. After hearing the submissions advanced by the learned counsel at Bar, considering the fact and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that, the matter of disputes is purely covered by civil law and not by criminal law, therefore, I do not see any reason that FIR dated 12-10-2011 has any stand in the eye of the law, so it needs to be quashed” 13. We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the contesting respondents under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an abuse of the process of the Court. As already noticed, the facts are seriously in dispute. The truth or otherwise of such facts can only be established by evidence at the trial. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court erred in quashing FIR No.43(10) of 2011 dated 12-10-2011. We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court. The first respondent is directed to proceed with FIR No.43(10) of 2011 dated 12-10-2011 in accordance with law. 10.5 Yet another decision delivered by the Apex Court in a case of Taramani Parakh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others reported in 2015 (11) SCC 260, wherein at the time of exercising the power under Section 482, the High Court should not examine the merit of the case. At this stage, while exercising of power u/s. 482 on the initial stage the merit and demerit of the case is not to be assessed. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others reported in 2015 (11) SCC 260, wherein at the time of exercising the power under Section 482, the High Court should not examine the merit of the case. At this stage, while exercising of power u/s. 482 on the initial stage the merit and demerit of the case is not to be assessed. The question whether the allegations are true or untrue is a matter of trial and therefore, at the initial stage of the proceedings by exercising the power under Section 482, the complaint cannot be throttled at the initial stage itself and therefore, relying upon the past precedent as well, the Apex Court had an occasion to observe as like this, which is reproduced herein under: “11. Law relating to quashing is well settled. If the allegations are absurd or do not made out any case or if it can be held that there is abuse of process of law, the proceedings can be quashed but if there is a triable case the Court does not go into reliability or otherwise of the version or the counter version. In matrimonial cases, the Courts have to be cautious when omnibus allegations are made particularly against relatives who are not generally concerned with the affairs of the couple. We may refer to the decisions of this Court dealing with the issue. Referring to earlier decisions, in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 4604, it was observed: “27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a fullfledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a fullfledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. (Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [ (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [ (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ (2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400 : AIR 1998 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 634]; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]; Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]). 27.16. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 12. In Kailash Chandra Agrawal & Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.2055 of 2014 decided on 6.9.2014), it was observed: “8. We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint. In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint they have been named without attributing any specific role to them. The relationship of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant. In Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2000) 5 SCC 207 ], it was observed: “5………A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been found to be making efforts for involving other relations which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused as appears to have happened in the instant case.” The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant relatives without there being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role. 9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a criminal complaint are well known. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role. 9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in a criminal complaint are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of Court’s process, quashing jurisdiction can be exercised. Reference may be made to K. Ramakrsihna and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Anr. [ (2000) 8 SCC 547 ], Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. [ (1998) 5 SCC 749 ], State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [(1992) Suppl 1 SCC 335] and Asmathunnisa vs. State of A.P. represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and Anr. [ (2011) 11 SCC 259 ]. 10.6 It has been reiterated time and again by catena of decision that it is not permissible for the High Court in exercise of power under Section 482 to dwell upon the disputed question of fact when the fullfledged trial is available to the parties concerned to prove their guilt and innocence. It is not for the High Court to examine such disputed question of facts and to arrive at a finding upon it. This is impermissible and to that effect also there is a decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of HMT Watches Limited Vs. M.A. Abida & Another reported in 2015 (11) SCC 776. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: “11. In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited v. Rajvir Industries Limited and others[ (2008) 13 SCC 678 ], this Court has made following observations explaining the parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:” “17. The parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now well settled. Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of caution is also required in its exercise. What is required is application of the well-known legal principles involved in the matter.” xxx xxx xxx 22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of caution is also required in its exercise. What is required is application of the well-known legal principles involved in the matter.” xxx xxx xxx 22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious of the fact that although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant immediately. The courts on the one hand should not encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The courts cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and criminal proceedings would be maintainable.' 12. In Rallis India Limited v. Poduru Vidya Bhushan and others, 2011(13) SCC 88 , this Court expressed its views on this point as under:" 12. At the threshold, the High Court should not have interfered with the cognizance of the complaints having been taken by the trial court. The High Court could not have discharged the respondents of the said liability at the threshold. Unless the parties are given opportunity to lead evidence, it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion as to what was the date when the earlier partnership was dissolved and since what date the respondents ceased to be the partners of the firm." 13. In view of the law laid down by this Court as above, in the present case High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by giving its opinion on disputed questions of fact, before the trial court. 14. In view of the law laid down by this Court as above, in the present case High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by giving its opinion on disputed questions of fact, before the trial court. 14. Lastly, it is contended on behalf of the respondent no.1 that it was not a case of insufficiency of fund, as such, ingredients of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act are not made out. We are not inclined to accept the contention of learned counsel for respondent no.1. In this connection, it is sufficient to mention that in the case of Pulsive Technologies P. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat, [ (2011) 13 SCC 88 ], this Court has already held that instruction of "stop payment" issued to the banker could be sufficient to make the accused liable for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Earlier also in Modi Cements Ltd. vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, 1998 (3) SCC 249 , this Court has clarified that if a cheque is dishonoured because of stop payment instruction even then offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act gets attracted. 15. For the reasons as discussed above, we find that the High Court has committed grave error of law in quashing the criminal complaints filed by the appellant in respect of offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by accepting factual defences of the accused which were disputed ones. Such defences, if taken before trial court, after recording of the evidence, can be better appreciated. 11. Therefore, considering this overall proposition of law laid down by various decisions of the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that the present case on hand is not the case, in which the inherent power of Section 482 deserves to be exercised. Considering overall set of circumstance, the power under Section 482 is not meant to be exercised in a casual manner and full opportunity to be given to the parties to establish the case or the defense as the case may be at fullfledged trial. 12. Considering overall set of circumstance, the power under Section 482 is not meant to be exercised in a casual manner and full opportunity to be given to the parties to establish the case or the defense as the case may be at fullfledged trial. 12. Considering the aforesaid set of proposition of law, the Court is of the opinion that the petition may not be entertained at this stage of the proceedings, more particularly, at the stage of investigation and after filing of the chargesheet if any, it is always a remedy available to the petitioner to approach if found no proper justification about his role being played in the complaint and continue to arraign in prosecution and therefore, considering this overall circumstance, the Court is of the opinion that petition devoid of merit and hence not to be entertained. Hence, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged and interim order vacated if prevailing. Petition dismissed.