JUDGMENT : Rajesh H. Shukla, J. 1. The present first appeal is filed by the appellants-original defendants being aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order in Special Civil Suit No. 24/85 by the 5th Jt. Civil Judge (S.D.), Rajkot, dated 19.4.1999 allowing the suit of respondent No. 1-original plaintiff. 2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that respondent No. 1 original plaintiff, Rajkot Jilla Panchayat, functioning under the Gujarat Panchayats Act invited tenders for the purpose of construction of bridge and approach near Village Ukarda for which provision was made by the State Government in the Budget for 1970-71. Appellants were awarded the tender which was approved by a resolution of the Executive Committee dated 5.8.1972. The work order was given on 4.9.1972 and the work was required to be completed within 24 months. There was an additional item provided than the tender and it is the case of respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat that through oversight excess payment has been made. Moreover, the work was not carried out properly by the appellants-original defendants (contractor) for which vide communication/notice, exh. 38, the original defendants were called upon to carry out the work. Again, notice exh. 45 was given to remain present at the site for the measurement and thereafter tender agreement/contract exh. 42 was cancelled. It is the case of the respondent No. 1 original plaintiff, Jilla Panchayat, that the work of three beams and slab carried out by the original defendants was weak for which it was again done through Ambedkar Majoor Sahkari Mandli for which a tender was given at exh. 75 & 76. Moreover, Solanki Construction Company was also given the work to complete the pending work which it has not done and ultimately respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat had to get it done departmentally. 3. It is contended that the measurement for the work done are produced at exh. 64, 65, that the original defendants had carried out the work for Rs. 10,37,149/- and as against that the last payment was made as per exh. 67. Thus, as the original defendants had left the work incomplete and even the work which was done was weak, it was required to be done through other agency resulting in loss to the original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat as stated in the statement at exh. 10,37,149/- and as against that the last payment was made as per exh. 67. Thus, as the original defendants had left the work incomplete and even the work which was done was weak, it was required to be done through other agency resulting in loss to the original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat as stated in the statement at exh. 81 for which the suit has been preferred by the original plaintiff, Rajkot Jilla Panchayat, to recover the amount from the original defendants. The court below, on appreciation of the material and evidence, decreed the suit for recovery of Rs. 11,56,018.94 with interest at the rate of 12% from the defendants vide the aforesaid impugned judgment in Special Civil Suit No. 24/85 dated 19.4.1999. 4. Therefore, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellants original defendants on the grounds stated in the memo of appeal, inter alia, that the material was not supplied when needed and hurdle was caused by the respondent original plaintiff which caused the delay. It is also contended that the court while decreeing the suit has exceeded the jurisdiction. It is contended that the bills of the appellants-original defendants (contractor) were not paid in running course and therefore it was difficult on part of the appellants original defendants to go on with the work without sufficient fund. It is also contended that the suit is barred by limitation as it is filed in the year 1985 after a period of 10 years from the date of completion of the contract. It is also contended that the suit is governed by the provisions of sec. 27 of the Limitation Act and the limitation prescribed is 3 years and therefore it is barred by limitation. It is contended that the programme-wise time-table was not given. 5. Learned advocate Shri Dagli for the appellants-original defendants (contractor) referred to the papers and submitted that there was a delay in the work due to non-supply of material as well as item-wise programme. For that purpose, he referred to the papers and submitted that the court below has failed to appreciate this aspect that the department itself was responsible for the delay and therefore could not have terminated the tender agreement/contract. Learned advocate Shri Dagli submitted that the court below has failed to appreciate that the suit is barred by limitation as it was filed after the period of limitation. Learned advocate Shri Dagli submitted that the court below has failed to appreciate that the suit is barred by limitation as it was filed after the period of limitation. For that purpose, he referred to Art. 112 of the Limitation Act and submitted that it provides for the limitation of 3 years. Learned advocate Shri Dagli referred to the papers and submitted that the work order which was given in 1972 and the work which was required to be completed within 2 years and when the agreement was terminated in 1976, the suit could not have been filed in the year 1985. He therefore submitted that the court below has failed to consider this aspect of limitation. 6. Learned advocate Shri Dagli also submitted that Art. 12 provides for approval of the State Government and there is no such approval before filing such a suit. He referred to Art. 55 and submitted that the court below, while considering the aspect of limitation, has committed an error inasmuch as the Jilla Panchayat could not be referred as a State or Central Government and therefore the period of limitation would be 3 years for filing the suit. He submitted that panchayat or local municipality would not be included in the definition of State or Central Government. In support of his contention, he has referred to and relied upon the judgment of this High Court reported in AIR 1990 Gujarat 142 in the case of Natvarlal Khodidas Parmar v. District Panchayat, Jamnagar. Similarly, he has referred to and relied upon the judgments reported in AIR 2011 Patna 187 in the case of Chairman, Electricity Board, Bihar Patna and Anr. v. Binay Kumar Jha, AIR 1989 Karnataka 86 in the case of. He has emphasized referring to the judgment reported in [2014] 0 Supreme (Ker) 603 in the case of M.G. Raveendran Nair v. State of Kerala represented by the Chief Secretary & Ors. and relied upon the observations made in para 25 and 26. 7. Learned advocate Shri Dagli submitted that in fact the counter claim by the appellants-original defendants has not been considered by the court below as there is no discussion and therefore the judgment and order decreeing the suit may be quashed and set aside. 8. and relied upon the observations made in para 25 and 26. 7. Learned advocate Shri Dagli submitted that in fact the counter claim by the appellants-original defendants has not been considered by the court below as there is no discussion and therefore the judgment and order decreeing the suit may be quashed and set aside. 8. Learned advocate Shri Premal Joshi for respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat referred to the papers and submitted that the work was not completed and whatever work was done was also not satisfactory. He referred to exh. 81 to emphasise about the aspect of damage. He has also referred to the communication dated 3.3.1984 at exh. 70 and submitted that the work order was given. He submitted that the contention that there was delay in supplying the material or item-wise programme is misconceived. Learned advocate Shri Joshi referred to the deposition of the Jr. Engineer, exh. 62, and submitted that he has stated that though the appellants original defendants were reminded vide communication exh. 40 to restart the work, it was not done and it was delayed raising some issues and therefore further notice under exhs. 41 and 42 wee given calling upon the appellants original defendants to restart the work within 10 days. He also submitted that as it was not done, ultimately, the tender agreement/contract was terminated and they were asked vide communication exh. 46 for the measurement when they failed to remain present pursuant to the letter exh. 45 to restart the work. Learned advocate Shri Joshi submitted that this deposition of the engineer examined on behalf of respondent No. 1 original plaintiff at exh. 62 has been corroborated by other evidence and therefore the court below has decreed the suit. He, therefore, submitted that the present appeal may not be entertained. 9. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present appeal deserves consideration. 10. As it transpires from the background of facts stated hereinabove, the tender of the appellant-original defendants (contractor) was accepted and it was required to be executed as per the terms and conditions of the tender agreement/contract at exh. 42. The work order was given and admittedly the appellants original defendants has abandoned the work. 10. As it transpires from the background of facts stated hereinabove, the tender of the appellant-original defendants (contractor) was accepted and it was required to be executed as per the terms and conditions of the tender agreement/contract at exh. 42. The work order was given and admittedly the appellants original defendants has abandoned the work. It is also brought on record that the work which was abandoned by the appellants original defendants was sought to be completed through other agency, initially through Solanki Construction Co. and thereafter by departmental agency. It is also brought on record that the slab of three beams were weak for which again the tender was invited at exh. 75 and 76 and it was given to Ambedkar Majoor Sahkari Mandli for which the details are there at exh. 79. This led to a loss to respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat as per the statement exh. 81 for which the suit was filed by it. 11. The submissions which have been made that for the delay in execution of the work the department was liable as necessary drawings as well as item-wise programme was not given and therefore the appellants may not be blamed requires to be considered in background of the material and evidence. The deposition of the officer of respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat at exh. 62 is required to be considered where it has been specifically stated that the progress of work was not satisfactory for which there were communications sent which were not responded. Therefore, ultimately, again by a registered letter exh. 82, the appellants original defendants were called upon to complete the work failing which it was informed that it may be got carried out at its expense through other agency. The circular was issued which is at exh. 83. The appellants original defendants (contractor) raised the issues as referred to in exh. 39 which was replied vide communication exh. 40. Thereafter, the appellants original defendants (contractor) was called upon by communication/notice exhs. 41, 42, 43 to restart the work within 10 days. Thereafter, as the appellants original defendants contractor did not restart the work, the notice was issued under clause 29 of the agreement. 12. 39 which was replied vide communication exh. 40. Thereafter, the appellants original defendants (contractor) was called upon by communication/notice exhs. 41, 42, 43 to restart the work within 10 days. Thereafter, as the appellants original defendants contractor did not restart the work, the notice was issued under clause 29 of the agreement. 12. Thus, the submission made by learned advocate Shri Dagli for the appellants original defendants (contractor) that they could not complete the work for reasons like non-supply of drawings or item-wise programme does not seem to be justified. The deposition of the Jr. Engineer examined on behalf of respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Jilla Panchayat at exh. 62 is corroborated by sufficient evidence to show that in spite of a request made to the appellant original defendants (contractor) and thereafter service of the notice at exhs. 41, 42, 43 to restart the work, when the work was not started and the contract was sought to be terminated after notice and the work was got executed through other agency, Solanki Construction Co., and as they also did not do the work, it was carried out departmentally. Moreover, as stated above, part of the work which was not carried out properly and satisfactorily with regard to the slab of 3 beams was given to Ambedkar Majoor Sahkari Mandli. 13. The submissions which have been made by learned advocate Shri Dagli for the appellant that the suit itself is time-barred referring to the provisions of the Limitation Act is required to be considered. It was emphasised that Art. 112 of the Limitation would not apply as respondent No. 1 original plaintiff Rajkot Jilla Panchayat cannot be termed as either State Government or Central Government providing for limitation of 30 years. Therefore, the emphasis was that even though the panchayat may be an instrumentality of State, it cannot be termed as 'State Government' and the limitation would be as provided under Art. 55 of the Limitation Act providing for 3 years as the limitation. Reliance is also placed on the judgment reported in AIR 2011 PATNA 187 in the case of Chairman Electricity Board, Bihar, Patna and Anr. v. Binay Kumar Jha for the purpose of "government" is required to be considered. The whole issue with regard to "government" was in a different context and will not have any application to the facts of the case. v. Binay Kumar Jha for the purpose of "government" is required to be considered. The whole issue with regard to "government" was in a different context and will not have any application to the facts of the case. Similarly, the reliance placed on the judgment reported in AIR 1989 KERALA 86 (1) in the case of V. Padmanabhai Nair v. Kerala State Electricity Board would not have any application as there also the discussion of the word "government" was in a different context referring to the Electricity Board, an instrumentality of the State under Art. 12. It is in this context it was observed that though it may be an instrumentality of State, it could not be a 'government' and therefore the submissions which have been made on the aspect of limitation require further scrutiny on the basis of evidence. 14. The communication, exh. 82, refers to the decision that the work may be completed through other agency at the risk and cost of the contractor, appellants-original defendants. On the basis thereof, circular dated 4.11.1982 at exh. 83 was issued. Exhibits 64, 65 are the bills prepared and ultimately when the work was given pursuant to such decision in 1984 to Gujarat State Construction Corporation vide order dated 3.3.1984 at exh. 70, it cannot be said that the suit would be time-barred. It is required to be stated that it is in respect of such incomplete work left by the appellants original defendants (contractor) that further steps are taken and it is only when the work is carried out at the risk and cost of the contractor, the amount of damage would be ascertained including the cost for getting the work done through other agency would be available. Therefore, as stated in exh. 81, the damage could be ascertained, quantified and the suit has been filed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation as per Art. 55. Therefore, as stated in exh. 81, the damage could be ascertained, quantified and the suit has been filed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation as per Art. 55. It is required to be mentioned that the submissions made by the learned advocate that respondent No. 1 original plaintiff cannot be termed as "government" for which the period of limitation would be as provided under Art 112 (30 years) and accepting that the period of limitation would be as provided under Art. 55, that is, period of 3 years, even then it has to be reckoned from the date after termination and/or completion of the work after the contractor has left it incomplete. Thus, the period of 3 years has to be reckoned accordingly and it cannot be said that it is beyond the period of limitation of 3 years as provided under Art. 55. A tender for the work incomplete was given to Gujarat State Construction Corporation as per exh. 70 dated 3.3.1984 and thereafter the suit is filed. Therefore, the submission made by learned advocate Shri Dagli that the suit is barred by limitation is misconceived and has no merit. 15. Another submission which has been referred to with regard to the delay aspect or non-supply of item-wise programme and other details is also misconceived as discussed hereinabove. 16. The present appeal filed by the appellant original defendants (contractor), therefore, cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed.